diff options
author | Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> | 2012-10-28 19:28:52 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> | 2012-10-28 19:29:19 +0100 |
commit | 3bd7bf1f0fe14f591c089ae61bbfa9bd356f178a (patch) | |
tree | 0058693cc9e70b7461dae551f8a19aff2efd13ca /security | |
parent | f16f84937d769c893492160b1a8c3672e3992beb (diff) | |
parent | e657e078d3dfa9f96976db7a2b5fd7d7c9f1f1a6 (diff) |
Merge branch 'master' into for-next
Sync up with Linus' tree to be able to apply Cesar's patch
against newer version of the code.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
51 files changed, 1396 insertions, 676 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile index 806bd19af7f..5706b74c857 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/Makefile +++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile @@ -57,9 +57,9 @@ cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *const rlim_names[RLIM_NLIMITS] = {" \ $(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h $(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h -$(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/capability.h \ +$(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/linux/capability.h \ $(src)/Makefile $(call cmd,make-caps) -$(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/asm-generic/resource.h \ +$(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/asm-generic/resource.h \ $(src)/Makefile $(call cmd,make-rlim) diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c index b81ea10a17a..60f0c76a27d 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c @@ -721,7 +721,7 @@ audit: if (!permtest) error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, OP_CHANGE_HAT, AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT, NULL, - target, 0, info, error); + target, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, error); out: aa_put_profile(hat); @@ -848,7 +848,7 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *ns_name, const char *hname, bool onexec, audit: if (!permtest) error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, op, request, - name, hname, 0, info, error); + name, hname, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, error); aa_put_namespace(ns); aa_put_profile(target); diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c index cf19d4093ca..cd21ec5b90a 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/file.c +++ b/security/apparmor/file.c @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static void audit_file_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask) static void file_audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) { struct common_audit_data *sa = va; - uid_t fsuid = current_fsuid(); + kuid_t fsuid = current_fsuid(); if (sa->aad->fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) { audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask="); @@ -76,8 +76,10 @@ static void file_audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) audit_file_mask(ab, sa->aad->fs.denied); } if (sa->aad->fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) { - audit_log_format(ab, " fsuid=%d", fsuid); - audit_log_format(ab, " ouid=%d", sa->aad->fs.ouid); + audit_log_format(ab, " fsuid=%d", + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, fsuid)); + audit_log_format(ab, " ouid=%d", + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, sa->aad->fs.ouid)); } if (sa->aad->fs.target) { @@ -103,7 +105,7 @@ static void file_audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) */ int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct file_perms *perms, gfp_t gfp, int op, u32 request, const char *name, - const char *target, uid_t ouid, const char *info, int error) + const char *target, kuid_t ouid, const char *info, int error) { int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO; struct common_audit_data sa; @@ -201,7 +203,7 @@ static struct file_perms compute_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state, */ perms.kill = 0; - if (current_fsuid() == cond->uid) { + if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), cond->uid)) { perms.allow = map_old_perms(dfa_user_allow(dfa, state)); perms.audit = map_old_perms(dfa_user_audit(dfa, state)); perms.quiet = map_old_perms(dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state)); diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h index 4b7e18951ae..69d8cae634e 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h @@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data { const char *target; u32 request; u32 denied; - uid_t ouid; + kuid_t ouid; } fs; }; }; diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/file.h b/security/apparmor/include/file.h index f98fd4701d8..967b2deda37 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/file.