Cache user_ns in struct cred

If !CONFIG_USERNS, have current_user_ns() defined to (&init_user_ns).

Get rid of _current_user_ns.  This requires nsown_capable() to be
defined in capability.c rather than as static inline in capability.h,
so do that.

Request_key needs init_user_ns defined at current_user_ns if
!CONFIG_USERNS, so forward-declare that in cred.h if !CONFIG_USERNS
at current_user_ns() define.

Compile-tested with and without CONFIG_USERNS.

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
[ This makes a huge performance difference for acl_permission_check(),
  up to 30%.  And that is one of the hottest kernel functions for loads
  that are pathname-lookup heavy.  ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

1 files changed, 12 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index bf0c734d0c1..32a80e08ff4 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -399,3 +399,15 @@ bool task_ns_capable(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
 	return ns_capable(task_cred_xxx(t, user)->user_ns, cap);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(task_ns_capable);
+
+/**
+ * nsown_capable - Check superior capability to one's own user_ns
+ * @cap: The capability in question
+ *
+ * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability
+ * targeted at its own user namespace.
+ */
+bool nsown_capable(int cap)
+{
+	return ns_capable(current_user_ns(), cap);
+}