Merge branch 'next' into for-linus

57 files changed, 1246 insertions, 1061 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/credentials.txt b/Documentation/credentials.txt
index df03169782e..a2db3528700 100644
--- a/Documentation/credentials.txt
+++ b/Documentation/credentials.txt
@@ -408,9 +408,6 @@ This should be used inside the RCU read lock, as in the following example:
 		...
 	}
 
-A function need not get RCU read lock to use __task_cred() if it is holding a
-spinlock at the time as this implicitly holds the RCU read lock.
-
 Should it be necessary to hold another task's credentials for a long period of
 time, and possibly to sleep whilst doing so, then the caller should get a
 reference on them using:
@@ -426,17 +423,16 @@ credentials, hiding the RCU magic from the caller:
 	uid_t task_uid(task)		Task's real UID
 	uid_t task_euid(task)		Task's effective UID
 
-If the caller is holding a spinlock or the RCU read lock at the time anyway,
-then:
+If the caller is holding the RCU read lock at the time anyway, then:
 
 	__task_cred(task)->uid
 	__task_cred(task)->euid
 
 should be used instead.  Similarly, if multiple aspects of a task's credentials
-need to be accessed, RCU read lock or a spinlock should be used, __task_cred()
-called, the result stored in a temporary pointer and then the credential
-aspects called from that before dropping the lock.  This prevents the
-potentially expensive RCU magic from being invoked multiple times.
+need to be accessed, RCU read lock should be used, __task_cred() called, the
+result stored in a temporary pointer and then the credential aspects called
+from that before dropping the lock.  This prevents the potentially expensive
+RCU magic from being invoked multiple times.
 
 Should some other single aspect of another task's credentials need to be
 accessed, then this can be used:
diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
index 839b21b0699..db1db1ea3c0 100644
--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ parameter is applicable:
 	SWSUSP	Software suspend (hibernation) is enabled.
 	SUSPEND	System suspend states are enabled.
 	FTRACE	Function tracing enabled.
+	TPM	TPM drivers are enabled.
 	TS	Appropriate touchscreen support is enabled.
 	UMS	USB Mass Storage support is enabled.
 	USB	USB support is enabled.
@@ -2610,6 +2611,15 @@ and is between 256 and 4096 characters. It is defined in the file
 
 	tp720=		[HW,PS2]
 
+	tpm_suspend_pcr=[HW,TPM]
+			Format: integer pcr id
+			Specify that at suspend time, the tpm driver
+			should extend the specified pcr with zeros,
+			as a workaround for some chips which fail to
+			flush the last written pcr on TPM_SaveState.
+			This will guarantee that all the other pcrs
+			are saved.
+
 	trace_buf_size=nn[KMG]
 			[FTRACE] will set tracing buffer size.
 
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
index f5fc64f89c5..4dc338f3d1a 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
@@ -17,14 +17,16 @@ menuconfig TCG_TPM
 	  obtained at: <http://sourceforge.net/projects/trousers>.  To 
 	  compile this driver as a module, choose M here; the module 
 	  will be called tpm. If unsure, say N.
-	  Note: For more TPM drivers enable CONFIG_PNP, CONFIG_ACPI
+	  Notes:
+	  1) For more TPM drivers enable CONFIG_PNP, CONFIG_ACPI
 	  and CONFIG_PNPACPI.
+	  2) Without ACPI enabled, the BIOS event log won't be accessible,
+	  which is required to validate the PCR 0-7 values.
 
 if TCG_TPM
 
 config TCG_TIS
 	tristate "TPM Interface Specification 1.2 Interface"
-	depends on PNP
 	---help---
 	  If you have a TPM security chip that is compliant with the
 	  TCG TIS 1.2 TPM specification say Yes and it will be accessible
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
index 068c816e694..05ad4a17a28 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
@@ -1068,6 +1068,27 @@ void tpm_remove_hardware(struct device *dev)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_remove_hardware);
 
+#define TPM_ORD_SAVESTATE cpu_to_be32(152)
+#define SAVESTATE_RESULT_SIZE 10
+
+static struct tpm_input_header savestate_header = {
+	.tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
+	.length = cpu_to_be32(10),
+	.ordinal = TPM_ORD_SAVESTATE
+};
+
+/* Bug workaround - some TPM's don't flush the most
+ * recently changed pcr on suspend, so force the flush
+ * with an extend to the selected _unused_ non-volatile pcr.
+ */
+static int tpm_suspend_pcr;
+static int __init tpm_suspend_setup(char *str)
+{
+	get_option(&str, &tpm_suspend_pcr);
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("tpm_suspend_pcr=", tpm_suspend_setup);
+
 /*
  * We are about to suspend. Save the TPM state
  * so that it can be restored.
@@ -1075,17 +1096,29 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_remove_hardware);
 int tpm_pm_suspend(struct device *dev, pm_message_t pm_state)
 {
 	struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
-	u8 savestate[] = {
-		0, 193,		/* TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND */
-		0, 0, 0, 10,	/* blob length (in bytes) */
-		0, 0, 0, 152	/* TPM_ORD_SaveState */
-	};
+	struct tpm_cmd_t cmd;
+	int rc;
+
+	u8 dummy_hash[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE] = { 0 };
 
 	if (chip == NULL)
 		return -ENODEV;
 
-	tpm_transmit(chip, savestate, sizeof(savestate));
-	return 0;
+	/* for buggy tpm, flush pcrs with extend to selected dummy */
+	if (tpm_suspend_pcr) {
+		cmd.header.in = pcrextend_header;
+		cmd.params.pcrextend_in.pcr_idx = cpu_to_be32(tpm_suspend_pcr);
+		memcpy(cmd.params.pcrextend_in.hash, dummy_hash,
+		       TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
+		rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_SIZE,
+				  "extending dummy pcr before suspend");
+	}
+
+	/* now do the actual savestate */
+	cmd.header.in = savestate_header;
+	rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, SAVESTATE_RESULT_SIZE,
+			  "sending savestate before suspend");
+	return rc;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_pm_suspend);
 
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c
index 94345994f8a..24314a9cffe 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c
@@ -598,7 +598,7 @@ out_err:
 	tpm_remove_hardware(chip->dev);
 	return rc;
 }
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_PNP
 static int __devinit tpm_tis_pnp_init(struct pnp_dev *pnp_dev,
 				      const struct pnp_device_id *pnp_id)
 {
@@ -663,7 +663,7 @@ static struct pnp_driver tis_pnp_driver = {
 module_param_string(hid, tpm_pnp_tbl[TIS_HID_USR_IDX].id,
 		    sizeof(tpm_pnp_tbl[TIS_HID_USR_IDX].id), 0444);
 MODULE_PARM_DESC(hid, "Set additional specific HID for this driver to probe");
-
+#endif
 static int tpm_tis_suspend(struct platform_device *dev, pm_message_t msg)
 {
 	return tpm_pm_suspend(&dev->dev, msg);
@@ -690,21 +690,21 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(force, "Force device probe rather than using ACPI entry");
 static int __init init_tis(void)
 {
 	int rc;
+#ifdef CONFIG_PNP
+	if (!force)
+		return pnp_register_driver(&tis_pnp_driver);
+#endif
 
-	if (force) {
-		rc = platform_driver_register(&tis_drv);
-		if (rc < 0)
-			return rc;
-		if (IS_ERR(pdev=platform_device_register_simple("tpm_tis", -1, NULL, 0)))
-			return PTR_ERR(pdev);
-		if((rc=tpm_tis_init(&pdev->dev, TIS_MEM_BASE, TIS_MEM_LEN, 0)) != 0) {
-			platform_device_unregister(pdev);
-			platform_driver_unregister(&tis_drv);
-		}
+	rc = platform_driver_register(&tis_drv);
+	if (rc < 0)
 		return rc;
+	if (IS_ERR(pdev=platform_device_register_simple("tpm_tis", -1, NULL, 0)))
+		return PTR_ERR(pdev);
+	if((rc=tpm_tis_init(&pdev->dev, TIS_MEM_BASE, TIS_MEM_LEN, 0)) != 0) {
+		platform_device_unregister(pdev);
+		platform_driver_unregister(&tis_drv);
 	}
-
-	return pnp_register_driver(&tis_pnp_driver);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 static void __exit cleanup_tis(void)
@@ -728,12 +728,14 @@ static void __exit cleanup_tis(void)
 		list_del(&i->list);
 	}
 	spin_unlock(&tis_lock);
-
-	if (force) {
-		platform_device_unregister(pdev);
-		platform_driver_unregister(&tis_drv);
-	} else
+#ifdef CONFIG_PNP
+	if (!force) {
 		pnp_unregister_driver(&tis_pnp_driver);
+		return;
+	}
+#endif
+	platform_device_unregister(pdev);
+	platform_driver_unregister(&tis_drv);
 }
 
 module_init(init_tis);
diff --git a/fs/inode.c b/fs/inode.c
index 407bf392e20..258ec22bb29 100644
--- a/fs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/inode.c
@@ -1205,8 +1205,6 @@ void generic_delete_inode(struct inode *inode)
 	inodes_stat.nr_inodes--;
 	spin_unlock(&inode_lock);
 
