[PATCH] FUSE: tighten check for processes allowed access

This patch tightens the check for allowing processes to access non-privileged
mounts.  The rational is that the filesystem implementation can control the
behavior or get otherwise unavailable information of the filesystem user.  If
the filesystem user process has the same uid, gid, and is not suid or sgid
application, then access is safe.  Otherwise access is not allowed unless the
"allow_other" mount option is given (for which policy is controlled by the
userspace mount utility).

Thanks to everyone linux-fsdevel, especially Martin Mares who helped uncover
problems with the previous approach.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

1 files changed, 34 insertions, 6 deletions

diff --git a/fs/fuse/dir.c b/fs/fuse/dir.c
index f127625543b..65da6e1b6de 100644
--- a/fs/fuse/dir.c
+++ b/fs/fuse/dir.c
@@ -411,17 +411,45 @@ int fuse_do_getattr(struct inode *inode)
 	return err;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Calling into a user-controlled filesystem gives the filesystem
+ * daemon ptrace-like capabilities over the requester process.  This
+ * means, that the filesystem daemon is able to record the exact
+ * filesystem operations performed, and can also control the behavior
+ * of the requester process in otherwise impossible ways.  For example
+ * it can delay the operation for arbitrary length of time allowing
+ * DoS against the requester.
+ *
+ * For this reason only those processes can call into the filesystem,
+ * for which the owner of the mount has ptrace privilege.  This
+ * excludes processes started by other users, suid or sgid processes.
+ */
+static int fuse_allow_task(struct fuse_conn *fc, struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	if (fc->flags & FUSE_ALLOW_OTHER)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (task->euid == fc->user_id &&
+	    task->suid == fc->user_id &&
+	    task->uid == fc->user_id &&
+	    task->egid == fc->group_id &&
+	    task->sgid == fc->group_id &&
+	    task->gid == fc->group_id)
+		return 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int fuse_revalidate(struct dentry *entry)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = entry->d_inode;
 	struct fuse_inode *fi = get_fuse_inode(inode);
 	struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(inode);
 
-	if (get_node_id(inode) == FUSE_ROOT_ID) {
-		if (!(fc->flags & FUSE_ALLOW_OTHER) &&
-		    current->fsuid != fc->user_id)
-			return -EACCES;
-	} else if (time_before_eq(jiffies, fi->i_time))
+	if (!fuse_allow_task(fc, current))
+		return -EACCES;
+	if (get_node_id(inode) != FUSE_ROOT_ID &&
+	    time_before_eq(jiffies, fi->i_time))
 		return 0;
 
 	return fuse_do_getattr(inode);
@@ -431,7 +459,7 @@ static int fuse_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, struct nameidata *nd)
 {
 	struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(inode);
 
-	if (!(fc->flags & FUSE_ALLOW_OTHER) && current->fsuid != fc->user_id)
+	if (!fuse_allow_task(fc, current))
 		return -EACCES;
 	else if (fc->flags & FUSE_DEFAULT_PERMISSIONS) {
 		int err = generic_permission(inode, mask, NULL);