diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/futex.c | 134 |
1 files changed, 106 insertions, 28 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c index 9720c424ff4..625a4e659e7 100644 --- a/kernel/futex.c +++ b/kernel/futex.c @@ -592,10 +592,58 @@ void exit_pi_state_list(struct task_struct *curr) raw_spin_unlock_irq(&curr->pi_lock); } +/* + * We need to check the following states: + * + * Waiter | pi_state | pi->owner | uTID | uODIED | ? + * + * [1] NULL | --- | --- | 0 | 0/1 | Valid + * [2] NULL | --- | --- | >0 | 0/1 | Valid + * + * [3] Found | NULL | -- | Any | 0/1 | Invalid + * + * [4] Found | Found | NULL | 0 | 1 | Valid + * [5] Found | Found | NULL | >0 | 1 | Invalid + * + * [6] Found | Found | task | 0 | 1 | Valid + * + * [7] Found | Found | NULL | Any | 0 | Invalid + * + * [8] Found | Found | task | ==taskTID | 0/1 | Valid + * [9] Found | Found | task | 0 | 0 | Invalid + * [10] Found | Found | task | !=taskTID | 0/1 | Invalid + * + * [1] Indicates that the kernel can acquire the futex atomically. We + * came came here due to a stale FUTEX_WAITERS/FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit. + * + * [2] Valid, if TID does not belong to a kernel thread. If no matching + * thread is found then it indicates that the owner TID has died. + * + * [3] Invalid. The waiter is queued on a non PI futex + * + * [4] Valid state after exit_robust_list(), which sets the user space + * value to FUTEX_WAITERS | FUTEX_OWNER_DIED. + * + * [5] The user space value got manipulated between exit_robust_list() + * and exit_pi_state_list() + * + * [6] Valid state after exit_pi_state_list() which sets the new owner in + * the pi_state but cannot access the user space value. + * + * [7] pi_state->owner can only be NULL when the OWNER_DIED bit is set. + * + * [8] Owner and user space value match + * + * [9] There is no transient state which sets the user space TID to 0 + * except exit_robust_list(), but this is indicated by the + * FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit. See [4] + * + * [10] There is no transient state which leaves owner and user space + * TID out of sync. + */ static int lookup_pi_state(u32 uval, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb, - union futex_key *key, struct futex_pi_state **ps, - struct task_struct *task) + union futex_key *key, struct futex_pi_state **ps) { struct futex_pi_state *pi_state = NULL; struct futex_q *this, *next; @@ -608,12 +656,13 @@ lookup_pi_state(u32 uval, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb, plist_for_each_entry_safe(this, next, head, list) { if (match_futex(&this->key, key)) { /* - * Another waiter already exists - bump up - * the refcount and return its pi_state: + * Sanity check the waiter before increasing + * the refcount and attaching to it. */ pi_state = this->pi_state; /* - * Userspace might have messed up non-PI and PI futexes + * Userspace might have messed up non-PI and + * PI futexes [3] */ if (unlikely(!pi_state)) return -EINVAL; @@ -621,44 +670,70 @@ lookup_pi_state(u32 uval, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb, WARN_ON(!atomic_read(&pi_state->refcount)); /* - * When pi_state->owner is NULL then the owner died - * and another waiter is on the fly. pi_state->owner - * is fixed up by the task which acquires - * pi_state->rt_mutex. - * - * We do not check for pid == 0 which can happen when - * the owner died and robust_list_exit() cleared the - * TID. + * Handle the owner died case: */ - if (pid && pi_state->owner) { + if (uval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED) { /* - * Bail out if user space manipulated the - * futex value. + * exit_pi_state_list sets owner to NULL and + * wakes the topmost waiter. The task which + * acquires the pi_state->rt_mutex will fixup + * owner. */ - if (pid != task_pid_vnr(pi_state->owner)) + if (!pi_state->owner) { + /* + * No pi state owner, but the user + * space TID is not 0. Inconsistent + * state. [5] + */ + if (pid) + return -EINVAL; + /* + * Take a ref on the state and + * return. [4] + */ + goto out_state; + } + + /* + * If TID is 0, then either the dying owner + * has not yet executed exit_pi_state_list() + * or some waiter acquired the rtmutex in the + * pi state, but did not yet fixup the TID in + * user space. + * + * Take a ref on the state and return. [6] + */ + if (!pid) + goto out_state; + } else { + /* + * If the owner died bit is not set, + * then the pi_state must have an + * owner. [7] + */ + if (!pi_state->owner) return -EINVAL; } /* - * Protect against a corrupted uval. If uval - * is 0x80000000 then pid is 0 and the waiter - * bit is set. So the deadlock check in the - * calling code has failed and we did not fall - * into the check above due to !pid. + * Bail out if user space manipulated the + * futex value. If pi state exists then the + * owner TID must be the same as the user + * space TID. [9/10] */ - if (task && pi_state->owner == task) - return -EDEADLK; + if (pid != task_pid_vnr(pi_state->owner)) + return -EINVAL; + out_state: atomic_inc(&pi_state->refcount); *ps = pi_state; - return 0; } } /* * We are the first waiter - try to look up the real owner and attach - * the new pi_state to it, but bail out when TID = 0 + * the new pi_state to it, but bail out when TID = 0 [1] */ if (!pid) return -ESRCH; @@ -691,6 +766,9 @@ lookup_pi_state(u32 uval, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb, return ret; } + /* + * No existing pi state. First waiter. [2] + */ pi_state = alloc_pi_state(); /* @@ -811,7 +889,7 @@ retry: * We dont have the lock. Look up the PI state (or create it if * we are the first waiter): */ - ret = lookup_pi_state(uval, hb, key, ps, task); + ret = lookup_pi_state(uval, hb, key, ps); if (unlikely(ret)) { switch (ret) { @@ -1414,7 +1492,7 @@ retry_private: * rereading and handing potential crap to * lookup_pi_state. */ - ret = lookup_pi_state(ret, hb2, &key2, &pi_state, NULL); + ret = lookup_pi_state(ret, hb2, &key2, &pi_state); } switch (ret) { |