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/file.h @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ struct path; /* need to make conditional which ones are being set */ struct path_cond { - uid_t uid; + kuid_t uid; umode_t mode; }; @@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ static inline u16 dfa_map_xindex(u16 mask) int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct file_perms *perms, gfp_t gfp, int op, u32 request, const char *name, - const char *target, uid_t ouid, const char *info, int error); + const char *target, kuid_t ouid, const char *info, int error); /** * struct aa_file_rules - components used for file rule permissions diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 8ea39aabe94..8c2a7f6b35e 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ static int apparmor_path_chmod(struct path *path, umode_t mode) return common_perm_mnt_dentry(OP_CHMOD, path->mnt, path->dentry, AA_MAY_CHMOD); } -static int apparmor_path_chown(struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) +static int apparmor_path_chown(struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid) { struct path_cond cond = { path->dentry->d_inode->i_uid, path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c index cf5fd220309..813200384d9 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c @@ -724,6 +724,8 @@ fail: */ static void free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile) { + struct aa_profile *p; + AA_DEBUG("%s(%p)\n", __func__, profile); if (!profile) @@ -751,7 +753,27 @@ static void free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile) aa_put_dfa(profile->xmatch); aa_put_dfa(profile->policy.dfa); - aa_put_profile(profile->replacedby); + /* put the profile reference for replacedby, but not via + * put_profile(kref_put). + * replacedby can form a long chain that can result in cascading + * frees that blows the stack because kref_put makes a nested fn + * call (it looks like recursion, with free_profile calling + * free_profile) for each profile in the chain lp#1056078. + */ + for (p = profile->replacedby; p; ) { + if (atomic_dec_and_test(&p->base.count.refcount)) { + /* no more refs on p, grab its replacedby */ + struct aa_profile *next = p->replacedby; + /* break the chain */ + p->replacedby = NULL; + /* now free p, chain is broken */ + free_profile(p); + + /* follow up with next profile in the chain */ + p = next; + } else + break; + } kzfree(profile); } diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c index 61095df8b89..b14a30c234b 100644 --- a/security/capability.c +++ b/security/capability.c @@ -74,8 +74,8 @@ static int cap_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) return 0; } -static int cap_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path, char *type, - unsigned long flags, void *data) +static int cap_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, struct path *path, + const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) { return 0; } @@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ static int cap_path_chmod(struct path *path, umode_t mode) return 0; } -static int cap_path_chown(struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) +static int cap_path_chown(struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid) { return 0; } diff --git a/security/device_cgroup.c b/security/device_cgroup.c index 442204cc22d..842c254396d 100644 --- a/security/device_cgroup.c +++ b/security/device_cgroup.c @@ -26,12 +26,12 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(devcgroup_mutex); /* - * whitelist locking rules: + * exception list locking rules: * hold devcgroup_mutex for update/read. * hold rcu_read_lock() for read. */ -struct dev_whitelist_item { +struct dev_exception_item { u32 major, minor; short type; short access; @@ -41,7 +41,11 @@ struct dev_whitelist_item { struct dev_cgroup { struct cgroup_subsys_state css; - struct list_head whitelist; + struct