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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2013-05-11 14:29:11 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2013-05-11 14:29:11 -0700
commitc4cc75c3321cad6f20d1e5325293890255c8a663 (patch)
treef515d034c9d6947bed0467840678aff823747596 /kernel/auditfilter.c
parent2dbd3cac87250a0d44e07acc86c4224a08522709 (diff)
parent2a0b4be6dd655e24990da1d0811e28b9277f8b12 (diff)
Merge git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/audit
Pull audit changes from Eric Paris: "Al used to send pull requests every couple of years but he told me to just start pushing them to you directly. Our touching outside of core audit code is pretty straight forward. A couple of interface changes which hit net/. A simple argument bug calling audit functions in namei.c and the removal of some assembly branch prediction code on ppc" * git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/audit: (31 commits) audit: fix message spacing printing auid Revert "audit: move kaudit thread start from auditd registration to kaudit init" audit: vfs: fix audit_inode call in O_CREAT case of do_last audit: Make testing for a valid loginuid explicit. audit: fix event coverage of AUDIT_ANOM_LINK audit: use spin_lock in audit_receive_msg to process tty logging audit: do not needlessly take a lock in tty_audit_exit audit: do not needlessly take a spinlock in copy_signal audit: add an option to control logging of passwords with pam_tty_audit audit: use spin_lock_irqsave/restore in audit tty code helper for some session id stuff audit: use a consistent audit helper to log lsm information audit: push loginuid and sessionid processing down audit: stop pushing loginid, uid, sessionid as arguments audit: remove the old depricated kernel interface audit: make validity checking generic audit: allow checking the type of audit message in the user filter audit: fix build break when AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 audit: remove duplicate export of audit_enabled Audit: do not print error when LSMs disabled ...
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/auditfilter.c')
-rw-r--r--kernel/auditfilter.c360
1 files changed, 110 insertions, 250 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 267436826c3..83a2970295d 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -310,121 +310,83 @@ static u32 audit_to_op(u32 op)
return n;
}
-
-/* Translate struct audit_rule to kernel's rule respresentation.
- * Exists for backward compatibility with userspace. */
-static struct audit_entry *audit_rule_to_entry(struct audit_rule *rule)
+/* check if an audit field is valid */
+static int audit_field_valid(struct audit_entry *entry, struct audit_field *f)
{
- struct audit_entry *entry;
- int err = 0;
- int i;
-
- entry = audit_to_entry_common(rule);
- if (IS_ERR(entry))
- goto exit_nofree;
-
- for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
- struct audit_field *f = &entry->rule.fields[i];
- u32 n;
-
- n = rule->fields[i] & (AUDIT_NEGATE|AUDIT_OPERATORS);
-
- /* Support for legacy operators where
- * AUDIT_NEGATE bit signifies != and otherwise assumes == */
- if (n & AUDIT_NEGATE)
- f->op = Audit_not_equal;
- else if (!n)
- f->op = Audit_equal;
- else
- f->op = audit_to_op(n);
-
- entry->rule.vers_ops = (n & AUDIT_OPERATORS) ? 2 : 1;
-
- f->type = rule->fields[i] & ~(AUDIT_NEGATE|AUDIT_OPERATORS);
- f->val = rule->values[i];
- f->uid = INVALID_UID;
- f->gid = INVALID_GID;
-
- err = -EINVAL;
- if (f->op == Audit_bad)
- goto exit_free;
-
- switch(f->type) {
- default:
- goto exit_free;
- case AUDIT_UID:
- case AUDIT_EUID:
- case AUDIT_SUID:
- case AUDIT_FSUID:
- case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
- /* bit ops not implemented for uid comparisons */
- if (f->op == Audit_bitmask || f->op == Audit_bittest)
- goto exit_free;
-
- f->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), f->val);
- if (!uid_valid(f->uid))
- goto exit_free;
- break;
- case AUDIT_GID:
- case AUDIT_EGID:
- case AUDIT_SGID:
- case AUDIT_FSGID:
- /* bit ops not implemented for gid comparisons */
