Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (125 commits)
  [CRYPTO] twofish: Merge common glue code
  [CRYPTO] hifn_795x: Fixup container_of() usage
  [CRYPTO] cast6: inline bloat--
  [CRYPTO] api: Set default CRYPTO_MINALIGN to unsigned long long
  [CRYPTO] tcrypt: Make xcbc available as a standalone test
  [CRYPTO] xcbc: Remove bogus hash/cipher test
  [CRYPTO] xcbc: Fix algorithm leak when block size check fails
  [CRYPTO] tcrypt: Zero axbuf in the right function
  [CRYPTO] padlock: Only reset the key once for each CBC and ECB operation
  [CRYPTO] api: Include sched.h for cond_resched in scatterwalk.h
  [CRYPTO] salsa20-asm: Remove unnecessary dependency on CRYPTO_SALSA20
  [CRYPTO] tcrypt: Add select of AEAD
  [CRYPTO] salsa20: Add x86-64 assembly version
  [CRYPTO] salsa20_i586: Salsa20 stream cipher algorithm (i586 version)
  [CRYPTO] gcm: Introduce rfc4106
  [CRYPTO] api: Show async type
  [CRYPTO] chainiv: Avoid lock spinning where possible
  [CRYPTO] seqiv: Add select AEAD in Kconfig
  [CRYPTO] scatterwalk: Handle zero nbytes in scatterwalk_map_and_copy
  [CRYPTO] null: Allow setkey on digest_null 
  ...

12 files changed, 2509 insertions, 1063 deletions

diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/aes_s390.c b/arch/s390/crypto/aes_s390.c
index 512669691ad..46c97058ebe 100644
--- a/arch/s390/crypto/aes_s390.c
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/aes_s390.c
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
  * s390 Version:
  *   Copyright IBM Corp. 2005,2007
  *   Author(s): Jan Glauber (jang@de.ibm.com)
+ *		Sebastian Siewior (sebastian@breakpoint.cc> SW-Fallback
  *
  * Derived from "crypto/aes_generic.c"
  *
@@ -16,17 +17,13 @@
  *
  */
 
+#include <crypto/aes.h>
 #include <crypto/algapi.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include "crypt_s390.h"
 
-#define AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE	16
-#define AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE	32
-
-/* data block size for all key lengths */
-#define AES_BLOCK_SIZE		16
-
 #define AES_KEYLEN_128		1
 #define AES_KEYLEN_192		2
 #define AES_KEYLEN_256		4
@@ -39,45 +36,89 @@ struct s390_aes_ctx {
 	long enc;
 	long dec;
 	int key_len;
+	union {
+		struct crypto_blkcipher *blk;
+		struct crypto_cipher *cip;
+	} fallback;
 };
 
-static int aes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
-		       unsigned int key_len)
+/*
+ * Check if the key_len is supported by the HW.
+ * Returns 0 if it is, a positive number if it is not and software fallback is
+ * required or a negative number in case the key size is not valid
+ */
+static int need_fallback(unsigned int key_len)
 {
-	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
-	u32 *flags = &tfm->crt_flags;
-
 	switch (key_len) {
 	case 16:
 		if (!(keylen_flag & AES_KEYLEN_128))
-			goto fail;
+			return 1;
 		break;
 	case 24:
 		if (!(keylen_flag & AES_KEYLEN_192))
-			goto fail;
-
+			return 1;
 		break;
 	case 32:
 		if (!(keylen_flag & AES_KEYLEN_256))
-			goto fail;
+			return 1;
 		break;
 	default:
-		goto fail;
+		return -1;
 		break;
 	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int setkey_fallback_cip(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+		unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+	int ret;
+
+	sctx->fallback.blk->base.crt_flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK;
+	sctx->fallback.blk->base.crt_flags |= (tfm->crt_flags &
+			CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+
+	ret = crypto_cipher_setkey(sctx->fallback.cip, in_key, key_len);
+	if (ret) {
+		tfm->crt_flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK;
+		tfm->crt_flags |= (sctx->fallback.blk->base.crt_flags &
+				CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK);
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int aes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+		       unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+	u32 *flags = &tfm->crt_flags;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = need_fallback(key_len);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		*flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 
 	sctx->key_len = key_len;
-	memcpy(sctx->key, in_key, key_len);
-	return 0;
-fail:
-	*flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN;
-	return -EINVAL;
+	if (!ret) {
+		memcpy(sctx->key, in_key, key_len);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return setkey_fallback_cip(tfm, in_key, key_len);
 }
 
 static void aes_encrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *out, const u8 *in)
 {
 	const struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
 
+	if (unlikely(need_fallback(sctx->key_len))) {
+		crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(sctx->fallback.cip, out, in);
+		return;
+	}
+
 	switch (sctx->key_len) {
 	case 16:
 		crypt_s390_km(KM_AES_128_ENCRYPT, &sctx->key, out, in,
@@ -98,6 +139,11 @@ static void aes_decrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *out, const u8 *in)
 {
 	const struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
 
+	if (unlikely(need_fallback(sctx->key_len))) {
+		crypto_cipher_decrypt_one(sctx->fallback.cip, out, in);
+		return;
+	}
+
 	switch (sctx->key_len) {
 	case 16:
 		crypt_s390_km(KM_AES_128_DECRYPT, &sctx->key, out, in,
@@ -114,6 +160,29 @@ static void aes_decrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *out, const u8 *in)
 	}
 }
 
