Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "New notable features:
   - The seccomp work from Will Drewry
   - PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS from Andy Lutomirski
   - Longer security labels for Smack from Casey Schaufler
   - Additional ptrace restriction modes for Yama by Kees Cook"

Fix up trivial context conflicts in arch/x86/Kconfig and include/linux/filter.h

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (65 commits)
  apparmor: fix long path failure due to disconnected path
  apparmor: fix profile lookup for unconfined
  ima: fix filename hint to reflect script interpreter name
  KEYS: Don't check for NULL key pointer in key_validate()
  Smack: allow for significantly longer Smack labels v4
  gfp flags for security_inode_alloc()?
  Smack: recursive tramsmute
  Yama: replace capable() with ns_capable()
  TOMOYO: Accept manager programs which do not start with / .
  KEYS: Add invalidation support
  KEYS: Do LRU discard in full keyrings
  KEYS: Permit in-place link replacement in keyring list
  KEYS: Perform RCU synchronisation on keys prior to key destruction
  KEYS: Announce key type (un)registration
  KEYS: Reorganise keys Makefile
  KEYS: Move the key config into security/keys/Kconfig
  KEYS: Use the compat keyctl() syscall wrapper on Sparc64 for Sparc32 compat
  Yama: remove an unused variable
  samples/seccomp: fix dependencies on arch macros
  Yama: add additional ptrace scopes
  ...

50 files changed, 1857 insertions, 1102 deletions

diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index ccc61f8006b..e9c6ac724fe 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -4,73 +4,7 @@
 
 menu "Security options"
 
-config KEYS
-	bool "Enable access key retention support"
-	help
-	  This option provides support for retaining authentication tokens and
-	  access keys in the kernel.
-
-	  It also includes provision of methods by which such keys might be
-	  associated with a process so that network filesystems, encryption
-	  support and the like can find them.
-
-	  Furthermore, a special type of key is available that acts as keyring:
-	  a searchable sequence of keys. Each process is equipped with access
-	  to five standard keyrings: UID-specific, GID-specific, session,
-	  process and thread.
-
-	  If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
-
-config TRUSTED_KEYS
-	tristate "TRUSTED KEYS"
-	depends on KEYS && TCG_TPM
-	select CRYPTO
-	select CRYPTO_HMAC
-	select CRYPTO_SHA1
-	help
-	  This option provides support for creating, sealing, and unsealing
-	  keys in the kernel. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys,
-	  generated and RSA-sealed by the TPM. The TPM only unseals the keys,
-	  if the boot PCRs and other criteria match.  Userspace will only ever
-	  see encrypted blobs.
-
-	  If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
-
-config ENCRYPTED_KEYS
-	tristate "ENCRYPTED KEYS"
-	depends on KEYS
-	select CRYPTO
-	select CRYPTO_HMAC
-	select CRYPTO_AES
-	select CRYPTO_CBC
-	select CRYPTO_SHA256
-	select CRYPTO_RNG
-	help
-	  This option provides support for create/encrypting/decrypting keys
-	  in the kernel.  Encrypted keys are kernel generated random numbers,
-	  which are encrypted/decrypted with a 'master' symmetric key. The
-	  'master' key can be either a trusted-key or user-key type.
-	  Userspace only ever sees/stores encrypted blobs.
-
-	  If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
-
-config KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS
-	bool "Enable the /proc/keys file by which keys may be viewed"
-	depends on KEYS
-	help
-	  This option turns on support for the /proc/keys file - through which
-	  can be listed all the keys on the system that are viewable by the
-	  reading process.
-
-	  The only keys included in the list are those that grant View
-	  permission to the reading process whether or not it possesses them.
-	  Note that LSM security checks are still performed, and may further
-	  filter out keys that the current process is not authorised to view.
-
-	  Only key attributes are listed here; key payloads are not included in
-	  the resulting table.
-
-	  If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
+source security/keys/Kconfig
 
 config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
 	bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog"
diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
index cc3520d39a7..3ae28db5a64 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/audit.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ static const char *const aa_audit_type[] = {
 static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca)
 {
 	struct common_audit_data *sa = ca;
-	struct task_struct *tsk = sa->tsk ? sa->tsk : current;
+	struct task_struct *tsk = sa->aad->tsk ? sa->aad->tsk : current;
 
 	if (aa_g_audit_header) {
 		audit_log_format(ab, "apparmor=");
@@ -149,6 +149,12 @@ static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca)
 		audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
 		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->name);
 	}
+
+	if (sa->aad->tsk) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", tsk->pid);
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, tsk->comm);
+	}
+
 }
 
