Linux-2.6.12-rc2v2.6.12-rc2

Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.

Let it rip!

1 files changed, 1725 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..462d78d5589
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1725 @@
+/*
+ *  linux/kernel/sys.c
+ *
+ *  Copyright (C) 1991, 1992  Linus Torvalds
+ */
+
+#include <linux/config.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/utsname.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
+#include <linux/notifier.h>
+#include <linux/reboot.h>
+#include <linux/prctl.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/highuid.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/workqueue.h>
+#include <linux/device.h>
+#include <linux/key.h>
+#include <linux/times.h>
+#include <linux/posix-timers.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/dcookies.h>
+#include <linux/suspend.h>
+#include <linux/tty.h>
+
+#include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+
+#include <asm/uaccess.h>
+#include <asm/io.h>
+#include <asm/unistd.h>
+
+#ifndef SET_UNALIGN_CTL
+# define SET_UNALIGN_CTL(a,b)	(-EINVAL)
+#endif
+#ifndef GET_UNALIGN_CTL
+# define GET_UNALIGN_CTL(a,b)	(-EINVAL)
+#endif
+#ifndef SET_FPEMU_CTL
+# define SET_FPEMU_CTL(a,b)	(-EINVAL)
+#endif
+#ifndef GET_FPEMU_CTL
+# define GET_FPEMU_CTL(a,b)	(-EINVAL)
+#endif
+#ifndef SET_FPEXC_CTL
+# define SET_FPEXC_CTL(a,b)	(-EINVAL)
+#endif
+#ifndef GET_FPEXC_CTL
+# define GET_FPEXC_CTL(a,b)	(-EINVAL)
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * this is where the system-wide overflow UID and GID are defined, for
+ * architectures that now have 32-bit UID/GID but didn't in the past
+ */
+
+int overflowuid = DEFAULT_OVERFLOWUID;
+int overflowgid = DEFAULT_OVERFLOWGID;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_UID16
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(overflowuid);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(overflowgid);
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * the same as above, but for filesystems which can only store a 16-bit
+ * UID and GID. as such, this is needed on all architectures
+ */
+
+int fs_overflowuid = DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWUID;
+int fs_overflowgid = DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWUID;
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_overflowuid);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_overflowgid);
+
+/*
+ * this indicates whether you can reboot with ctrl-alt-del: the default is yes
+ */
+
+int C_A_D = 1;
+int cad_pid = 1;
+
+/*
+ *	Notifier list for kernel code which wants to be called
+ *	at shutdown. This is used to stop any idling DMA operations
+ *	and the like. 
+ */
+
+static struct notifier_block *reboot_notifier_list;
+static DEFINE_RWLOCK(notifier_lock);
+
+/**
+ *	notifier_chain_register	- Add notifier to a notifier chain
+ *	@list: Pointer to root list pointer
+ *	@n: New entry in notifier chain
+ *
+ *	Adds a notifier to a notifier chain.
+ *
+ *	Currently always returns zero.
+ */
+ 
+int notifier_chain_register(struct notifier_block **list, struct notifier_block *n)
+{
+	write_lock(&notifier_lock);
+	while(*list)
+	{
+		if(n->priority > (*list)->priority)
+			break;
+		list= &((*list)->next);
+	}
+	n->next = *list;
+	*list=n;
+	write_unlock(&notifier_lock);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(notifier_chain_register);
+
+/**
+ *	notifier_chain_unregister - Remove notifier from a notifier chain
+ *	@nl: Pointer to root list pointer
+ *	@n: New entry in notifier chain
+ *
+ *	Removes a notifier from a notifier chain.
+ *
+ *	Returns zero on success, or %-ENOENT on failure.
+ */
+ 
+int notifier_chain_unregister(struct notifier_block **nl, struct notifier_block *n)
+{
+	write_lock(&notifier_lock);
+	while((*nl)!=NULL)
+	{
+		if((*nl)==n)
+		{
+			*nl=n->next;
+			write_unlock(&notifier_lock);
+			return 0;
+		}
+		nl=&((*nl)->next);
+	}
+	write_unlock(&notifier_lock);
+	return -ENOENT;
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(notifier_chain_unregister);
+
+/**
+ *	notifier_call_chain - Call functions in a notifier chain
+ *	@n: Pointer to root pointer of notifier chain
+ *	@val: Value passed unmodified to notifier function
+ *	@v: Pointer passed unmodified to notifier function
+ *
+ *	Calls each function in a notifier chain in turn.
