Merge branch 'master' of /home/davem/src/GIT/linux-2.6/

Conflicts:
	drivers/net/pcmcia/fmvj18x_cs.c
	drivers/net/pcmcia/nmclan_cs.c
	drivers/net/pcmcia/xirc2ps_cs.c
	drivers/net/wireless/ray_cs.c

31 files changed, 791 insertions, 1974 deletions

diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index fb363cd81cf..226b9556b25 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -91,28 +91,6 @@ config SECURITY_PATH
 	  implement pathname based access controls.
 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
 
-config SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
-	bool "File POSIX Capabilities"
-	default n
-	help
-	  This enables filesystem capabilities, allowing you to give
-	  binaries a subset of root's powers without using setuid 0.
-
-	  If in doubt, answer N.
-
-config SECURITY_ROOTPLUG
-	bool "Root Plug Support"
-	depends on USB=y && SECURITY
-	help
-	  This is a sample LSM module that should only be used as such.
-	  It prevents any programs running with egid == 0 if a specific
-	  USB device is not present in the system.
-
-	  See <http://www.linuxjournal.com/article.php?sid=6279> for
-	  more information about this module.
-
-	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
-
 config INTEL_TXT
 	bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)"
 	depends on HAVE_INTEL_TXT
@@ -165,5 +143,37 @@ source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
 
 source security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
 
+choice
+	prompt "Default security module"
+	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX
+	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK
+	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO
+	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
+
+	help
+	  Select the security module that will be used by default if the
+	  kernel parameter security= is not specified.
+
+	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
+		bool "SELinux" if SECURITY_SELINUX=y
+
+	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
+		bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control" if SECURITY_SMACK=y
+
+	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
+		bool "TOMOYO" if SECURITY_TOMOYO=y
+
+	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
+		bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls"
+
+endchoice
+
+config DEFAULT_SECURITY
+	string
+	default "selinux" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
+	default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
+	default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
+	default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
+
 endmenu
 
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
index 95ecc06392d..bb44e350c61 100644
--- a/security/Makefile
+++ b/security/Makefile
@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)		+= selinux/built-in.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)		+= smack/built-in.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT)			+= lsm_audit.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO)		+= tomoyo/built-in.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_ROOTPLUG)		+= root_plug.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE)		+= device_cgroup.o
 
 # Object integrity file lists
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index fce07a7bc82..5c700e1a4fd 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -308,6 +308,22 @@ static int cap_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length,
 {
 	return 0;
 }
+
+static int cap_path_chmod(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
+			  mode_t mode)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cap_path_chown(struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cap_path_chroot(struct path *root)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
 #endif
 
 static int cap_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
@@ -405,7 +421,7 @@ static int cap_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int cap_kernel_module_request(void)
+static int cap_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -977,6 +993,9 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_link);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_rename);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_truncate);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_chmod);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_chown);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_chroot);
 #endif
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_permission);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_alloc_security);
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index fe30751a6cd..f800fdb3de9 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* Common capabilities, needed by capability.o and root_plug.o
+/* Common capabilities, needed by capability.o.
  *
  *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  *	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -173,7 +173,6 @@ int cap_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
  */
 static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)
 {
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
 
 	/* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP
 	 * capability
@@ -181,7 +180,6 @@ static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)
 	if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SETPCAP,
 			SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0)
 		return 0;
-#endif
 	return 1;
 }
 
@@ -239,8 +237,6 @@ static inline void bprm_clear_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	bprm->cap_effective = false;
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
-
 /**
  * cap_inode_need_killpriv - Determine if inode change affects privileges
  * @dentry: The inode/dentry in being changed with change marked ATTR_KILL_PRIV
@@ -421,49 +417,6 @@ out:
 	return rc;
 }
 