+static int fallback_init_cip(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+	const char *name = tfm->__crt_alg->cra_name;
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	sctx->fallback.cip = crypto_alloc_cipher(name, 0,
+			CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK);
+
+	if (IS_ERR(sctx->fallback.cip)) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "Error allocating fallback algo %s\n", name);
+		return PTR_ERR(sctx->fallback.blk);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void fallback_exit_cip(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	crypto_free_cipher(sctx->fallback.cip);
+	sctx->fallback.cip = NULL;
+}
 
 static struct crypto_alg aes_alg = {
 	.cra_name		=	"aes",
@@ -125,6 +194,8 @@ static struct crypto_alg aes_alg = {
 	.cra_ctxsize		=	sizeof(struct s390_aes_ctx),
 	.cra_module		=	THIS_MODULE,
 	.cra_list		=	LIST_HEAD_INIT(aes_alg.cra_list),
+	.cra_init               =       fallback_init_cip,
+	.cra_exit               =       fallback_exit_cip,
 	.cra_u			=	{
 		.cipher = {
 			.cia_min_keysize	=	AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
@@ -136,10 +207,70 @@ static struct crypto_alg aes_alg = {
 	}
 };
 
+static int setkey_fallback_blk(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *key,
+		unsigned int len)
+{
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+	unsigned int ret;
+
+	sctx->fallback.blk->base.crt_flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK;
+	sctx->fallback.blk->base.crt_flags |= (tfm->crt_flags &
+			CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+
+	ret = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(sctx->fallback.blk, key, len);
+	if (ret) {
+		tfm->crt_flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK;
+		tfm->crt_flags |= (sctx->fallback.blk->base.crt_flags &
+				CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK);
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int fallback_blk_dec(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+		struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+		unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	unsigned int ret;
+	struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm;
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
+
+	tfm = desc->tfm;
+	desc->tfm = sctx->fallback.blk;
+
+	ret = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt_iv(desc, dst, src, nbytes);
+
+	desc->tfm = tfm;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int fallback_blk_enc(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+		struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+		unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	unsigned int ret;
+	struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm;
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
+
+	tfm = desc->tfm;
+	desc->tfm = sctx->fallback.blk;
+
+	ret = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt_iv(desc, dst, src, nbytes);
+
+	desc->tfm = tfm;
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static int ecb_aes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
 			   unsigned int key_len)
 {
 	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = need_fallback(key_len);
+	if (ret > 0) {
+		sctx->key_len = key_len;
+		return setkey_fallback_blk(tfm, in_key, key_len);
+	}
 
 	switch (key_len) {
 	case 16:
@@ -188,6 +319,9 @@ static int ecb_aes_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
 	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
 	struct blkcipher_walk walk;
 
+	if (unlikely(need_fallback(sctx->key_len)))
+		return fallback_blk_enc(desc, dst, src, nbytes);
+
 	blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
 	return ecb_aes_crypt(desc, sctx->enc, sctx->key, &walk);
 }
@@ -199,10 +333,37 @@ static int ecb_aes_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
 	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
 	struct blkcipher_walk walk;
 
+	if (unlikely(need_fallback(sctx->key_len)))
+		return fallback_blk_dec(desc, dst, src, nbytes);
+
 	blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
 	return ecb_aes_crypt(desc, sctx->dec, sctx->key, &walk);
 }
 
+static int fallback_init_blk(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+	const char *name = tfm->__crt_alg->cra_name;
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	sctx->fallback.blk = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(name, 0,
+			CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK);
+
+	if (IS_ERR(sctx->fallback.blk)) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "Error allocating fallback algo %s\n", name);
+		return PTR_ERR(sctx->fallback.blk);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void fallback_exit_blk(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	crypto_free_blkcipher(sctx->fallback.blk);
+	sctx->fallback.blk = NULL;
+}
+
 static struct crypto_alg ecb_aes_alg = {
 	.cra_name		=	"ecb(aes)",
 	.cra_driver_name	=	"ecb-aes-s390",
@@ -214,6 +375,8 @@ static struct crypto_alg ecb_aes_alg = {
 	.cra_type		=	&crypto_blkcipher_type,
 	.cra_module		=	THIS_MODULE,
 	.cra_list		=	LIST_HEAD_INIT(ecb_aes_alg.cra_list),
+	.cra_init		=	fallback_init_blk,
+	.cra_exit		=	fallback_exit_blk,
 	.cra_u			=	{
 		.blkcipher = {
 			.min_keysize		=	AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
@@ -229,6 +392,13 @@ static int cbc_aes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
 			   unsigned int key_len)
 {
 	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = need_fallback(key_len);
+	if (ret > 0) {
+		sctx->key_len = key_len;
+		return setkey_fallback_blk(tfm, in_key, key_len);
+	}
 
 	switch (key_len) {
 	case 16:
@@ -283,6 +453,9 @@ static int cbc_aes_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
 	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
 	struct blkcipher_walk walk;
 
