mac80211: perform power save processing before decryption

This patch decouples the power save processing from the frame decryption
by running the decrypt rx handler after sta_process. In the case where
the decryption failed for some reason, the stack used to not process
the PM and MOREDATA bits for that frame. The stack now always performs
power save processing regardless of the decryption result. That means that
encrypted data frames and NULLFUNC frames are now handled in the same way
regarding power save processing, making the stack more robust.

Signed-off-by: Johan Almbladh <ja@anyfi.net>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>

1 files changed, 202 insertions, 202 deletions

diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c
index 0ac75127b7d..ffad155316a 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/rx.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c
@@ -1049,207 +1049,6 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_check(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 
 
 static ieee80211_rx_result debug_noinline
-ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
-{
-	struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
-	struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
-	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
-	int keyidx;
-	int hdrlen;
-	ieee80211_rx_result result = RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
-	struct ieee80211_key *sta_ptk = NULL;
-	int mmie_keyidx = -1;
-	__le16 fc;
-
-	/*
-	 * Key selection 101
-	 *
-	 * There are four types of keys:
-	 *  - GTK (group keys)
-	 *  - IGTK (group keys for management frames)
-	 *  - PTK (pairwise keys)
-	 *  - STK (station-to-station pairwise keys)
-	 *
-	 * When selecting a key, we have to distinguish between multicast
-	 * (including broadcast) and unicast frames, the latter can only
-	 * use PTKs and STKs while the former always use GTKs and IGTKs.
-	 * Unless, of course, actual WEP keys ("pre-RSNA") are used, then
-	 * unicast frames can also use key indices like GTKs. Hence, if we
-	 * don't have a PTK/STK we check the key index for a WEP key.
-	 *
-	 * Note that in a regular BSS, multicast frames are sent by the
-	 * AP only, associated stations unicast the frame to the AP first
-	 * which then multicasts it on their behalf.
-	 *
-	 * There is also a slight problem in IBSS mode: GTKs are negotiated
-	 * with each station, that is something we don't currently handle.
-	 * The spec seems to expect that one negotiates the same key with
-	 * every station but there's no such requirement; VLANs could be
-	 * possible.
-	 */
-
-	/*
-	 * No point in finding a key and decrypting if the frame is neither
-	 * addressed to us nor a multicast frame.
-	 */
-	if (!(status->rx_flags & IEEE80211_RX_RA_MATCH))
-		return RX_CONTINUE;
-
-	/* start without a key */
-	rx->key = NULL;
-
-	if (rx->sta)
-		sta_ptk = rcu_dereference(rx->sta->ptk);
-
-	fc = hdr->frame_control;
-
-	if (!ieee80211_has_protected(fc))
-		mmie_keyidx = ieee80211_get_mmie_keyidx(rx->skb);
-
-	if (!is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1) && sta_ptk) {
-		rx->key = sta_ptk;
-		if ((status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) &&
-		    (status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED))
-			return RX_CONTINUE;
-		/* Skip decryption if the frame is not protected. */
-		if (!ieee80211_has_protected(fc))
-			return RX_CONTINUE;
-	} else if (mmie_keyidx >= 0) {
-		/* Broadcast/multicast robust management frame / BIP */
-		if ((status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) &&
-		    (status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED))
-			return RX_CONTINUE;
-
-		if (mmie_keyidx < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS ||
-		    mmie_keyidx >= NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS)
-			return RX_DROP_MONITOR; /* unexpected BIP keyidx */
-		if (rx->sta)
-			rx->key = rcu_dereference(rx->sta->gtk[mmie_keyidx]);
-		if (!rx->key)
-			rx->key = rcu_dereference(rx->sdata->keys[mmie_keyidx]);
-	} else if (!ieee80211_has_protected(fc)) {
-		/*
-		 * The frame was not protected, so skip decryption. However, we
