diff options
author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@woody.osdl.org> | 2006-12-07 09:05:15 -0800 |
---|---|---|
committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@woody.osdl.org> | 2006-12-07 09:05:15 -0800 |
commit | 2685b267bce34c9b66626cb11664509c32a761a5 (patch) | |
tree | ce8b4ad47b4a1aa1b0e7634298d63c4cb0ca46c5 /net | |
parent | 4522d58275f124105819723e24e912c8e5bf3cdd (diff) | |
parent | 272491ef423b6976a230a998b10f46976aa91342 (diff) |
Merge master.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6
* master.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6: (48 commits)
[NETFILTER]: Fix non-ANSI func. decl.
[TG3]: Identify Serdes devices more clearly.
[TG3]: Use msleep.
[TG3]: Use netif_msg_*.
[TG3]: Allow partial speed advertisement.
[TG3]: Add TG3_FLG2_IS_NIC flag.
[TG3]: Add 5787F device ID.
[TG3]: Fix Phy loopback.
[WANROUTER]: Kill kmalloc debugging code.
[TCP] inet_twdr_hangman: Delete unnecessary memory barrier().
[NET]: Memory barrier cleanups
[IPSEC]: Fix inetpeer leak in ipv4 xfrm dst entries.
audit: disable ipsec auditing when CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL=n
audit: Add auditing to ipsec
[IRDA] irlan: Fix compile warning when CONFIG_PROC_FS=n
[IrDA]: Incorrect TTP header reservation
[IrDA]: PXA FIR code device model conversion
[GENETLINK]: Fix misplaced command flags.
[NETLIK]: Add a pointer to the Generic Netlink wiki page.
[IPV6] RAW: Don't release unlocked sock.
...
Diffstat (limited to 'net')
-rw-r--r-- | net/bridge/br_netfilter.c | 36 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/core/wireless.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 48 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 144 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/route.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/xfrm4_policy.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 59 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/ipv6/raw.c | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/irda/irttp.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/key/af_key.c | 27 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c | 27 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/netlink/genetlink.c | 18 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/packet/af_packet.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/sched/cls_fw.c | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/wanrouter/wanmain.c | 57 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/xfrm/xfrm_algo.c | 17 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 177 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 42 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 33 |
23 files changed, 432 insertions, 282 deletions
diff --git a/net/bridge/br_netfilter.c b/net/bridge/br_netfilter.c index ac47ba2ba02..bd221ad52ea 100644 --- a/net/bridge/br_netfilter.c +++ b/net/bridge/br_netfilter.c @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h> #include <linux/netfilter_arp.h> #include <linux/in_route.h> +#include <linux/inetdevice.h> #include <net/ip.h> #include <net/ipv6.h> @@ -221,10 +222,14 @@ static void __br_dnat_complain(void) * * Otherwise, the packet is considered to be routed and we just * change the destination MAC address so that the packet will - * later be passed up to the IP stack to be routed. + * later be passed up to the IP stack to be routed. For a redirected + * packet, ip_route_input() will give back the localhost as output device, + * which differs from the bridge device. * * Let us now consider the case that ip_route_input() fails: * + * This can be because the destination address is martian, in which case + * the packet will be dropped. * After a "echo '0' > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward" ip_route_input() * will fail, while __ip_route_output_key() will return success. The source * address for __ip_route_output_key() is set to zero, so __ip_route_output_key @@ -237,7 +242,8 @@ static void __br_dnat_complain(void) * * --Lennert, 20020411 * --Bart, 20020416 (updated) - * --Bart, 20021007 (updated) */ + * --Bart, 20021007 (updated) + * --Bart, 20062711 (updated) */ static int br_nf_pre_routing_finish_bridge(struct sk_buff *skb) { if (skb->pkt_type == PACKET_OTHERHOST) { @@ -264,15 +270,15 @@ static int br_nf_pre_routing_finish(struct sk_buff *skb) struct net_device *dev = skb->dev; struct iphdr *iph = skb->nh.iph; struct nf_bridge_info *nf_bridge = skb->nf_bridge; + int err; if (nf_bridge->mask & BRNF_PKT_TYPE) { skb->pkt_type = PACKET_OTHERHOST; nf_bridge->mask ^= BRNF_PKT_TYPE; } nf_bridge->mask ^= BRNF_NF_BRIDGE_PREROUTING; - if (dnat_took_place(skb)) { - if (ip_route_input(skb, iph->daddr, iph->saddr, iph->tos, dev)) { + if ((err = ip_route_input(skb, iph->daddr, iph->saddr, iph->tos, dev))) { struct rtable *rt; struct flowi fl = { .nl_u = { @@ -283,19 +289,33 @@ static int br_nf_pre_routing_finish(struct sk_buff *skb) }, .proto = 0, }; + struct in_device *in_dev = in_dev_get(dev); + + /* If err equals -EHOSTUNREACH the error is due to a + * martian destination or due to the fact that + * forwarding is disabled. For most martian packets, + * ip_route_output_key() will fail. It won't fail for 2 types of + * martian destinations: loopback destinations and destination + * 0.0.0.0. In both cases the packet will be dropped because the + * destination is the loopback device and not the bridge. */ + if (err != -EHOSTUNREACH || !in_dev || IN_DEV_FORWARD(in_dev)) + goto free_skb; if (!ip_route_output_key(&rt, &fl)) { /* - Bridged-and-DNAT'ed traffic doesn't - * require ip_forwarding. - * - Deal with redirected traffic. */ - if (((struct dst_entry *)rt)->dev == dev || - rt->rt_type == RTN_LOCAL) { + * require ip_forwarding. */ + if (((struct dst_entry *)rt)->dev == dev) { skb->dst = (struct dst_entry *)rt; goto bridged_dnat; } + /* we are sure that forwarding is disabled, so printing + * this message is no problem. Note that the packet could + * still have a martian destination address, in which case + * the packet could be dropped even if forwarding were enabled */ __br_dnat_complain(); dst_release((struct dst_entry *)rt); } +free_skb: kfree_skb(skb); return 0; } else { diff --git a/net/core/wireless.c b/net/core/wireless.c index cb1b8728d7e..f69ab7b4408 100644 --- a/net/core/wireless.c +++ b/net/core/wireless.c @@ -2130,7 +2130,7 @@ int iw_handler_set_spy(struct net_device * dev, * The rtnl_lock() make sure we don't race with the other iw_handlers. * This make sure wireless_spy_update() "see" that the spy list * is temporarily disabled. */ - wmb(); + smp_wmb(); /* Are there are addresses to copy? */ if(wrqu->data.length > 0) { @@ -2159,7 +2159,7 @@ int iw_handler_set_spy(struct net_device * dev, } /* Make sure above is updated before re-enabling */ - wmb(); + smp_wmb(); /* Enable addresses */ spydata->spy_number = wrqu->data.length; diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c b/net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c index e28330aa413..9f414e35c48 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c +++ b/net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c @@ -178,7 +178,6 @@ void inet_twdr_hangman(unsigned long data) need_timer = 0; if (inet_twdr_do_twkill_work(twdr, twdr->slot)) { twdr->thread_slots |= (1 << twdr->slot); - mb(); schedule_work(&twdr->twkill_work); need_timer = 1; } else { diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c index 413c2d0a1f3..71b76ade00e 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c @@ -375,6 +375,13 @@ static int mark_source_chains(struct xt_table_info *newinfo, && unconditional(&e->arp)) { unsigned int oldpos, size; + if (t->verdict < -NF_MAX_VERDICT - 1) { + duprintf("mark_source_chains: bad " + "negative verdict (%i)\n", + t->verdict); + return 0; + } + /* Return: backtrack through the last * big jump. */ @@ -404,6 +411,14 @@ static int mark_source_chains(struct xt_table_info *newinfo, if (strcmp(t->target.u.user.name, ARPT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 && newpos >= 0) { + if (newpos > newinfo->size - + sizeof(struct