+	if (unlikely(need_fallback(sctx->key_len)))
+		return fallback_blk_enc(desc, dst, src, nbytes);
+
 	blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
 	return cbc_aes_crypt(desc, sctx->enc, sctx->iv, &walk);
 }
@@ -294,6 +467,9 @@ static int cbc_aes_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
 	struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
 	struct blkcipher_walk walk;
 
+	if (unlikely(need_fallback(sctx->key_len)))
+		return fallback_blk_dec(desc, dst, src, nbytes);
+
 	blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
 	return cbc_aes_crypt(desc, sctx->dec, sctx->iv, &walk);
 }
@@ -309,6 +485,8 @@ static struct crypto_alg cbc_aes_alg = {
 	.cra_type		=	&crypto_blkcipher_type,
 	.cra_module		=	THIS_MODULE,
 	.cra_list		=	LIST_HEAD_INIT(cbc_aes_alg.cra_list),
+	.cra_init		=	fallback_init_blk,
+	.cra_exit		=	fallback_exit_blk,
 	.cra_u			=	{
 		.blkcipher = {
 			.min_keysize		=	AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
@@ -336,14 +514,10 @@ static int __init aes_init(void)
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
 	/* z9 109 and z9 BC/EC only support 128 bit key length */
-	if (keylen_flag == AES_KEYLEN_128) {
-		aes_alg.cra_u.cipher.cia_max_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE;
-		ecb_aes_alg.cra_u.blkcipher.max_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE;
-		cbc_aes_alg.cra_u.blkcipher.max_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE;
+	if (keylen_flag == AES_KEYLEN_128)
 		printk(KERN_INFO
 		       "aes_s390: hardware acceleration only available for"
 		       "128 bit keys\n");
-	}
 
 	ret = crypto_register_alg(&aes_alg);
 	if (ret)
@@ -382,4 +556,3 @@ MODULE_ALIAS("aes");
 
 MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Rijndael (AES) Cipher Algorithm");
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
-
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/Makefile b/arch/x86/crypto/Makefile
index 46bb609e244..3874c2de540 100644
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/Makefile
@@ -4,12 +4,16 @@
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_586) += aes-i586.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_TWOFISH_586) += twofish-i586.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SALSA20_586) += salsa20-i586.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_X86_64) += aes-x86_64.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_TWOFISH_X86_64) += twofish-x86_64.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SALSA20_X86_64) += salsa20-x86_64.o
 
-aes-i586-y := aes-i586-asm_32.o aes_32.o
-twofish-i586-y := twofish-i586-asm_32.o twofish_32.o
+aes-i586-y := aes-i586-asm_32.o aes_glue.o
+twofish-i586-y := twofish-i586-asm_32.o twofish_glue.o
+salsa20-i586-y := salsa20-i586-asm_32.o salsa20_glue.o
 
-aes-x86_64-y := aes-x86_64-asm_64.o aes_64.o
-twofish-x86_64-y := twofish-x86_64-asm_64.o twofish_64.o
+aes-x86_64-y := aes-x86_64-asm_64.o aes_glue.o
+twofish-x86_64-y := twofish-x86_64-asm_64.o twofish_glue.o
+salsa20-x86_64-y := salsa20-x86_64-asm_64.o salsa20_glue.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/aes-i586-asm_32.S b/arch/x86/crypto/aes-i586-asm_32.S
index f942f0c8f63..1093bede3e0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/aes-i586-asm_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/aes-i586-asm_32.S
@@ -46,9 +46,9 @@
 #define in_blk 16
 
 /* offsets in crypto_tfm structure */
-#define ekey (crypto_tfm_ctx_offset + 0)
-#define nrnd (crypto_tfm_ctx_offset + 256)
-#define dkey (crypto_tfm_ctx_offset + 260)
+#define klen (crypto_tfm_ctx_offset + 0)
+#define ekey (crypto_tfm_ctx_offset + 4)
+#define dkey (crypto_tfm_ctx_offset + 244)
 
 // register mapping for encrypt and decrypt subroutines
 
@@ -221,8 +221,8 @@
 
 .global  aes_enc_blk
 
-.extern  ft_tab
-.extern  fl_tab
+.extern  crypto_ft_tab
+.extern  crypto_fl_tab
 
 .align 4
 
@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ aes_enc_blk:
 1:	push    %ebx
 	mov     in_blk+4(%esp),%r2
 	push    %esi
-	mov     nrnd(%ebp),%r3   // number of rounds
+	mov     klen(%ebp),%r3   // key size
 	push    %edi
 #if ekey != 0
 	lea     ekey(%ebp),%ebp  // key pointer
@@ -255,26 +255,26 @@ aes_enc_blk:
 
 	sub     $8,%esp		// space for register saves on stack
 	add     $16,%ebp	// increment to next round key
-	cmp     $12,%r3
+	cmp     $24,%r3
 	jb      4f		// 10 rounds for 128-bit key
 	lea     32(%ebp),%ebp
 	je      3f		// 12 rounds for 192-bit key
 	lea     32(%ebp),%ebp
 