-	security_inode_delete(inode);
-
 	if (op->delete_inode) {
 		void (*delete)(struct inode *) = op->delete_inode;
 		/* Filesystems implementing their own
diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index f20cb57d106..88058de59c7 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -628,7 +628,6 @@ repeat:
 		mnt->mnt_pinned = 0;
 		spin_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
 		acct_auto_close_mnt(mnt);
-		security_sb_umount_close(mnt);
 		goto repeat;
 	}
 }
@@ -1117,8 +1116,6 @@ static int do_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
 		retval = 0;
 	}
 	spin_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
-	if (retval)
-		security_sb_umount_busy(mnt);
 	up_write(&namespace_sem);
 	release_mounts(&umount_list);
 	return retval;
@@ -1435,17 +1432,10 @@ static int graft_tree(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct path *path)
 	if (cant_mount(path->dentry))
 		goto out_unlock;
 
-	err = security_sb_check_sb(mnt, path);
-	if (err)
-		goto out_unlock;
-
-	err = -ENOENT;
 	if (!d_unlinked(path->dentry))
 		err = attach_recursive_mnt(mnt, path, NULL);
 out_unlock:
 	mutex_unlock(&path->dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
-	if (!err)
-		security_sb_post_addmount(mnt, path);
 	return err;
 }
 
@@ -1581,8 +1571,6 @@ static int do_remount(struct path *path, int flags, int mnt_flags,
 	}
 	up_write(&sb->s_umount);
 	if (!err) {
-		security_sb_post_remount(path->mnt, flags, data);
-
 		spin_lock(&vfsmount_lock);
 		touch_mnt_namespace(path->mnt->mnt_ns);
 		spin_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
@@ -2277,7 +2265,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(pivot_root, const char __user *, new_root,
 	touch_mnt_namespace(current->nsproxy->mnt_ns);
 	spin_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
 	chroot_fs_refs(&root, &new);
-	security_sb_post_pivotroot(&root, &new);
 	error = 0;
 	path_put(&root_parent);
 	path_put(&parent_path);
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h
index f78f83d7663..6907251d520 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ struct common_audit_data {
 #define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC	4
 #define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK	5
 #define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY	6
-#define LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT	7
+#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE	7
 #define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD	8
 	struct task_struct *tsk;
 	union 	{
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 3158dd982d2..0c881917046 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -267,49 +267,16 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	@orig the original mount data copied from userspace.
  *	@copy copied data which will be passed to the security module.
  *	Returns 0 if the copy was successful.
- * @sb_check_sb:
- *	Check permission before the device with superblock @mnt->sb is mounted
- *	on the mount point named by @nd.
- *	@mnt contains the vfsmount for device being mounted.
- *	@path contains the path for the mount point.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  * @sb_umount:
  *	Check permission before the @mnt file system is unmounted.
  *	@mnt contains the mounted file system.
  *	@flags contains the unmount flags, e.g. MNT_FORCE.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @sb_umount_close:
- *	Close any files in the @mnt mounted filesystem that are held open by
- *	the security module.  This hook is called during an umount operation
- *	prior to checking whether the filesystem is still busy.
- *	@mnt contains the mounted filesystem.
- * @sb_umount_busy:
- *	Handle a failed umount of the @mnt mounted filesystem, e.g.  re-opening
- *	any files that were closed by umount_close.  This hook is called during
- *	an umount operation if the umount fails after a call to the
- *	umount_close hook.
- *	@mnt contains the mounted filesystem.
- * @sb_post_remount:
- *	Update the security module's state when a filesystem is remounted.
- *	This hook is only called if the remount was successful.
- *	@mnt contains the mounted file system.
- *	@flags contains the new filesystem flags.
- *	@data contains the filesystem-specific data.
- * @sb_post_addmount:
- *	Update the security module's state when a filesystem is mounted.
- *	This hook is called any time a mount is successfully grafetd to
- *	the tree.
- *	@mnt contains the mounted filesystem.
- *	@mountpoint contains the path for the mount point.
  * @sb_pivotroot:
  *	Check permission before pivoting the root filesystem.
  *	@old_path contains the path for the new location of the current root (put_old).
  *	@new_path contains the path for the new root (new_root).
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @sb_post_pivotroot:
- *	Update module state after a successful pivot.
- *	@old_path contains the path for the old root.
- *	@new_path contains the path for the new root.
  * @sb_set_mnt_opts:
  *	Set the security relevant mount options used for a superblock
  *	@sb the superblock to set security mount options for
@@ -511,12 +478,6 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	@mnt is the vfsmount where the dentry was looked up
  *	@dentry contains the dentry structure for the file.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @inode_delete:
- *	@inode contains the inode structure for deleted inode.
- *	This hook is called when a deleted inode is released (i.e. an inode
- *	with no hard links has its use count drop to zero).  A security module
- *	can use this hook to release any persistent label associated with the
- *	inode.
  * @inode_setxattr:
  *	Check permission before setting the extended attributes
  *	@value identified by @name for @dentry.
@@ -691,10 +652,6 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	@old points to the original credentials.
  *	@gfp indicates the atomicity of any memory allocations.
  *	Prepare a new set of credentials by copying the data from the old set.
- * @cred_commit:
- *	@new points to the new credentials.
- *	@old points to the original credentials.
- *	Install a new set of credentials.
  * @cred_transfer:
  *	@new points to the new credentials.
  *	@old points to the original credentials.
@@ -717,18 +674,6 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	userspace to load a kernel module with the given name.
  *	@kmod_name name of the module requested by the kernel
  *	Return 0 if successful.
- * @task_setuid:
- *	Check permission before setting one or more of the user identity
- *	attributes of the current process.  The @flags parameter indicates
- *	which of the set*uid system calls invoked this hook and how to
- *	interpret the @id0, @id1, and @id2 parameters.  See the LSM_SETID
- *	definitions at the beginning of this file for the @flags values and
- *	their meanings.
- *	@id0 contains a uid.
- *	@id1 contains a uid.
- *	@id2 contains a uid.
- *	@flags contains one of the LSM_SETID_* values.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  * @task_fix_setuid:
  *	Update the module's state after setting one or more of the user
  *	identity attributes of the current process.  The @flags parameter
@@ -738,18 +683,6 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	@old is the set of credentials that are being replaces
  *	@flags contains one of the LSM_SETID_* values.
  *	Return 0 on success.
- * @task_setgid:
- *	Check permission before setting one or more of the group identity
- *	attributes of the current process.  The @flags parameter indicates
- *	which of the set*gid system calls invoked this hook and how to
- *	interpret the @id0, @id1, and @id2 parameters.  See the LSM_SETID
- *	definitions at the beginning of this file for the @flags values and
- *	their meanings.
- *	@id0 contains a gid.
- *	@id1 contains a gid.
- *	@id2 contains a gid.
- *	@flags contains one of the LSM_SETID_* values.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  * @task_setpgid:
  *	Check permission before setting the process group identifier of the
  *	process @p to @pgid.
@@ -771,11 +704,6 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	@p contains the task_struct for the process and place is into @secid.
  *	In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
  *
- * @task_setgroups:
- *	Check permission before setting the supplementary group set of the
- *	current process.
- *	@group_info contains the new group information.
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  * @task_setnice:
  *	Check permission before setting the nice value of @p to @nice.
  *	@p contains the task_struct of process.
@@ -1139,13 +1067,6 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	Return the length of the string (including terminating NUL) or -ve if
  *      an error.
  *	May also return 0 (and a NULL buffer pointer) if there is no label.
- * @key_session_to_parent:
- *	Forcibly assign the session keyring from a process to its parent
- *	process.
- *	@cred: Pointer to process's credentials
- *	@parent_cred: Pointer to parent process's credentials
- *	@keyring: Proposed new session keyring
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted, -ve error otherwise.
  *
  * Security hooks affecting all System V IPC operations.
  *
@@ -1333,13 +1254,6 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	@cap contains the capability <include/linux/capability.h>.
  *	@audit: Whether to write an audit message or not
  *	Return 0 if the capability is granted for @tsk.
- * @acct:
- *	Check permission before enabling or disabling process accounting.  If
- *	accounting is being enabled, then @file refers to the open file used to
- *	store accounting records.  If accounting is being disabled, then @file
- *	is NULL.
- *	@file contains the file structure for the accounting file (may be NULL).
- *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  * @sysctl:
  *	Check permission before accessing the @table sysctl variable in the
  *	manner specified by @op.
@@ -1462,7 +1376,6 @@ struct security_operations {
 		       const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
 	int (*capable) (struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
 			int cap, int audit);
-	int (*acct) (struct file *file);
 	int (*sysctl) (struct ctl_table *table, int op);
 	int (*quotactl) (int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb);
 	int (*quota_on) (struct dentry *dentry);
@@ -1484,18 +1397,9 @@ struct security_operations {
 	int (*sb_statfs) (struct dentry *dentry);
 	int (*sb_mount) (char *dev_name, struct path *path,
 			 char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data);
-	int (*sb_check_sb) (struct vfsmount *mnt, struct path *path);
 	int (*sb_umount) (struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags);
-	void (*sb_umount_close) (struct vfsmount *mnt);
-	void (*sb_umount_busy) (struct vfsmount *mnt);
-	void (*sb_post_remount) (struct vfsmount *mnt,
-				 unsigned long flags, void *data);
-	void (*sb_post_addmount) (struct vfsmount *mnt,
-				  struct path *mountpoint);
 	int (*sb_pivotroot) (struct path *old_path,
 			     struct path *new_path);
-	void (*sb_post_pivotroot) (struct path *old_path,
-				   struct path *new_path);
 	int (*sb_set_mnt_opts) (struct super_block *sb,
 				struct security_mnt_opts *opts);
 	void (*sb_clone_mnt_opts) (const struct super_block *oldsb,
@@ -1544,7 +1448,6 @@ struct security_operations {
 	int (*inode_permission) (struct inode *inode, int mask);
 	int (*inode_setattr)	(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr);
 	int (*inode_getattr) (struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry);
-	void (*inode_delete) (struct inode *inode);
 	int (*inode_setxattr) (struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 			       const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
 	void (*inode_post_setxattr) (struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
@@ -1585,20 +1488,16 @@ struct security_operations {
 	void (*cred_free) (struct cred *cred);
 	int (*cred_prepare)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 			    gfp_t gfp);
-	void (*cred_commit)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
 	void (*cred_transfer)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
 	int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
 	int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
 	int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name);
-	int (*task_setuid) (uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags);
 	int (*task_fix_setuid) (struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 				int flags);
-	int (*task_setgid) (gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags);
 	int (*task_setpgid) (struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
 	int (*task_getpgid) (struct task_struct *p);
 	int (*task_getsid) (struct task_struct *p);
 	void (*task_getsecid) (struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
-	int (*task_setgroups) (struct group_info *group_info);
 	int (*task_setnice) (struct task_struct *p, int nice);
 	int (*task_setioprio) (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
 	int (*task_getioprio) (struct task_struct *p);
@@ -1728,9 +1627,6 @@ struct security_operations {
 			       const struct cred *cred,
 			       key_perm_t perm);
 	int (*key_getsecurity)(struct key *key, char **_buffer);
-	int (*key_session_to_parent)(const struct cred *cred,
-				     const struct cred *parent_cred,
-				     struct key *key);
 #endif	/* CONFIG_KEYS */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
@@ -1761,7 +1657,6 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 int security_capable(int cap);
 int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
 int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
-int security_acct(struct file *file);
 int security_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int op);
 int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb);
 int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry);
@@ -1783,14 +1678,8 @@ int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb);
 int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry);
 int security_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path,
 		      char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data);
-int security_sb_check_sb(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct path *path);
 int security_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags);
-void security_sb_umount_close(struct vfsmount *mnt);
-void security_sb_umount_busy(struct vfsmount *mnt);
-void security_sb_post_remount(struct vfsmount *mnt, unsigned long flags, void *data);
-void security_sb_post_addmount(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct path *mountpoint);
 int security_sb_pivotroot(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path);
-void security_sb_post_pivotroot(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path);
 int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, struct security_mnt_opts *opts);
 void security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
 				struct super_block *newsb);
@@ -1816,7 +1705,6 @@ int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd);
 int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask);
 int security_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr);
 int security_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry);
-void security_inode_delete(struct inode *inode);
 int security_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 			    const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
 void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
@@ -1850,20 +1738,16 @@ int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags);
 int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
 void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
 int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
-void security_commit_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
 void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
 int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
 int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
 int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
-int security_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags);
 int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 			     int flags);
-int security_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags);
 int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
 int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p);
 int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p);
 void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
-int security_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info);
 int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
 int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
 int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p);
@@ -1990,11 +1874,6 @@ int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
 	return ret;
 }
 