+ *
+ *	If the return value of the notifier can be and'd
+ *	with %NOTIFY_STOP_MASK, then notifier_call_chain
+ *	will return immediately, with the return value of
+ *	the notifier function which halted execution.
+ *	Otherwise, the return value is the return value
+ *	of the last notifier function called.
+ */
+ 
+int notifier_call_chain(struct notifier_block **n, unsigned long val, void *v)
+{
+	int ret=NOTIFY_DONE;
+	struct notifier_block *nb = *n;
+
+	while(nb)
+	{
+		ret=nb->notifier_call(nb,val,v);
+		if(ret&NOTIFY_STOP_MASK)
+		{
+			return ret;
+		}
+		nb=nb->next;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(notifier_call_chain);
+
+/**
+ *	register_reboot_notifier - Register function to be called at reboot time
+ *	@nb: Info about notifier function to be called
+ *
+ *	Registers a function with the list of functions
+ *	to be called at reboot time.
+ *
+ *	Currently always returns zero, as notifier_chain_register
+ *	always returns zero.
+ */
+ 
+int register_reboot_notifier(struct notifier_block * nb)
+{
+	return notifier_chain_register(&reboot_notifier_list, nb);
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(register_reboot_notifier);
+
+/**
+ *	unregister_reboot_notifier - Unregister previously registered reboot notifier
+ *	@nb: Hook to be unregistered
+ *
+ *	Unregisters a previously registered reboot
+ *	notifier function.
+ *
+ *	Returns zero on success, or %-ENOENT on failure.
+ */
+ 
+int unregister_reboot_notifier(struct notifier_block * nb)
+{
+	return notifier_chain_unregister(&reboot_notifier_list, nb);
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_reboot_notifier);
+
+static int set_one_prio(struct task_struct *p, int niceval, int error)
+{
+	int no_nice;
+
+	if (p->uid != current->euid &&
+		p->euid != current->euid && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
+		error = -EPERM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (niceval < task_nice(p) && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
+		error = -EACCES;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	no_nice = security_task_setnice(p, niceval);
+	if (no_nice) {
+		error = no_nice;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (error == -ESRCH)
+		error = 0;
+	set_user_nice(p, niceval);
+out:
+	return error;
+}
+
+asmlinkage long sys_setpriority(int which, int who, int niceval)
+{
+	struct task_struct *g, *p;
+	struct user_struct *user;
+	int error = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (which > 2 || which < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* normalize: avoid signed division (rounding problems) */
+	error = -ESRCH;
+	if (niceval < -20)
+		niceval = -20;
+	if (niceval > 19)
+		niceval = 19;
+
+	read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+	switch (which) {
+		case PRIO_PROCESS:
+			if (!who)
+				who = current->pid;
+			p = find_task_by_pid(who);
+			if (p)
+				error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error);
+			break;
+		case PRIO_PGRP:
+			if (!who)
+				who = process_group(current);
+			do_each_task_pid(who, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) {
+				error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error);
+			} while_each_task_pid(who, PIDTYPE_PGID, p);
+			break;
+		case PRIO_USER:
+			user = current->user;
+			if (!who)
+				who = current->uid;
+			else
+				if ((who != current->uid) && !(user = find_user(who)))
+					goto out_unlock;	/* No processes for this user */
+
+			do_each_thread(g, p)
+				if (p->uid == who)
+					error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error);
+			while_each_thread(g, p);
+			if (who != current->uid)
+				free_uid(user);		/* For find_user() */
+			break;
+	}
+out_unlock:
+	read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+out:
+	return error;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Ugh. To avoid negative return values, "getpriority()" will
+ * not return the normal nice-value, but a negated value that
+ * has been offset by 20 (ie it returns 40..1 instead of -20..19)
+ * to stay compatible.