 /**
@@ -205,7 +211,8 @@ int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp,
 	aa_audit_msg(type, sa, cb);
 
 	if (sa->aad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL)
-		(void)send_sig_info(SIGKILL, NULL, sa->tsk ? sa->tsk : current);
+		(void)send_sig_info(SIGKILL, NULL,
+				    sa->aad->tsk ?  sa->aad->tsk : current);
 
 	if (sa->aad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED)
 		return complain_error(sa->aad->error);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/capability.c b/security/apparmor/capability.c
index 088dba3bf7d..887a5e94894 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/capability.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/capability.c
@@ -65,10 +65,10 @@ static int audit_caps(struct aa_profile *profile, struct task_struct *task,
 	int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
 	struct common_audit_data sa;
 	struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, CAP);
+	sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
 	sa.aad = &aad;
-	sa.tsk = task;
 	sa.u.cap = cap;
+	sa.aad->tsk = task;
 	sa.aad->op = OP_CAPABLE;
 	sa.aad->error = error;
 
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index 6327685c101..b81ea10a17a 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -394,6 +394,11 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 			new_profile = find_attach(ns, &ns->base.profiles, name);
 		if (!new_profile)
 			goto cleanup;
+		/*
+		 * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined are allowed
+		 * even when no_new_privs is set because this aways results
+		 * in a further reduction of permissions.
+		 */
 		goto apply;
 	}
 
@@ -455,6 +460,16 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		/* fail exec */
 		error = -EACCES;
 
+	/*
+	 * Policy has specified a domain transition, if no_new_privs then
+	 * fail the exec.
+	 */
+	if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) {
+		aa_put_profile(new_profile);
+		error = -EPERM;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
 	if (!new_profile)
 		goto audit;
 
@@ -609,6 +624,14 @@ int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, bool permtest)
 	const char *target = NULL, *info = NULL;
 	int error = 0;
 
+	/*
+	 * Fail explicitly requested domain transitions if no_new_privs.
+	 * There is no exception for unconfined as change_hat is not
+	 * available.
+	 */
+	if (current->no_new_privs)
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	/* released below */
 	cred = get_current_cred();
 	cxt = cred->security;
@@ -750,6 +773,18 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *ns_name, const char *hname, bool onexec,
 	cxt = cred->security;
 	profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
 
+	/*
+	 * Fail explicitly requested domain transitions if no_new_privs
+	 * and not unconfined.
+	 * Domain transitions from unconfined are allowed even when
+	 * no_new_privs is set because this aways results in a reduction
+	 * of permissions.
+	 */
+	if (current->no_new_privs && !unconfined(profile)) {
+		put_cred(cred);
+		return -EPERM;
+	}
+
 	if (ns_name) {
 		/* released below */
 		ns = aa_find_namespace(profile->ns, ns_name);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c
index 2f8fcba9ce4..cf19d4093ca 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/file.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/file.c
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct file_perms *perms,
 	int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
 	struct common_audit_data sa;
 	struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
+	sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
 	sa.aad = &aad;
 	aad.op = op,
 	aad.fs.request = request;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
index 3868b1e5d5b..4b7e18951ae 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
 	void *profile;
 	const char *name;
 	const char *info;
+	struct task_struct *tsk;
 	union {
 		void *target;
 		struct {
diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
index c3da93a5150..cf1071b1423 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ static int aa_audit_ptrace(struct aa_profile *profile,
 {
 	struct common_audit_data sa;
 	struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
+	sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
 	sa.aad = &aad;
 	aad.op = OP_PTRACE;
 	aad.target = target;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lib.c b/security/apparmor/lib.c
index e75829ba0ff..7430298116d 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lib.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lib.c
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ void aa_info_message(const char *str)
 	if (audit_enabled) {
 		struct common_audit_data sa;
 		struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
-		COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
+		sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
 		sa.aad = &aad;
 		aad.info = str;
 		aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, &sa, NULL);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index ad05d391974..032daab449b 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ static int apparmor_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
 				      AA_MAY_META_READ);
 }
 
-static int apparmor_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
+static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
 {
 	struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security;
 	struct aa_profile *profile;
@@ -589,7 +589,7 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
 		} else {
 			struct common_audit_data sa;
 			struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
-			COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
+			sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
 			sa.aad = &aad;
 			aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR;
 			aad.info = name;
@@ -640,9 +640,9 @@ static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
 	.path_chmod =			apparmor_path_chmod,
 	.path_chown =			apparmor_path_chown,
 	.path_truncate =		apparmor_path_truncate,
-	.dentry_open =			apparmor_dentry_open,
 	.inode_getattr =                apparmor_inode_getattr,
 