-static inline int security_acct(struct file *file)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static inline int security_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int op)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -2099,41 +1978,17 @@ static inline int security_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int security_sb_check_sb(struct vfsmount *mnt,
-				       struct path *path)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static inline int security_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline void security_sb_umount_close(struct vfsmount *mnt)
-{ }
-
-static inline void security_sb_umount_busy(struct vfsmount *mnt)
-{ }
-
-static inline void security_sb_post_remount(struct vfsmount *mnt,
-					     unsigned long flags, void *data)
-{ }
-
-static inline void security_sb_post_addmount(struct vfsmount *mnt,
-					     struct path *mountpoint)
-{ }
-
 static inline int security_sb_pivotroot(struct path *old_path,
 					struct path *new_path)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline void security_sb_post_pivotroot(struct path *old_path,
-					      struct path *new_path)
-{ }
-
 static inline int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 					   struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
 {
@@ -2249,9 +2104,6 @@ static inline int security_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline void security_inode_delete(struct inode *inode)
-{ }
-
 static inline int security_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 		const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
 {
@@ -2398,11 +2250,6 @@ static inline int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline void security_commit_creds(struct cred *new,
-					 const struct cred *old)
-{
-}
-
 static inline void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new,
 					   const struct cred *old)
 {
@@ -2424,12 +2271,6 @@ static inline int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int security_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2,
-				       int flags)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static inline int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new,
 					   const struct cred *old,
 					   int flags)
@@ -2437,12 +2278,6 @@ static inline int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new,
 	return cap_task_fix_setuid(new, old, flags);
 }
 
-static inline int security_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2,
-				       int flags)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static inline int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -2463,11 +2298,6 @@ static inline void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
 	*secid = 0;
 }
 
-static inline int security_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static inline int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 {
 	return cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
@@ -3064,9 +2894,6 @@ void security_key_free(struct key *key);
 int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
 			    const struct cred *cred, key_perm_t perm);
 int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer);
-int security_key_session_to_parent(const struct cred *cred,
-				   const struct cred *parent_cred,
-				   struct key *key);
 
 #else
 
@@ -3094,13 +2921,6 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int security_key_session_to_parent(const struct cred *cred,
-						 const struct cred *parent_cred,
-						 struct key *key)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
 #endif
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 
diff --git a/kernel/acct.c b/kernel/acct.c
index e4c0e1fee9b..385b88461c2 100644
--- a/kernel/acct.c
+++ b/kernel/acct.c
@@ -216,7 +216,6 @@ static int acct_on(char *name)
 {
 	struct file *file;
 	struct vfsmount *mnt;
-	int error;
 	struct pid_namespace *ns;
 	struct bsd_acct_struct *acct = NULL;
 
