diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
37 files changed, 1190 insertions, 328 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/acct.c b/kernel/acct.c index 126ca43d5d2..f18e0b8df3e 100644 --- a/kernel/acct.c +++ b/kernel/acct.c @@ -43,7 +43,6 @@ * a struct file opened for write. Fixed. 2/6/2000, AV. */ -#include <linux/config.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/acct.h> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 82443fb433e..d417ca1db79 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ void audit_send_reply(int pid, int seq, int type, int done, int multi, * Check for appropriate CAP_AUDIT_ capabilities on incoming audit * control messages. */ -static int audit_netlink_ok(kernel_cap_t eff_cap, u16 msg_type) +static int audit_netlink_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 msg_type) { int err = 0; @@ -459,13 +459,13 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(kernel_cap_t eff_cap, u16 msg_type) case AUDIT_DEL: case AUDIT_DEL_RULE: case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO: - if (!cap_raised(eff_cap, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL)) + if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL)) err = -EPERM; break; case AUDIT_USER: case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG...AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG: case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2...AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2: - if (!cap_raised(eff_cap, CAP_AUDIT_WRITE)) + if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_AUDIT_WRITE)) err = -EPERM; break; default: /* bad msg */ @@ -488,7 +488,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) char *ctx; u32 len; - err = audit_netlink_ok(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, msg_type); + err = audit_netlink_ok(skb, msg_type); if (err) return err; diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h index 8323e4132a3..6aa33b848cf 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.h +++ b/kernel/audit.h @@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ struct audit_krule { u32 mask[AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE]; u32 buflen; /* for data alloc on list rules */ u32 field_count; + char *filterkey; /* ties events to rules */ struct audit_field *fields; struct audit_field *inode_f; /* quick access to an inode field */ struct audit_watch *watch; /* associated watch */ diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index 4c99d2c586e..5b4e16276ca 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ static inline void audit_free_rule(struct audit_entry *e) selinux_audit_rule_free(f->se_rule); } kfree(e->rule.fields); + kfree(e->rule.filterkey); kfree(e); } @@ -278,6 +279,29 @@ static int audit_to_watch(struct audit_krule *krule, char *path, int len, return 0; } +static __u32 *classes[AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES]; + +int __init audit_register_class(int class, unsigned *list) +{ + __u32 *p = kzalloc(AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE * sizeof(__u32), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!p) + return -ENOMEM; + while (*list != ~0U) { + unsigned n = *list++; + if (n >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE * 32 - AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES) { + kfree(p); + return -EINVAL; + } + p[AUDIT_WORD(n)] |= AUDIT_BIT(n); + } + if (class >= AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES || classes[class]) { + kfree(p); + return -EINVAL; + } + classes[class] = p; + return 0; +} + /* Common user-space to kernel rule translation. */ static inline struct audit_entry *audit_to_entry_common(struct audit_rule *rule) { @@ -321,6 +345,22 @@ static inline struct audit_entry *audit_to_entry_common(struct audit_rule *rule) for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) entry->rule.mask[i] = rule->mask[i]; + for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES; i++) { + int bit = AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE * 32 - i - 1; + __u32 *p = &entry->rule.mask[AUDIT_WORD(bit)]; + __u32 *class; + + if (!