- if (f->op == Audit_bitmask || f->op == Audit_bittest)
- goto exit_free;
-
- f->gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), f->val);
- if (!gid_valid(f->gid))
- goto exit_free;
- break;
- case AUDIT_PID:
- case AUDIT_PERS:
- case AUDIT_MSGTYPE:
- case AUDIT_PPID:
- case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
- case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
- case AUDIT_EXIT:
- case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
- /* bit ops are only useful on syscall args */
- if (f->op == Audit_bitmask || f->op == Audit_bittest)
- goto exit_free;
- break;
- case AUDIT_ARG0:
- case AUDIT_ARG1:
- case AUDIT_ARG2:
- case AUDIT_ARG3:
- break;
- /* arch is only allowed to be = or != */
- case AUDIT_ARCH:
- if (f->op != Audit_not_equal && f->op != Audit_equal)
- goto exit_free;
- entry->rule.arch_f = f;
- break;
- case AUDIT_PERM:
- if (f->val & ~15)
- goto exit_free;
- break;
- case AUDIT_FILETYPE:
- if (f->val & ~S_IFMT)
- goto exit_free;
- break;
- case AUDIT_INODE:
- err = audit_to_inode(&entry->rule, f);
- if (err)
- goto exit_free;
- break;
- }
- }
-
- if (entry->rule.inode_f && entry->rule.inode_f->op == Audit_not_equal)
- entry->rule.inode_f = NULL;
-
-exit_nofree:
- return entry;
+ switch(f->type) {
+ case AUDIT_MSGTYPE:
+ if (entry->rule.listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE &&
+ entry->rule.listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_USER)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ };
-exit_free:
- audit_free_rule(entry);
- return ERR_PTR(err);
+ switch(f->type) {
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ case AUDIT_UID:
+ case AUDIT_EUID:
+ case AUDIT_SUID:
+ case AUDIT_FSUID:
+ case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_UID:
+ case AUDIT_GID:
+ case AUDIT_EGID:
+ case AUDIT_SGID:
+ case AUDIT_FSGID:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_GID:
+ case AUDIT_PID:
+ case AUDIT_PERS:
+ case AUDIT_MSGTYPE:
+ case AUDIT_PPID:
+ case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
+ case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
+ case AUDIT_EXIT:
+ case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
+ /* bit ops are only useful on syscall args */
+ if (f->op == Audit_bitmask || f->op == Audit_bittest)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_ARG0:
+ case AUDIT_ARG1:
+ case AUDIT_ARG2:
+ case AUDIT_ARG3:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+ case AUDIT_WATCH:
+ case AUDIT_DIR:
+ case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
+ if ((f->val != 0) && (f->val != 1))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ /* FALL THROUGH */
+ case AUDIT_ARCH:
+ if (f->op != Audit_not_equal && f->op != Audit_equal)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_PERM:
+ if (f->val & ~15)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_FILETYPE:
+ if (f->val & ~S_IFMT)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE:
+ if (f->val > AUDIT_MAX_FIELD_COMPARE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ };
+ return 0;
}
/* Translate struct audit_rule_data to kernel's rule respresentation. */
@@ -459,17 +421,25 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
f->gid = INVALID_GID;
f->lsm_str = NULL;
f->lsm_rule = NULL;
- switch(f->type) {
+
+ /* Support legacy tests for a valid loginuid */
+ if ((f->type == AUDIT_LOGINUID) && (f->val == 4294967295)) {
+ f->type = AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET;
+ f->val = 0;
+ }
+
+ err = audit_field_valid(entry, f);
+ if (err)
+ goto exit_free;
+
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ switch (f->type) {
+ case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
case AUDIT_UID:
case AUDIT_EUID:
case AUDIT_SUID:
case AUDIT_FSUID:
- case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
case AUDIT_OBJ_UID:
- /* bit ops not implemented for uid comparisons */
- if (f->op == Audit_bitmask || f->op == Audit_bittest)
- goto exit_free;
-
f->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), f->val);
if (!uid_valid(f->uid))
goto exit_free;
@@ -479,27 +449,10 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