@@ -244,13 +243,6 @@ static int acct_on(char *name)
 		}
 	}
 
-	error = security_acct(file);
-	if (error) {
-		kfree(acct);
-		filp_close(file, NULL);
-		return error;
-	}
-
 	spin_lock(&acct_lock);
 	if (ns->bacct == NULL) {
 		ns->bacct = acct;
@@ -281,7 +273,7 @@ static int acct_on(char *name)
  */
 SYSCALL_DEFINE1(acct, const char __user *, name)
 {
-	int error;
+	int error = 0;
 
 	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_PACCT))
 		return -EPERM;
@@ -299,13 +291,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(acct, const char __user *, name)
 		if (acct == NULL)
 			return 0;
 
-		error = security_acct(NULL);
-		if (!error) {
-			spin_lock(&acct_lock);
-			acct_file_reopen(acct, NULL, NULL);
-			spin_unlock(&acct_lock);
-		}
+		spin_lock(&acct_lock);
+		acct_file_reopen(acct, NULL, NULL);
+		spin_unlock(&acct_lock);
 	}
+
 	return error;
 }
 
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 62af1816c23..31f38a99adf 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -523,8 +523,6 @@ int commit_creds(struct cred *new)
 #endif
 	BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) < 1);
 
-	security_commit_creds(new, old);
-
 	get_cred(new); /* we will require a ref for the subj creds too */
 
 	/* dumpability changes */
diff --git a/kernel/groups.c b/kernel/groups.c
index 2b45b2ee396..53b1916c949 100644
--- a/kernel/groups.c
+++ b/kernel/groups.c
@@ -164,12 +164,6 @@ int groups_search(const struct group_info *group_info, gid_t grp)
  */
 int set_groups(struct cred *new, struct group_info *group_info)
 {
-	int retval;
-
-	retval = security_task_setgroups(group_info);
-	if (retval)
-		return retval;
-
 	put_group_info(new->group_info);
 	groups_sort(group_info);
 	get_group_info(group_info);
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index 7cb426a5896..0d36d889c74 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -492,10 +492,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setregid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	old = current_cred();
 
-	retval = security_task_setgid(rgid, egid, (gid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_RE);
-	if (retval)
-		goto error;
-
 	retval = -EPERM;
 	if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) {
 		if (old->gid == rgid ||
@@ -543,10 +539,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setgid, gid_t, gid)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	old = current_cred();
 
-	retval = security_task_setgid(gid, (gid_t)-1, (gid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_ID);
-	if (retval)
-		goto error;
-
 	retval = -EPERM;
 	if (capable(CAP_SETGID))
 		new->gid = new->egid = new->sgid = new->fsgid = gid;
@@ -610,10 +602,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setreuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	old = current_cred();
 
-	retval = security_task_setuid(ruid, euid, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_RE);
-	if (retval)
-		goto error;
-
 	retval = -EPERM;
 	if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) {
 		new->uid = ruid;
@@ -675,10 +663,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setuid, uid_t, uid)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	old = current_cred();
 
-	retval = security_task_setuid(uid, (uid_t)-1, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_ID);
-	if (retval)
-		goto error;
-
 	retval = -EPERM;
 	if (capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
 		new->suid = new->uid = uid;
@@ -719,9 +703,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid, uid_t, suid)
 	if (!new)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	retval = security_task_setuid(ruid, euid, suid, LSM_SETID_RES);
-	if (retval)
-		goto error;
 	old = current_cred();
 
 	retval = -EPERM;
@@ -788,10 +769,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresgid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid, gid_t, sgid)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	old = current_cred();
 
-	retval = security_task_setgid(rgid, egid, sgid, LSM_SETID_RES);
-	if (retval)
-		goto error;
-
 	retval = -EPERM;
 	if (!capable(CAP_SETGID)) {
 		if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 && rgid != old->gid &&
@@ -851,9 +828,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsuid, uid_t, uid)
 	old = current_cred();
 	old_fsuid = old->fsuid;
 
-	if (security_task_setuid(uid, (uid_t)-1, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_FS) < 0)
-		goto error;
-
 	if (uid == old->uid  || uid == old->euid  ||
 	    uid == old->suid || uid == old->fsuid ||
 	    capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
@@ -864,7 +838,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsuid, uid_t, uid)
 		}
 	}
 
-error:
 	abort_creds(new);
 	return old_fsuid;
 
@@ -888,9 +861,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsgid, gid_t, gid)
 	old = current_cred();
 	old_fsgid = old->fsgid;
 
-	if (security_task_setgid(gid, (gid_t)-1, (gid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_FS))
-		goto error;
-
 	if (gid == old->gid  || gid == old->egid  ||
 	    gid == old->sgid || gid == old->fsgid ||
 	    capable(CAP_SETGID)) {
@@ -900,7 +870,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsgid, gid_t, gid)
 		}
 	}
 
-error:
 	abort_creds(new);
 	return old_fsgid;
 
diff --git a/scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c b/scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c
index 24626968055..58a12c27870 100644
--- a/scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c
+++ b/scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 	fprintf(fout, "\n");
 
 	for (i = 1; i < isids_len; i++) {
-		char *s = initial_sid_to_string[i];
+		const char *s = initial_sid_to_string[i];
 		fprintf(fout, "#define SECINITSID_%s", s);
 		for (j = 0; j < max(1, 40 - strlen(s)); j++)
 			fprintf(fout, " ");
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 4875142b858..8168e3ecd5b 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -12,11 +12,6 @@
 
 #include <linux/security.h>
 
-static int cap_acct(struct file *file)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static int cap_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -80,42 +75,16 @@ static int cap_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path, char *type,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int cap_sb_check_sb(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct path *path)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static int cap_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void cap_sb_umount_close(struct vfsmount *mnt)
-{
-}
-
-static void cap_sb_umount_busy(struct vfsmount *mnt)
-{
-}
-
-static void cap_sb_post_remount(struct vfsmount *mnt, unsigned long flags,
-				void *data)
-{
-}
-
-static void cap_sb_post_addmount(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct path *path)
-{
-}
-
 static int cap_sb_pivotroot(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void cap_sb_post_pivotroot(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path)
-{
-}
-
 static int cap_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 			       struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
 {
@@ -221,10 +190,6 @@ static int cap_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void cap_inode_delete(struct inode *ino)
-{
-}
-
 static void cap_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 				    const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
 {
@@ -403,10 +368,6 @@ static int cap_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void cap_cred_commit(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
-{
-}
-
 static void cap_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 {
 }
@@ -426,16 +387,6 @@ static int cap_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int cap_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static int cap_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -456,11 +407,6 @@ static void cap_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
 	*secid = 0;
 }
 
-static int cap_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static int cap_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -875,13 +821,6 @@ static int cap_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int cap_key_session_to_parent(const struct cred *cred,
-				     const struct cred *parent_cred,
-				     struct key *key)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
@@ -915,13 +854,12 @@ static void cap_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
 			}						\
 	} while (0)
 
-void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
+void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 {
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_access_check);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_traceme);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capget);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capset);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, acct);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capable);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, quotactl);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, quota_on);
@@ -941,14 +879,8 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_show_options);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_statfs);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_mount);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_check_sb);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_umount);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_umount_close);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_umount_busy);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_post_remount);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_post_addmount);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_pivotroot);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_post_pivotroot);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_set_mnt_opts);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_clone_mnt_opts);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_parse_opts_str);
@@ -968,7 +900,6 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_permission);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_setattr);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_getattr);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_delete);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_setxattr);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_post_setxattr);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_getxattr);
@@ -1009,19 +940,15 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_alloc_blank);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_free);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_prepare);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_commit);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_transfer);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_act_as);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_create_files_as);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_module_request);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setuid);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_fix_setuid);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setgid);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setpgid);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_getpgid);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_getsid);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_getsecid);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setgroups);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setnice);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setioprio);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_getioprio);
@@ -1113,7 +1040,6 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_free);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_permission);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_getsecurity);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_session_to_parent);
 #endif	/* CONFIG_KEYS */
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, audit_rule_init);
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 61669730da9..4e015996dd4 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -570,7 +570,7 @@ int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	}
 
 	if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
-		     sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1)  &&
+		     sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) &&
 	    !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 	return 0;
@@ -596,7 +596,7 @@ int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 	}
 