-#else
-int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps)
-{
-	memset(cpu_caps, 0, sizeof(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data));
- 	return -ENODATA;
-}
-
-static inline int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective)
-{
-	bprm_clear_caps(bprm);
-	return 0;
-}
-#endif
-
-/*
- * Determine whether a exec'ing process's new permitted capabilities should be
- * limited to just what it already has.
- *
- * This prevents processes that are being ptraced from gaining access to
- * CAP_SETPCAP, unless the process they're tracing already has it, and the
- * binary they're executing has filecaps that elevate it.
- *
- *  Returns 1 if they should be limited, 0 if they are not.
- */
-static inline int cap_limit_ptraced_target(void)
-{
-#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
-	if (capable(CAP_SETPCAP))
-		return 0;
-#endif
-	return 1;
-}
-
 /**
  * cap_bprm_set_creds - Set up the proposed credentials for execve().
  * @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds
@@ -523,9 +476,8 @@ skip:
 			new->euid = new->uid;
 			new->egid = new->gid;
 		}
-		if (cap_limit_ptraced_target())
-			new->cap_permitted = cap_intersect(new->cap_permitted,
-							   old->cap_permitted);
+		new->cap_permitted = cap_intersect(new->cap_permitted,
+						   old->cap_permitted);
 	}
 
 	new->suid = new->fsuid = new->euid;
@@ -739,7 +691,6 @@ int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
 /*
  * Rationale: code calling task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, and
  * task_setnice, assumes that
@@ -820,22 +771,6 @@ static long cap_prctl_drop(struct cred *new, unsigned long cap)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-#else
-int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy,
-			   struct sched_param *lp)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-#endif
-
 /**
  * cap_task_prctl - Implement process control functions for this security module
  * @option: The process control function requested
@@ -866,7 +801,6 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 		error = !!cap_raised(new->cap_bset, arg2);
 		goto no_change;
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
 	case PR_CAPBSET_DROP:
 		error = cap_prctl_drop(new, arg2);
 		if (error < 0)
@@ -917,8 +851,6 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 		error = new->securebits;
 		goto no_change;
 
-#endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
-
 	case PR_GET_KEEPCAPS:
 		if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS))
 			error = 1;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index 53d9764e8f0..3d7846de806 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 config IMA
 	bool "Integrity Measurement Architecture(IMA)"
 	depends on ACPI
+	depends on SECURITY
 	select SECURITYFS
 	select CRYPTO
 	select CRYPTO_HMAC
diff --git a/security/lsm_audit.c b/security/lsm_audit.c
index e04566a2c4e..acba3dfc8d2 100644
--- a/security/lsm_audit.c
+++ b/security/lsm_audit.c
@@ -354,6 +354,10 @@ static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab,
 		}
 		break;
 #endif
+	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD:
+		audit_log_format(ab, " kmod=");
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, a->u.kmod_name);
+		break;
 	} /* switch (a->type) */
 }
 
diff --git a/security/min_addr.c b/security/min_addr.c
index c844eed7915..fc43c9d3708 100644
--- a/security/min_addr.c
+++ b/security/min_addr.c
@@ -33,6 +33,9 @@ int mmap_min_addr_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 {
 	int ret;
 
+	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	ret = proc_doulongvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
 
