diff options
author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@woody.linux-foundation.org> | 2007-10-11 19:40:14 -0700 |
---|---|---|
committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@woody.linux-foundation.org> | 2007-10-11 19:40:14 -0700 |
commit | 038a5008b2f395c85e6e71d6ddf3c684e7c405b0 (patch) | |
tree | 4735eab577e97e5a22c3141e3f60071c8065585e /net/mac80211/wpa.c | |
parent | dd6d1844af33acb4edd0a40b1770d091a22c94be (diff) | |
parent | 266918303226cceac7eca38ced30f15f277bd89c (diff) |
Merge branch 'master' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6
* 'master' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6: (867 commits)
[SKY2]: status polling loop (post merge)
[NET]: Fix NAPI completion handling in some drivers.
[TCP]: Limit processing lost_retrans loop to work-to-do cases
[TCP]: Fix lost_retrans loop vs fastpath problems
[TCP]: No need to re-count fackets_out/sacked_out at RTO
[TCP]: Extract tcp_match_queue_to_sack from sacktag code
[TCP]: Kill almost unused variable pcount from sacktag
[TCP]: Fix mark_head_lost to ignore R-bit when trying to mark L
[TCP]: Add bytes_acked (ABC) clearing to FRTO too
[IPv6]: Update setsockopt(IPV6_MULTICAST_IF) to support RFC 3493, try2
[NETFILTER]: x_tables: add missing ip6t_modulename aliases
[NETFILTER]: nf_conntrack_tcp: fix connection reopening
[QETH]: fix qeth_main.c
[NETLINK]: fib_frontend build fixes
[IPv6]: Export userland ND options through netlink (RDNSS support)
[9P]: build fix with !CONFIG_SYSCTL
[NET]: Fix dev_put() and dev_hold() comments
[NET]: make netlink user -> kernel interface synchronious
[NET]: unify netlink kernel socket recognition
[NET]: cleanup 3rd argument in netlink_sendskb
...
Fix up conflicts manually in Documentation/feature-removal-schedule.txt
and my new least favourite crap, the "mod_devicetable" support in the
files include/linux/mod_devicetable.h and scripts/mod/file2alias.c.
(The latter files seem to be explicitly _designed_ to get conflicts when
different subsystems work with them - that have an absolutely horrid
lack of subsystem separation!)
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/mac80211/wpa.c')
-rw-r--r-- | net/mac80211/wpa.c | 196 |
1 files changed, 74 insertions, 122 deletions
diff --git a/net/mac80211/wpa.c b/net/mac80211/wpa.c index 783af32c691..6695efba57e 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c +++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c @@ -11,10 +11,8 @@ #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/skbuff.h> #include <linux/compiler.h> -#include <net/iw_handler.h> - #include <net/mac80211.h> -#include "ieee80211_common.h" + #include "ieee80211_i.h" #include "michael.h" #include "tkip.h" @@ -84,16 +82,16 @@ ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx) fc = tx->fc; - if (!tx->key || tx->key->alg != ALG_TKIP || skb->len < 24 || + if (!tx->key || tx->key->conf.alg != ALG_TKIP || skb->len < 24 || !WLAN_FC_DATA_PRESENT(fc)) return TXRX_CONTINUE; if (ieee80211_get_hdr_info(skb, &sa, &da, &qos_tid, &data, &data_len)) return TXRX_DROP; - if (!tx->key->force_sw_encrypt && - !tx->fragmented && - !(tx->local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_TKIP_INCLUDE_MMIC) && + if ((tx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE) && + !(tx->flags & IEEE80211_TXRXD_FRAGMENTED) && + !(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC) && !wpa_test) { /* hwaccel - with no need for preallocated room for Michael MIC */ @@ -116,8 +114,8 @@ ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx) #else authenticator = 1; #endif - key = &tx->key->key[authenticator ? ALG_TKIP_TEMP_AUTH_TX_MIC_KEY : - ALG_TKIP_TEMP_AUTH_RX_MIC_KEY]; + key = &tx->key->conf.key[authenticator ? ALG_TKIP_TEMP_AUTH_TX_MIC_KEY : + ALG_TKIP_TEMP_AUTH_RX_MIC_KEY]; mic = skb_put(skb, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN); michael_mic(key, da, sa, qos_tid & 0x0f, data, data_len, mic); @@ -134,31 +132,20 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx) u8 mic[MICHAEL_MIC_LEN]; struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb; int authenticator = 1, wpa_test = 0; + DECLARE_MAC_BUF(mac); fc = rx->fc; - /* If device handles decryption totally, skip this check */ - if ((rx->local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_DEVICE_HIDES_WEP) || - (rx->local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_DEVICE_STRIPS_MIC)) + /* + * No way to verify the MIC if the hardware stripped it + */ + if (rx->u.rx.status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED) return TXRX_CONTINUE; - if (!rx->key || rx->key->alg != ALG_TKIP || + if (!rx->key || rx->key->conf.alg != ALG_TKIP || !