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-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c5
-rw-r--r--include/linux/cred.h18
-rw-r--r--kernel/cred.c19
-rw-r--r--security/keys/gc.c4
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/avc.c19
5 files changed, 39 insertions, 26 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
index 32b957efa42..45d58002b06 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
@@ -742,7 +742,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_pcr_read);
* the module usage count.
*/
#define TPM_ORD_PCR_EXTEND cpu_to_be32(20)
-#define EXTEND_PCR_SIZE 34
+#define EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_SIZE 34
static struct tpm_input_header pcrextend_header = {
.tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
.length = cpu_to_be32(34),
@@ -760,10 +760,9 @@ int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash)
return -ENODEV;
cmd.header.in = pcrextend_header;
- BUG_ON(be32_to_cpu(cmd.header.in.length) > EXTEND_PCR_SIZE);
cmd.params.pcrextend_in.pcr_idx = cpu_to_be32(pcr_idx);
memcpy(cmd.params.pcrextend_in.hash, hash, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
- rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, cmd.header.in.length,
+ rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_SIZE,
"attempting extend a PCR value");
module_put(chip->dev->driver->owner);
diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
index fb371601a3b..4e3387a89cb 100644
--- a/include/linux/cred.h
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
@@ -176,23 +176,7 @@ extern void __invalid_creds(const struct cred *, const char *, unsigned);
extern void __validate_process_creds(struct task_struct *,
const char *, unsigned);
-static inline bool creds_are_invalid(const struct cred *cred)
-{
- if (cred->magic != CRED_MAGIC)
- return true;
- if (atomic_read(&cred->usage) < atomic_read(&cred->subscribers))
- return true;
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
- if (selinux_is_enabled()) {
- if ((unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE)
- return true;
- if ((*(u32 *)cred->security & 0xffffff00) ==
- (POISON_FREE << 24 | POISON_FREE << 16 | POISON_FREE << 8))
- return true;
- }
-#endif
- return false;
-}
+extern bool creds_are_invalid(const struct cred *cred);
static inline void __validate_creds(const struct cred *cred,
const char *file, unsigned line)
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index d7f7a01082e..dd76cfe5f5b 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -782,6 +782,25 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_create_files_as);
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
+bool creds_are_invalid(const struct cred *cred)
+{
+ if (cred->magic != CRED_MAGIC)
+ return true;
+ if (atomic_read(&cred->usage) < atomic_read(&cred->subscribers))
+ return true;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
+ if (selinux_is_enabled()) {
+ if ((unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE)
+ return true;
+ if ((*(u32 *)cred->security & 0xffffff00) ==
+ (POISON_FREE << 24 | POISON_FREE << 16 | POISON_FREE << 8))
+ return true;
+ }
+#endif
+ return false;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(creds_are_invalid);
+
/*
* dump invalid credentials
*/
diff --git a/security/keys/gc.c b/security/keys/gc.c
index 485fc6233c3..4770be375ff 100644
--- a/security/keys/gc.c
+++ b/security/keys/gc.c
@@ -169,9 +169,9 @@ static void key_garbage_collector(struct work_struct *work)
/* trawl through the keys looking for keyrings */
for (;;) {
- if (key->expiry > now && key->expiry < new_timer) {
+ if (key->expiry > limit && key->expiry < new_timer) {
kdebug("will expire %x in %ld",
- key_serial(key), key->expiry - now);
+ key_serial(key), key->expiry - limit);
new_timer = key->expiry;
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 1ed0f076aad..b4b5da1c0a4 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -868,8 +868,19 @@ u32 avc_policy_seqno(void)
void avc_disable(void)
{
- avc_flush();
- synchronize_rcu();
- if (avc_node_cachep)
- kmem_cache_destroy(avc_node_cachep);
+ /*
+ * If you are looking at this because you have realized that we are
+ * not destroying the avc_node_cachep it might be easy to fix, but
+ * I don't know the memory barrier semantics well enough to know. It's
+ * possible that some other task dereferenced security_ops when
+ * it still pointed to selinux operations. If that is the case it's
+ * possible that it is about to use the avc and is about to need the
+ * avc_node_cachep. I know I could wrap the security.c security_ops call
+ * in an rcu_lock, but seriously, it's not worth it. Instead I just flush
+ * the cache and get that memory back.
+ */
+ if (avc_node_cachep) {
+ avc_flush();
+ /* kmem_cache_destroy(avc_node_cachep); */
+ }
}