arpt_entry)) { + duprintf("mark_source_chains: " + "bad verdict (%i)\n", + newpos); + return 0; + } + /* This a jump; chase it. */ duprintf("Jump rule %u -> %u\n", pos, newpos); @@ -426,8 +441,6 @@ static int mark_source_chains(struct xt_table_info *newinfo, static inline int standard_check(const struct arpt_entry_target *t, unsigned int max_offset) { - struct arpt_standard_target *targ = (void *)t; - /* Check standard info. */ if (t->u.target_size != ARPT_ALIGN(sizeof(struct arpt_standard_target))) { @@ -437,18 +450,6 @@ static inline int standard_check(const struct arpt_entry_target *t, return 0; } - if (targ->verdict >= 0 - && targ->verdict > max_offset - sizeof(struct arpt_entry)) { - duprintf("arpt_standard_check: bad verdict (%i)\n", - targ->verdict); - return 0; - } - - if (targ->verdict < -NF_MAX_VERDICT - 1) { - duprintf("arpt_standard_check: bad negative verdict (%i)\n", - targ->verdict); - return 0; - } return 1; } @@ -627,18 +628,20 @@ static int translate_table(const char *name, } } + if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, valid_hooks, entry0)) { + duprintf("Looping hook\n"); + return -ELOOP; + } + /* Finally, each sanity check must pass */ i = 0; ret = ARPT_ENTRY_ITERATE(entry0, newinfo->size, check_entry, name, size, &i); - if (ret != 0) - goto cleanup; - - ret = -ELOOP; - if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, valid_hooks, entry0)) { - duprintf("Looping hook\n"); - goto cleanup; + if (ret != 0) { + ARPT_ENTRY_ITERATE(entry0, newinfo->size, + cleanup_entry, &i); + return ret; } /* And one copy for every other CPU */ @@ -647,9 +650,6 @@ static int translate_table(const char *name, memcpy(newinfo->entries[i], entry0, newinfo->size); } - return 0; -cleanup: - ARPT_ENTRY_ITERATE(entry0, newinfo->size, cleanup_entry, &i); return ret; } diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c index 8a455439b12..0ff2956d35e 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c @@ -401,6 +401,13 @@ mark_source_chains(struct xt_table_info *newinfo, && unconditional(&e->ip)) { unsigned int oldpos, size; + if (t->verdict < -NF_MAX_VERDICT - 1) { + duprintf("mark_source_chains: bad " + "negative verdict (%i)\n", + t->verdict); + return 0; + } + /* Return: backtrack through the last big jump. */ do { @@ -438,6 +445,13 @@ mark_source_chains(struct xt_table_info *newinfo, if (strcmp(t->target.u.user.name, IPT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 && newpos >= 0) { + if (newpos > newinfo->size - + sizeof(struct ipt_entry)) { + duprintf("mark_source_chains: " + "bad verdict (%i)\n", + newpos); + return 0; + } /* This a jump; chase it. */ duprintf("Jump rule %u -> %u\n", pos, newpos); @@ -470,27 +484,6 @@ cleanup_match(struct ipt_entry_match *m, unsigned int *i) } static inline int -standard_check(const struct ipt_entry_target *t, - unsigned int max_offset) -{ - struct ipt_standard_target *targ = (void *)t; - - /* Check standard info. */ - if (targ->verdict >= 0 - && targ->verdict > max_offset - sizeof(struct ipt_entry)) { - duprintf("ipt_standard_check: bad verdict (%i)\n", - targ->verdict); - return 0; - } - if (targ->verdict < -NF_MAX_VERDICT - 1) { - duprintf("ipt_standard_check: bad negative verdict (%i)\n", - targ->verdict); - return 0; - } - return 1; -} - -static inline int check_match(struct ipt_entry_match *m, const char *name, const struct ipt_ip *ip, @@ -576,12 +569,7 @@ check_entry(struct ipt_entry *e, const char *name, unsigned int size, if (ret) goto err; - if (t->u.kernel.target == &ipt_standard_target) { - if (!standard_check(t, size)) { - ret = -EINVAL; - goto err; - } - } else if (t->u.kernel.target->checkentry + if (t->u.kernel.target->checkentry && !t->u.kernel.target->checkentry(name, e, target, t->data, e->comefrom)) { duprintf("ip_tables: check failed for `%s'.