-2:	fwd_rnd1( -64(%ebp) ,ft_tab)	// 14 rounds for 256-bit key
-	fwd_rnd2( -48(%ebp) ,ft_tab)
-3:	fwd_rnd1( -32(%ebp) ,ft_tab)	// 12 rounds for 192-bit key
-	fwd_rnd2( -16(%ebp) ,ft_tab)
-4:	fwd_rnd1(    (%ebp) ,ft_tab)	// 10 rounds for 128-bit key
-	fwd_rnd2( +16(%ebp) ,ft_tab)
-	fwd_rnd1( +32(%ebp) ,ft_tab)
-	fwd_rnd2( +48(%ebp) ,ft_tab)
-	fwd_rnd1( +64(%ebp) ,ft_tab)
-	fwd_rnd2( +80(%ebp) ,ft_tab)
-	fwd_rnd1( +96(%ebp) ,ft_tab)
-	fwd_rnd2(+112(%ebp) ,ft_tab)
-	fwd_rnd1(+128(%ebp) ,ft_tab)
-	fwd_rnd2(+144(%ebp) ,fl_tab)	// last round uses a different table
+2:	fwd_rnd1( -64(%ebp), crypto_ft_tab)	// 14 rounds for 256-bit key
+	fwd_rnd2( -48(%ebp), crypto_ft_tab)
+3:	fwd_rnd1( -32(%ebp), crypto_ft_tab)	// 12 rounds for 192-bit key
+	fwd_rnd2( -16(%ebp), crypto_ft_tab)
+4:	fwd_rnd1(    (%ebp), crypto_ft_tab)	// 10 rounds for 128-bit key
+	fwd_rnd2( +16(%ebp), crypto_ft_tab)
+	fwd_rnd1( +32(%ebp), crypto_ft_tab)
+	fwd_rnd2( +48(%ebp), crypto_ft_tab)
+	fwd_rnd1( +64(%ebp), crypto_ft_tab)
+	fwd_rnd2( +80(%ebp), crypto_ft_tab)
+	fwd_rnd1( +96(%ebp), crypto_ft_tab)
+	fwd_rnd2(+112(%ebp), crypto_ft_tab)
+	fwd_rnd1(+128(%ebp), crypto_ft_tab)
+	fwd_rnd2(+144(%ebp), crypto_fl_tab)	// last round uses a different table
 
 // move final values to the output array.  CAUTION: the 
 // order of these assigns rely on the register mappings
@@ -297,8 +297,8 @@ aes_enc_blk:
 
 .global  aes_dec_blk
 
-.extern  it_tab
-.extern  il_tab
+.extern  crypto_it_tab
+.extern  crypto_il_tab
 
 .align 4
 
@@ -312,14 +312,11 @@ aes_dec_blk:
 1:	push    %ebx
 	mov     in_blk+4(%esp),%r2
 	push    %esi
-	mov     nrnd(%ebp),%r3   // number of rounds
+	mov     klen(%ebp),%r3   // key size
 	push    %edi
 #if dkey != 0
 	lea     dkey(%ebp),%ebp  // key pointer
 #endif
-	mov     %r3,%r0
-	shl     $4,%r0
-	add     %r0,%ebp
 	
 // input four columns and xor in first round key
 
@@ -333,27 +330,27 @@ aes_dec_blk:
 	xor     12(%ebp),%r5
 
 	sub     $8,%esp		// space for register saves on stack
-	sub     $16,%ebp	// increment to next round key
-	cmp     $12,%r3
+	add     $16,%ebp	// increment to next round key
+	cmp     $24,%r3
 	jb      4f		// 10 rounds for 128-bit key
-	lea     -32(%ebp),%ebp
+	lea     32(%ebp),%ebp
 	je      3f		// 12 rounds for 192-bit key
-	lea     -32(%ebp),%ebp
-
-2:	inv_rnd1( +64(%ebp), it_tab)	// 14 rounds for 256-bit key
-	inv_rnd2( +48(%ebp), it_tab)
-3:	inv_rnd1( +32(%ebp), it_tab)	// 12 rounds for 192-bit key
-	inv_rnd2( +16(%ebp), it_tab)
-4:	inv_rnd1(    (%ebp), it_tab)	// 10 rounds for 128-bit key
-	inv_rnd2( -16(%ebp), it_tab)
-	inv_rnd1( -32(%ebp), it_tab)
-	inv_rnd2( -48(%ebp), it_tab)
-	inv_rnd1( -64(%ebp), it_tab)
-	inv_rnd2( -80(%ebp), it_tab)
-	inv_rnd1( -96(%ebp), it_tab)
-	inv_rnd2(-112(%ebp), it_tab)
-	inv_rnd1(-128(%ebp), it_tab)
-	inv_rnd2(-144(%ebp), il_tab)	// last round uses a different table
+	lea     32(%ebp),%ebp
+
+2:	inv_rnd1( -64(%ebp), crypto_it_tab)	// 14 rounds for 256-bit key
+	inv_rnd2( -48(%ebp), crypto_it_tab)
+3:	inv_rnd1( -32(%ebp), crypto_it_tab)	// 12 rounds for 192-bit key
+	inv_rnd2( -16(%ebp), crypto_it_tab)
+4:	inv_rnd1(    (%ebp), crypto_it_tab)	// 10 rounds for 128-bit key
+	inv_rnd2( +16(%ebp), crypto_it_tab)
+	inv_rnd1( +32(%ebp), crypto_it_tab)
+	inv_rnd2( +48(%ebp), crypto_it_tab)
+	inv_rnd1( +64(%ebp), crypto_it_tab)
+	inv_rnd2( +80(%ebp), crypto_it_tab)
+	inv_rnd1( +96(%ebp), crypto_it_tab)
+	inv_rnd2(+112(%ebp), crypto_it_tab)
+	inv_rnd1(+128(%ebp), crypto_it_tab)
+	inv_rnd2(+144(%ebp), crypto_il_tab)	// last round uses a different table
 
