move RLIMIT_NPROC check from set_user() to do_execve_common()

The patch http://lkml.org/lkml/2003/7/13/226 introduced an RLIMIT_NPROC
check in set_user() to check for NPROC exceeding via setuid() and
similar functions.

Before the check there was a possibility to greatly exceed the allowed
number of processes by an unprivileged user if the program relied on
rlimit only.  But the check created new security threat: many poorly
written programs simply don't check setuid() return code and believe it
cannot fail if executed with root privileges.  So, the check is removed
in this patch because of too often privilege escalations related to
buggy programs.

The NPROC can still be enforced in the common code flow of daemons
spawning user processes.  Most of daemons do fork()+setuid()+execve().
The check introduced in execve() (1) enforces the same limit as in
setuid() and (2) doesn't create similar security issues.

Neil Brown suggested to track what specific process has exceeded the
limit by setting PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED process flag.  With the change only
this process would fail on execve(), and other processes' execve()
behaviour is not changed.

Solar Designer suggested to re-check whether NPROC limit is still
exceeded at the moment of execve().  If the process was sleeping for
days between set*uid() and execve(), and the NPROC counter step down
under the limit, the defered execve() failure because NPROC limit was
exceeded days ago would be unexpected.  If the limit is not exceeded
anymore, we clear the flag on successful calls to execve() and fork().

The flag is also cleared on successful calls to set_user() as the limit
was exceeded for the previous user, not the current one.

Similar check was introduced in -ow patches (without the process flag).

v3 - clear PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED on successful calls to set_user().

Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Acked-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

3 files changed, 14 insertions, 8 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 174fa84eca3..8ef31f53c44 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -508,10 +508,8 @@ int commit_creds(struct cred *new)
 		key_fsgid_changed(task);
 
 	/* do it
-	 * - What if a process setreuid()'s and this brings the
-	 *   new uid over his NPROC rlimit?  We can check this now
-	 *   cheaply with the new uid cache, so if it matters
-	 *   we should be checking for it.  -DaveM
+	 * RLIMIT_NPROC limits on user->processes have already been checked
+	 * in set_user().
 	 */
 	alter_cred_subscribers(new, 2);
 	if (new->user != old->user)
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index e7ceaca8960..8e6b6f4fb27 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -1111,6 +1111,7 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags,
 		    p->real_cred->user != INIT_USER)
 			goto bad_fork_free;
 	}
+	current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED;
 
 	retval = copy_creds(p, clone_flags);
 	if (retval < 0)
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index a101ba36c44..dd948a1fca4 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -621,11 +621,18 @@ static int set_user(struct cred *new)
 	if (!new_user)
 		return -EAGAIN;
 
+	/*
+	 * We don't fail in case of NPROC limit excess here because too many
+	 * poorly written programs don't check set*uid() return code, assuming
+	 * it never fails if called by root.  We may still enforce NPROC limit
+	 * for programs doing set*uid()+execve() by harmlessly deferring the
+	 * failure to the execve() stage.
+	 */
 	if (atomic_read(&new_user->processes) >= rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC) &&
-			new_user != INIT_USER) {
-		free_uid(new_user);
-		return -EAGAIN;
-	}
+			new_user != INIT_USER)
+		current->flags |= PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED;
+	else
+		current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED;
 
 	free_uid(new->user);
 	new->user = new_user;