+ */
+asmlinkage long sys_getpriority(int which, int who)
+{
+	struct task_struct *g, *p;
+	struct user_struct *user;
+	long niceval, retval = -ESRCH;
+
+	if (which > 2 || which < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+	switch (which) {
+		case PRIO_PROCESS:
+			if (!who)
+				who = current->pid;
+			p = find_task_by_pid(who);
+			if (p) {
+				niceval = 20 - task_nice(p);
+				if (niceval > retval)
+					retval = niceval;
+			}
+			break;
+		case PRIO_PGRP:
+			if (!who)
+				who = process_group(current);
+			do_each_task_pid(who, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) {
+				niceval = 20 - task_nice(p);
+				if (niceval > retval)
+					retval = niceval;
+			} while_each_task_pid(who, PIDTYPE_PGID, p);
+			break;
+		case PRIO_USER:
+			user = current->user;
+			if (!who)
+				who = current->uid;
+			else
+				if ((who != current->uid) && !(user = find_user(who)))
+					goto out_unlock;	/* No processes for this user */
+
+			do_each_thread(g, p)
+				if (p->uid == who) {
+					niceval = 20 - task_nice(p);
+					if (niceval > retval)
+						retval = niceval;
+				}
+			while_each_thread(g, p);
+			if (who != current->uid)
+				free_uid(user);		/* for find_user() */
+			break;
+	}
+out_unlock:
+	read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+
+	return retval;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Reboot system call: for obvious reasons only root may call it,
+ * and even root needs to set up some magic numbers in the registers
+ * so that some mistake won't make this reboot the whole machine.
+ * You can also set the meaning of the ctrl-alt-del-key here.
+ *
+ * reboot doesn't sync: do that yourself before calling this.
+ */
+asmlinkage long sys_reboot(int magic1, int magic2, unsigned int cmd, void __user * arg)
+{
+	char buffer[256];
+
+	/* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */
+	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	/* For safety, we require "magic" arguments. */
+	if (magic1 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC1 ||
+	    (magic2 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2 &&
+	                magic2 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2A &&
+			magic2 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2B &&
+	                magic2 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2C))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	lock_kernel();
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_RESTART:
+		notifier_call_chain(&reboot_notifier_list, SYS_RESTART, NULL);
+		system_state = SYSTEM_RESTART;
+		device_shutdown();
+		printk(KERN_EMERG "Restarting system.\n");
+		machine_restart(NULL);
+		break;
+
+	case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_CAD_ON:
+		C_A_D = 1;
+		break;
+
+	case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_CAD_OFF:
+		C_A_D = 0;
+		break;
+
+	case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_HALT:
+		notifier_call_chain(&reboot_notifier_list, SYS_HALT, NULL);
+		system_state = SYSTEM_HALT;
+		device_shutdown();
+		printk(KERN_EMERG "System halted.\n");
+		machine_halt();
+		unlock_kernel();
+		do_exit(0);
+		break;
+
+	case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_POWER_OFF:
+		notifier_call_chain(&reboot_notifier_list, SYS_POWER_OFF, NULL);
+		system_state = SYSTEM_POWER_OFF;
+		device_shutdown();
+		printk(KERN_EMERG "Power down.\n");
+		machine_power_off();
+		unlock_kernel();
+		do_exit(0);
+		break;
+
+	case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_RESTART2:
+		if (strncpy_from_user(&buffer[0], arg, sizeof(buffer) - 1) < 0) {
+			unlock_kernel();
+			return -EFAULT;
+		}
+		buffer[sizeof(buffer) - 1] = '\0';
+
+		notifier_call_chain(&reboot_notifier_list, SYS_RESTART, buffer);
+		system_state = SYSTEM_RESTART;
+		device_shutdown();
+		printk(KERN_EMERG "Restarting system with command '%s'.\n", buffer);
+		machine_restart(buffer);
+		break;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SOFTWARE_SUSPEND
+	case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_SW_SUSPEND:
+		{
+			int ret = software_suspend();
+			unlock_kernel();
+			return ret;
+		}
+#endif
+
+	default:
+		unlock_kernel();
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	unlock_kernel();
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void deferred_cad(void *dummy)
+{
+	notifier_call_chain(&reboot_notifier_list, SYS_RESTART, NULL);
+	machine_restart(NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function gets called by ctrl-alt-del - ie the keyboard interrupt.
+ * As it's called within an interrupt, it may NOT sync: the only choice
+ * is whether to reboot at once, or just ignore the ctrl-alt-del.
+ */
+void ctrl_alt_del(void)
+{
+	static DECLARE_WORK(cad_work, deferred_cad, NULL);
+
+	if (C_A_D)
+		schedule_work(&cad_work);
+	else
+		kill_proc(cad_pid, SIGINT, 1);
+}
+	
+
+/*
+ * Unprivileged users may change the real gid to the effective gid
+ * or vice versa.  (BSD-style)
+ *
+ * If you set the real gid at all, or set the effective gid to a value not
+ * equal to the real gid, then the saved gid is set to the new effective gid.