-		 * need to set rx->key if there is a key that could have been
-		 * used so that the frame may be dropped if encryption would
-		 * have been expected.
-		 */
-		struct ieee80211_key *key = NULL;
-		struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = rx->sdata;
-		int i;
-
-		if (ieee80211_is_mgmt(fc) &&
-		    is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1) &&
-		    (key = rcu_dereference(rx->sdata->default_mgmt_key)))
-			rx->key = key;
-		else {
-			if (rx->sta) {
-				for (i = 0; i < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS; i++) {
-					key = rcu_dereference(rx->sta->gtk[i]);
-					if (key)
-						break;
-				}
-			}
-			if (!key) {
-				for (i = 0; i < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS; i++) {
-					key = rcu_dereference(sdata->keys[i]);
-					if (key)
-						break;
-				}
-			}
-			if (key)
-				rx->key = key;
-		}
-		return RX_CONTINUE;
-	} else {
-		u8 keyid;
-		/*
-		 * The device doesn't give us the IV so we won't be
-		 * able to look up the key. That's ok though, we
-		 * don't need to decrypt the frame, we just won't
-		 * be able to keep statistics accurate.
-		 * Except for key threshold notifications, should
-		 * we somehow allow the driver to tell us which key
-		 * the hardware used if this flag is set?
-		 */
-		if ((status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) &&
-		    (status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED))
-			return RX_CONTINUE;
-
-		hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(fc);
-
-		if (rx->skb->len < 8 + hdrlen)
-			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* TODO: count this? */
-
-		/*
-		 * no need to call ieee80211_wep_get_keyidx,
-		 * it verifies a bunch of things we've done already
-		 */
-		skb_copy_bits(rx->skb, hdrlen + 3, &keyid, 1);
-		keyidx = keyid >> 6;
-
-		/* check per-station GTK first, if multicast packet */
-		if (is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1) && rx->sta)
-			rx->key = rcu_dereference(rx->sta->gtk[keyidx]);
-
-		/* if not found, try default key */
-		if (!rx->key) {
-			rx->key = rcu_dereference(rx->sdata->keys[keyidx]);
-
-			/*
-			 * RSNA-protected unicast frames should always be
-			 * sent with pairwise or station-to-station keys,
-			 * but for WEP we allow using a key index as well.
-			 */
-			if (rx->key &&
-			    rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40 &&
-			    rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104 &&
-			    !is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1))
-				rx->key = NULL;
-		}
-	}
-
-	if (rx->key) {
-		if (unlikely(rx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_TAINTED))
-			return RX_DROP_MONITOR;
-
-		rx->key->tx_rx_count++;
-		/* TODO: add threshold stuff again */
-	} else {
-		return RX_DROP_MONITOR;
-	}
-
-	switch (rx->key->conf.cipher) {
-	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40:
-	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104:
-		result = ieee80211_crypto_wep_decrypt(rx);
-		break;
-	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP:
-		result = ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(rx);
-		break;
-	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP:
-		result = ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(rx);
-		break;
-	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC:
-		result = ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_decrypt(rx);
-		break;
-	default:
-		/*
-		 * We can reach here only with HW-only algorithms
-		 * but why didn't it decrypt the frame?!
-		 */
-		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
-	}
-
-	/* the hdr variable is invalid after the decrypt handlers */
-
-	/* either the frame has been decrypted or will be dropped */
-	status->flag |= RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED;
-
-	return result;
-}
-
-static ieee80211_rx_result debug_noinline
 ieee80211_rx_h_check_more_data(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 {
 	struct ieee80211_local *local;
@@ -1550,6 +1349,207 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_sta_process(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 	return RX_CONTINUE;
 } /* ieee80211_rx_h_sta_process */
 
