diff options
| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2008-12-28 11:43:54 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2008-12-28 11:43:54 -0800 |
| commit | bb26c6c29b7cc9f39e491b074b09f3c284738d36 (patch) | |
| tree | c7867af2bb4ff0feae889183efcd4d79b0f9a325 /arch/x86 | |
| parent | e14e61e967f2b3bdf23f05e4ae5b9aa830151a44 (diff) | |
| parent | cbacc2c7f066a1e01b33b0e27ae5efbf534bc2db (diff) | |
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (105 commits)
SELinux: don't check permissions for kernel mounts
security: pass mount flags to security_sb_kern_mount()
SELinux: correctly detect proc filesystems of the form "proc/foo"
Audit: Log TIOCSTI
user namespaces: document CFS behavior
user namespaces: require cap_set{ug}id for CLONE_NEWUSER
user namespaces: let user_ns be cloned with fairsched
CRED: fix sparse warnings
User namespaces: use the current_user_ns() macro
User namespaces: set of cleanups (v2)
nfsctl: add headers for credentials
coda: fix creds reference
capabilities: define get_vfs_caps_from_disk when file caps are not enabled
CRED: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions
CRED: Add a kernel_service object class to SELinux
CRED: Differentiate objective and effective subjective credentials on a task
CRED: Documentation
CRED: Use creds in file structs
CRED: Prettify commoncap.c
CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials
...
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/ia32/ia32_aout.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 2 |
2 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_aout.c b/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_aout.c index 127ec3f0721..2a4d073d2cf 100644 --- a/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_aout.c +++ b/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_aout.c @@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct pt_regs *regs) current->mm->cached_hole_size = 0; current->mm->mmap = NULL; - compute_creds(bprm); + install_exec_creds(bprm); current->flags &= ~PF_FORKNOEXEC; if (N_MAGIC(ex) == OMAGIC) { diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c index 31e8730fa24..3a1b6ef4f05 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c @@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ static void show_fault_oops(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, if (pte && pte_present(*pte) && !pte_exec(*pte)) printk(KERN_CRIT "kernel tried to execute " "NX-protected page - exploit attempt? " - "(uid: %d)\n", current->uid); + "(uid: %d)\n", current_uid()); } #endif |