 // move final values to the output array.  CAUTION: the 
 // order of these assigns rely on the register mappings
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/aes-x86_64-asm_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/aes-x86_64-asm_64.S
index 26b40de4d0b..a120f526c3d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/aes-x86_64-asm_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/aes-x86_64-asm_64.S
@@ -8,10 +8,10 @@
  * including this sentence is retained in full.
  */
 
-.extern aes_ft_tab
-.extern aes_it_tab
-.extern aes_fl_tab
-.extern aes_il_tab
+.extern crypto_ft_tab
+.extern crypto_it_tab
+.extern crypto_fl_tab
+.extern crypto_il_tab
 
 .text
 
@@ -56,13 +56,13 @@
 	.align	8;			\
 FUNC:	movq	r1,r2;			\
 	movq	r3,r4;			\
-	leaq	BASE+KEY+52(r8),r9;	\
+	leaq	BASE+KEY+48+4(r8),r9;	\
 	movq	r10,r11;		\
 	movl	(r7),r5 ## E;		\
 	movl	4(r7),r1 ## E;		\
 	movl	8(r7),r6 ## E;		\
 	movl	12(r7),r7 ## E;		\
-	movl	BASE(r8),r10 ## E;	\
+	movl	BASE+0(r8),r10 ## E;	\
 	xorl	-48(r9),r5 ## E;	\
 	xorl	-44(r9),r1 ## E;	\
 	xorl	-40(r9),r6 ## E;	\
@@ -154,37 +154,37 @@ FUNC:	movq	r1,r2;			\
 /* void aes_enc_blk(stuct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *out, const u8 *in) */
 
 	entry(aes_enc_blk,0,enc128,enc192)
-	encrypt_round(aes_ft_tab,-96)
-	encrypt_round(aes_ft_tab,-80)
-enc192:	encrypt_round(aes_ft_tab,-64)
-	encrypt_round(aes_ft_tab,-48)
-enc128:	encrypt_round(aes_ft_tab,-32)
-	encrypt_round(aes_ft_tab,-16)
-	encrypt_round(aes_ft_tab,  0)
-	encrypt_round(aes_ft_tab, 16)
-	encrypt_round(aes_ft_tab, 32)
-	encrypt_round(aes_ft_tab, 48)
-	encrypt_round(aes_ft_tab, 64)
-	encrypt_round(aes_ft_tab, 80)
-	encrypt_round(aes_ft_tab, 96)
-	encrypt_final(aes_fl_tab,112)
+	encrypt_round(crypto_ft_tab,-96)
+	encrypt_round(crypto_ft_tab,-80)
+enc192:	encrypt_round(crypto_ft_tab,-64)
+	encrypt_round(crypto_ft_tab,-48)
+enc128:	encrypt_round(crypto_ft_tab,-32)
+	encrypt_round(crypto_ft_tab,-16)
+	encrypt_round(crypto_ft_tab,  0)
+	encrypt_round(crypto_ft_tab, 16)
+	encrypt_round(crypto_ft_tab, 32)
+	encrypt_round(crypto_ft_tab, 48)
+	encrypt_round(crypto_ft_tab, 64)
+	encrypt_round(crypto_ft_tab, 80)
+	encrypt_round(crypto_ft_tab, 96)
+	encrypt_final(crypto_fl_tab,112)
 	return
 
 /* void aes_dec_blk(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *out, const u8 *in) */
 