list_head exceptions; + enum { + DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW, + DEVCG_DEFAULT_DENY, + } behavior; }; static inline struct dev_cgroup *css_to_devcgroup(struct cgroup_subsys_state *s) @@ -74,12 +78,12 @@ static int devcgroup_can_attach(struct cgroup *new_cgrp, /* * called under devcgroup_mutex */ -static int dev_whitelist_copy(struct list_head *dest, struct list_head *orig) +static int dev_exceptions_copy(struct list_head *dest, struct list_head *orig) { - struct dev_whitelist_item *wh, *tmp, *new; + struct dev_exception_item *ex, *tmp, *new; - list_for_each_entry(wh, orig, list) { - new = kmemdup(wh, sizeof(*wh), GFP_KERNEL); + list_for_each_entry(ex, orig, list) { + new = kmemdup(ex, sizeof(*ex), GFP_KERNEL); if (!new) goto free_and_exit; list_add_tail(&new->list, dest); @@ -88,64 +92,60 @@ static int dev_whitelist_copy(struct list_head *dest, struct list_head *orig) return 0; free_and_exit: - list_for_each_entry_safe(wh, tmp, dest, list) { - list_del(&wh->list); - kfree(wh); + list_for_each_entry_safe(ex, tmp, dest, list) { + list_del(&ex->list); + kfree(ex); } return -ENOMEM; } -/* Stupid prototype - don't bother combining existing entries */ /* * called under devcgroup_mutex */ -static int dev_whitelist_add(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup, - struct dev_whitelist_item *wh) +static int dev_exception_add(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup, + struct dev_exception_item *ex) { - struct dev_whitelist_item *whcopy, *walk; + struct dev_exception_item *excopy, *walk; - whcopy = kmemdup(wh, sizeof(*wh), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!whcopy) + excopy = kmemdup(ex, sizeof(*ex), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!excopy) return -ENOMEM; - list_for_each_entry(walk, &dev_cgroup->whitelist, list) { - if (walk->type != wh->type) + list_for_each_entry(walk, &dev_cgroup->exceptions, list) { + if (walk->type != ex->type) continue; - if (walk->major != wh->major) + if (walk->major != ex->major) continue; - if (walk->minor != wh->minor) + if (walk->minor != ex->minor) continue; - walk->access |= wh->access; - kfree(whcopy); - whcopy = NULL; + walk->access |= ex->access; + kfree(excopy); + excopy = NULL; } - if (whcopy != NULL) - list_add_tail_rcu(&whcopy->list, &dev_cgroup->whitelist); + if (excopy != NULL) + list_add_tail_rcu(&excopy->list, &dev_cgroup->exceptions); return 0; } /* * called under devcgroup_mutex */ -static void dev_whitelist_rm(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup, - struct dev_whitelist_item *wh) +static void dev_exception_rm(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup, + struct dev_exception_item *ex) { - struct dev_whitelist_item *walk, *tmp; + struct dev_exception_item *walk, *tmp; - list_for_each_entry_safe(walk, tmp, &dev_cgroup->whitelist, list) { - if (walk->type == DEV_ALL) - goto remove; - if (walk->type != wh->type) + list_for_each_entry_safe(walk, tmp, &dev_cgroup->exceptions, list) { + if (walk->type != ex->type) continue; - if (walk->major != ~0 && walk->major != wh->major) + if (walk->major != ex->major) continue; - if (walk->minor != ~0 && walk->minor != wh->minor) + if (walk->minor != ex->minor) continue; -remove: - walk->access &= ~wh->access; + walk->access &= ~ex->access; if (!walk->access) { list_del_rcu(&walk->list); kfree_rcu(walk, rcu); @@ -153,6 +153,22 @@ remove: } } +/** + * dev_exception_clean - frees all entries of the exception list + * @dev_cgroup: dev_cgroup with the exception list to be cleaned + * + * called under devcgroup_mutex + */ +static void dev_exception_clean(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup) +{ + struct dev_exception_item *ex, *tmp; + + list_for_each_entry_safe(ex, tmp, &dev_cgroup->exceptions, list) { + list_del(&ex->list); + kfree(ex); + } +} + /* * called from kernel/cgroup.c with cgroup_lock() held. */ @@ -165,25 +181,17 @@ static struct cgroup_subsys_state *devcgroup_create(struct cgroup *cgroup) dev_cgroup = kzalloc(sizeof(*dev_cgroup), GFP_KERNEL); if (!dev_cgroup) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev_cgroup->whitelist); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev_cgroup->exceptions); parent_cgroup = cgroup->parent; - if (parent_cgroup == NULL) { - struct dev_whitelist_item *wh; - wh = kmalloc(sizeof(*wh), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!wh) { - kfree(dev_cgroup); - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); - } - wh->minor = wh->major = ~0; - wh->type = DEV_ALL; - wh->access = ACC_MASK; - list_add(&wh->list, &dev_cgroup->whitelist); - } else { + if (parent_cgroup == NULL) + dev_cgroup->behavior = DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW; + else { parent_dev_cgroup = cgroup_to_devcgroup(parent_cgroup); mutex_lock(&devcgroup_mutex); - ret = dev_whitelist_copy(&dev_cgroup->whitelist, - &parent_dev_cgroup->whitelist); + ret = dev_exceptions_copy(&dev_cgroup->exceptions, + &parent_dev_cgroup->exceptions); + dev_cgroup->behavior = parent_dev_cgroup->behavior; mutex_unlock(&devcgroup_mutex); if (ret) { kfree(dev_cgroup); @@ -197,13 +205,9 @@ static struct cgroup_subsys_state *devcgroup_create(struct cgroup *cgroup) static void devcgroup_destroy(struct cgroup *cgroup) { struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup; - struct dev_whitelist_item *wh, *tmp; dev_cgroup = cgroup_to_devcgroup(cgroup); - list_for_each_entry_safe(wh, tmp, &dev_cgroup->whitelist, list) { - list_del(&wh->list); - kfree(wh); - } + dev_exception_clean(dev_cgroup); kfree(dev_cgroup); } @@ -249,59 +253,87 @@ static int devcgroup_seq_read(struct cgroup *cgroup, struct cftype *cft, struct seq_file *m) { struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup = cgroup_to_devcgroup(cgroup); - struct dev_whitelist_item *wh; + struct dev_exception_item *ex; char maj[MAJMINLEN], min[MAJMINLEN], acc[ACCLEN]; rcu_read_lock(); - list_for_each_entry_rcu(wh, &devcgroup->whitelist, list) { - set_access(acc, wh->access); - set_majmin(maj, wh->major); - set_majmin(min, wh->minor); - seq_printf(m, "%c %s:%s %s\n", type_to_char(wh->type), + /* + * To preserve the compatibility: + * - Only show the "all devices" when the default policy is to allow + * - List the exceptions in case the default policy is to deny + * This way, the file remains as a "whitelist of devices" + */ + if (devcgroup->behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW) { + set_access(acc, ACC_MASK); + set_majmin(maj, ~0); + set_majmin(min, ~0); + seq_printf(m, "%c %s:%s %s\n", type_to_char(DEV_ALL), maj, min, acc); + } else { + list_for_each_entry_rcu(ex, &devcgroup->exceptions, list) { + set_access(acc, ex->access); + set_majmin(maj, ex->major); + set_majmin(min, ex->minor); + seq_printf(m, "%c %s:%s %s\n", type_to_char(ex->type), + maj, min, acc); + } } rcu_read_unlock(); return 0; } -/* - * may_access_whitelist: - * does the access granted to dev_cgroup c contain the access - * requested in whitelist item refwh. - * return 1 if yes, 0 if no. - * call with devcgroup_mutex held +/** + * may_access - verifies if a new exception is part of what is allowed + * by a dev cgroup based on the default policy + + * exceptions. This is used to make sure a child cgroup + * won't have more privileges than its parent or to + * verify if a certain access is allowed. + * @dev_cgroup: dev cgroup to be tested against + * @refex: new exception */ -static int may_access_whitelist(struct dev_cgroup *c, - struct dev_whitelist_item *refwh) +static int may_access(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup, + struct dev_exception_item *refex) { - struct dev_whitelist_item *whitem; + struct dev_exception_item *ex; + bool match = false; - list_for_each_entry(whitem, &c->whitelist, list) { - if (whitem->type & DEV_ALL) - return 1; - if ((refwh->type & DEV_BLOCK) && !(whitem->type & DEV_BLOCK)) + list_for_each_entry(ex, &dev_cgroup->exceptions, list) { + if ((refex->type & DEV_BLOCK) && !(ex->type & DEV_BLOCK)) continue; - if ((refwh->type & DEV_CHAR) && !(whitem->type & DEV_CHAR)) + if ((refex->type & DEV_CHAR) && !(ex->type & DEV_CHAR)) continue; - if (whitem->major != ~0 && whitem->major != refwh->major) + if (ex->major != ~0 && ex->major != refex->major) continue; - if (whitem->minor != ~0 && whitem->minor != refwh->minor) + if (ex->minor != ~0 && ex->minor != refex->minor) continue; - if (refwh->access & (~whitem->access)) + if (refex->access & (~ex->access)) continue; - return 1; + match = true; + break; } + + /* + * In two cases we'll consider this new exception valid: + * - the dev cgroup has its default policy to allow + exception list: + * the new exception should *not* match any of the exceptions + * (behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW, !match) + * - the