+ *
+ * This makes it possible for a setgid program to completely drop its
+ * privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing
+ * a security audit over a program.
+ *
+ * The general idea is that a program which uses just setregid() will be
+ * 100% compatible with BSD.  A program which uses just setgid() will be
+ * 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs. 
+ *
+ * SMP: There are not races, the GIDs are checked only by filesystem
+ *      operations (as far as semantic preservation is concerned).
+ */
+asmlinkage long sys_setregid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid)
+{
+	int old_rgid = current->gid;
+	int old_egid = current->egid;
+	int new_rgid = old_rgid;
+	int new_egid = old_egid;
+	int retval;
+
+	retval = security_task_setgid(rgid, egid, (gid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_RE);
+	if (retval)
+		return retval;
+
+	if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) {
+		if ((old_rgid == rgid) ||
+		    (current->egid==rgid) ||
+		    capable(CAP_SETGID))
+			new_rgid = rgid;
+		else
+			return -EPERM;
+	}
+	if (egid != (gid_t) -1) {
+		if ((old_rgid == egid) ||
+		    (current->egid == egid) ||
+		    (current->sgid == egid) ||
+		    capable(CAP_SETGID))
+			new_egid = egid;
+		else {
+			return -EPERM;
+		}
+	}
+	if (new_egid != old_egid)
+	{
+		current->mm->dumpable = 0;
+		wmb();
+	}
+	if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 ||
+	    (egid != (gid_t) -1 && egid != old_rgid))
+		current->sgid = new_egid;
+	current->fsgid = new_egid;
+	current->egid = new_egid;
+	current->gid = new_rgid;
+	key_fsgid_changed(current);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * setgid() is implemented like SysV w/ SAVED_IDS 
+ *
+ * SMP: Same implicit races as above.
+ */
+asmlinkage long sys_setgid(gid_t gid)
+{
+	int old_egid = current->egid;
+	int retval;
+
+	retval = security_task_setgid(gid, (gid_t)-1, (gid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_ID);
+	if (retval)
+		return retval;
+
+	if (capable(CAP_SETGID))
+	{
+		if(old_egid != gid)
+		{
+			current->mm->dumpable=0;
+			wmb();
+		}
+		current->gid = current->egid = current->sgid = current->fsgid = gid;
+	}
+	else if ((gid == current->gid) || (gid == current->sgid))
+	{
+		if(old_egid != gid)
+		{
+			current->mm->dumpable=0;
+			wmb();
+		}
+		current->egid = current->fsgid = gid;
+	}
+	else
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	key_fsgid_changed(current);
+	return 0;
+}
+  
+static int set_user(uid_t new_ruid, int dumpclear)
+{
+	struct user_struct *new_user;
+
+	new_user = alloc_uid(new_ruid);
+	if (!new_user)
+		return -EAGAIN;
+
+	if (atomic_read(&new_user->processes) >=
+				current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC].rlim_cur &&
+			new_user != &root_user) {
+		free_uid(new_user);
+		return -EAGAIN;
+	}
+
+	switch_uid(new_user);
+
+	if(dumpclear)
+	{
+		current->mm->dumpable = 0;
+		wmb();
+	}
+	current->uid = new_ruid;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Unprivileged users may change the real uid to the effective uid
+ * or vice versa.  (BSD-style)
+ *
+ * If you set the real uid at all, or set the effective uid to a value not
+ * equal to the real uid, then the saved uid is set to the new effective uid.
+ *
+ * This makes it possible for a setuid program to completely drop its
+ * privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing
+ * a security audit over a program.
+ *
+ * The general idea is that a program which uses just setreuid() will be
+ * 100% compatible with BSD.  A program which uses just setuid() will be
+ * 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs. 