 	entry(aes_dec_blk,240,dec128,dec192)
-	decrypt_round(aes_it_tab,-96)
-	decrypt_round(aes_it_tab,-80)
-dec192:	decrypt_round(aes_it_tab,-64)
-	decrypt_round(aes_it_tab,-48)
-dec128:	decrypt_round(aes_it_tab,-32)
-	decrypt_round(aes_it_tab,-16)
-	decrypt_round(aes_it_tab,  0)
-	decrypt_round(aes_it_tab, 16)
-	decrypt_round(aes_it_tab, 32)
-	decrypt_round(aes_it_tab, 48)
-	decrypt_round(aes_it_tab, 64)
-	decrypt_round(aes_it_tab, 80)
-	decrypt_round(aes_it_tab, 96)
-	decrypt_final(aes_il_tab,112)
+	decrypt_round(crypto_it_tab,-96)
+	decrypt_round(crypto_it_tab,-80)
+dec192:	decrypt_round(crypto_it_tab,-64)
+	decrypt_round(crypto_it_tab,-48)
+dec128:	decrypt_round(crypto_it_tab,-32)
+	decrypt_round(crypto_it_tab,-16)
+	decrypt_round(crypto_it_tab,  0)
+	decrypt_round(crypto_it_tab, 16)
+	decrypt_round(crypto_it_tab, 32)
+	decrypt_round(crypto_it_tab, 48)
+	decrypt_round(crypto_it_tab, 64)
+	decrypt_round(crypto_it_tab, 80)
+	decrypt_round(crypto_it_tab, 96)
+	decrypt_final(crypto_il_tab,112)
 	return
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/aes_32.c b/arch/x86/crypto/aes_32.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 49aad9397f1..00000000000
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/aes_32.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,515 +0,0 @@
-/* 
- * 
- * Glue Code for optimized 586 assembler version of AES
- *
- * Copyright (c) 2002, Dr Brian Gladman <>, Worcester, UK.
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * LICENSE TERMS
- *
- * The free distribution and use of this software in both source and binary
- * form is allowed (with or without changes) provided that:
- *
- *   1. distributions of this source code include the above copyright
- *      notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer;
- *
- *   2. distributions in binary form include the above copyright
- *      notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer
- *      in the documentation and/or other associated materials;
- *
- *   3. the copyright holder's name is not used to endorse products
- *      built using this software without specific written permission.
- *
- * ALTERNATIVELY, provided that this notice is retained in full, this product
- * may be distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License (GPL),
- * in which case the provisions of the GPL apply INSTEAD OF those given above.
- *
- * DISCLAIMER
- *
- * This software is provided 'as is' with no explicit or implied warranties
- * in respect of its properties, including, but not limited to, correctness
- * and/or fitness for purpose.
- *
- * Copyright (c) 2003, Adam J. Richter <adam@yggdrasil.com> (conversion to
- * 2.5 API).
- * Copyright (c) 2003, 2004 Fruhwirth Clemens <clemens@endorphin.org>
- * Copyright (c) 2004 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
- *
- */
-
-#include <asm/byteorder.h>
-#include <linux/kernel.h>
-#include <linux/module.h>
-#include <linux/init.h>
-#include <linux/types.h>
-#include <linux/crypto.h>
-#include <linux/linkage.h>
-
-asmlinkage void aes_enc_blk(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *dst, const u8 *src);
-asmlinkage void aes_dec_blk(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *dst, const u8 *src);
-
-#define AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE	16
-#define AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE	32
-#define AES_BLOCK_SIZE		16
-#define AES_KS_LENGTH		4 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE
-#define RC_LENGTH		29
-
-struct aes_ctx {
-	u32 ekey[AES_KS_LENGTH];
-	u32 rounds;
-	u32 dkey[AES_KS_LENGTH];
-};
-
-#define WPOLY 0x011b
-#define bytes2word(b0, b1, b2, b3)  \
-	(((u32)(b3) << 24) | ((u32)(b2) << 16) | ((u32)(b1) << 8) | (b0))
-
