diff options
| author | Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> | 2011-12-22 16:28:01 -0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2012-08-15 12:04:11 -0700 |
| commit | d191959fa812fadb86b52f16aa09a49fe6db98dd (patch) | |
| tree | b490805d758febadcd0316d2417bfbd6d3d56432 | |
| parent | be0052b8995dfa8d43a94badd54254e8cfc59471 (diff) | |
random: Use arch-specific RNG to initialize the entropy store
commit 3e88bdff1c65145f7ba297ccec69c774afe4c785 upstream.
If there is an architecture-specific random number generator (such as
RDRAND for Intel architectures), use it to initialize /dev/random's
entropy stores. Even in the worst case, if RDRAND is something like
AES(NSA_KEY, counter++), it won't hurt, and it will definitely help
against any other adversaries.
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1324589281-31931-1-git-send-email-tytso@mit.edu
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/random.c | 6 |
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index e35f6e8680a..fddfc4242ca 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -965,6 +965,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes); */ static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r) { + int i; ktime_t now; unsigned long flags; @@ -974,6 +975,11 @@ static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r) now = ktime_get_real(); mix_pool_bytes(r, &now, sizeof(now)); + for (i = r->poolinfo->poolwords; i; i--) { + if (!arch_get_random_long(&flags)) + break; + mix_pool_bytes(r, &flags, sizeof(flags)); + } mix_pool_bytes(r, utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname()))); } |