+ */
+asmlinkage long sys_setreuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid)
+{
+	int old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, new_ruid, new_euid;
+	int retval;
+
+	retval = security_task_setuid(ruid, euid, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_RE);
+	if (retval)
+		return retval;
+
+	new_ruid = old_ruid = current->uid;
+	new_euid = old_euid = current->euid;
+	old_suid = current->suid;
+
+	if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) {
+		new_ruid = ruid;
+		if ((old_ruid != ruid) &&
+		    (current->euid != ruid) &&
+		    !capable(CAP_SETUID))
+			return -EPERM;
+	}
+
+	if (euid != (uid_t) -1) {
+		new_euid = euid;
+		if ((old_ruid != euid) &&
+		    (current->euid != euid) &&
+		    (current->suid != euid) &&
+		    !capable(CAP_SETUID))
+			return -EPERM;
+	}
+
+	if (new_ruid != old_ruid && set_user(new_ruid, new_euid != old_euid) < 0)
+		return -EAGAIN;
+
+	if (new_euid != old_euid)
+	{
+		current->mm->dumpable=0;
+		wmb();
+	}
+	current->fsuid = current->euid = new_euid;
+	if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 ||
+	    (euid != (uid_t) -1 && euid != old_ruid))
+		current->suid = current->euid;
+	current->fsuid = current->euid;
+
+	key_fsuid_changed(current);
+
+	return security_task_post_setuid(old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, LSM_SETID_RE);
+}
+
+
+		
+/*
+ * setuid() is implemented like SysV with SAVED_IDS 
+ * 
+ * Note that SAVED_ID's is deficient in that a setuid root program
+ * like sendmail, for example, cannot set its uid to be a normal 
+ * user and then switch back, because if you're root, setuid() sets
+ * the saved uid too.  If you don't like this, blame the bright people
+ * in the POSIX committee and/or USG.  Note that the BSD-style setreuid()
+ * will allow a root program to temporarily drop privileges and be able to
+ * regain them by swapping the real and effective uid.  
+ */
+asmlinkage long sys_setuid(uid_t uid)
+{
+	int old_euid = current->euid;
+	int old_ruid, old_suid, new_ruid, new_suid;
+	int retval;
+
+	retval = security_task_setuid(uid, (uid_t)-1, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_ID);
+	if (retval)
+		return retval;
+
+	old_ruid = new_ruid = current->uid;
+	old_suid = current->suid;
+	new_suid = old_suid;
+	
+	if (capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
+		if (uid != old_ruid && set_user(uid, old_euid != uid) < 0)
+			return -EAGAIN;
+		new_suid = uid;
+	} else if ((uid != current->uid) && (uid != new_suid))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (old_euid != uid)
+	{
+		current->mm->dumpable = 0;
+		wmb();
+	}
+	current->fsuid = current->euid = uid;
+	current->suid = new_suid;
+
+	key_fsuid_changed(current);
+
+	return security_task_post_setuid(old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, LSM_SETID_ID);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * This function implements a generic ability to update ruid, euid,
+ * and suid.  This allows you to implement the 4.4 compatible seteuid().
+ */
+asmlinkage long sys_setresuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid, uid_t suid)
+{
+	int old_ruid = current->uid;
+	int old_euid = current->euid;
+	int old_suid = current->suid;
+	int retval;
+
+	retval = security_task_setuid(ruid, euid, suid, LSM_SETID_RES);
+	if (retval)
+		return retval;
+
+	if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
+		if ((ruid != (uid_t) -1) && (ruid != current->uid) &&
+		    (ruid != current->euid) && (ruid != current->suid))
+			return -EPERM;
+		if ((euid != (uid_t) -1) && (euid != current->uid) &&
+		    (euid != current->euid) && (euid != current->suid))
+			return -EPERM;
+		if ((suid != (uid_t) -1) && (suid != current->uid) &&
+		    (suid != current->euid) && (suid != current->suid))
+			return -EPERM;
+	}
+	if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) {
+		if (ruid != current->uid && set_user(ruid, euid != current->euid) < 0)
+			return -EAGAIN;
+	}
+	if (euid != (uid_t) -1) {
+		if (euid != current->euid)
+		{
+			current->mm->dumpable = 0;
+			wmb();
+		}
+		current->euid = euid;
+	}
+	current->fsuid = current->euid;
+	if (suid != (uid_t) -1)
+		current->suid = suid;
+
+	key_fsuid_changed(current);
+
+	return security_task_post_setuid(old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, LSM_SETID_RES);
+}
+
+asmlinkage long sys_getresuid(uid_t __user *ruid, uid_t __user *euid, uid_t __user *suid)
+{
+	int retval;
+
+	if (!(retval = put_user(current->uid, ruid)) &&
+	    !(retval = put_user(current->euid, euid)))
+		retval = put_user(current->suid, suid);
+
+	return retval;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Same as above, but for rgid, egid, sgid.
