diff options
| author | Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> | 2008-07-15 21:03:57 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> | 2008-07-26 20:53:14 -0400 |
| commit | e6305c43eda10ebfd2ad9e35d6e172ccc7bb3695 (patch) | |
| tree | 8a95bd0e27fb3ce895cca9ef91af2e1605e4cdab /fs/proc | |
| parent | 1bd5191d9f5d1928c4efdf604c4164b04bb88dbe (diff) | |
[PATCH] sanitize ->permission() prototype
* kill nameidata * argument; map the 3 bits in ->flags anybody cares
about to new MAY_... ones and pass with the mask.
* kill redundant gfs2_iop_permission()
* sanitize ecryptfs_permission()
* fix remaining places where ->permission() instances might barf on new
MAY_... found in mask.
The obvious next target in that direction is permission(9)
folded fix for nfs_permission() breakage from Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/proc')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/proc/base.c | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c | 2 |
2 files changed, 2 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index 81bce6791bf..d82d800389f 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -1859,8 +1859,7 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_fd_operations = { * /proc/pid/fd needs a special permission handler so that a process can still * access /proc/self/fd after it has executed a setuid(). */ -static int proc_fd_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, - struct nameidata *nd) +static int proc_fd_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) { int rv; diff --git a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c index fa1ec2433e4..f9a8b892718 100644 --- a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c +++ b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c @@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ out: return ret; } -static int proc_sys_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, struct nameidata *nd) +static int proc_sys_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) { /* * sysctl entries that are not writeable, |