 	if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
-		     sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1)  &&
+		     sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) &&
 	    !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 	return 0;
@@ -931,7 +931,7 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
  * @addr: address attempting to be mapped
  * @addr_only: unused
  *
- * If the process is attempting to map memory below mmap_min_addr they need
+ * If the process is attempting to map memory below dac_mmap_min_addr they need
  * CAP_SYS_RAWIO.  The other parameters to this function are unused by the
  * capability security module.  Returns 0 if this mapping should be allowed
  * -EPERM if not.
diff --git a/security/device_cgroup.c b/security/device_cgroup.c
index f77c6042399..8d9c48f1377 100644
--- a/security/device_cgroup.c
+++ b/security/device_cgroup.c
@@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ struct cgroup_subsys devices_subsys = {
 	.name = "devices",
 	.can_attach = devcgroup_can_attach,
 	.create = devcgroup_create,
-	.destroy  = devcgroup_destroy,
+	.destroy = devcgroup_destroy,
 	.populate = devcgroup_populate,
 	.subsys_id = devices_subsys_id,
 };
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index 3d7846de806..b6ecfd4d8d7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -2,15 +2,14 @@
 #
 config IMA
 	bool "Integrity Measurement Architecture(IMA)"
-	depends on ACPI
 	depends on SECURITY
 	select SECURITYFS
 	select CRYPTO
 	select CRYPTO_HMAC
 	select CRYPTO_MD5
 	select CRYPTO_SHA1
-	select TCG_TPM
-	select TCG_TIS
+	select TCG_TPM if !S390
+	select TCG_TIS if TCG_TPM
 	help
 	  The Trusted Computing Group(TCG) runtime Integrity
 	  Measurement Architecture(IMA) maintains a list of hash
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 47fb65d1fcb..16d100d3fc3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK };
 int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask);
 void ima_init_policy(void);
 void ima_update_policy(void);
-int ima_parse_add_rule(char *);
+ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *);
 void ima_delete_rules(void);
 
 /* LSM based policy rules require audit */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
index 5af76340470..c5c5a72c30b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
 		return;
 
 	ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, audit_msgno);
-	audit_log_format(ab, "integrity: pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u ses=%u",
+	audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u ses=%u",
 			 current->pid, current_cred()->uid,
 			 audit_get_loginuid(current),
 			 audit_get_sessionid(current));
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index 952e51373f5..9b3ade7468b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ static int init_desc(struct hash_desc *desc)
 
 	desc->tfm = crypto_alloc_hash(ima_hash, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
 	if (IS_ERR(desc->tfm)) {
-		pr_info("failed to load %s transform: %ld\n",
+		pr_info("IMA: failed to load %s transform: %ld\n",
 			ima_hash, PTR_ERR(desc->tfm));
 		rc = PTR_ERR(desc->tfm);
 		return rc;
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ static void __init ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr)
 		return;
 
 	if (tpm_pcr_read(TPM_ANY_NUM, idx, pcr) != 0)
-		pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip\n");
+		pr_err("IMA: Error Communicating to TPM chip\n");
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index 07cb9c338cc..8fe736aabe7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -244,32 +244,34 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_ascii_measurements_ops = {
 static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 				size_t datalen, loff_t *ppos)
 {
-	char *data;
-	int rc;
+	char *data = NULL;
+	ssize_t result;
 
 	if (datalen >= PAGE_SIZE)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-	if (*ppos != 0) {
-		/* No partial writes. */
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
+		datalen = PAGE_SIZE - 1;
+
+	/* No partial writes. */
+	result = -EINVAL;
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	result = -ENOMEM;
 	data = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!data)
-		return -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
 
-	if (copy_from_user(data, buf, datalen)) {
-		kfree(data);
-		return -EFAULT;
-	}
 	*(data + datalen) = '\0';
-	rc = ima_parse_add_rule(data);
-	if (rc < 0) {
-		datalen = -EINVAL;
-		valid_policy = 0;
-	}
 
+	result = -EFAULT;
+	if (copy_from_user(data, buf, datalen))
+		goto out;
+
+	result = ima_parse_add_rule(data);
+out:
+	if (result < 0)
+		valid_policy = 0;
 	kfree(data);
-	return datalen;
+	return result;
 }
 
 static struct dentry *ima_dir;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
index 2c744d48801..2dc2d659414 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
@@ -80,17 +80,17 @@ void iint_free(struct kref *kref)
 	iint->version = 0;
 	iint->flags = 0UL;
 	if (iint->readcount != 0) {
-		printk(KERN_INFO "%s: readcount: %ld\n", __FUNCTION__,
+		printk(KERN_INFO "%s: readcount: %ld\n", __func__,
 		       iint->readcount);
 		iint->readcount = 0;
 	}
 	if (iint->writecount != 0) {
-		printk(KERN_INFO "%s: writecount: %ld\n", __FUNCTION__,
+		printk(KERN_INFO "%s: writecount: %ld\n", __func__,
 		       iint->writecount);
 		iint->writecount = 0;
 	}
 	if (iint->opencount != 0) {
-		printk(KERN_INFO "%s: opencount: %ld\n", __FUNCTION__,
+		printk(KERN_INFO "%s: opencount: %ld\n", __func__,
 		       iint->opencount);
 		iint->opencount = 0;
 	}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index b1bcb702a27..17f1f060306 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ int __init ima_init(void)
 		ima_used_chip = 1;
 
 	if (!ima_used_chip)
-		pr_info("No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!\n");
+		pr_info("IMA: No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!\n");
 
 	ima_add_boot_aggregate();	/* boot aggregate must be first entry */
 	ima_init_policy();
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index b2c89d9de2a..f93641382e9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ static void ima_dec_counts(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode,
 	     (iint->writecount < 0)) &&
 	    !ima_limit_imbalance(file)) {
 		printk(KERN_INFO "%s: open/free imbalance (r:%ld w:%ld o:%ld)\n",
-		       __FUNCTION__, iint->readcount, iint->writecount,
+		       __func__, iint->readcount, iint->writecount,
 		       iint->opencount);
 		dump_stack();
 	}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 8643a93c596..aef8c0a923a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -246,6 +246,9 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry,
 {
 	int result;
 
+	if (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
 	result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type,
 					   Audit_equal, args,
@@ -253,6 +256,13 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry,
 	return result;
 }
 
+static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value)
+{
+	audit_log_format(ab, "%s=", key);
+	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, value);
+	audit_log_format(ab, " ");
+}
+
 static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
@@ -261,28 +271,41 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
 
 	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
 
-	entry->action = -1;
-	while ((p = strsep(&rule, " \n")) != NULL) {
+	entry->uid = -1;
+	entry->action = UNKNOWN;
+	while ((p = strsep(&rule, " \t")) != NULL) {
 		substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
 		int token;
 		unsigned long lnum;
 
