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| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2013-11-08 08:54:53 +0900 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2013-11-08 08:54:53 +0900 |
| commit | 6c86ae2928f9e4cbf0d5844f5fcfd549e3450b8c (patch) | |
| tree | 47963d4a27f4dd318474de096ba2aca7e90f7150 /kernel | |
| parent | 3ae423fe4734af3b2f7ac718c6e64e72bfe443b3 (diff) | |
| parent | 12ae030d54ef250706da5642fc7697cc60ad0df7 (diff) | |
Merge tag 'ftrace-urgent-3.12-v2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull perf/ftrace fix from Steven Rostedt:
"Dave Jones's trinity program was able to enable the function tracer
from a normal user account via the perf syscall "perf_event_open()".
When I was able to reproduce it with trinity, I was able to track down
exactly how it happened.
I discovered that the check for whether the function tracepoint should
be activated or not was using the "perf_paranoid_kernel()" check which
by default, lets the user continue. The user should not by default be
able to enable function tracing.
The fix is to use "perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw()" which will not let
the user enable function tracing. This is a security fix as normal
users should never be allowed to enable the function tracer"
* tag 'ftrace-urgent-3.12-v2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
perf/ftrace: Fix paranoid level for enabling function tracer
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c b/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c index 80c36bcf66e..78e27e3b52a 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ static int perf_trace_event_perm(struct ftrace_event_call *tp_event, { /* The ftrace function trace is allowed only for root. */ if (ftrace_event_is_function(tp_event) && - perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; /* No tracing, just counting, so no obvious leak */ |