-/* define the finite field multiplies required for Rijndael */
-#define f2(x) ((x) ? pow[log[x] + 0x19] : 0)
-#define f3(x) ((x) ? pow[log[x] + 0x01] : 0)
-#define f9(x) ((x) ? pow[log[x] + 0xc7] : 0)
-#define fb(x) ((x) ? pow[log[x] + 0x68] : 0)
-#define fd(x) ((x) ? pow[log[x] + 0xee] : 0)
-#define fe(x) ((x) ? pow[log[x] + 0xdf] : 0)
-#define fi(x) ((x) ?   pow[255 - log[x]]: 0)
-
-static inline u32 upr(u32 x, int n)
-{
-	return (x << 8 * n) | (x >> (32 - 8 * n));
-}
-
-static inline u8 bval(u32 x, int n)
-{
-	return x >> 8 * n;
-}
-
-/* The forward and inverse affine transformations used in the S-box */
-#define fwd_affine(x) \
-	(w = (u32)x, w ^= (w<<1)^(w<<2)^(w<<3)^(w<<4), 0x63^(u8)(w^(w>>8)))
-
-#define inv_affine(x) \
-	(w = (u32)x, w = (w<<1)^(w<<3)^(w<<6), 0x05^(u8)(w^(w>>8)))
-
-static u32 rcon_tab[RC_LENGTH];
-
-u32 ft_tab[4][256];
-u32 fl_tab[4][256];
-static u32 im_tab[4][256];
-u32 il_tab[4][256];
-u32 it_tab[4][256];
-
-static void gen_tabs(void)
-{
-	u32 i, w;
-	u8 pow[512], log[256];
-
-	/*
-	 * log and power tables for GF(2^8) finite field with
-	 * WPOLY as modular polynomial - the simplest primitive
-	 * root is 0x03, used here to generate the tables.
-	 */
-	i = 0; w = 1; 
-	
-	do {
-		pow[i] = (u8)w;
-		pow[i + 255] = (u8)w;
-		log[w] = (u8)i++;
-		w ^=  (w << 1) ^ (w & 0x80 ? WPOLY : 0);
-	} while (w != 1);
-	
-	for(i = 0, w = 1; i < RC_LENGTH; ++i) {
-		rcon_tab[i] = bytes2word(w, 0, 0, 0);
-		w = f2(w);
-	}
-
-	for(i = 0; i < 256; ++i) {
-		u8 b;
-		
-		b = fwd_affine(fi((u8)i));
-		w = bytes2word(f2(b), b, b, f3(b));
-
-		/* tables for a normal encryption round */
-		ft_tab[0][i] = w;
-		ft_tab[1][i] = upr(w, 1);
-		ft_tab[2][i] = upr(w, 2);
-		ft_tab[3][i] = upr(w, 3);
-		w = bytes2word(b, 0, 0, 0);
-		
-		/*
-		 * tables for last encryption round
-		 * (may also be used in the key schedule)
-		 */
-		fl_tab[0][i] = w;
-		fl_tab[1][i] = upr(w, 1);
-		fl_tab[2][i] = upr(w, 2);
-		fl_tab[3][i] = upr(w, 3);
-		
-		b = fi(inv_affine((u8)i));
-		w = bytes2word(fe(b), f9(b), fd(b), fb(b));
-
-		/* tables for the inverse mix column operation  */
-		im_tab[0][b] = w;
-		im_tab[1][b] = upr(w, 1);
-		im_tab[2][b] = upr(w, 2);
-		im_tab[3][b] = upr(w, 3);
-
-		/* tables for a normal decryption round */
-		it_tab[0][i] = w;
-		it_tab[1][i] = upr(w,1);
-		it_tab[2][i] = upr(w,2);
-		it_tab[3][i] = upr(w,3);
-
-		w = bytes2word(b, 0, 0, 0);
-		
-		/* tables for last decryption round */
-		il_tab[0][i] = w;
-		il_tab[1][i] = upr(w,1);
-		il_tab[2][i] = upr(w,2);
-		il_tab[3][i] = upr(w,3);
-    }
-}
-
-#define four_tables(x,tab,vf,rf,c)		\
-(	tab[0][bval(vf(x,0,c),rf(0,c))]	^	\
-	tab[1][bval(vf(x,1,c),rf(1,c))] ^	\
-	tab[2][bval(vf(x,2,c),rf(2,c))] ^	\
-	tab[3][bval(vf(x,3,c),rf(3,c))]		\
-)
-
-#define vf1(x,r,c)  (x)
-#define rf1(r,c)    (r)
-#define rf2(r,c)    ((r-c)&3)
-
-#define inv_mcol(x) four_tables(x,im_tab,vf1,rf1,0)
-#define ls_box(x,c) four_tables(x,fl_tab,vf1,rf2,c)
-
-#define ff(x) inv_mcol(x)
-
-#define ke4(k,i)							\
-{									\
-	k[4*(i)+4] = ss[0] ^= ls_box(ss[3],3) ^ rcon_tab[i];		\
-	k[4*(i)+5] = ss[1] ^= ss[0];					\
-	k[4*(i)+6] = ss[2] ^= ss[1];					\
-	k[4*(i)+7] = ss[3] ^= ss[2];					\
-}
-
-#define kel4(k,i)							\
-{									\
-	k[4*(i)+4] = ss[0] ^= ls_box(ss[3],3) ^ rcon_tab[i];		\
-	k[4*(i)+5] = ss[1] ^= ss[0];					\
-	k[4*(i)+6] = ss[2] ^= ss[1]; k[4*(i)+7] = ss[3] ^= ss[2];	\
-}
-
-#define ke6(k,i)							\
-{									\
-	k[6*(i)+ 6] = ss[0] ^= ls_box(ss[5],3) ^ rcon_tab[i];		\
-	k[6*(i)+ 7] = ss[1] ^= ss[0];					\
-	k[6*(i)+ 8] = ss[2] ^= ss[1];					\
-	k[6*(i)+ 9] = ss[3] ^= ss[2];					\
-	k[6*(i)+10] = ss[4] ^= ss[3];					\
-	k[6*(i)+11] = ss[5] ^= ss[4];					\
-}
-
-#define kel6(k,i)							\
-{									\
-	k[6*(i)+ 6] = ss[0] ^= ls_box(ss[5],3) ^ rcon_tab[i];		\