+ */
+asmlinkage long sys_setresgid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid, gid_t sgid)
+{
+	int retval;
+
+	retval = security_task_setgid(rgid, egid, sgid, LSM_SETID_RES);
+	if (retval)
+		return retval;
+
+	if (!capable(CAP_SETGID)) {
+		if ((rgid != (gid_t) -1) && (rgid != current->gid) &&
+		    (rgid != current->egid) && (rgid != current->sgid))
+			return -EPERM;
+		if ((egid != (gid_t) -1) && (egid != current->gid) &&
+		    (egid != current->egid) && (egid != current->sgid))
+			return -EPERM;
+		if ((sgid != (gid_t) -1) && (sgid != current->gid) &&
+		    (sgid != current->egid) && (sgid != current->sgid))
+			return -EPERM;
+	}
+	if (egid != (gid_t) -1) {
+		if (egid != current->egid)
+		{
+			current->mm->dumpable = 0;
+			wmb();
+		}
+		current->egid = egid;
+	}
+	current->fsgid = current->egid;
+	if (rgid != (gid_t) -1)
+		current->gid = rgid;
+	if (sgid != (gid_t) -1)
+		current->sgid = sgid;
+
+	key_fsgid_changed(current);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+asmlinkage long sys_getresgid(gid_t __user *rgid, gid_t __user *egid, gid_t __user *sgid)
+{
+	int retval;
+
+	if (!(retval = put_user(current->gid, rgid)) &&
+	    !(retval = put_user(current->egid, egid)))
+		retval = put_user(current->sgid, sgid);
+
+	return retval;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * "setfsuid()" sets the fsuid - the uid used for filesystem checks. This
+ * is used for "access()" and for the NFS daemon (letting nfsd stay at
+ * whatever uid it wants to). It normally shadows "euid", except when
+ * explicitly set by setfsuid() or for access..
+ */
+asmlinkage long sys_setfsuid(uid_t uid)
+{
+	int old_fsuid;
+
+	old_fsuid = current->fsuid;
+	if (security_task_setuid(uid, (uid_t)-1, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_FS))
+		return old_fsuid;
+
+	if (uid == current->uid || uid == current->euid ||
+	    uid == current->suid || uid == current->fsuid || 
+	    capable(CAP_SETUID))
+	{
+		if (uid != old_fsuid)
+		{
+			current->mm->dumpable = 0;
+			wmb();
+		}
+		current->fsuid = uid;
+	}
+
+	key_fsuid_changed(current);
+
+	security_task_post_setuid(old_fsuid, (uid_t)-1, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_FS);
+
+	return old_fsuid;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Samma på svenska..
+ */
+asmlinkage long sys_setfsgid(gid_t gid)
+{
+	int old_fsgid;
+
+	old_fsgid = current->fsgid;
+	if (security_task_setgid(gid, (gid_t)-1, (gid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_FS))
+		return old_fsgid;
+
+	if (gid == current->gid || gid == current->egid ||
+	    gid == current->sgid || gid == current->fsgid || 
+	    capable(CAP_SETGID))
+	{
+		if (gid != old_fsgid)
+		{
+			current->mm->dumpable = 0;
+			wmb();
+		}
+		current->fsgid = gid;
+		key_fsgid_changed(current);
+	}
+	return old_fsgid;
+}
+
+asmlinkage long sys_times(struct tms __user * tbuf)
+{
+	/*
+	 *	In the SMP world we might just be unlucky and have one of
+	 *	the times increment as we use it. Since the value is an
+	 *	atomically safe type this is just fine. Conceptually its
+	 *	as if the syscall took an instant longer to occur.
+	 */
+	if (tbuf) {
+		struct tms tmp;
+		struct task_struct *tsk = current;
+		struct task_struct *t;
+		cputime_t utime, stime, cutime, cstime;
+
+		read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+		utime = tsk->signal->utime;
+		stime = tsk->signal->stime;
+		t = tsk;
+		do {
+			utime = cputime_add(utime, t->utime);
+			stime = cputime_add(stime, t->stime);
+			t = next_thread(t);
+		} while (t != tsk);
+
+		/*
+		 * While we have tasklist_lock read-locked, no dying thread
+		 * can be updating current->signal->[us]time.  Instead,
+		 * we got their counts included in the live thread loop.