\n", @@ -718,17 +706,19 @@ translate_table(const char *name, } } + if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, valid_hooks, entry0)) + return -ELOOP; + /* Finally, each sanity check must pass */ i = 0; ret = IPT_ENTRY_ITERATE(entry0, newinfo->size, check_entry, name, size, &i); - if (ret != 0) - goto cleanup; - - ret = -ELOOP; - if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, valid_hooks, entry0)) - goto cleanup; + if (ret != 0) { + IPT_ENTRY_ITERATE(entry0, newinfo->size, + cleanup_entry, &i); + return ret; + } /* And one copy for every other CPU */ for_each_possible_cpu(i) { @@ -736,9 +726,6 @@ translate_table(const char *name, memcpy(newinfo->entries[i], entry0, newinfo->size); } - return 0; -cleanup: - IPT_ENTRY_ITERATE(entry0, newinfo->size, cleanup_entry, &i); return ret; } @@ -1529,25 +1516,8 @@ static inline int compat_copy_match_from_user(struct ipt_entry_match *m, void **dstptr, compat_uint_t *size, const char *name, const struct ipt_ip *ip, unsigned int hookmask) { - struct ipt_entry_match *dm; - struct ipt_match *match; - int ret; - - dm = (struct ipt_entry_match *)*dstptr; - match = m->u.kernel.match; xt_compat_match_from_user(m, dstptr, size); - - ret = xt_check_match(match, AF_INET, dm->u.match_size - sizeof(*dm), - name, hookmask, ip->proto, - ip->invflags & IPT_INV_PROTO); - if (!ret && m->u.kernel.match->checkentry - && !m->u.kernel.match->checkentry(name, ip, match, dm->data, - hookmask)) { - duprintf("ip_tables: check failed for `%s'.\n", - m->u.kernel.match->name); - ret = -EINVAL; - } - return ret; + return 0; } static int compat_copy_entry_from_user(struct ipt_entry *e, void **dstptr, @@ -1569,7 +1539,7 @@ static int compat_copy_entry_from_user(struct ipt_entry *e, void **dstptr, ret = IPT_MATCH_ITERATE(e, compat_copy_match_from_user, dstptr, size, name, &de->ip, de->comefrom); if (ret) - goto err; + return ret; de->target_offset = e->target_offset - (origsize - *size); t = ipt_get_target(e); target = t->u.kernel.target; @@ -1582,31 +1552,62 @@ static int compat_copy_entry_from_user(struct ipt_entry *e, void **dstptr, if ((unsigned char *)de - base < newinfo->underflow[h]) newinfo->underflow[h] -= origsize - *size; } + return ret; +} + +static inline int compat_check_match(struct ipt_entry_match *m, const char *name, + const struct ipt_ip *ip, unsigned int hookmask) +{ + struct ipt_match *match; + int ret; + + match = m->u.kernel.match; + ret = xt_check_match(match, AF_INET, m->u.match_size - sizeof(*m), + name, hookmask, ip->proto, + ip->invflags & IPT_INV_PROTO); + if (!ret && m->u.kernel.match->checkentry + && !m->u.kernel.match->checkentry(name, ip, match, m->data, + hookmask)) { + duprintf("ip_tables: compat: check failed for `%s'.\n", + m->u.kernel.match->name); + ret = -EINVAL; + } + return ret; +} + +static inline int compat_check_target(struct ipt_entry *e, const char *name) +{ + struct ipt_entry_target *t; + struct ipt_target *target; + int ret; - t = ipt_get_target(de); + t = ipt_get_target(e); target = t->u.kernel.target; ret = xt_check_target(target, AF_INET, t->u.target_size - sizeof(*t), name, e->comefrom, e->ip.proto, e->ip.invflags & IPT_INV_PROTO); - if (ret) - goto err; - - ret = -EINVAL; - if (t->u.kernel.target == &ipt_standard_target) { - if (!standard_check(t, *size)) - goto err; - } else if (t->u.kernel.target->checkentry - && !t->u.kernel.target->checkentry(name, de, target, - t->data, de->comefrom)) { + if (!ret && t->u.kernel.target->checkentry + && !t->u.kernel.target->checkentry(name, e, target, + t->data, e->comefrom)) { duprintf("ip_tables: compat: check failed for `%s'.\n", t->u.kernel.target->name); - goto err; + ret = -EINVAL; } - ret = 0; -err: return ret; } +static inline int compat_check_entry(struct ipt_entry *e, const char *name) +{ + int ret; + + ret = IPT_MATCH_ITERATE(e, compat_check_match, name, &e->ip, + e->comefrom); + if (ret) + return ret; + + return compat_check_target(e, name); +} + static int translate_compat_table(const char *name, unsigned int valid_hooks, @@ -1695,6 +1696,11 @@ translate_compat_table(const char *name, if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, valid_hooks, entry1)) goto free_newinfo; + ret = IPT_ENTRY_ITERATE(entry1, newinfo->size, compat_check_entry, + name); + if (ret) + goto free_newinfo; + /* And one copy for every other