dev cgroup has its default policy to deny + exception list: + * the new exception *should* match the exceptions + * (behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_DENY, match) + */ + if ((dev_cgroup->behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_DENY) == match) + return 1; return 0; } /* * parent_has_perm: - * when adding a new allow rule to a device whitelist, the rule + * when adding a new allow rule to a device exception list, the rule * must be allowed in the parent device */ static int parent_has_perm(struct dev_cgroup *childcg, - struct dev_whitelist_item *wh) + struct dev_exception_item *ex) { struct cgroup *pcg = childcg->css.cgroup->parent; struct dev_cgroup *parent; @@ -309,17 +341,28 @@ static int parent_has_perm(struct dev_cgroup *childcg, if (!pcg) return 1; parent = cgroup_to_devcgroup(pcg); - return may_access_whitelist(parent, wh); + return may_access(parent, ex); +} + +/** + * may_allow_all - checks if it's possible to change the behavior to + * allow based on parent's rules. + * @parent: device cgroup's parent + * returns: != 0 in case it's allowed, 0 otherwise + */ +static inline int may_allow_all(struct dev_cgroup *parent) +{ + return parent->behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW; } /* - * Modify the whitelist using allow/deny rules. + * Modify the exception list using allow/deny rules. * CAP_SYS_ADMIN is needed for this. It's at least separate from CAP_MKNOD * so we can give a container CAP_MKNOD to let it create devices but not - * modify the whitelist. + * modify the exception list. * It seems likely we'll want to add a CAP_CONTAINER capability to allow * us to also grant CAP_SYS_ADMIN to containers without giving away the - * device whitelist controls, but for now we'll stick with CAP_SYS_ADMIN + * device exception list controls, but for now we'll stick with CAP_SYS_ADMIN * * Taking rules away is always allowed (given CAP_SYS_ADMIN). Granting * new access is only allowed if you're in the top-level cgroup, or your @@ -329,28 +372,44 @@ static int devcgroup_update_access(struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup, int filetype, const char *buffer) { const char *b; - char *endp; - int count; - struct dev_whitelist_item wh; + char temp[12]; /* 11 + 1 characters needed for a u32 */ + int count, rc; + struct dev_exception_item ex; + struct cgroup *p = devcgroup->css.cgroup; + struct dev_cgroup *parent = cgroup_to_devcgroup(p->parent); if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; - memset(&wh, 0, sizeof(wh)); + memset(&ex, 0, sizeof(ex)); b = buffer; switch (*b) { case 'a': - wh.type = DEV_ALL; - wh.access = ACC_MASK; - wh.major = ~0; - wh.minor = ~0; - goto handle; + switch (filetype) { + case DEVCG_ALLOW: + if (!may_allow_all(parent)) + return -EPERM; + dev_exception_clean(devcgroup); + rc = dev_exceptions_copy(&devcgroup->exceptions, + &parent->exceptions); + if (rc) + return rc; + devcgroup->behavior = DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW; + break; + case DEVCG_DENY: + dev_exception_clean(devcgroup); + devcgroup->behavior = DEVCG_DEFAULT_DENY; + break; + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + return 0; case 'b': - wh.type = DEV_BLOCK; + ex.type = DEV_BLOCK; break; case 'c': - wh.type = DEV_CHAR; + ex.type = DEV_CHAR; break; default: return -EINVAL; @@ -360,11 +419,19 @@ static int devcgroup_update_access(struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup, return -EINVAL; b++; if (*b == '*') { - wh.major = ~0; + ex.major = ~0; b++; } else if (isdigit(*b)) { - wh.major = simple_strtoul(b, &endp, 10); - b = endp; + memset(temp, 0, sizeof(temp)); + for (count = 0; count < sizeof(temp) - 1; count++) { + temp[count] = *b; + b++; + if (!isdigit(*b)) + break; + } + rc = kstrtou32(temp, 10, &ex.major); + if (rc) + return -EINVAL; } else { return -EINVAL; } @@ -374,11 +441,19 @@ static int devcgroup_update_access(struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup, /* read minor */ if (*b == '*') { - wh.minor = ~0; + ex.minor = ~0; b++; } else if (isdigit(*b)) { - wh.minor = simple_strtoul(b, &endp, 10); - b = endp; + memset(temp, 0, sizeof(temp)); + for (count = 0; count < sizeof(temp) - 1; count++) { + temp[count] = *b; + b++; + if (!isdigit(*b)) + break; + } + rc = kstrtou32(temp, 10, &ex.minor); + if (rc) + return -EINVAL; } else { return -EINVAL; } @@ -387,13 |