diff options
| author | Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> | 2011-02-01 11:05:39 -0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> | 2011-02-01 11:12:29 -0500 |
| commit | 2a7dba391e5628ad665ce84ef9a6648da541ebab (patch) | |
| tree | ba0722bd74d2c883dbda7ff721850bab411cac04 /fs/reiserfs/xattr_security.c | |
| parent | 821404434f3324bf23f545050ff64055a149766e (diff) | |
fs/vfs/security: pass last path component to LSM on inode creation
SELinux would like to implement a new labeling behavior of newly created
inodes. We currently label new inodes based on the parent and the creating
process. This new behavior would also take into account the name of the
new object when deciding the new label. This is not the (supposed) full path,
just the last component of the path.
This is very useful because creating /etc/shadow is different than creating
/etc/passwd but the kernel hooks are unable to differentiate these
operations. We currently require that userspace realize it is doing some
difficult operation like that and than userspace jumps through SELinux hoops
to get things set up correctly. This patch does not implement new
behavior, that is obviously contained in a seperate SELinux patch, but it
does pass the needed name down to the correct LSM hook. If no such name
exists it is fine to pass NULL.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/reiserfs/xattr_security.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/reiserfs/xattr_security.c | 3 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/fs/reiserfs/xattr_security.c b/fs/reiserfs/xattr_security.c index 237c6928d3c..ef66c18a933 100644 --- a/fs/reiserfs/xattr_security.c +++ b/fs/reiserfs/xattr_security.c @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ static size_t security_list(struct dentry *dentry, char *list, size_t list_len, * of blocks needed for the transaction. If successful, reiserfs_security * must be released using reiserfs_security_free when the caller is done. */ int reiserfs_security_init(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, + const struct qstr *qstr, struct reiserfs_security_handle *sec) { int blocks = 0; @@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ int reiserfs_security_init(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, if (IS_PRIVATE(dir)) return 0; - error = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, &sec->name, + error = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, &sec->name, &sec->value, &sec->length); if (error) { if (error == -EOPNOTSUPP) |