CPU */ for_each_possible_cpu(i) if (newinfo->entries[i] && newinfo->entries[i] != entry1) diff --git a/net/ipv4/route.c b/net/ipv4/route.c index 9f3924c4905..11c167118e8 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/route.c +++ b/net/ipv4/route.c @@ -1780,7 +1780,7 @@ static inline int __mkroute_input(struct sk_buff *skb, #endif if (in_dev->cnf.no_policy) rth->u.dst.flags |= DST_NOPOLICY; - if (in_dev->cnf.no_xfrm) + if (out_dev->cnf.no_xfrm) rth->u.dst.flags |= DST_NOXFRM; rth->fl.fl4_dst = daddr; rth->rt_dst = daddr; diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index 9304034c0c4..c701f6abbfc 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -4235,7 +4235,7 @@ static int tcp_rcv_synsent_state_process(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, * Change state from SYN-SENT only after copied_seq * is initialized. */ tp->copied_seq = tp->rcv_nxt; - mb(); + smp_mb(); tcp_set_state(sk, TCP_ESTABLISHED); security_inet_conn_established(sk, skb); @@ -4483,7 +4483,7 @@ int tcp_rcv_state_process(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, case TCP_SYN_RECV: if (acceptable) { tp->copied_seq = tp->rcv_nxt; - mb(); + smp_mb(); tcp_set_state(sk, TCP_ESTABLISHED); sk->sk_state_change(sk); diff --git a/net/ipv4/xfrm4_policy.c b/net/ipv4/xfrm4_policy.c index d4107bb701b..fb9f69c616f 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/xfrm4_policy.c +++ b/net/ipv4/xfrm4_policy.c @@ -274,6 +274,8 @@ static void xfrm4_dst_destroy(struct dst_entry *dst) if (likely(xdst->u.rt.idev)) in_dev_put(xdst->u.rt.idev); + if (likely(xdst->u.rt.peer)) + inet_putpeer(xdst->u.rt.peer); xfrm_dst_destroy(xdst); } diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c index e05ecbb1412..e9212c7ff5c 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c @@ -624,13 +624,13 @@ static int ip6_fragment(struct sk_buff *skb, int (*output)(struct sk_buff *)) skb_shinfo(skb)->frag_list = NULL; /* BUILD HEADER */ + *prevhdr = NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT; tmp_hdr = kmemdup(skb->nh.raw, hlen, GFP_ATOMIC); if (!tmp_hdr) { IP6_INC_STATS(ip6_dst_idev(skb->dst), IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGFAILS); return -ENOMEM; } - *prevhdr = NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT; __skb_pull(skb, hlen); fh = (struct frag_hdr*)__skb_push(skb, sizeof(struct frag_hdr)); skb->nh.raw = __skb_push(skb, hlen); diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c index f63fb86d7c7..4eec4b3988b 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c @@ -440,6 +440,13 @@ mark_source_chains(struct xt_table_info *newinfo, && unconditional(&e->ipv6)) { unsigned int oldpos, size; + if (t->verdict < -NF_MAX_VERDICT - 1) { + duprintf("mark_source_chains: bad " + "negative verdict (%i)\n", + t->verdict); + return 0; + } + /* Return: backtrack through the last big jump. */ do { @@ -477,6 +484,13 @@ mark_source_chains(struct xt_table_info *newinfo, if (strcmp(t->target.u.user.name, IP6T_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 && newpos >= 0) { + if (newpos > newinfo->size - + sizeof(struct ip6t_entry)) { + duprintf("mark_source_chains: " + "bad verdict (%i)\n", + newpos); + return 0; + } /* This a jump; chase it. */ duprintf("Jump rule %u -> %u\n", pos, newpos); @@ -509,27 +523,6 @@ cleanup_match(struct ip6t_entry_match *m, unsigned int *i) } static inline int -standard_check(const struct ip6t_entry_target *t, - unsigned int max_offset) -{ - struct ip6t_standard_target *targ = (void *)t; - - /* Check standard info. */ - if (targ->verdict >= 0 - && targ->verdict > max_offset - sizeof(struct ip6t_entry)) { - duprintf("ip6t_standard_check: bad verdict (%i)\n", - targ->verdict); - return 0; - } - if (targ->verdict < -NF_MAX_VERDICT - 1) { - duprintf("ip6t_standard_check: bad negative verdict (%i)\n", - targ->verdict); - return 0; - } - return 1; -} - -static inline int check_match(struct ip6t_entry_match *m, const char *name, const struct ip6t_ip6 *ipv6, @@ -616,12 +609,7 @@ check_entry(struct ip6t_entry *e, const char *name, unsigned int size, if (ret) goto err; - if (t->u.kernel.target == &ip6t_standard_target) { - if (!standard_check(t, size)) { - ret = -EINVAL; - goto err; - } - } else if (t->u.kernel.target->checkentry + if (t->u.kernel.target->checkentry && !t->u.kernel.target->checkentry(name, e, target, t->data, e->comefrom)) { duprintf("ip_tables: check failed for `%s'.