+		 * However, another thread can come in right now and
+		 * do a wait call that updates current->signal->c[us]time.
+		 * To make sure we always see that pair updated atomically,
+		 * we take the siglock around fetching them.
+		 */
+		spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
+		cutime = tsk->signal->cutime;
+		cstime = tsk->signal->cstime;
+		spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
+		read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+
+		tmp.tms_utime = cputime_to_clock_t(utime);
+		tmp.tms_stime = cputime_to_clock_t(stime);
+		tmp.tms_cutime = cputime_to_clock_t(cutime);
+		tmp.tms_cstime = cputime_to_clock_t(cstime);
+		if (copy_to_user(tbuf, &tmp, sizeof(struct tms)))
+			return -EFAULT;
+	}
+	return (long) jiffies_64_to_clock_t(get_jiffies_64());
+}
+
+/*
+ * This needs some heavy checking ...
+ * I just haven't the stomach for it. I also don't fully
+ * understand sessions/pgrp etc. Let somebody who does explain it.
+ *
+ * OK, I think I have the protection semantics right.... this is really
+ * only important on a multi-user system anyway, to make sure one user
+ * can't send a signal to a process owned by another.  -TYT, 12/12/91
+ *
+ * Auch. Had to add the 'did_exec' flag to conform completely to POSIX.
+ * LBT 04.03.94
+ */
+
+asmlinkage long sys_setpgid(pid_t pid, pid_t pgid)
+{
+	struct task_struct *p;
+	int err = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!pid)
+		pid = current->pid;
+	if (!pgid)
+		pgid = pid;
+	if (pgid < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* From this point forward we keep holding onto the tasklist lock
+	 * so that our parent does not change from under us. -DaveM
+	 */
+	write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+
+	err = -ESRCH;
+	p = find_task_by_pid(pid);
+	if (!p)
+		goto out;
+
+	err = -EINVAL;
+	if (!thread_group_leader(p))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (p->parent == current || p->real_parent == current) {
+		err = -EPERM;
+		if (p->signal->session != current->signal->session)
+			goto out;
+		err = -EACCES;
+		if (p->did_exec)
+			goto out;
+	} else {
+		err = -ESRCH;
+		if (p != current)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	err = -EPERM;
+	if (p->signal->leader)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (pgid != pid) {
+		struct task_struct *p;
+
+		do_each_task_pid(pgid, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) {
+			if (p->signal->session == current->signal->session)
+				goto ok_pgid;
+		} while_each_task_pid(pgid, PIDTYPE_PGID, p);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+ok_pgid:
+	err = security_task_setpgid(p, pgid);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (process_group(p) != pgid) {
+		detach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PGID);
+		p->signal->pgrp = pgid;
+		attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PGID, pgid);
+	}
+
+	err = 0;
+out:
+	/* All paths lead to here, thus we are safe. -DaveM */
+	write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+	return err;
+}
+
+asmlinkage long sys_getpgid(pid_t pid)
+{
+	if (!pid) {
+		return process_group(current);
+	} else {
+		int retval;
+		struct task_struct *p;
+
+		read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+		p = find_task_by_pid(pid);
+
+		retval = -ESRCH;
+		if (p) {
+			retval = security_task_getpgid(p);
+			if (!retval)
+				retval = process_group(p);
+		}
+		read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+		return retval;
+	}
+}
+
+#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_GETPGRP
+
+asmlinkage long sys_getpgrp(void)
+{
+	/* SMP - assuming writes are word atomic this is fine */
+	return process_group(current);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+asmlinkage long sys_getsid(pid_t pid)
+{
+	if (!pid) {
+		return current->signal->session;
+	} else {
+		int retval;
+		struct task_struct *p;
+
+		read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+		p = find_task_by_pid(pid);
+
+		retval = -ESRCH;
+		if(p) {
+			retval = security_task_getsid(p);
+			if (!retval)
+				retval = p->signal->session;
+		}
+		read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+		return retval;