 	update_mmap_min_addr();
diff --git a/security/root_plug.c b/security/root_plug.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 2f7ffa67c4d..00000000000
--- a/security/root_plug.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Root Plug sample LSM module
- *
- * Originally written for a Linux Journal.
- *
- * Copyright (C) 2002 Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
- *
- * Prevents any programs running with egid == 0 if a specific USB device
- * is not present in the system.  Yes, it can be gotten around, but is a
- * nice starting point for people to play with, and learn the LSM
- * interface.
- *
- * If you want to turn this into something with a semblance of security,
- * you need to hook the task_* functions also.
- *
- * See http://www.linuxjournal.com/article.php?sid=6279 for more information
- * about this code.
- *
- *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
- *	modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
- *	published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
- *	License.
- */
-
-#include <linux/kernel.h>
-#include <linux/init.h>
-#include <linux/security.h>
-#include <linux/usb.h>
-#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
-
-/* default is a generic type of usb to serial converter */
-static int vendor_id = 0x0557;
-static int product_id = 0x2008;
-
-module_param(vendor_id, uint, 0400);
-module_param(product_id, uint, 0400);
-
-/* should we print out debug messages */
-static int debug = 0;
-
-module_param(debug, bool, 0600);
-
-#define MY_NAME "root_plug"
-
-#define root_dbg(fmt, arg...)					\
-	do {							\
-		if (debug)					\
-			printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: %s: " fmt ,	\
-				MY_NAME , __func__ , 	\
-				## arg);			\
-	} while (0)
-
-static int rootplug_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
-{
-	struct usb_device *dev;
-
-	root_dbg("file %s, e_uid = %d, e_gid = %d\n",
-		 bprm->filename, bprm->cred->euid, bprm->cred->egid);
-
-	if (bprm->cred->egid == 0) {
-		dev = usb_find_device(vendor_id, product_id);
-		if (!dev) {
-			root_dbg("e_gid = 0, and device not found, "
-				 "task not allowed to run...\n");
-			return -EPERM;
-		}
-		usb_put_dev(dev);
-	}
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static struct security_operations rootplug_security_ops = {
-	.bprm_check_security =		rootplug_bprm_check_security,
-};
-
-static int __init rootplug_init (void)
-{
-	/* register ourselves with the security framework */
-	if (register_security (&rootplug_security_ops)) {
-		printk (KERN_INFO 
-			"Failure registering Root Plug module with the kernel\n");
-			return -EINVAL;
-	}
-	printk (KERN_INFO "Root Plug module initialized, "
-		"vendor_id = %4.4x, product id = %4.4x\n", vendor_id, product_id);
-	return 0;
-}
-
-security_initcall (rootplug_init);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index c4c673240c1..24e060be9fa 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -16,9 +16,11 @@
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
 
 /* Boot-time LSM user choice */
-static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1];
+static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1] =
+	CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY;
 
 /* things that live in capability.c */
 extern struct security_operations default_security_ops;
@@ -79,8 +81,10 @@ __setup("security=", choose_lsm);
  *
  * Return true if:
  *	-The passed LSM is the one chosen by user at boot time,
- *	-or user didn't specify a specific LSM and we're the first to ask
- *	 for registration permission,
+ *	-or the passed LSM is configured as the default and the user did not
+ *	 choose an alternate LSM at boot time,
+ *	-or there is no default LSM set and the user didn't specify a
+ *	 specific LSM and we're the first to ask for registration permission,
  *	-or the passed LSM is currently loaded.
  * Otherwise, return false.
  */
@@ -235,7 +239,12 @@ int security_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 
 int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
-	return security_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = security_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+	return ima_bprm_check(bprm);
 }
 
 void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
@@ -352,12 +361,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_parse_opts_str);
 
 int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
 {
+	int ret;
+
 	inode->i_security = NULL;
-	return security_ops->inode_alloc_security(inode);
+	ret =  security_ops->inode_alloc_security(inode);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+	ret = ima_inode_alloc(inode);
+	if (ret)
+		security_inode_free(inode);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
 {
+	ima_inode_free(inode);
 	security_ops->inode_free_security(inode);
 }
 
@@ -434,6 +452,26 @@ int security_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length,
 		return 0;
 	return security_ops->path_truncate(path, length, time_attrs);
 }
+
+int security_path_chmod(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
+			mode_t mode)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode)))
+		return 0;
+	return security_ops->path_chmod(dentry, mnt, mode);
+}
+
+int security_path_chown(struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode)))
+		return 0;
+	return security_ops->path_chown(path, uid, gid);
+}
+
+int security_path_chroot(struct path *path)
+{
+	return security_ops->path_chroot(path);
+}
 #endif
 
 int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode)
@@ -628,6 +666,8 @@ int security_file_alloc(struct file *file)
 void security_file_free(struct file *file)
 {
 	security_ops->file_free_security(file);
+	if (file->f_dentry)
+		ima_file_free(file);
 }
 
 int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
@@ -639,7 +679,12 @@ int security_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
 			unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
 			unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
 {
-	return security_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = security_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+	return ima_file_mmap(file, prot);
 }
 
 int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
@@ -719,9 +764,9 @@ int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
 	return security_ops->kernel_create_files_as(new, inode);
 }
 