\n", @@ -758,17 +746,19 @@ translate_table(const char *name, } } + if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, valid_hooks, entry0)) + return -ELOOP; + /* Finally, each sanity check must pass */ i = 0; ret = IP6T_ENTRY_ITERATE(entry0, newinfo->size, check_entry, name, size, &i); - if (ret != 0) - goto cleanup; - - ret = -ELOOP; - if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, valid_hooks, entry0)) - goto cleanup; + if (ret != 0) { + IP6T_ENTRY_ITERATE(entry0, newinfo->size, + cleanup_entry, &i); + return ret; + } /* And one copy for every other CPU */ for_each_possible_cpu(i) { @@ -777,9 +767,6 @@ translate_table(const char *name, } return 0; -cleanup: - IP6T_ENTRY_ITERATE(entry0, newinfo->size, cleanup_entry, &i); - return ret; } /* Gets counters. */ diff --git a/net/ipv6/raw.c b/net/ipv6/raw.c index c2e629d6aea..4ae1b19ada5 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/raw.c +++ b/net/ipv6/raw.c @@ -854,7 +854,8 @@ back_from_confirm: } done: dst_release(dst); - release_sock(sk); + if (!inet->hdrincl) + release_sock(sk); out: fl6_sock_release(flowlabel); return err<0?err:len; diff --git a/net/irda/irttp.c b/net/irda/irttp.c index 252f1101256..03504f3e499 100644 --- a/net/irda/irttp.c +++ b/net/irda/irttp.c @@ -1100,7 +1100,7 @@ int irttp_connect_request(struct tsap_cb *self, __u8 dtsap_sel, return -ENOMEM; /* Reserve space for MUX_CONTROL and LAP header */ - skb_reserve(tx_skb, TTP_MAX_HEADER); + skb_reserve(tx_skb, TTP_MAX_HEADER + TTP_SAR_HEADER); } else { tx_skb = userdata; /* @@ -1349,7 +1349,7 @@ int irttp_connect_response(struct tsap_cb *self, __u32 max_sdu_size, return -ENOMEM; /* Reserve space for MUX_CONTROL and LAP header */ - skb_reserve(tx_skb, TTP_MAX_HEADER); + skb_reserve(tx_skb, TTP_MAX_HEADER + TTP_SAR_HEADER); } else { tx_skb = userdata; /* diff --git a/net/key/af_key.c b/net/key/af_key.c index 0e1dbfbb9b1..5dd5094659a 100644 --- a/net/key/af_key.c +++ b/net/key/af_key.c @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ #include <linux/proc_fs.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <net/xfrm.h> +#include <linux/audit.h> #include <net/sock.h> @@ -1420,6 +1421,9 @@ static int pfkey_add(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct sadb_msg *hdr, else err = xfrm_state_update(x); + xfrm_audit_log(audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context), 0, + AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_ADDSA, err ? 0 : 1, NULL, x); + if (err < 0) { x->km.state = XFRM_STATE_DEAD; __xfrm_state_put(x); @@ -1460,8 +1464,12 @@ static int pfkey_delete(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct sadb_msg *h err = -EPERM; goto out; } - + err = xfrm_state_delete(x); + + xfrm_audit_log(audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context), 0, + AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_DELSA, err ? 0 : 1, NULL, x); + if (err < 0) goto out; @@ -1637,12 +1645,15 @@ static int pfkey_flush(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct sadb_msg *hd { unsigned proto; struct km_event c; + struct xfrm_audit audit_info; proto = pfkey_satype2proto(hdr->sadb_msg_satype); if (proto == 0) return -EINVAL; - xfrm_state_flush(proto); + audit_info.loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context); + audit_info.secid = 0; + xfrm_state_flush(proto, &audit_info); c.data.proto = proto; c.seq = hdr->sadb_msg_seq; c.pid = hdr->sadb_msg_pid; @@ -2205,6 +2216,9 @@ static int pfkey_spdadd(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct sadb_msg *h err = xfrm_policy_insert(pol->sadb_x_policy_dir-1, xp, hdr->sadb_msg_type != SADB_X_SPDUPDATE); + xfrm_audit_log(audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context), 0, + AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_ADDSPD, err ? 