+	.file_open =			apparmor_file_open,
 	.file_permission =		apparmor_file_permission,
 	.file_alloc_security =		apparmor_file_alloc_security,
 	.file_free_security =		apparmor_file_free_security,
diff --git a/security/apparmor/path.c b/security/apparmor/path.c
index 2daeea4f926..e91ffee8016 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/path.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/path.c
@@ -94,6 +94,8 @@ static int d_namespace_path(struct path *path, char *buf, int buflen,
 	 * be returned.
 	 */
 	if (!res || IS_ERR(res)) {
+		if (PTR_ERR(res) == -ENAMETOOLONG)
+			return -ENAMETOOLONG;
 		connected = 0;
 		res = dentry_path_raw(path->dentry, buf, buflen);
 		if (IS_ERR(res)) {
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
index f1f7506a464..cf5fd220309 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -903,6 +903,10 @@ struct aa_profile *aa_lookup_profile(struct aa_namespace *ns, const char *hname)
 	profile = aa_get_profile(__lookup_profile(&ns->base, hname));
 	read_unlock(&ns->lock);
 
+	/* the unconfined profile is not in the regular profile list */
+	if (!profile && strcmp(hname, "unconfined") == 0)
+		profile = aa_get_profile(ns->unconfined);
+
 	/* refcount released by caller */
 	return profile;
 }
@@ -965,7 +969,7 @@ static int audit_policy(int op, gfp_t gfp, const char *name, const char *info,
 {
 	struct common_audit_data sa;
 	struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
+	sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
 	sa.aad = &aad;
 	aad.op = op;
 	aad.name = name;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
index deab7c7e8dc..329b1fd3074 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ static int audit_iface(struct aa_profile *new, const char *name,
 	struct aa_profile *profile = __aa_current_profile();
 	struct common_audit_data sa;
 	struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
+	sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
 	sa.aad = &aad;
 	if (e)
 		aad.iface.pos = e->pos - e->start;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/resource.c b/security/apparmor/resource.c
index 2fe8613efe3..e1f3d7ef2c5 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/resource.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/resource.c
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ static int audit_resource(struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int resource,
 	struct common_audit_data sa;
 	struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
+	sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
 	sa.aad = &aad;
 	aad.op = OP_SETRLIMIT,
 	aad.rlim.rlim = resource;
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 5bb21b1c448..fca889676c5 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ static int cap_file_receive(struct file *file)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int cap_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
+static int cap_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -956,7 +956,7 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_set_fowner);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_send_sigiotask);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_receive);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, dentry_open);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_open);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_create);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_free);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_alloc_blank);
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 71a166a0597..f80d1160939 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -512,14 +512,17 @@ skip:
 
 
 	/* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised
-	 * credentials unless they have the appropriate permit
+	 * credentials unless they have the appropriate permit.
+	 *
+	 * In addition, if NO_NEW_PRIVS, then ensure we get no new privs.
 	 */
 	if ((new->euid != old->uid ||
 	     new->egid != old->gid ||
 	     !cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) &&
 	    bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP) {
 		/* downgrade; they get no more than they had, and maybe less */
-		if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
+		if (!capable(CAP_SETUID) ||
+		    (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS)) {
 			new->euid = new->uid;
 			new->egid = new->gid;
 		}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 1eff5cb001e..b17be79b9cf 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -194,7 +194,9 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->filename,
+	rc = process_measurement(bprm->file,
+				 (strcmp(bprm->filename, bprm->interp) == 0) ?
+				 bprm->filename : bprm->interp,
 				 MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..a90d6d300db
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+#
+# Key management configuration
+#
+
+config KEYS
+	bool "Enable access key retention support"
+	help
+	  This option provides support for retaining authentication tokens and
+	  access keys in the kernel.
+
+	  It also includes provision of methods by which such keys might be
+	  associated with a process so that network filesystems, encryption
+	  support and the like can find them.
+
+	  Furthermore, a special type of key is available that acts as keyring:
+	  a searchable sequence of keys. Each process is equipped with access
+	  to five standard keyrings: UID-specific, GID-specific, session,
+	  process and thread.
+
+	  If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
+
+config TRUSTED_KEYS
+	tristate "TRUSTED KEYS"
+	depends on KEYS && TCG_TPM
+	select CRYPTO
+	select CRYPTO_HMAC
+	select CRYPTO_SHA1
+	help
+	  This option provides support for creating, sealing, and unsealing
+	  keys in the kernel. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys,
+	  generated and RSA-sealed by the TPM. The TPM only unseals the keys,
+	  if the boot PCRs and other criteria match.  Userspace will only ever
+	  see encrypted blobs.
+
+	  If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
+
+config ENCRYPTED_KEYS
+	tristate "ENCRYPTED KEYS"
+	depends on KEYS
+	select CRYPTO
+	select CRYPTO_HMAC
+	select CRYPTO_AES
+	select CRYPTO_CBC
+	select CRYPTO_SHA256
+	select CRYPTO_RNG
+	help
+	  This option provides support for create/encrypting/decrypting keys
+	  in the kernel.  Encrypted keys are kernel generated random numbers,
+	  which are encrypted/decrypted with a 'master' symmetric key. The
+	  'master' key can be either a trusted-key or user-key type.
+	  Userspace only ever sees/stores encrypted blobs.
+
+	  If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
+
+config KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS
+	bool "Enable the /proc/keys file by which keys may be viewed"
+	depends on KEYS
+	help
+	  This option turns on support for the /proc/keys file - through which
+	  can be listed all the keys on the system that are viewable by the
+	  reading process.
+
+	  The only keys included in the list are those that grant View
+	  permission to the reading process whether or not it possesses them.
+	  Note that LSM security checks are still performed, and may further
+	  filter out keys that the current process is not authorised to view.
+
+	  Only key attributes are listed here; key payloads are not included in
+	  the resulting table.
+
+	  If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
diff --git a/security/keys/Makefile b/security/keys/Makefile
index a56f1ffdc64..504aaa00838 100644
--- a/security/keys/Makefile
+++ b/security/keys/Makefile
@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@
 # Makefile for key management
 #
 