case AUDIT_SGID:
case AUDIT_FSGID:
case AUDIT_OBJ_GID:
- /* bit ops not implemented for gid comparisons */
- if (f->op == Audit_bitmask || f->op == Audit_bittest)
- goto exit_free;
-
f->gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), f->val);
if (!gid_valid(f->gid))
goto exit_free;
break;
- case AUDIT_PID:
- case AUDIT_PERS:
- case AUDIT_MSGTYPE:
- case AUDIT_PPID:
- case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
- case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
- case AUDIT_EXIT:
- case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
- case AUDIT_ARG0:
- case AUDIT_ARG1:
- case AUDIT_ARG2:
- case AUDIT_ARG3:
- break;
case AUDIT_ARCH:
entry->rule.arch_f = f;
break;
@@ -570,20 +523,6 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
entry->rule.filterkey = str;
break;
- case AUDIT_PERM:
- if (f->val & ~15)
- goto exit_free;
- break;
- case AUDIT_FILETYPE:
- if (f->val & ~S_IFMT)
- goto exit_free;
- break;
- case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE:
- if (f->val > AUDIT_MAX_FIELD_COMPARE)
- goto exit_free;
- break;
- default:
- goto exit_free;
}
}
@@ -613,36 +552,6 @@ static inline size_t audit_pack_string(void **bufp, const char *str)
return len;
}
-/* Translate kernel rule respresentation to struct audit_rule.
- * Exists for backward compatibility with userspace. */
-static struct audit_rule *audit_krule_to_rule(struct audit_krule *krule)
-{
- struct audit_rule *rule;
- int i;
-
- rule = kzalloc(sizeof(*rule), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (unlikely(!rule))
- return NULL;
-
- rule->flags = krule->flags | krule->listnr;
- rule->action = krule->action;
- rule->field_count = krule->field_count;
- for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
- rule->values[i] = krule->fields[i].val;
- rule->fields[i] = krule->fields[i].type;
-
- if (krule->vers_ops == 1) {
- if (krule->fields[i].op == Audit_not_equal)
- rule->fields[i] |= AUDIT_NEGATE;
- } else {
- rule->fields[i] |= audit_ops[krule->fields[i].op];
- }
- }
- for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) rule->mask[i] = krule->mask[i];
-
- return rule;
-}
-
/* Translate kernel rule respresentation to struct audit_rule_data. */
static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule)
{
@@ -1055,35 +964,6 @@ out:
return ret;
}
-/* List rules using struct audit_rule. Exists for backward
- * compatibility with userspace. */
-static void audit_list(int pid, int seq, struct sk_buff_head *q)
-{
- struct sk_buff *skb;
- struct audit_krule *r;
- int i;
-
- /* This is a blocking read, so use audit_filter_mutex instead of rcu
- * iterator to sync with list writers. */
- for (i=0; i<AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
- list_for_each_entry(r, &audit_rules_list[i], list) {
- struct audit_rule *rule;
-
- rule = audit_krule_to_rule(r);
- if (unlikely(!rule))
- break;
- skb = audit_make_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
- rule, sizeof(*rule));
- if (skb)
- skb_queue_tail(q, skb);
- kfree(rule);
- }
- }
- skb = audit_make_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
- if (skb)
- skb_queue_tail(q, skb);
-}
-
/* List rules using struct audit_rule_data. */
static void audit_list_rules(int pid, int seq, struct sk_buff_head *q)
{
@@ -1113,11 +993,11 @@ static void audit_list_rules(int pid, int seq, struct sk_buff_head *q)
}
/* Log rule additions and removals */
-static void audit_log_rule_change(kuid_t loginuid, u32 sessionid, u32 sid,
- char *action, struct audit_krule *rule,
- int res)
+static void audit_log_rule_change(char *action, struct audit_krule *rule, int res)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
+ uid_t loginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current));
+ u32 sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
if (!audit_enabled)
return;
@@ -1125,18 +1005,8 @@ static void audit_log_rule_change(kuid_t loginuid, u32 sessionid, u32 sid,
ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
if (!ab)
return;
- audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u ses=%u",
- from_kuid(&init_user_ns, loginuid), sessionid);