0 : 1, xp, NULL); + if (err) goto out; @@ -2282,6 +2296,10 @@ static int pfkey_spddelete(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct sadb_msg xp = xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx(XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAIN, pol->sadb_x_policy_dir-1, &sel, tmp.security, 1); security_xfrm_policy_free(&tmp); + + xfrm_audit_log(audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context), 0, + AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_DELSPD, (xp) ? 1 : 0, xp, NULL); + if (xp == NULL) return -ENOENT; @@ -2416,8 +2434,11 @@ static int key_notify_policy_flush(struct km_event *c) static int pfkey_spdflush(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct sadb_msg *hdr, void **ext_hdrs) { struct km_event c; + struct xfrm_audit audit_info; - xfrm_policy_flush(XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAIN); + audit_info.loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context); + audit_info.secid = 0; + xfrm_policy_flush(XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAIN, &audit_info); c.data.type = XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAIN; c.event = XFRM_MSG_FLUSHPOLICY; c.pid = hdr->sadb_msg_pid; diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c index a9638ff52a7..9b02ec4012f 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c @@ -1093,7 +1093,7 @@ static void free_conntrack_hash(struct list_head *hash, int vmalloced, int size) get_order(sizeof(struct list_head) * size)); } -void nf_conntrack_flush() +void nf_conntrack_flush(void) { nf_ct_iterate_cleanup(kill_all, NULL); } diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c index c20f901fa17..9cbf926cdd1 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c @@ -91,25 +91,28 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nf_conntrack_expect_find_get); struct nf_conntrack_expect * find_expectation(const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple) { - struct nf_conntrack_expect *i; + struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp; + + exp = __nf_conntrack_expect_find(tuple); + if (!exp) + return NULL; - list_for_each_entry(i, &nf_conntrack_expect_list, list) { /* If master is not in hash table yet (ie. packet hasn't left this machine yet), how can other end know about expected? Hence these are not the droids you are looking for (if master ct never got confirmed, we'd hold a reference to it and weird things would happen to future packets). */ - if (nf_ct_tuple_mask_cmp(tuple, &i->tuple, &i->mask) - && nf_ct_is_confirmed(i->master)) { - if (i->flags & NF_CT_EXPECT_PERMANENT) { - atomic_inc(&i->use); - return i; - } else if (del_timer(&i->timeout)) { - nf_ct_unlink_expect(i); - return i; - } - } + if (!nf_ct_is_confirmed(exp->master)) + return NULL; + + if (exp->flags & NF_CT_EXPECT_PERMANENT) { + atomic_inc(&exp->use); + return exp; + } else if (del_timer(&exp->timeout)) { + nf_ct_unlink_expect(exp); + return exp; } + return NULL; } diff --git a/net/netlink/genetlink.c b/net/netlink/genetlink.c index b9b03747c1f..548e4e6e698 100644 --- a/net/netlink/genetlink.c +++ b/net/netlink/genetlink.c @@ -143,6 +143,13 @@ int genl_register_ops(struct genl_family *family, struct genl_ops *ops) goto errout; } + if (ops->dumpit) + ops->flags |= GENL_CMD_CAP_DUMP; + if (ops->doit) + ops->flags |= GENL_CMD_CAP_DO; + if (ops->policy) + ops->flags |= GENL_CMD_CAP_HASPOL; + genl_lock(); list_add_tail(&ops->ops_list, &family->ops_list); genl_unlock(); @@ -387,7 +394,7 @@ static void genl_rcv(struct sock *sk, int len) static struct genl_family genl_ctrl = { .id = GENL_ID_CTRL, .name = "nlctrl", - .version = 0x1, + .version = 0x2, .maxattr = CTRL_ATTR_MAX, }; @@ -425,15 +432,6 @@ static int ctrl_fill_info(struct genl_family *family, u32 pid, u32 seq, NLA_PUT_U32(skb, CTRL_ATTR_OP_ID, ops->cmd); NLA_PUT_U32(skb, CTRL_ATTR_OP_FLAGS, ops->flags); - if (ops->policy) - NLA_PUT_FLAG(skb, CTRL_ATTR_OP_POLICY); - - if (ops->doit) - NLA_PUT_FLAG(skb, CTRL_ATT |