diff options
| author | Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> | 2012-05-25 18:24:12 -0600 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> | 2012-09-21 03:13:24 -0700 |
| commit | 8b94eea4bfb8df693c5b35d08b74f13cfb92f3de (patch) | |
| tree | 908ffbf4f0bb117ca47346712dc0e57f6434cda1 /security | |
| parent | cf9c93526f4517581a9e8f1c0d9093a4c7748ec6 (diff) | |
userns: Add user namespace support to IMA
Use kuid's in the IMA rules.
When reporting the current uid in audit logs use from_kuid
to get a usable value.
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 14 |
2 files changed, 10 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c index 7a57f6769e9..c586faae8fd 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c @@ -39,8 +39,9 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode, ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, audit_msgno); audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u ses=%u", - current->pid, current_cred()->uid, - audit_get_loginuid(current), + current->pid, + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_cred()->uid), + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)), audit_get_sessionid(current)); audit_log_task_context(ab); audit_log_format(ab, " op="); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 1a9583008aa..c84df05180c 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ struct ima_measure_rule_entry { enum ima_hooks func; int mask; unsigned long fsmagic; - uid_t uid; + kuid_t uid; struct { void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */ int type; /* audit type */ @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = { .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK}, {.action = MEASURE,.func = BPRM_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK}, - {.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = 0, + {.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID}, }; @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *rule, if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC) && rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic) return false; - if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && rule->uid != cred->uid) + if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->uid)) return false; for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) { int rc = 0; @@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry) ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE); - entry->uid = -1; + entry->uid = INVALID_UID; entry->action = UNKNOWN; while ((p = strsep(&rule, " \t")) != NULL) { substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; @@ -361,15 +361,15 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry) case Opt_uid: ima_log_string(ab, "uid", args[0].from); - if (entry->uid != -1) { + if (uid_valid(entry->uid)) { result = -EINVAL; break; } result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum); if (!result) { - entry->uid = (uid_t) lnum; - if (entry->uid != lnum) + entry->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), (uid_t)lnum); + if (!uid_valid(entry->uid) || (((uid_t)lnum) != lnum)) result = -EINVAL; else entry->flags |= IMA_UID; |