-int security_kernel_module_request(void)
+int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
 {
-	return security_ops->kernel_module_request();
+	return security_ops->kernel_module_request(kmod_name);
 }
 
 int security_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
diff --git a/security/selinux/.gitignore b/security/selinux/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..2e5040a3d48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+av_permissions.h
+flask.h
diff --git a/security/selinux/Makefile b/security/selinux/Makefile
index d47fc5e545e..f013982df41 100644
--- a/security/selinux/Makefile
+++ b/security/selinux/Makefile
@@ -18,5 +18,13 @@ selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM) += xfrm.o
 
 selinux-$(CONFIG_NETLABEL) += netlabel.o
 
-EXTRA_CFLAGS += -Isecurity/selinux/include
+EXTRA_CFLAGS += -Isecurity/selinux -Isecurity/selinux/include
 
+$(obj)/avc.o: $(obj)/flask.h
+
+quiet_cmd_flask = GEN     $(obj)/flask.h $(obj)/av_permissions.h
+      cmd_flask = scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders $(obj)/flask.h $(obj)/av_permissions.h
+
+targets += flask.h
+$(obj)/flask.h: $(src)/include/classmap.h FORCE
+	$(call if_changed,flask)
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index b4b5da1c0a4..f2dde268165 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -31,43 +31,7 @@
 #include <net/ipv6.h>
 #include "avc.h"
 #include "avc_ss.h"
-
-static const struct av_perm_to_string av_perm_to_string[] = {
-#define S_(c, v, s) { c, v, s },
-#include "av_perm_to_string.h"
-#undef S_
-};
-
-static const char *class_to_string[] = {
-#define S_(s) s,
-#include "class_to_string.h"
-#undef S_
-};
-
-#define TB_(s) static const char *s[] = {
-#define TE_(s) };
-#define S_(s) s,
-#include "common_perm_to_string.h"
-#undef TB_
-#undef TE_
-#undef S_
-
-static const struct av_inherit av_inherit[] = {
-#define S_(c, i, b) {	.tclass = c,\
-			.common_pts = common_##i##_perm_to_string,\
-			.common_base =  b },
-#include "av_inherit.h"
-#undef S_
-};
-
-const struct selinux_class_perm selinux_class_perm = {
-	.av_perm_to_string = av_perm_to_string,
-	.av_pts_len = ARRAY_SIZE(av_perm_to_string),
-	.class_to_string = class_to_string,
-	.cts_len = ARRAY_SIZE(class_to_string),
-	.av_inherit = av_inherit,
-	.av_inherit_len = ARRAY_SIZE(av_inherit)
-};
+#include "classmap.h"
 
 #define AVC_CACHE_SLOTS			512
 #define AVC_DEF_CACHE_THRESHOLD		512
@@ -139,52 +103,28 @@ static inline int avc_hash(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
  */
 static void avc_dump_av(struct audit_buffer *ab, u16 tclass, u32 av)
 {
-	const char **common_pts = NULL;
-	u32 common_base = 0;
-	int i, i2, perm;
+	const char **perms;
+	int i, perm;
 
 	if (av == 0) {
 		audit_log_format(ab, " null");
 		return;
 	}
 
-	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(av_inherit); i++) {
-		if (av_inherit[i].tclass == tclass) {
-			common_pts = av_inherit[i].common_pts;
-			common_base = av_inherit[i].common_base;
-			break;
-		}
-	}
+	perms = secclass_map[tclass-1].perms;
 
 	audit_log_format(ab, " {");
 	i = 0;
 	perm = 1;
-	while (perm < common_base) {
-		if (perm & av) {
-			audit_log_format(ab, " %s", common_pts[i]);
+	while (i < (sizeof(av) * 8)) {
+		if ((perm & av) && perms[i]) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " %s", perms[i]);
 			av &= ~perm;
 		}
 		i++;
 		perm <<= 1;
 	}
 
-	while (i < sizeof(av) * 8) {
-		if (perm & av) {
-			for (i2 = 0; i2 < ARRAY_SIZE(av_perm_to_string); i2++) {
-				if ((av_perm_to_string[i2].tclass == tclass) &&
-				    (av_perm_to_string[i2].value == perm))
-					break;
-			}
-			if (i2 < ARRAY_SIZE(av_perm_to_string)) {
-				audit_log_format(ab, " %s",
-						 av_perm_to_string[i2].name);
-				av &= ~perm;
-			}
-		}
-		i++;
-		perm <<= 1;
-	}
-
 	if (av)
 		audit_log_format(ab, " 0x%x", av);
 