(*p & AUDIT_BIT(bit))) + continue; + *p &= ~AUDIT_BIT(bit); + class = classes[i]; + if (class) { + int j; + for (j = 0; j < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; j++) + entry->rule.mask[j] |= class[j]; + } + } + return entry; exit_err: @@ -469,11 +509,16 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, case AUDIT_ARG2: case AUDIT_ARG3: break; - case AUDIT_SE_USER: - case AUDIT_SE_ROLE: - case AUDIT_SE_TYPE: - case AUDIT_SE_SEN: - case AUDIT_SE_CLR: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: + case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: + case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE: + case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: + case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: + case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val); if (IS_ERR(str)) goto exit_free; @@ -511,6 +556,16 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, if (err) goto exit_free; break; + case AUDIT_FILTERKEY: + err = -EINVAL; + if (entry->rule.filterkey || f->val > AUDIT_MAX_KEY_LEN) + goto exit_free; + str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val); + if (IS_ERR(str)) + goto exit_free; + entry->rule.buflen += f->val; + entry->rule.filterkey = str; + break; default: goto exit_free; } @@ -600,11 +655,16 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule) data->fields[i] = f->type; data->fieldflags[i] = f->op; switch(f->type) { - case AUDIT_SE_USER: - case AUDIT_SE_ROLE: - case AUDIT_SE_TYPE: - case AUDIT_SE_SEN: - case AUDIT_SE_CLR: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: + case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: + case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE: + case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: + case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: + case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: data->buflen += data->values[i] = audit_pack_string(&bufp, f->se_str); break; @@ -612,6 +672,10 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule) data->buflen += data->values[i] = audit_pack_string(&bufp, krule->watch->path); break; + case AUDIT_FILTERKEY: + data->buflen += data->values[i] = + audit_pack_string(&bufp, krule->filterkey); + break; default: data->values[i] = f->val; } @@ -639,11 +703,16 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b) return 1; switch(a->fields[i].type) { - case AUDIT_SE_USER: - case AUDIT_SE_ROLE: - case AUDIT_SE_TYPE: - case AUDIT_SE_SEN: - case AUDIT_SE_CLR: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: + case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: + case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE: + case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: + case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: + case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: if (strcmp(a->fields[i].se_str, b->fields[i].se_str)) return 1; break; @@ -651,6 +720,11 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b) if (strcmp(a->watch->path, b->watch->path)) return 1; break; + case AUDIT_FILTERKEY: + /* both filterkeys exist based on above type compare */ + if (strcmp(a->filterkey, b->filterkey)) + return 1; + break; default: if (a->fields[i].val != b->fields[i].val) return 1; @@ -730,6 +804,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old, u32 fcount = old->field_count; struct audit_entry *entry; struct audit_krule *new; + char *fk; int i, err = 0; entry = audit_init_entry(fcount); @@ -753,13 +828,25 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old, * the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */ for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) { switch (new->fields[i].type) { - case AUDIT_SE_USER: - case AUDIT_SE_ROLE: - case AUDIT_SE_TYPE: - case AUDIT_SE_SEN: - case AUDIT_SE_CLR: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: + case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: + case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE: + case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: + case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: + case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: err = audit_dupe_selinux_field(&new->fields[i], &old->fields[i]); + break; + case AUDIT_FILTERKEY: + fk = kstrdup(old->filterkey, GFP_KERNEL); + if (unlikely(!fk)) + err = -ENOMEM; + else + new->filterkey = fk; } if (err) { audit_free_rule(entry); @@ -1245,6 +1332,34 @@ static void audit_list_rules(int pid, int seq, struct sk_buff_head *q) skb_queue_tail(q, skb); } +/* Log rule additions and removals */ +static void audit_log_rule_change(uid_t loginuid, u32 sid, char *action, + struct audit_krule *rule, int res) +{ + struct audit_buffer *ab; + + ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE); + if (!ab) + return; + audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u", loginuid); + if (sid) { + char *ctx = NULL; + u32 len; + if (selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)) + audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid); + else + audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx); + kfree(ctx); + } + audit_log_format(ab, " %s rule key=", action); + if (rule->filterkey) + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, rule->filterkey); + else + audit_log_format(ab, "(null)"); + audit_log_format(ab, " list=%d res=%d", rule->listnr, res); + audit_log_end(ab); +} + /** * audit_receive_filter - apply all rules to the specified message type * @type: audit message type @@ -1304,24 +1419,7 @@ int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data, err = audit_add_rule(entry, &audit_filter_list[entry->rule.listnr]); - - if (sid) { - char *ctx = NULL; - u32 len; - if (selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)) { - /* Maybe call audit_panic? */ - audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE, - "auid=%u ssid=%u add rule to list=%d res=%d", - loginuid, sid, entry->rule.listnr, !err); - } else - audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE, - "auid=%u subj=%s add rule to list=%d res=%d", - loginuid, ctx, entry->rule.listnr, !err); - kfree(ctx); - } else - audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE, - "auid=%u add rule to list=%d res=%d", - loginuid, entry->rule.listnr, !err); + audit_log_rule_change(loginuid, sid, "add", &entry->rule, !err); if (err) audit_free_rule(entry); @@ -1337,24 +1435,8 @@ int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data, err = audit_del_rule(entry, &audit_filter_list[entry->rule.listnr]); - - if (sid) { - char *ctx = NULL; - u32 len; - if (selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)) { - /* Maybe call audit_panic? */ - audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE, - "auid=%u ssid=%u remove rule from list=%d res=%d", - loginuid, sid, entry->rule.listnr, !err); - } else - audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE, - "auid=%u subj=%s remove rule from list=%d res=%d", - loginuid, ctx, entry->rule.listnr, !err); - kfree(ctx); - } else - audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE, - "auid=%u remove rule from list=%d res=%d", - loginuid, entry->rule.listnr, !err); + audit_log_rule_change(loginuid, sid, "remove", &entry->rule, + !err); audit_free_rule(entry); break; @@ -1514,11 +1596,16 @@ static inline int audit_rule_has_selinux(struct audit_krule *rule) for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i]; switch (f->type) { - case AUDIT_SE_USER: - case AUDIT_SE_ROLE: - case AUDIT_SE_TYPE: - case AUDIT_SE_SEN: - case AUDIT_SE_CLR: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: + case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: + case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE: + case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: + case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: + case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: return 1; } } diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index dc5e3f01efe..ae40ac8c39e 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -186,6 +186,7 @@ struct audit_context { int auditable; /* 1 if record should be written */ int name_count; struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES]; + char * filterkey; /* key for rule that triggered record */ struct dentry * pwd; struct vfsmount * pwdmnt; struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */ @@ -320,11 +321,11 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, if (ctx) result = audit_comparator(ctx->loginuid, f->op, f->val); break; - case AUDIT_SE_USER: - case AUDIT_SE_ROLE: - case AUDIT_SE_TYPE: - case AUDIT_SE_SEN: - case AUDIT_SE_CLR: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating a temporary error. We simply treat this as a match for now to avoid losing information that @@ -341,6 +342,46 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, ctx); } break; + case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: + case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE: + case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: + case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: + case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: + /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR + also applies here */ + if (f->se_rule) { + /* Find files that match */ + if (name) { + result = selinux_audit_rule_match( + name->osid, f->type, f->op, + f->se_rule, ctx); + } else if (ctx) { + for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { + if (selinux_audit_rule_match( + ctx->names[j].osid, + f->type, f->op, + f->se_rule, ctx)) { + ++result; + break; + } + } + } + /* Find ipc objects that match */ + if (ctx) { + struct audit_aux_data *aux; + for (aux = ctx->aux; aux; + aux = aux->next) { + if (aux->type == AUDIT_IPC) { + struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux; + if (selinux_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->se_rule, ctx)) { + ++result; + break; + } + } + } + } + } + break; case AUDIT_ARG0: case AUDIT_ARG1: case AUDIT_ARG2: @@ -348,11 +389,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, if (ctx) result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val); break; + case AUDIT_FILTERKEY: + /* ignore this field for filtering */ + result = 1; + break; } if (!result) return 0; } + if (rule->filterkey) + ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC); switch (rule->action) { case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break; case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break; @@ -627,6 +674,7 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context) } audit_free_names(context); audit_free_aux(context); + kfree(context->filterkey); kfree(context); context = previous; } while (context); @@ -735,6 +783,11 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid, context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty); audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk); + if (context->filterkey) { + audit_log_format(ab, " key="); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->filterkey); + } else + audit_log_format(ab, " key=(null)"); audit_log_end(ab); for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) { @@ -1060,6 +1113,8 @@ void audit_syscall_exit(int valid, long return_code) } else { audit_free_names(context); audit_free_aux(context); + kfree(context->filterkey); + context->filterkey = NULL; tsk->audit_context = context; } } diff --git a/kernel/configs.c b/kernel/configs.c index 009e1ebdcb8..f9e31974f4a 100644 --- a/kernel/configs.c +++ b/kernel/configs.c @@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ * Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA. */ -#include <linux/config.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/proc_fs.h> diff --git a/kernel/cpuset.c b/kernel/cpuset.c index 1535af3a912..c232dc07743 100644 --- a/kernel/cpuset.c +++ b/kernel/cpuset.c @@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ * distribution for more details. */ -#include <linux/config.h> #include <linux/cpu.h> #include <linux/cpumask.h> #include <linux/cpuset.h> @@ -1064,7 +1063,7 @@ static int update_flag(cpuset_flagbits_t bit, struct cpuset *cs, char *buf) } /* - * Frequency meter - How fast is some event occuring? + * Frequency meter - How fast is some event occurring? * * These routines manage a digitally filtered, constant time based, * event frequency meter. There are four routines: diff --git a/kernel/exec_domain.c b/kernel/exec_domain.c index c01cead2cfd..3c2eaea66b1 100644 --- a/kernel/exec_domain.c +++ b/kernel/exec_domain.c @@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ * 2001-05-06 Complete rewrite, Christoph Hellwig (hch@infradead.org) */ -#include <linux/config.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/kmod.h> diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c index ab06b9f88f6..7f7ef225855 100644 --- a/kernel/exit.c +++ b/kernel/exit.c @@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ * Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds */ -#include <linux/config.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/interrupt.h> diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index 628198a4f28..9064bf9e131 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ * management can be a bitch. See 'mm/memory.c': 'copy_page_range()' */ -#include <linux/config.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/unistd.h> diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c index 6c91f938005..15caf93e4a4 100644 --- a/kernel/futex.c +++ b/kernel/futex.c @@ -630,8 +630,10 @@ static int futex_wake(u32 __user *uaddr, int nr_wake) list_for_each_entry_safe(this, next, head, list) { if (match_futex (&this->key, &key)) { - if (this->pi_state) - return -EINVAL; + if (this->pi_state) { + ret = -EINVAL; + break; + } wake_futex(this); if (++ret >= nr_wake) break; @@ -1208,7 +1210,7 @@ static int do_futex_lock_pi(u32 __user *uaddr, int detect, int trylock, } down_read(&curr->mm->mmap_sem); - hb = queue_lock(&q, -1, NULL); + spin_lock(q.lock_ptr); /* * Got the lock. We might not be the anticipated owner if we diff --git a/kernel/irq/Makefile b/kernel/irq/Makefile index 9f77f50d814..1dab0ac3f79 100644 --- a/kernel/irq/Makefile +++ b/kernel/irq/Makefile @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ -obj-y := handle.o manage.o spurious.o +obj-y := handle.o manage.o spurious.o resend.o chip.o obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_IRQ_PROBE) += autoprobe.o obj-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS) += proc.o obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_PENDING_IRQ) += migration.o diff --git a/kernel/irq/autoprobe.c b/kernel/irq/autoprobe.c index 3467097ca61..533068cfb60 100644 --- a/kernel/irq/autoprobe.c +++ b/kernel/irq/autoprobe.c @@ -11,12 +11,14 @@ #include <linux/interrupt.h> #include <linux/delay.h> +#include "internals.h" + /* * Autodetection depends on the fact that any interrupt that * comes in on to an unassigned handler will get stuck with * "IRQ_WAITING" cleared and the interrupt disabled. */ -static DECLARE_MUTEX(probe_sem); +static DEFINE_MUTEX(probing_active); /** * probe_irq_on - begin an interrupt autodetect @@ -27,11 +29,11 @@ static DECLARE_MUTEX(probe_sem); */ unsigned long probe_irq_on(void) { - unsigned long val; - irq_desc_t *desc; + struct irq_desc *desc; + unsigned long mask; unsigned int i; - down(&probe_sem); + mutex_lock(&probing_active); /* * something may have generated an irq long ago and we want to * flush such a longstanding irq before considering it as spurious. @@ -40,8 +42,21 @@ unsigned long probe_irq_on(void) desc = irq_desc + i; spin_lock_irq(&desc->lock); - if (!irq_desc[i].action) - irq_desc[i].handler->startup(i); + if (!desc->action && !(desc->status & IRQ_NOPROBE)) { + /* + * An old-style architecture might still have + * the handle_bad_irq handler there: + */ + compat_irq_chip_set_default_handler(desc); + + /* + * Some chips need to know about probing in + * progress: + */ + if (desc->chip->set_type) + desc->chip->set_type(i, IRQ_TYPE_PROBE); + desc->chip->startup(i); + } spin_unlock_irq(&desc->lock); } @@ -57,9 +72,9 @@ unsigned long probe_irq_on(void) desc = irq_desc + i; spin_lock_irq(&desc->lock); - if (!desc->action) { + if (!desc->action && !(desc->status & IRQ_NOPROBE)) { desc->status |= IRQ_AUTODETECT | IRQ_WAITING; - if (desc->handler->startup(i)) + if (desc->chip->startup(i)) desc->status |= IRQ_PENDING; } spin_unlock_irq(&desc->lock); @@ -73,11 +88,11 @@ unsigned long probe_irq_on(void) /* * Now filter out any obviously spurious interrupts */ - val = 0; + mask = 0; for (i = 0; i < NR_IRQS; i++) { - irq_desc_t *desc = irq_desc + i; unsigned int status; + desc = irq_desc + i; spin_lock_irq(&desc->lock); status = desc->status; @@ -85,17 +100,16 @@ unsigned long probe_irq_on(void) /* It triggered already - consider it spurious. */ if (!(status & IRQ_WAITING)) { desc->status = status & ~IRQ_AUTODETECT; - desc->handler->shutdown(i); + desc->chip->shutdown(i); } else if (i < 32) - val |= 1 << i; + mask |= 1 << i; } spin_unlock_irq(&desc->lock); } - return val; + return mask; } - EXPORT_SYMBOL(probe_irq_on); /** @@ -117,7 +131,7 @@ unsigned int probe_irq_mask(unsigned long val) mask = 0; for (i = 0; i < NR_IRQS; i++) { - irq_desc_t *desc = irq_desc + i; + struct irq_desc *desc = irq_desc + i; unsigned int status; spin_lock_irq(&desc->lock); @@ -128,11 +142,11 @@ unsigned int probe_irq_mask(unsigned long val) mask |= 1 << i; desc->status = status & ~IRQ_AUTODETECT; - desc->handler->shutdown(i); + desc->chip->shutdown(i); } spin_unlock_irq(&desc->lock); } - up(&probe_sem); + mutex_unlock(&probing_active); return mask & val; } @@ -160,7 +174,7 @@ int probe_irq_off(unsigned long val) int i, irq_found = 0, nr_irqs = 0; for (i = 0; i < NR_IRQS; i++) { - irq_desc_t *desc = irq_desc + i; + struct irq_desc *desc = irq_desc + i; unsigned int status; spin_lock_irq(&desc->lock); @@ -173,16 +187,16 @@ int probe_irq_off(unsigned long val) nr_irqs++; } desc->status = status & ~IRQ_AUTODETECT; - desc->handler->shutdown(i); + desc->chip->shutdown(i); } spin_unlock_irq(&desc->lock); } - up(&probe_sem); + mutex_unlock(&probing_active); if (nr_irqs > 1) irq_found = -irq_found; + return irq_found; } - EXPORT_SYMBOL(probe_irq_off); diff --git a/kernel/irq/chip.c b/kernel/irq/chip.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..4a0952d9458 --- /dev/null +++ b/kernel/irq/chip.c @@ -0,0 +1,525 @@ +/* + * linux/kernel/irq/chip.c + * + * Copyright (C) 1992, 1998-2006 Linus Torvalds, Ingo Molnar + * Copyright (C) 2005-2006, Thomas Gleixner, Russell King + * + * This file contains the core interrupt handling code, for irq-chip + * based architectures. + * + * Detailed information is available in Documentation/DocBook/genericirq + */ + +#include <linux/irq.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/interrupt.h> +#include <linux/kernel_stat.h> + +#include "internals.h" + +/** + * set_irq_chip - set the irq chip for an irq + * @irq: irq number + * @chip: pointer to irq chip description structure + */ +int set_irq_chip(unsigned int irq, struct irq_chip *chip) +{ + struct irq_desc *desc; + unsigned long flags; + + if (irq >= NR_IRQS) { + |