+static ieee80211_rx_result debug_noinline
+ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
+{
+	struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
+	struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
+	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
+	int keyidx;
+	int hdrlen;
+	ieee80211_rx_result result = RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+	struct ieee80211_key *sta_ptk = NULL;
+	int mmie_keyidx = -1;
+	__le16 fc;
+
+	/*
+	 * Key selection 101
+	 *
+	 * There are four types of keys:
+	 *  - GTK (group keys)
+	 *  - IGTK (group keys for management frames)
+	 *  - PTK (pairwise keys)
+	 *  - STK (station-to-station pairwise keys)
+	 *
+	 * When selecting a key, we have to distinguish between multicast
+	 * (including broadcast) and unicast frames, the latter can only
+	 * use PTKs and STKs while the former always use GTKs and IGTKs.
+	 * Unless, of course, actual WEP keys ("pre-RSNA") are used, then
+	 * unicast frames can also use key indices like GTKs. Hence, if we
+	 * don't have a PTK/STK we check the key index for a WEP key.
+	 *
+	 * Note that in a regular BSS, multicast frames are sent by the
+	 * AP only, associated stations unicast the frame to the AP first
+	 * which then multicasts it on their behalf.
+	 *
+	 * There is also a slight problem in IBSS mode: GTKs are negotiated
+	 * with each station, that is something we don't currently handle.
+	 * The spec seems to expect that one negotiates the same key with
+	 * every station but there's no such requirement; VLANs could be
+	 * possible.
+	 */
+
+	/*
+	 * No point in finding a key and decrypting if the frame is neither
+	 * addressed to us nor a multicast frame.
+	 */
+	if (!(status->rx_flags & IEEE80211_RX_RA_MATCH))
+		return RX_CONTINUE;
+
+	/* start without a key */
+	rx->key = NULL;
+
+	if (rx->sta)
+		sta_ptk = rcu_dereference(rx->sta->ptk);
+
+	fc = hdr->frame_control;
+
+	if (!ieee80211_has_protected(fc))
+		mmie_keyidx = ieee80211_get_mmie_keyidx(rx->skb);
+
+	if (!is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1) && sta_ptk) {
+		rx->key = sta_ptk;
+		if ((status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) &&
+		    (status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED))
+			return RX_CONTINUE;
+		/* Skip decryption if the frame is not protected. */
+		if (!ieee80211_has_protected(fc))
+			return RX_CONTINUE;
+	} else if (mmie_keyidx >= 0) {
+		/* Broadcast/multicast robust management frame / BIP */
+		if ((status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) &&
+		    (status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED))
+			return RX_CONTINUE;
+
+		if (mmie_keyidx < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS ||
+		    mmie_keyidx >= NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS)
+			return RX_DROP_MONITOR; /* unexpected BIP keyidx */
+		if (rx->sta)
+			rx->key = rcu_dereference(rx->sta->gtk[mmie_keyidx]);
+		if (!rx->key)
+			rx->key = rcu_dereference(rx->sdata->keys[mmie_keyidx]);
+	} else if (!ieee80211_has_protected(fc)) {
+		/*
+		 * The frame was not protected, so skip decryption. However, we
+		 * need to set rx->key if there is a key that could have been
+		 * used so that the frame may be dropped if encryption would
+		 * have been expected.
+		 */
+		struct ieee80211_key *key = NULL;
+		struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = rx->sdata;
+		int i;
+
+		if (ieee80211_is_mgmt(fc) &&
+		    is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1) &&
+		    (key = rcu_dereference(rx->sdata->default_mgmt_key)))
+			rx->key = key;
+		else {
+			if (rx->sta) {
+				for (i = 0; i < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS; i++) {
+					key = rcu_dereference(rx->sta->gtk[i]);
+					if (key)
+						break;
+				}
+			}
+			if (!key) {
+				for (i = 0; i < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS; i++) {
+					key = rcu_dereference(sdata->keys[i]);
+					if (key)
+						break;
+				}
+			}
+			if (key)
+				rx->key = key;
+		}
+		return RX_CONTINUE;
+	} else {
+		u8 keyid;
+		/*
+		 * The device doesn't give us the IV so we won't be
+		 * able to look up the key. That's ok though, we
+		 * don't need to decrypt the frame, we just won't
+		 * be able to keep statistics accurate.
+		 * Except for key threshold notifications, should
+		 * we somehow allow the driver to tell us which key
+		 * the hardware used if this flag is set?
+		 */
+		if ((status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) &&
+		    (status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED))
+			return RX_CONTINUE;
+
+		hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(fc);
+
+		if (rx->skb->len < 8 + hdrlen)
+			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* TODO: count this? */
+
+		/*
+		 * no need to call ieee80211_wep_get_keyidx,
+		 * it verifies a bunch of things we've done already
+		 */
+		skb_copy_bits(rx->skb, hdrlen + 3, &keyid, 1);
+		keyidx = keyid >> 6;
+
+		/* check per-station GTK first, if multicast packet */
+		if (is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1) && rx->sta)
+			rx->key = rcu_dereference(rx->sta->gtk[keyidx]);
+
+		/* if not found, try default key */
+		if (!rx->key) {
+			rx->key = rcu_dereference(rx->sdata->keys[keyidx]);
+
+			/*
+			 * RSNA-protected unicast frames should always be
+			 * sent with pairwise or station-to-station keys,
+			 * but for WEP we allow using a key index as well.
+			 */
+			if (rx->key &&
+			    rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40 &&
+			    rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104 &&
+			    !is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1))
+				rx->key = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (rx->key) {
+		if (unlikely(rx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_TAINTED))
+			return RX_DROP_MONITOR;
+
+		rx->key->tx_rx_count++;
+		/* TODO: add threshold stuff again */
+	} else {
+		return RX_DROP_MONITOR;
+	}
+
+	switch (rx->key->conf.cipher) {
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40:
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104:
+		result = ieee80211_crypto_wep_decrypt(rx);
+		break;
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP:
+		result = ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(rx);
+		break;
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP:
+		result = ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(rx);
+		break;
+	case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC:
+		result = ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_decrypt(rx);
+		break;
+	default:
+		/*
+		 * We can reach here only with HW-only algorithms
+		 * but why didn't it decrypt the frame?!
+		 */
+		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+	}
+
+	/* the hdr variable is invalid after the decrypt handlers */
+
+	/* either the frame has been decrypted or will be dropped */
+	status->flag |= RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED;
+
+	return result;
+}
+
 static inline struct ieee80211_fragment_entry *
 ieee80211_reassemble_add(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
 			 unsigned int frag, unsigned int seq, int rx_queue,
@@ -2933,10 +2933,10 @@ static void ieee80211_rx_handlers(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx,
 		 */
 		rx->skb = skb;
 
-		CALL_RXH(ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt)
 		CALL_RXH(ieee80211_rx_h_check_more_data)
 		CALL_RXH(ieee80211_rx_h_uapsd_and_pspoll)
 		CALL_RXH(ieee80211_rx_h_sta_process)
+		CALL_RXH(ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt)
 		CALL_RXH(ieee80211_rx_h_defragment)
 		CALL_RXH(ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify)
 		/* must be after MMIC verify so header is counted in MPDU mic */