diff options
| author | Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> | 2009-07-31 12:54:11 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> | 2009-08-17 15:09:11 +1000 |
| commit | 788084aba2ab7348257597496befcbccabdc98a3 (patch) | |
| tree | 2da42d746d67b16ef705229a1b5a3528ec19c725 /security/selinux | |
| parent | 8cf948e744e0218af604c32edecde10006dc8e9e (diff) | |
Security/SELinux: seperate lsm specific mmap_min_addr
Currently SELinux enforcement of controls on the ability to map low memory
is determined by the mmap_min_addr tunable. This patch causes SELinux to
ignore the tunable and instead use a seperate Kconfig option specific to how
much space the LSM should protect.
The tunable will now only control the need for CAP_SYS_RAWIO and SELinux
permissions will always protect the amount of low memory designated by
CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR.
This allows users who need to disable the mmap_min_addr controls (usual reason
being they run WINE as a non-root user) to do so and still have SELinux
controls preventing confined domains (like a web server) from being able to
map some area of low memory.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index e6d1432b080..8d8b69c5664 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3036,7 +3036,7 @@ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even * if DAC would have also denied the operation. */ - if (addr < mmap_min_addr) { + if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) { rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT, MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL); if (rc) |