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authorSerge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>2009-04-02 18:47:14 -0500
committerJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>2009-04-03 11:49:31 +1100
commitb5f22a59c0356655a501190959db9f7f5dd07e3f (patch)
tree3c20437a6a3b7b7e980078bfbcd0d53cdeda7528 /security/lsm_audit.c
parent3d43321b7015387cfebbe26436d0e9d299162ea1 (diff)
don't raise all privs on setuid-root file with fE set (v2)
Distributions face a backward compatibility problem with starting to use file capabilities. For instance, removing setuid root from ping and doing setcap cap_net_raw=pe means that booting with an older kernel or one compiled without file capabilities means ping won't work for non-root users. In order to replace the setuid root bit on a capability-unaware program, one has to set the effective, or legacy, file capability, which makes the capability effective immediately. This patch uses the legacy bit as a queue to not automatically add full privilege to a setuid-root program. So, with this patch, an ordinary setuid-root program will run with privilege. But if /bin/ping has both setuid-root and cap_net_raw in fP and fE, then ping (when run by non-root user) will not run with only cap_net_raw. Changelog: Apr 2 2009: Print a message once when such a binary is loaded, as per James Morris' suggestion. Apr 2 2009: Fix the condition to only catch uid!=0 && euid==0. Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/lsm_audit.c')
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