-	k[6*(i)+ 7] = ss[1] ^= ss[0];					\
-	k[6*(i)+ 8] = ss[2] ^= ss[1];					\
-	k[6*(i)+ 9] = ss[3] ^= ss[2];					\
-}
-
-#define ke8(k,i)							\
-{									\
-	k[8*(i)+ 8] = ss[0] ^= ls_box(ss[7],3) ^ rcon_tab[i];		\
-	k[8*(i)+ 9] = ss[1] ^= ss[0];					\
-	k[8*(i)+10] = ss[2] ^= ss[1];					\
-	k[8*(i)+11] = ss[3] ^= ss[2];					\
-	k[8*(i)+12] = ss[4] ^= ls_box(ss[3],0);				\
-	k[8*(i)+13] = ss[5] ^= ss[4];					\
-	k[8*(i)+14] = ss[6] ^= ss[5];					\
-	k[8*(i)+15] = ss[7] ^= ss[6];					\
-}
-
-#define kel8(k,i)							\
-{									\
-	k[8*(i)+ 8] = ss[0] ^= ls_box(ss[7],3) ^ rcon_tab[i];		\
-	k[8*(i)+ 9] = ss[1] ^= ss[0];					\
-	k[8*(i)+10] = ss[2] ^= ss[1];					\
-	k[8*(i)+11] = ss[3] ^= ss[2];					\
-}
-
-#define kdf4(k,i)							\
-{									\
-	ss[0] = ss[0] ^ ss[2] ^ ss[1] ^ ss[3];				\
-	ss[1] = ss[1] ^ ss[3];						\
-	ss[2] = ss[2] ^ ss[3];						\
-	ss[3] = ss[3];							\
-	ss[4] = ls_box(ss[(i+3) % 4], 3) ^ rcon_tab[i];			\
-	ss[i % 4] ^= ss[4];						\
-	ss[4] ^= k[4*(i)];						\
-	k[4*(i)+4] = ff(ss[4]);						\
-	ss[4] ^= k[4*(i)+1];						\
-	k[4*(i)+5] = ff(ss[4]);						\
-	ss[4] ^= k[4*(i)+2];						\
-	k[4*(i)+6] = ff(ss[4]);						\
-	ss[4] ^= k[4*(i)+3];						\
-	k[4*(i)+7] = ff(ss[4]);						\
-}
-
-#define kd4(k,i)							\
-{									\
-	ss[4] = ls_box(ss[(i+3) % 4], 3) ^ rcon_tab[i];			\
-	ss[i % 4] ^= ss[4];						\
-	ss[4] = ff(ss[4]);						\
-	k[4*(i)+4] = ss[4] ^= k[4*(i)];					\
-	k[4*(i)+5] = ss[4] ^= k[4*(i)+1];				\
-	k[4*(i)+6] = ss[4] ^= k[4*(i)+2];				\
-	k[4*(i)+7] = ss[4] ^= k[4*(i)+3];				\
-}
-
-#define kdl4(k,i)							\
-{									\
-	ss[4] = ls_box(ss[(i+3) % 4], 3) ^ rcon_tab[i];			\
-	ss[i % 4] ^= ss[4];						\
-	k[4*(i)+4] = (ss[0] ^= ss[1]) ^ ss[2] ^ ss[3];			\
-	k[4*(i)+5] = ss[1] ^ ss[3];					\
-	k[4*(i)+6] = ss[0];						\
-	k[4*(i)+7] = ss[1];						\
-}
-
-#define kdf6(k,i)							\
-{									\
-	ss[0] ^= ls_box(ss[5],3) ^ rcon_tab[i];				\
-	k[6*(i)+ 6] = ff(ss[0]);					\
-	ss[1] ^= ss[0];							\
-	k[6*(i)+ 7] = ff(ss[1]);					\
-	ss[2] ^= ss[1];							\
-	k[6*(i)+ 8] = ff(ss[2]);					\
-	ss[3] ^= ss[2];							\
-	k[6*(i)+ 9] = ff(ss[3]);					\
-	ss[4] ^= ss[3];							\
-	k[6*(i)+10] = ff(ss[4]);					\
-	ss[5] ^= ss[4];							\
-	k[6*(i)+11] = ff(ss[5]);					\
-}
-
-#define kd6(k,i)							\
-{									\
-	ss[6] = ls_box(ss[5],3) ^ rcon_tab[i];				\
-	ss[0] ^= ss[6]; ss[6] = ff(ss[6]);				\
-	k[6*(i)+ 6] = ss[6] ^= k[6*(i)];				\
-	ss[1] ^= ss[0];							\
-	k[6*(i)+ 7] = ss[6] ^= k[6*(i)+ 1];				\
-	ss[2] ^= ss[1];							\
-	k[6*(i)+ 8] = ss[6] ^= k[6*(i)+ 2];				\
-	ss[3] ^= ss[2];							\
-	k[6*(i)+ 9] = ss[6] ^= k[6*(i)+ 3];				\
-	ss[4] ^= ss[3];							\
-	k[6*(i)+10] = ss[6] ^= k[6*(i)+ 4];				\
-	ss[5] ^= ss[4];							\
-	k[6*(i)+11] = ss[6] ^= k[6*(i)+ 5];				\
-}
-
-#define kdl6(k,i)							\
-{									\
-	ss[0] ^= ls_box(ss[5],3) ^ rcon_tab[i];				\
-	k[6*(i)+ 6] = ss[0];						\
-	ss[1] ^= ss[0];							\
-	k[6*(i)+ 7] = ss[1];						\
-	ss[2] ^= ss[1];							\
-	k[6*(i)+ 8] = ss[2];						\
-	ss[3] ^= ss[2];							\
-	k[6*(i)+ 9] = ss[3];						\
-}
-
-#define kdf8(k,i)							\
-{									\
-	ss[0] ^= ls_box(ss[7],3) ^ rcon_tab[i];				\
-	k[8*(i)+ 8] = ff(ss[0]);					\
-	ss[1] ^= ss[0];							\
-	k[8*(i)+ 9] = ff(ss[1]);					\
-	ss[2] ^= ss[1];							\
-	k[8*(i)+10] = ff(ss[2]);					\
-	ss[3] ^= ss[2];							\
-	k[8*(i)+11] = ff(ss[3]);					\
-	ss[4] ^= ls_box(ss[3],0);					\
-	k[8*(i)+12] = ff(ss[4]);					\
-	ss[5] ^= ss[4];							\
-	k[8*(i)+13] = ff(ss[5]);					\
-	ss[6] ^= ss[5];							\
-	k[8*(i)+14] = ff(ss[6]);					\
-	ss[7] ^= ss[6];							\
-	k[8*(i)+15] = ff(ss[7]);					\
-}
-
-#define kd8(k,i)							\
-{									\
-	u32 __g = ls_box(ss[7],3) ^ rcon_tab[i];			\
-	ss[0] ^= __g;							\
-	__g = ff(__g);							\