(rx->fc & IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED) || !WLAN_FC_DATA_PRESENT(fc)) return TXRX_CONTINUE; - if ((rx->u.rx.status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) && - !rx->key->force_sw_encrypt) { - if (rx->local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_WEP_INCLUDE_IV) { - if (skb->len < MICHAEL_MIC_LEN) - return TXRX_DROP; - } - /* Need to verify Michael MIC sometimes in software even when - * hwaccel is used. Atheros ar5212: fragmented frames and QoS - * frames. */ - if (!rx->fragmented && !wpa_test) - goto remove_mic; - } - if (ieee80211_get_hdr_info(skb, &sa, &da, &qos_tid, &data, &data_len) || data_len < MICHAEL_MIC_LEN) return TXRX_DROP; @@ -170,49 +157,28 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx) #else authenticator = 1; #endif - key = &rx->key->key[authenticator ? ALG_TKIP_TEMP_AUTH_RX_MIC_KEY : - ALG_TKIP_TEMP_AUTH_TX_MIC_KEY]; + key = &rx->key->conf.key[authenticator ? ALG_TKIP_TEMP_AUTH_RX_MIC_KEY : + ALG_TKIP_TEMP_AUTH_TX_MIC_KEY]; michael_mic(key, da, sa, qos_tid & 0x0f, data, data_len, mic); if (memcmp(mic, data + data_len, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN) != 0 || wpa_test) { - if (!rx->u.rx.ra_match) + if (!(rx->flags & IEEE80211_TXRXD_RXRA_MATCH)) return TXRX_DROP; printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: invalid Michael MIC in data frame from " - MAC_FMT "\n", rx->dev->name, MAC_ARG(sa)); - - do { - struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr; - union iwreq_data wrqu; - char *buf = kmalloc(128, GFP_ATOMIC); - if (!buf) - break; - - /* TODO: needed parameters: count, key type, TSC */ - hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data; - sprintf(buf, "MLME-MICHAELMICFAILURE.indication(" - "keyid=%d %scast addr=" MAC_FMT ")", - rx->key->keyidx, - hdr->addr1[0] & 0x01 ? "broad" : "uni", - MAC_ARG(hdr->addr2)); - memset(&wrqu, 0, sizeof(wrqu)); - wrqu.data.length = strlen(buf); - wireless_send_event(rx->dev, IWEVCUSTOM, &wrqu, buf); - kfree(buf); - } while (0); - - if (!rx->local->apdev) - return TXRX_DROP; - - ieee80211_rx_mgmt(rx->local, rx->skb, rx->u.rx.status, - ieee80211_msg_michael_mic_failure); + "%s\n", rx->dev->name, print_mac(mac, sa)); - return TXRX_QUEUED; + mac80211_ev_michael_mic_failure(rx->dev, rx->key->conf.keyidx, + (void *) skb->data); + return TXRX_DROP; } - remove_mic: /* remove Michael MIC from payload */ skb_trim(skb, skb->len - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN); + /* update IV in key information to be able to detect replays */ + rx->key->u.tkip.iv32_rx[rx->u.rx.queue] = rx->u.rx.tkip_iv32; + rx->key->u.tkip.iv16_rx[rx->u.rx.queue] = rx->u.rx.tkip_iv16; + return TXRX_CONTINUE; } @@ -230,7 +196,11 @@ static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx, hdrlen = ieee80211_get_hdrlen(fc); len = skb->len - hdrlen; - tailneed = !tx->key->force_sw_encrypt ? 0 : TKIP_ICV_LEN; + if (tx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE) + tailneed = 0; + else + tailneed = TKIP_ICV_LEN; + if ((skb_headroom(skb) < TKIP_IV_LEN || skb_tailroom(skb) < tailneed)) { I802_DEBUG_INC(tx->local->tx_expand_skb_head); @@ -248,8 +218,7 @@ static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx, if (key->u.tkip.iv16 == 0) key->u.tkip.iv32++; - if (!tx->key->force_sw_encrypt) { - u32 flags = tx->local->hw.flags; + if (tx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE) { hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; /* hwaccel - with preallocated room for IV */ @@ -259,23 +228,7 @@ static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx, 0x7f), (u8) key->u.tkip.iv16); - if (flags & IEEE80211_HW_TKIP_REQ_PHASE2_KEY) - ieee80211_tkip_gen_rc4key(key, hdr->addr2, - tx->u.tx.control->tkip_key); - else if (flags & IEEE80211_HW_TKIP_REQ_PHASE1_KEY) { - if (key->u.tkip.iv16 == 0 || - !key->u.tkip.tx_initialized) { - ieee80211_tkip_gen_phase1key(key, hdr->addr2, - (u16 *)tx->u.tx.control->tkip_key); - key->u.tkip.tx_initialized = 1; - tx->u.tx.control->flags |= - IEEE80211_TXCTL_TKIP_NEW_PHASE1_KEY; - } else - tx->u.tx.control->flags &= - ~IEEE80211_TXCTL_TKIP_NEW_PHASE1_KEY; - } - - tx->u.tx.control->key_idx = tx->key->hw_key_idx; + tx->u.tx.control->key_idx = tx->key->conf.hw_key_idx; return 0; } @@ -290,28 +243,27 @@ static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx, ieee80211_txrx_result -ieee80211_tx_h_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx) +ieee80211_crypto_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx) { struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) tx->skb->data; u16 fc; - struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key; struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb; int wpa_test = 0, test = 0; fc = le16_to_cpu(hdr->frame_control); - if (!key || key->alg != ALG_TKIP || !WLAN_FC_DATA_PRESENT(fc)) + if (!WLAN_FC_DATA_PRESENT(fc)) return TXRX_CONTINUE; tx->u.tx.control->icv_len = TKIP_ICV_LEN; tx->u.tx.control->iv_len = TKIP_IV_LEN; ieee80211_tx_set_iswep(tx); - if (!tx->key->force_sw_encrypt && - !(tx->local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_WEP_INCLUDE_IV) && + if ((tx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE) && + !(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) && !wpa_test) { /* hwaccel - with no need for preallocated room for IV/ICV */ - tx->u.tx.control->key_idx = tx->key->hw_key_idx; + tx->u.tx.control->key_idx = tx->key->conf.hw_key_idx; return TXRX_CONTINUE; } @@ -332,30 +284,31 @@ ieee80211_tx_h_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx) ieee80211_txrx_result -ieee80211_rx_h_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx) +ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx) { struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) rx->skb->data; u16 fc; int hdrlen, res, hwaccel = 0, wpa_test = 0; struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key; struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb; + DECLARE_MAC_BUF(mac); fc = le16_to_cpu(hdr->frame_control); hdrlen = ieee80211_get_hdrlen(fc); - if (!rx->key || rx->key->alg != ALG_TKIP || - !(rx->fc & IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED) || - (rx->fc & IEEE80211_FCTL_FTYPE) != IEEE80211_FTYPE_DATA) + if ((rx->fc & IEEE80211_FCTL_FTYPE) != IEEE80211_FTYPE_DATA) return TXRX_CONTINUE; if (!rx->sta || skb->len - hdrlen < 12) return TXRX_DROP; - if ((rx->u.rx.status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) && - !rx->key->force_sw_encrypt) { - if (!(rx->local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_WEP_INCLUDE_IV)) { - /* Hardware takes care of all processing, including - * replay protection, so no need to continue here. */ + if (rx->u.rx.status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) { + if (rx->u.rx.status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED) { + /* + * Hardware took care of all processing, including + * replay protection, and stripped the ICV/IV so + * we cannot do any checks here. + */ return TXRX_CONTINUE; } @@ -366,11 +319,13 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx) res = ieee80211_tkip_decrypt_data(rx->local->wep_rx_tfm, key, skb->data + hdrlen, skb->len - hdrlen, rx->sta->addr, - hwaccel, rx->u.rx.queue); + hwaccel, rx->u.rx.queue, + &rx->u.rx.tkip_iv32, + &rx->u.rx.tkip_iv16); if (res != TKIP_DECRYPT_OK || wpa_test) { printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: TKIP decrypt failed for RX frame from " - MAC_FMT " (res=%d)\n", - rx->dev->name, MAC_ARG(rx->sta->addr), res); + "%s (res=%d)\n", + rx->dev->name, print_mac(mac, rx->sta->addr), res); return TXRX_DROP; } @@ -496,7 +451,10 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx, hdrlen = ieee80211_get_hdrlen(fc); len = skb->len - hdrlen; - tailneed = !key->force_sw_encrypt ? 0 : CCMP_MIC_LEN; + if (key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE) + tailneed = 0; + else + tailneed = CCMP_MIC_LEN; if ((skb_headroom(skb) < CCMP_HDR_LEN || skb_tailroom(skb) < tailneed)) { @@ -520,11 +478,11 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx, break; } - ccmp_pn2hdr(pos, pn, key->keyidx); + ccmp_pn2hdr(pos, pn, key->conf.keyidx); - if (!key->force_sw_encrypt) { + if (key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE) { /* hwaccel - with preallocated room for CCMP header */ - tx->u.tx.control->key_idx = key->hw_key_idx; + tx->u.tx.control->key_idx = key->conf.hw_key_idx; return 0; } @@ -538,28 +496,27 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx, ieee80211_txrx_result -ieee80211_tx_h_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx) +ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx) { struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) tx->skb->data; - struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key; u16 fc; struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb; int test = 0; fc = le16_to_cpu(hdr->frame_control); - if (!key || key->alg != ALG_CCMP || !WLAN_FC_DATA_PRESENT(fc)) + if (!WLAN_FC_DATA_PRESENT(fc)) return TXRX_CONTINUE; tx->u.tx.control->icv_len = CCMP_MIC_LEN; tx->u.tx.control->iv_len = CCMP_HDR_LEN; ieee80211_tx_set_iswep(tx); - if (!tx->key->force_sw_encrypt && - !