 		if (result < 0)
 			break;
-		if (!*p)
+		if ((*p == '\0') || (*p == ' ') || (*p == '\t'))
 			continue;
 		token = match_token(p, policy_tokens, args);
 		switch (token) {
 		case Opt_measure:
-			audit_log_format(ab, "%s ", "measure");
+			ima_log_string(ab, "action", "measure");
+
+			if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
+				result = -EINVAL;
+
 			entry->action = MEASURE;
 			break;
 		case Opt_dont_measure:
-			audit_log_format(ab, "%s ", "dont_measure");
+			ima_log_string(ab, "action", "dont_measure");
+
+			if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
+				result = -EINVAL;
+
 			entry->action = DONT_MEASURE;
 			break;
 		case Opt_func:
-			audit_log_format(ab, "func=%s ", args[0].from);
+			ima_log_string(ab, "func", args[0].from);
+
+			if (entry->func)
+				result  = -EINVAL;
+
 			if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_CHECK") == 0)
 				entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
 			/* PATH_CHECK is for backwards compat */
@@ -298,7 +321,11 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
 				entry->flags |= IMA_FUNC;
 			break;
 		case Opt_mask:
-			audit_log_format(ab, "mask=%s ", args[0].from);
+			ima_log_string(ab, "mask", args[0].from);
+
+			if (entry->mask)
+				result = -EINVAL;
+
 			if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_EXEC")) == 0)
 				entry->mask = MAY_EXEC;
 			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_WRITE") == 0)
@@ -313,14 +340,26 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
 				entry->flags |= IMA_MASK;
 			break;
 		case Opt_fsmagic:
-			audit_log_format(ab, "fsmagic=%s ", args[0].from);
+			ima_log_string(ab, "fsmagic", args[0].from);
+
+			if (entry->fsmagic) {
+				result = -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			}
+
 			result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 16,
 						&entry->fsmagic);
 			if (!result)
 				entry->flags |= IMA_FSMAGIC;
 			break;
 		case Opt_uid:
-			audit_log_format(ab, "uid=%s ", args[0].from);
+			ima_log_string(ab, "uid", args[0].from);
+
+			if (entry->uid != -1) {
+				result = -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			}
+
 			result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
 			if (!result) {
 				entry->uid = (uid_t) lnum;
@@ -331,50 +370,51 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
 			}
 			break;
 		case Opt_obj_user:
-			audit_log_format(ab, "obj_user=%s ", args[0].from);
+			ima_log_string(ab, "obj_user", args[0].from);
 			result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
 						   LSM_OBJ_USER,
 						   AUDIT_OBJ_USER);
 			break;
 		case Opt_obj_role:
-			audit_log_format(ab, "obj_role=%s ", args[0].from);
+			ima_log_string(ab, "obj_role", args[0].from);
 			result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
 						   LSM_OBJ_ROLE,
 						   AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE);
 			break;
 		case Opt_obj_type:
-			audit_log_format(ab, "obj_type=%s ", args[0].from);
+			ima_log_string(ab, "obj_type", args[0].from);
 			result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
 						   LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
 						   AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE);
 			break;
 		case Opt_subj_user:
-			audit_log_format(ab, "subj_user=%s ", args[0].from);
+			ima_log_string(ab, "subj_user", args[0].from);
 			result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
 						   LSM_SUBJ_USER,
 						   AUDIT_SUBJ_USER);
 			break;
 		case Opt_subj_role:
-			audit_log_format(ab, "subj_role=%s ", args[0].from);
+			ima_log_string(ab, "subj_role", args[0].from);
 			result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
 						   LSM_SUBJ_ROLE,
 						   AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE);
 			break;
 		case Opt_subj_type:
-			audit_log_format(ab, "subj_type=%s ", args[0].from);
+			ima_log_string(ab, "subj_type", args[0].from);
 			result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
 						   LSM_SUBJ_TYPE,
 						   AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE);
 			break;
 		case Opt_err:
-			audit_log_format(ab, "UNKNOWN=%s ", p);
+			ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p);
+			result = -EINVAL;
 			break;
 		}
 	}
-	if (entry->action == UNKNOWN)
+	if (!result && (entry->action == UNKNOWN))
 		result = -EINVAL;
 
-	audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result ? 0 : 1);
+	audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !!result);
 	audit_log_end(ab);
 	return result;
 }
@@ -384,13 +424,14 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
  * @rule - ima measurement policy rule
  *
  * Uses a mutex to protect the policy list from multiple concurrent writers.
- * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure.
+ * Returns the length of the rule parsed, an error code on failure
  */
-int ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
+ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
 {
 	const char *op = "update_policy";
+	char *p;
 	struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry;
-	int result = 0;
+	ssize_t result, len;
 	int audit_info = 0;
 
 	/* Prevent installed policy from changing */
@@ -410,18 +451,28 @@ int ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
 
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
 
-	result = ima_parse_rule(rule, entry);
-	if (!result) {
-		mutex_lock(&ima_measure_mutex);
-		list_add_tail(&entry->list, &measure_policy_rules);
-		mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex);
-	} else {
+	p = strsep(&rule, "\n");
+	len = strlen(p) + 1;
+
+	if (*p == '#') {
+		kfree(entry);
+		return len;
+	}
+
+	result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry);
+	if (result) {
 		kfree(entry);
 		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
 				    NULL, op, "invalid policy", result,
 				    audit_info);
+		return result;
 	}
-	return result;
+
+	mutex_lock(&ima_measure_mutex);
+	list_add_tail(&entry->list, &measure_policy_rules);
+	mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex);
+
+	return len;
 }
 
 /* ima_delete_rules called to cleanup invalid policy */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
index 46ba62b1adf..8e28f04a5e2 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ static int ima_add_digest_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry)
 
 	qe = kmalloc(sizeof(*qe), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (qe == NULL) {
-		pr_err("OUT OF MEMORY ERROR creating queue entry.\n");
+		pr_err("IMA: OUT OF MEMORY ERROR creating queue entry.\n");
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 	qe->entry = entry;
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ static int ima_pcr_extend(const u8 *hash)
 
 	result = tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX, hash);
 	if (result != 0)
-		pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip\n");
+		pr_err("IMA: Error Communicating to TPM chip\n");
 	return result;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index 24ba0307b7a..5d4402a1161 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -87,7 +87,16 @@ extern wait_queue_head_t request_key_conswq;
 extern struct key_type *key_type_lookup(const char *type);
 extern void key_type_put(struct key_type *ktype);
 
-extern int __key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key);
+extern int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring,
+			    const struct key_type *type,
+			    const char *description,
+			    struct keyring_list **_prealloc);
+extern int __key_link_check_live_key(struct key *keyring, struct key *key);
+extern void __key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
+		       struct keyring_list **_prealloc);
+extern void __key_link_end(struct key *keyring,
+			   struct key_type *type,
+			   struct keyring_list *prealloc);
 
 extern key_ref_t __keyring_search_one(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 				      const struct key_type *type,
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index e50d264c9ad..c1eac8084ad 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -355,7 +355,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_alloc);
  */
 int key_payload_reserve(struct key *key, size_t datalen)
 {
-	int delta = (int) datalen - key->datalen;
+	int delta = (int)datalen - key->datalen;
 	int ret = 0;
 
 	key_check(key);
@@ -398,7 +398,8 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
 				      const void *data,
 				      size_t datalen,
 				      struct key *keyring,
-				      struct key *authkey)
+				      struct key *authkey,
+				      struct keyring_list **_prealloc)
 {
 	int ret, awaken;
 
@@ -425,7 +426,7 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
 
 			/* and link it into the destination keyring */
 			if (keyring)
-				ret = __key_link(keyring, key);
+				__key_link(keyring, key, _prealloc);
 
 			/* disable the authorisation key */
 			if (authkey)
@@ -453,15 +454,21 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
 			     struct key *keyring,
 			     struct key *authkey)
 {
+	struct keyring_list *prealloc;
 	int ret;
 
-	if (keyring)
-		down_write(&keyring->sem);
+	if (keyring) {
+		ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, key->type, key->description,
+				       &prealloc);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return ret;
+	}
 
-	ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, data, datalen, keyring, authkey);
+	ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, data, datalen, keyring, authkey,
+					 &prealloc);
 
 	if (keyring)
-		up_write(&keyring->sem);
+		__key_link_end(keyring, key->type, prealloc);
 
 	return ret;
 
@@ -478,8 +485,9 @@ int key_negate_and_link(struct key *key,
 			struct key *keyring,
 			struct key *authkey)
 {
+	struct keyring_list *prealloc;
 	struct timespec now;
-	int ret, awaken;
+	int ret, awaken, link_ret = 0;
 
 	key_check(key);
 	key_check(keyring);
@@ -488,7 +496,8 @@ int key_negate_and_link(struct key *key,
 	ret = -EBUSY;
 
 	if (keyring)
-		down_write(&keyring->sem);
+		link_ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, key->type,
+					    key->description, &prealloc);
 
 	mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex);
 
@@ -508,8 +517,8 @@ int key_negate_and_link(struct key *key,
 		ret = 0;
 
 		/* and link it into the destination keyring */
-		if (keyring)
-			ret = __key_link(keyring, key);
+		if (keyring && link_ret == 0)
+			__key_link(keyring, key, &prealloc);
 
 		/* disable the authorisation key */
 		if (authkey)
@@ -519,13 +528,13 @@ int key_negate_and_link(struct key *key,
 	mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
 
 	if (keyring)
-		up_write(&keyring->sem);
+		__key_link_end(keyring, key->type, prealloc);
 
 	/* wake up anyone waiting for a key to be constructed */
 	if (awaken)
 		wake_up_bit(&key->flags, KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT);
 