@@ -219,8 +159,8 @@ static void avc_dump_query(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tcla
 		kfree(scontext);
 	}
 
-	BUG_ON(tclass >= ARRAY_SIZE(class_to_string) || !class_to_string[tclass]);
-	audit_log_format(ab, " tclass=%s", class_to_string[tclass]);
+	BUG_ON(tclass >= ARRAY_SIZE(secclass_map));
+	audit_log_format(ab, " tclass=%s", secclass_map[tclass-1].name);
 }
 
 /**
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 83a4aada0b4..7a374c2eb04 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -91,7 +91,6 @@
 
 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
 
-extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
 
@@ -3338,9 +3337,18 @@ static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int selinux_kernel_module_request(void)
+static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
 {
-	return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST);
+	u32 sid;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+	sid = task_sid(current);
+
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, KMOD);
+	ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
+
+	return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
+			    SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
 }
 
 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
@@ -4714,10 +4722,7 @@ static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
-	if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
-		err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
-
-	return err;
+	return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
 }
 
 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
@@ -5830,12 +5835,12 @@ int selinux_disable(void)
 	selinux_disabled = 1;
 	selinux_enabled = 0;
 
-	/* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
-	avc_disable();
-
 	/* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
 	security_ops = secondary_ops;
 
+	/* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
+	avc_disable();
+
 	/* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
 	selinux_nf_ip_exit();
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h b/security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h
deleted file mode 100644
index abedcd704da..00000000000
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-/* This file is automatically generated.  Do not edit. */
-   S_(SECCLASS_DIR, file, 0x00020000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_FILE, file, 0x00020000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_LNK_FILE, file, 0x00020000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, file, 0x00020000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_BLK_FILE, file, 0x00020000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE, file, 0x00020000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE, file, 0x00020000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_IPC, ipc, 0x00000200UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_SEM, ipc, 0x00000200UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_MSGQ, ipc, 0x00000200UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_SHM, ipc, 0x00000200UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
-   S_(SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 2b683ad83d2..00000000000
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,183 +0,0 @@
-/* This file is automatically generated.  Do not edit. */
-   S_(SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, "mount")
-   S_(SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, "remount")
-   S_(SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, "unmount")
-   S_(SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, "getattr")
-   S_(SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, "relabelfrom")
-   S_(SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, "relabelto")
-   S_(SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__TRANSITION, "transition")
-   S_(SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, "associate")
-   S_(SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, "quotamod")
-   S_(SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, "quotaget")
-   S_(SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__ADD_NAME, "add_name")
-   S_(SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__REMOVE_NAME, "remove_name")
-   S_(SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__REPARENT, "reparent")
-   S_(SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, "search")
-   S_(SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__RMDIR, "rmdir")
-   S_(SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__OPEN, "open")
-   S_(SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, "execute_no_trans")
-   S_(SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, "entrypoint")
-   S_(SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECMOD, "execmod")
-   S_(SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__OPEN, "open")
-   S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, CHR_FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, "execute_no_trans")
-   S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, CHR_FILE__ENTRYPOINT, "entrypoint")
-   S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, CHR_FILE__EXECMOD, "execmod")
-   S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, CHR_FILE__OPEN, "open")
-   S_(SECCLASS_BLK_FILE, BLK_FILE__OPEN, "open")
-   S_(SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE, SOCK_FILE__OPEN, "open")
-   S_(SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE, FIFO_FILE__OPEN, "open")
-   S_(SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, "use")
-   S_(SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET, TCP_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, "connectto")
-   S_(SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET, TCP_SOCKET__NEWCONN, "newconn")
-   S_(SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET, TCP_SOCKET__ACCEPTFROM, "acceptfrom")
-   S_(SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET, TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND, "node_bind")
-   S_(SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET, TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT, "name_connect")
-   S_(SECCLASS_UDP_SO