(tx->local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_WEP_INCLUDE_IV)) { + if ((tx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE) && + !(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV)) { /* hwaccel - with no need for preallocated room for CCMP " * header or MIC fields */ - tx->u.tx.control->key_idx = tx->key->hw_key_idx; + tx->u.tx.control->key_idx = tx->key->conf.hw_key_idx; return TXRX_CONTINUE; } @@ -568,7 +525,6 @@ ieee80211_tx_h_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx) if (tx->u.tx.extra_frag) { int i; - for (i = 0; i < tx->u.tx.num_extra_frag; i++) { if (ccmp_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->u.tx.extra_frag[i], test) < 0) @@ -581,7 +537,7 @@ ieee80211_tx_h_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx) ieee80211_txrx_result -ieee80211_rx_h_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx) +ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx) { struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) rx->skb->data; u16 fc; @@ -590,13 +546,12 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx) struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb; u8 pn[CCMP_PN_LEN]; int data_len; + DECLARE_MAC_BUF(mac); fc = le16_to_cpu(hdr->frame_control); hdrlen = ieee80211_get_hdrlen(fc); - if (!key || key->alg != ALG_CCMP || - !(rx->fc & IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED) || - (rx->fc & IEEE80211_FCTL_FTYPE) != IEEE80211_FTYPE_DATA) + if ((rx->fc & IEEE80211_FCTL_FTYPE) != IEEE80211_FTYPE_DATA) return TXRX_CONTINUE; data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - CCMP_HDR_LEN - CCMP_MIC_LEN; @@ -604,8 +559,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx) return TXRX_DROP; if ((rx->u.rx.status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) && - !key->force_sw_encrypt && - !(rx->local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_WEP_INCLUDE_IV)) + (rx->u.rx.status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED)) return TXRX_CONTINUE; (void) ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen); @@ -613,10 +567,11 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx) if (memcmp(pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[rx->u.rx.queue], CCMP_PN_LEN) <= 0) { #ifdef CONFIG_MAC80211_DEBUG u8 *ppn = key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[rx->u.rx.queue]; + printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: CCMP replay detected for RX frame from " - MAC_FMT " (RX PN %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x <= prev. PN " + "%s (RX PN %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x <= prev. PN " "%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x)\n", rx->dev->name, - MAC_ARG(rx->sta->addr), + print_mac(mac, rx->sta->addr), pn[0], pn[1], pn[2], pn[3], pn[4], pn[5], ppn[0], ppn[1], ppn[2], ppn[3], ppn[4], ppn[5]); #endif /* CONFIG_MAC80211_DEBUG */ @@ -624,10 +579,8 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx) return TXRX_DROP; } - if ((rx->u.rx.status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) && - !key->force_sw_encrypt) { - /* hwaccel has already decrypted frame and verified MIC */ - } else { + if (!(rx->u.rx.status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) { + /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */ u8 *scratch, *b_0, *aad; scratch = key->u.ccmp.rx_crypto_buf; @@ -642,8 +595,8 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx) skb->data + skb->len - CCMP_MIC_LEN, skb->data + hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN)) { printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: CCMP decrypt failed for RX " - "frame from " MAC_FMT "\n", rx->dev->name, - MAC_ARG(rx->sta->addr)); + "frame from %s\n", rx->dev->name, + print_mac(mac, rx->sta->addr)); return TXRX_DROP; } } @@ -657,4 +610,3 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx) return TXRX_CONTINUE; } - |