-	return ret;
+	return ret == 0 ? link_ret : ret;
 
 } /* end key_negate_and_link() */
 
@@ -749,6 +758,7 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 			       key_perm_t perm,
 			       unsigned long flags)
 {
+	struct keyring_list *prealloc;
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	struct key_type *ktype;
 	struct key *keyring, *key = NULL;
@@ -775,7 +785,9 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 	if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring)
 		goto error_2;
 
-	down_write(&keyring->sem);
+	ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, ktype, description, &prealloc);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error_2;
 
 	/* if we're going to allocate a new key, we're going to have
 	 * to modify the keyring */
@@ -817,7 +829,8 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 	}
 
 	/* instantiate it and link it into the target keyring */
-	ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, payload, plen, keyring, NULL);
+	ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, payload, plen, keyring, NULL,
+					 &prealloc);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		key_put(key);
 		key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
@@ -827,7 +840,7 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 	key_ref = make_key_ref(key, is_key_possessed(keyring_ref));
 
  error_3:
-	up_write(&keyring->sem);
+	__key_link_end(keyring, ktype, prealloc);
  error_2:
 	key_type_put(ktype);
  error:
@@ -837,7 +850,7 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 	/* we found a matching key, so we're going to try to update it
 	 * - we can drop the locks first as we have the key pinned
 	 */
-	up_write(&keyring->sem);
+	__key_link_end(keyring, ktype, prealloc);
 	key_type_put(ktype);
 
 	key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, payload, plen);
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index e9c2e7c584d..8f4dce1987c 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -212,15 +212,15 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(request_key, const char __user *, _type,
 	ret = key->serial;
 
  	key_put(key);
- error5:
+error5:
 	key_type_put(ktype);
- error4:
+error4:
 	key_ref_put(dest_ref);
- error3:
+error3:
 	kfree(callout_info);
- error2:
+error2:
 	kfree(description);
- error:
+error:
 	return ret;
 
 } /* end sys_request_key() */
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ long keyctl_get_keyring_ID(key_serial_t id, int create)
 
 	ret = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->serial;
 	key_ref_put(key_ref);
- error:
+error:
 	return ret;
 
 } /* end keyctl_get_keyring_ID() */
@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ long keyctl_join_session_keyring(const char __user *_name)
 	ret = join_session_keyring(name);
 	kfree(name);
 
- error:
+error:
 	return ret;
 
 } /* end keyctl_join_session_keyring() */
@@ -322,9 +322,9 @@ long keyctl_update_key(key_serial_t id,
 	ret = key_update(key_ref, payload, plen);
 
 	key_ref_put(key_ref);
- error2:
+error2:
 	kfree(payload);
- error:
+error:
 	return ret;
 
 } /* end keyctl_update_key() */
@@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ long keyctl_revoke_key(key_serial_t id)
 	ret = 0;
 
 	key_ref_put(key_ref);
- error:
+error:
 	return ret;
 
 } /* end keyctl_revoke_key() */
@@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ long keyctl_keyring_clear(key_serial_t ringid)
 	ret = keyring_clear(key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref));
 
 	key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
- error:
+error:
 	return ret;
 
 } /* end keyctl_keyring_clear() */
@@ -413,9 +413,9 @@ long keyctl_keyring_link(key_serial_t id, key_serial_t ringid)
 	ret = key_link(key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref), key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref));
 
 	key_ref_put(key_ref);
- error2:
+error2:
 	key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
- error:
+error:
 	return ret;
 
 } /* end keyctl_keyring_link() */
@@ -447,9 +447,9 @@ long keyctl_keyring_unlink(key_serial_t id, key_serial_t ringid)
 	ret = key_unlink(key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref), key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref));
 
 	key_ref_put(key_ref);
- error2:
+error2:
 	key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
- error:
+error:
 	return ret;
 
 } /* end keyctl_keyring_unlink() */
@@ -529,9 +529,9 @@ okay:
 	}
 
 	kfree(tmpbuf);
- error2:
+error2:
 	key_ref_put(key_ref);
- error:
+error:
 	return ret;
 
 } /* end keyctl_describe_key() */
@@ -616,17 +616,17 @@ long keyctl_keyring_search(key_serial_t ringid,
 
 	ret = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->serial;
 
- error6:
+error6:
 	key_ref_put(key_ref);
- error5:
+error5:
 	key_type_put(ktype);
- error4:
+error4:
 	key_ref_put(dest_ref);
- error3:
+error3:
 	key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
- error2:
+error2:
 	kfree(description);
- error:
+error:
 	return ret;
 
 } /* end keyctl_keyring_search() */
@@ -673,7 +673,7 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
 	}
 
 	/* the key is probably readable - now try to read it */
- can_read_key:
+can_read_key:
 	ret = key_validate(key);
 	if (ret == 0) {
 		ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
@@ -686,9 +686,9 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
 		}
 	}
 
- error2:
+error2:
 	key_put(key);
- error:
+error:
 	return ret;
 
 } /* end keyctl_read_key() */
@@ -1282,26 +1282,19 @@ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
 
 	/* the parent must have the same effective ownership and mustn't be
 	 * SUID/SGID */
-	if (pcred-> uid	!= mycred->euid	||
+	if (pcred->uid	!= mycred->euid	||
 	    pcred->euid	!= mycred->euid	||
 	    pcred->suid	!= mycred->euid	||
-	    pcred-> gid	!= mycred->egid	||
+	    pcred->gid	!= mycred->egid	||
 	    pcred->egid	!= mycred->egid	||
 	    pcred->sgid	!= mycred->egid)
 		goto not_permitted;
 
 	/* the keyrings must have the same UID */
-	if (pcred ->tgcred->session_keyring->uid != mycred->euid ||
+	if (pcred->tgcred->session_keyring->uid != mycred->euid ||
 	    mycred->tgcred->session_keyring->uid != mycred->euid)
 		goto not_permitted;
 
-	/* the LSM must permit the replacement of the parent's keyring with the
-	 * keyring from this process */
-	ret = security_key_session_to_parent(mycred, pcred,
-					     key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_r));
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto not_permitted;
-
 	/* if there's an already pending keyring replacement, then we replace
 	 * that */
 	oldcred = parent->replacement_session_keyring;
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 1e4b0037935..ef03a82a013 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <keys/keyring-type.h>
-#include <asm/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include "internal.h"
 
 #define rcu_dereference_locked_keyring(keyring)				\
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ static inline unsigned keyring_hash(const char *desc)
 	unsigned bucket = 0;
 
 	for (; *desc; desc++)
-		bucket += (unsigned char) *desc;
+		bucket += (unsigned char)*desc;
 
 	return bucket & (KEYRING_NAME_HASH_SIZE - 1);
 }
@@ -175,12 +175,10 @@ static void keyring_describe(const struct key *keyring, struct seq_file *m)
 {
 	struct keyring_list *klist;
 
-	if (keyring->description) {
+	if (keyring->description)
 		seq_puts(m, keyring->description);
-	}
-	else {
+	else
 		seq_puts(m, "[anon]");
-	}
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	klist = rcu_dereference(keyring->payload.subscriptions);
@@ -241,7 +239,7 @@ static long keyring_read(const struct key *keyring,
 		ret = qty;
 	}
 
- error:
+error:
 	return ret;
 
 } /* end keyring_read() */
@@ -310,7 +308,7 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 	key_check(keyring);
 
 	/* top keyring must have search permission to begin the search */
-        err = key_task_permission(keyring_ref, cred, KEY_SEARCH);
+	err = key_task_permission(keyring_ref, cred, KEY_SEARCH);
 	if (err < 0) {
 		key_ref = ERR_PTR(err);
 		goto error;
@@ -512,7 +510,7 @@ key_ref_t __keyring_search_one(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 	return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
 
- found:
+found:
 	atomic_inc(&key->usage);
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 	return make_key_ref(key, possessed);
@@ -602,7 +600,7 @@ static int keyring_detect_cycle(struct key *A, struct key *B)
 	sp = 0;
 
 	/* start processing a new keyring */
- descend:
+descend:
 	if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &subtree->flags))
 		goto not_this_keyring;
 
@@ -611,7 +609,7 @@ static int keyring_detect_cycle(struct key *A, struct key *B)
 		goto not_this_keyring;
 	kix = 0;
 
