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authorDavid Engraf <david.engraf@sysgo.com>2013-03-19 13:29:55 +0100
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2013-05-07 20:33:10 -0700
commitf931d5e4bf1902ae2a4829db0e6f3c789fd7d092 (patch)
tree11a16f38534e057cebabe49c7eb1af48f35ddad1 /include/net/tc_act
parentbee59d68d7cc802c9ee4e7ecda01ba4c906dbd73 (diff)
hrtimer: Fix ktime_add_ns() overflow on 32bit architectures
commit 51fd36f3fad8447c487137ae26b9d0b3ce77bb25 upstream. One can trigger an overflow when using ktime_add_ns() on a 32bit architecture not supporting CONFIG_KTIME_SCALAR. When passing a very high value for u64 nsec, e.g. 7881299347898368000 the do_div() function converts this value to seconds (7881299347) which is still to high to pass to the ktime_set() function as long. The result in is a negative value. The problem on my system occurs in the tick-sched.c, tick_nohz_stop_sched_tick() when time_delta is set to timekeeping_max_deferment(). The check for time_delta < KTIME_MAX is valid, thus ktime_add_ns() is called with a too large value resulting in a negative expire value. This leads to an endless loop in the ticker code: time_delta: 7881299347898368000 expires = ktime_add_ns(last_update, time_delta) expires: negative value This fix caps the value to KTIME_MAX. This error doesn't occurs on 64bit or architectures supporting CONFIG_KTIME_SCALAR (e.g. ARM, x86-32). Signed-off-by: David Engraf <david.engraf@sysgo.com> [jstultz: Minor tweaks to commit message & header] Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/net/tc_act')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions