perf tools: Fixup exit path when not able to open events

We have to deal with the TUI mode in perf top, so that we don't end up
with a garbled screen when, say, a non root user on a machine with a
paranoid setting (the default) tries to use 'perf top'.

Introduce a ui__warning_paranoid() routine shared by top and record that
tells the user the valid values for /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid.

Cc: David Ahern <daahern@cisco.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Tom Zanussi <tzanussi@gmail.com>
LKML-Reference: <new-submission>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

1 files changed, 10 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/tools/perf/util/debug.c b/tools/perf/util/debug.c
index d4536a9e0d8..155749d7435 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/debug.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/debug.c
@@ -57,6 +57,16 @@ void ui__warning(const char *format, ...)
 }
 #endif
 
+void ui__warning_paranoid(void)
+{
+	ui__warning("Permission error - are you root?\n"
+		    "Consider tweaking /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid:\n"
+		    " -1 - Not paranoid at all\n"
+		    "  0 - Disallow raw tracepoint access for unpriv\n"
+		    "  1 - Disallow cpu events for unpriv\n"
+		    "  2 - Disallow kernel profiling for unpriv\n");
+}
+
 void trace_event(union perf_event *event)
 {
 	unsigned char *raw_event = (void *)event;