diff options
| author | Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> | 2013-03-25 20:07:01 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> | 2013-08-28 21:35:14 -0700 |
| commit | 7dc5dbc879bd0779924b5132a48b731a0bc04a1e (patch) | |
| tree | bcae7323006aa19fc91c27fdb156667c9a061809 /net/core | |
| parent | e51db73532955dc5eaba4235e62b74b460709d5b (diff) | |
sysfs: Restrict mounting sysfs
Don't allow mounting sysfs unless the caller has CAP_SYS_ADMIN rights
over the net namespace. The principle here is if you create or have
capabilities over it you can mount it, otherwise you get to live with
what other people have mounted.
Instead of testing this with a straight forward ns_capable call,
perform this check the long and torturous way with kobject helpers,
this keeps direct knowledge of namespaces out of sysfs, and preserves
the existing sysfs abstractions.
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/core')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/core/net-sysfs.c | 8 |
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/core/net-sysfs.c b/net/core/net-sysfs.c index 981fed397d1..9bd9ae16adf 100644 --- a/net/core/net-sysfs.c +++ b/net/core/net-sysfs.c @@ -1157,6 +1157,13 @@ static void remove_queue_kobjects(struct net_device *net) #endif } +static bool net_current_may_mount(void) +{ + struct net *net = current->nsproxy->net_ns; + + return ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); +} + static void *net_grab_current_ns(void) { struct net *ns = current->nsproxy->net_ns; @@ -1179,6 +1186,7 @@ static const void *net_netlink_ns(struct sock *sk) struct kobj_ns_type_operations net_ns_type_operations = { .type = KOBJ_NS_TYPE_NET, + .current_may_mount = net_current_may_mount, .grab_current_ns = net_grab_current_ns, .netlink_ns = net_netlink_ns, .initial_ns = net_initial_ns, |