+	}
+}
+
+asmlinkage long sys_setsid(void)
+{
+	struct pid *pid;
+	int err = -EPERM;
+
+	if (!thread_group_leader(current))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	down(&tty_sem);
+	write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+
+	pid = find_pid(PIDTYPE_PGID, current->pid);
+	if (pid)
+		goto out;
+
+	current->signal->leader = 1;
+	__set_special_pids(current->pid, current->pid);
+	current->signal->tty = NULL;
+	current->signal->tty_old_pgrp = 0;
+	err = process_group(current);
+out:
+	write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+	up(&tty_sem);
+	return err;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Supplementary group IDs
+ */
+
+/* init to 2 - one for init_task, one to ensure it is never freed */
+struct group_info init_groups = { .usage = ATOMIC_INIT(2) };
+
+struct group_info *groups_alloc(int gidsetsize)
+{
+	struct group_info *group_info;
+	int nblocks;
+	int i;
+
+	nblocks = (gidsetsize + NGROUPS_PER_BLOCK - 1) / NGROUPS_PER_BLOCK;
+	/* Make sure we always allocate at least one indirect block pointer */
+	nblocks = nblocks ? : 1;
+	group_info = kmalloc(sizeof(*group_info) + nblocks*sizeof(gid_t *), GFP_USER);
+	if (!group_info)
+		return NULL;
+	group_info->ngroups = gidsetsize;
+	group_info->nblocks = nblocks;
+	atomic_set(&group_info->usage, 1);
+
+	if (gidsetsize <= NGROUPS_SMALL) {
+		group_info->blocks[0] = group_info->small_block;
+	} else {
+		for (i = 0; i < nblocks; i++) {
+			gid_t *b;
+			b = (void *)__get_free_page(GFP_USER);
+			if (!b)
+				goto out_undo_partial_alloc;
+			group_info->blocks[i] = b;
+		}
+	}
+	return group_info;
+
+out_undo_partial_alloc:
+	while (--i >= 0) {
+		free_page((unsigned long)group_info->blocks[i]);
+	}
+	kfree(group_info);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(groups_alloc);
+
+void groups_free(struct group_info *group_info)
+{
+	if (group_info->blocks[0] != group_info->small_block) {
+		int i;
+		for (i = 0; i < group_info->nblocks; i++)
+			free_page((unsigned long)group_info->blocks[i]);
+	}
+	kfree(group_info);
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(groups_free);
+
+/* export the group_info to a user-space array */
+static int groups_to_user(gid_t __user *grouplist,
+    struct group_info *group_info)
+{
+	int i;
+	int count = group_info->ngroups;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < group_info->nblocks; i++) {
+		int cp_count = min(NGROUPS_PER_BLOCK, count);
+		int off = i * NGROUPS_PER_BLOCK;
+		int len = cp_count * sizeof(*grouplist);
+
+		if (copy_to_user(grouplist+off, group_info->blocks[i], len))
+			return -EFAULT;
+
+		count -= cp_count;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* fill a group_info from a user-space array - it must be allocated already */
+static int groups_from_user(struct group_info *group_info,
+    gid_t __user *grouplist)
+ {
+	int i;
+	int count = group_info->ngroups;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < group_info->nblocks; i++) {
+		int cp_count = min(NGROUPS_PER_BLOCK, count);
+		int off = i * NGROUPS_PER_BLOCK;
+		int len = cp_count * sizeof(*grouplist);
+
+		if (copy_from_user(group_info->blocks[i], grouplist+off, len))
+			return -EFAULT;
+
+		count -= cp_count;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* a simple shell-metzner sort */
+static void groups_sort(struct group_info *group_info)
+{
+	int base, max, stride;
+	int gidsetsize = group_info->ngroups;
+
+	for (stride = 1; stride < gidsetsize; stride = 3 * stride + 1)
+		; /* nothing */
+	stride /= 3;
+
+	while (stride) {
+		max = gidsetsize - stride;
+		for (base = 0; base < max; base++) {
+			int left = base;
+			int right = left + stride;
+			gid_t tmp = GROUP_AT(group_info, right);
+
+			while (left >= 0 && GROUP_AT(group_info, left) > tmp) {
+				GROUP_AT(group_info, right) =
+				    GROUP_AT(group_info, left);
+				right = left;
+				left -= stride;
+			}
+			GROUP_AT(group_info, right) = tmp;
+		}
+		stride /= 3;
+	}
+}
+
+/* a simple bsearch */
+static int groups_search(struct group_info *group_info, gid_t grp)
+{
+	int left, right;
+
+	if (!group_info)
+		return 0;
+
+	left = 0;
+	r