+#
+# Core
+#
 obj-y := \
 	gc.o \
 	key.o \
@@ -12,9 +15,12 @@ obj-y := \
 	request_key.o \
 	request_key_auth.o \
 	user_defined.o
-
-obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) += encrypted-keys/
 obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT) += compat.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS) += proc.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += sysctl.o
+
+#
+# Key types
+#
+obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) += encrypted-keys/
diff --git a/security/keys/compat.c b/security/keys/compat.c
index 4c48e13448f..fab4f8dda6c 100644
--- a/security/keys/compat.c
+++ b/security/keys/compat.c
@@ -135,6 +135,9 @@ asmlinkage long compat_sys_keyctl(u32 option,
 		return compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(
 			arg2, compat_ptr(arg3), arg4, arg5);
 
+	case KEYCTL_INVALIDATE:
+		return keyctl_invalidate_key(arg2);
+
 	default:
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	}
diff --git a/security/keys/gc.c b/security/keys/gc.c
index a42b45531aa..61ab7c82ebb 100644
--- a/security/keys/gc.c
+++ b/security/keys/gc.c
@@ -72,6 +72,15 @@ void key_schedule_gc(time_t gc_at)
 }
 
 /*
+ * Schedule a dead links collection run.
+ */
+void key_schedule_gc_links(void)
+{
+	set_bit(KEY_GC_KEY_EXPIRED, &key_gc_flags);
+	queue_work(system_nrt_wq, &key_gc_work);
+}
+
+/*
  * Some key's cleanup time was met after it expired, so we need to get the
  * reaper to go through a cycle finding expired keys.
  */
@@ -79,8 +88,7 @@ static void key_gc_timer_func(unsigned long data)
 {
 	kenter("");
 	key_gc_next_run = LONG_MAX;
-	set_bit(KEY_GC_KEY_EXPIRED, &key_gc_flags);
-	queue_work(system_nrt_wq, &key_gc_work);
+	key_schedule_gc_links();
 }
 
 /*
@@ -131,12 +139,12 @@ void key_gc_keytype(struct key_type *ktype)
 static void key_gc_keyring(struct key *keyring, time_t limit)
 {
 	struct keyring_list *klist;
-	struct key *key;
 	int loop;
 
 	kenter("%x", key_serial(keyring));
 
-	if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &keyring->flags))
+	if (keyring->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
+			      (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED)))
 		goto dont_gc;
 
 	/* scan the keyring looking for dead keys */
@@ -148,9 +156,8 @@ static void key_gc_keyring(struct key *keyring, time_t limit)
 	loop = klist->nkeys;
 	smp_rmb();
 	for (loop--; loop >= 0; loop--) {
-		key = klist->keys[loop];
-		if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_DEAD, &key->flags) ||
-		    (key->expiry > 0 && key->expiry <= limit))
+		struct key *key = rcu_dereference(klist->keys[loop]);
+		if (key_is_dead(key, limit))
 			goto do_gc;
 	}
 
@@ -168,38 +175,45 @@ do_gc:
 }
 
 /*
- * Garbage collect an unreferenced, detached key
+ * Garbage collect a list of unreferenced, detached keys
  */
-static noinline void key_gc_unused_key(struct key *key)
+static noinline voi