- if (sid) {
- char *ctx = NULL;
- u32 len;
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len))
- audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
- else {
- audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
- security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
- }
- }
+ audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u ses=%u" ,loginuid, sessionid);
+ audit_log_task_context(ab);
audit_log_format(ab, " op=");
audit_log_string(ab, action);
audit_log_key(ab, rule->filterkey);
@@ -1155,8 +1025,7 @@ static void audit_log_rule_change(kuid_t loginuid, u32 sessionid, u32 sid,
* @sessionid: sessionid for netlink audit message
* @sid: SE Linux Security ID of sender
*/
-int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int seq, void *data,
- size_t datasz, kuid_t loginuid, u32 sessionid, u32 sid)
+int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int seq, void *data, size_t datasz)
{
struct task_struct *tsk;
struct audit_netlink_list *dest;
@@ -1164,7 +1033,6 @@ int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int seq, void *data,
struct audit_entry *entry;
switch (type) {
- case AUDIT_LIST:
case AUDIT_LIST_RULES:
/* We can't just spew out the rules here because we might fill
* the available socket buffer space and deadlock waiting for
@@ -1179,10 +1047,7 @@ int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int seq, void *data,
skb_queue_head_init(&dest->q);
mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
- if (type == AUDIT_LIST)
- audit_list(pid, seq, &dest->q);
- else
- audit_list_rules(pid, seq, &dest->q);
+ audit_list_rules(pid, seq, &dest->q);
mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
tsk = kthread_run(audit_send_list, dest, "audit_send_list");
@@ -1192,35 +1057,23 @@ int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int seq, void *data,
err = PTR_ERR(tsk);
}
break;
- case AUDIT_ADD:
case AUDIT_ADD_RULE:
- if (type == AUDIT_ADD)
- entry = audit_rule_to_entry(data);
- else
- entry = audit_data_to_entry(data, datasz);
+ entry = audit_data_to_entry(data, datasz);
if (IS_ERR(entry))
return PTR_ERR(entry);
err = audit_add_rule(entry);
- audit_log_rule_change(loginuid, sessionid, sid, "add rule",
- &entry->rule, !err);
-
+ audit_log_rule_change("add rule", &entry->rule, !err);
if (err)
audit_free_rule(entry);
break;
- case AUDIT_DEL:
case AUDIT_DEL_RULE:
- if (type == AUDIT_DEL)
- entry = audit_rule_to_entry(data);
- else
- entry = audit_data_to_entry(data, datasz);
+ entry = audit_data_to_entry(data, datasz);
if (IS_ERR(entry))
return PTR_ERR(entry);
err = audit_del_rule(entry);
- audit_log_rule_change(loginuid, sessionid, sid, "remove rule",
- &entry->rule, !err);
-
+ audit_log_rule_change("remove rule", &entry->rule, !err);
audit_free_rule(entry);
break;
default:
@@ -1358,7 +1211,7 @@ int audit_compare_dname_path(const char *dname, const char *path, int parentlen)
return strncmp(p, dname, dlen);
}
-static int audit_filter_user_rules(struct audit_krule *rule,
+static int audit_filter_user_rules(struct audit_krule *rule, int type,
enum audit_state *state)
{
int i;
@@ -1382,6 +1235,13 @@ static int audit_filter_user_rules(struct audit_krule *rule,
result = audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(current),
f->op, f->uid);
break;
+ case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
+ result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(current),
+ f->op, f->val);
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_MSGTYPE:
+ result = audit_comparator(type, f->op, f->val);
+ break;
case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
@@ -1408,7 +1268,7 @@ static int audit_filter_user_rules(struct audit_krule *rule,
return 1;
}
-int audit_filter_user(void)
+int audit_filter_user(int type)
{
enum audit_state state = AUDIT_DISABLED;
struct audit_entry *e;
@@ -1416,7 +1276,7 @@ int audit_filter_user(void)
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_USER], list) {
- if (audit_filter_user_rules(&e->rule, &state)) {
+ if (audit_filter_user_rules(&e->rule, type, &state)) {
if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
ret = 0;
break;