- ascend:
+ascend:
 	/* iterate through the remaining keys in this keyring */
 	for (; kix < keylist->nkeys; kix++) {
 		key = keylist->keys[kix];
@@ -637,7 +635,7 @@ static int keyring_detect_cycle(struct key *A, struct key *B)
 
 	/* the keyring we're looking at was disqualified or didn't contain a
 	 * matching key */
- not_this_keyring:
+not_this_keyring:
 	if (sp > 0) {
 		/* resume the checking of a keyring higher up in the tree */
 		sp--;
@@ -648,34 +646,20 @@ static int keyring_detect_cycle(struct key *A, struct key *B)
 
 	ret = 0; /* no cycles detected */
 
- error:
+error:
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 	return ret;
 
- too_deep:
+too_deep:
 	ret = -ELOOP;
 	goto error;
 
- cycle_detected:
+cycle_detected:
 	ret = -EDEADLK;
 	goto error;
 
 } /* end keyring_detect_cycle() */
 
-/*****************************************************************************/
-/*
- * dispose of a keyring list after the RCU grace period
- */
-static void keyring_link_rcu_disposal(struct rcu_head *rcu)
-{
-	struct keyring_list *klist =
-		container_of(rcu, struct keyring_list, rcu);
-
-	kfree(klist);
-
-} /* end keyring_link_rcu_disposal() */
-
-/*****************************************************************************/
 /*
  * dispose of a keyring list after the RCU grace period, freeing the unlinked
  * key
@@ -685,55 +669,51 @@ static void keyring_unlink_rcu_disposal(struct rcu_head *rcu)
 	struct keyring_list *klist =
 		container_of(rcu, struct keyring_list, rcu);
 
-	key_put(klist->keys[klist->delkey]);
+	if (klist->delkey != USHORT_MAX)
+		key_put(klist->keys[klist->delkey]);
 	kfree(klist);
+}
 
-} /* end keyring_unlink_rcu_disposal() */
-
-/*****************************************************************************/
 /*
- * link a key into to a keyring
- * - must be called with the keyring's semaphore write-locked
- * - discard already extant link to matching key if there is one
+ * preallocate memory so that a key can be linked into to a keyring
  */
-int __key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key)
+int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring, const struct key_type *type,
+		     const char *description,
+		     struct keyring_list **_prealloc)
+	__acquires(&keyring->sem)
 {
 	struct keyring_list *klist, *nklist;
 	unsigned max;
 	size_t size;
 	int loop, ret;
 
-	ret = -EKEYREVOKED;
-	if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &keyring->flags))
-		goto error;
+	kenter("%d,%s,%s,", key_serial(keyring), type->name, description);
 
-	ret = -ENOTDIR;
 	if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring)
-		goto error;
+		return -ENOTDIR;
 
-	/* serialise link/link calls to prevent parallel calls causing a
-	 * cycle when applied to two keyring in opposite orders */
-	down_write(&keyring_serialise_link_sem);
+	down_write(&keyring->sem);
 
-	/* check that we aren't going to create a cycle adding one keyring to
-	 * another */
-	if (key->type == &key_type_keyring) {
-		ret = keyring_detect_cycle(keyring, key);
-		if (ret < 0)
-			goto error2;
-	}
+	ret = -EKEYREVOKED;
+	if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &keyring->flags))
+		goto error_krsem;
+
+	/* serialise link/link calls to prevent parallel calls causing a cycle
+	 * when linking two keyring in opposite orders */
+	if (type == &key_type_keyring)
+		down_write(&keyring_serialise_link_sem);
 
-	/* see if there's a matching key we can displace */
 	klist = rcu_dereference_locked_keyring(keyring);
-	if (klist && klist->nkeys > 0) {
-		struct key_type *type = key->type;
 
+	/* see if there's a matching key we can displace */
+	if (klist && klist->nkeys > 0) {
 		for (loop = klist->nkeys - 1; loop >= 0; loop--) {
 			if (klist->keys[loop]->type == type &&
 			    strcmp(klist->keys[loop]->description,
-				   key->description) == 0
+				   description) == 0
 			    ) {
-				/* found a match - replace with new key */
+				/* found a match - we'll replace this one with
+				 * the new key */
 				size = sizeof(struct key *) * klist->maxkeys;
 				size += sizeof(*klist);
 				BUG_ON(size > PAGE_SIZE);
@@ -741,22 +721,10 @@ int __key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key)
 				ret = -ENOMEM;
 				nklist = kmemdup(klist, size, GFP_KERNEL);
 				if (!nklist)
-					goto error2;
-
-				/* replace matched key */
-				atomic_inc(&key->usage);
-				nklist->keys[loop] = key;
-
-				rcu_assign_pointer(
-					keyring->payload.subscriptions,
-					nklist);
-
-				/* dispose of the old keyring list and the
-				 * displaced key */
-				klist->delkey = loop;
-				call_rcu(&klist->rcu,
-					 keyring_unlink_rcu_disposal);
+					goto error_sem;
 
+				/* note replacement slot */
+				klist->delkey = nklist->delkey = loop;
 				goto done;
 			}
 		}
@@ -766,88 +734,167 @@ int __key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key)
 	ret = key_payload_reserve(keyring,
 				  keyring->datalen + KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES);
 	if (ret < 0)
-		goto error2;
+		goto error_sem;
 
 	if (klist && klist->nkeys < klist->maxkeys) {
-		/* there's sufficient slack space to add directly */
-		atomic_inc(&key->usage);
-
-		klist->keys[klist->nkeys] = key;
-		smp_wmb();
-		klist->nkeys++;
-		smp_wmb();
-	}
-	else {
+		/* there's sufficient slack space to append directly */
+		nklist = NULL;
+	} else {
 		/* grow the key list */
 		max = 4;
 		if (klist)
 			max += klist->maxkeys;
 
 		ret = -ENFILE;
-		if (max > 65535)
-			goto error3;
+		if (max > USHORT_MAX - 1)
+			goto error_quota;
 		size = sizeof(*klist) + sizeof(struct key *) * max;
 		if (size > PAGE_SIZE)
-			goto error3;
+			goto error_quota;
 
 		ret = -ENOMEM;
 		nklist = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!nklist)
-			goto error3;
-		nklist->maxkeys = max;
-		nklist->nkeys = 0;
+			goto error_quota;
 
+		nklist->maxkeys = max;
 		if (klist) {
-			nklist->nkeys = klist->nkeys;
-			memcpy(nklist->keys,
-			       klist->keys,
+			memcpy(nklist->keys, klist->keys,
 			       sizeof(struct key *) * klist->nkeys);
+			nklist->delkey = klist->nkeys;
+			nklist->nkeys = klist->nkeys + 1;
+			klist->delkey = USHORT_MAX;
+		} else {
+			nklist->nkeys = 1;
+			nklist->delkey = 0;
 		}
 
 		/* add the key into the new space */
-		atomic_inc(&key->usage);
-		nklist->keys[nklist->nkeys++] = key;
-
-		rcu_assign_pointer(keyring->payload.subscriptions, nklist);
-
-		/* dispose of the old keyring list */
-		if (klist)
-			call_rcu(&klist->rcu, keyring_link_rcu_disposal);
+		nklist->keys[nklist->delkey] = NULL;
 	}
 
 done:
-	ret = 0;
-error2:
-	up_write(&keyring_serialise_link_sem);
-error:
-	return ret;
+	*_prealloc = nklist;
+	kleave(" = 0");
+	return 0;
 
-error3:
+error_quota:
 	/* undo the quota changes */
 	key_payload_reserve(keyring,
 			    keyring->datalen - KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES);
-	goto error2;
+error_sem:
+	if (type == &key_type_keyring)
+		up_write(&keyring_serialise_link_sem);
+error_krsem:
+	up_write(&keyring->sem);
+	kleave(" = %d", ret);
+	return ret;
+}
 
-} /* end __key_link() */
+/*
+ * check already instantiated keys aren't going to be a problem
+ * - the caller must have called __key_link_begin()
+ * - don't need to call this for keys that were created since __key_link_begin()
+ *   was called
+ */
+int __key_link_check_live_key(struct key *keyring, struct key *key)
+{
+	if (key->type == &key_type_keyring)
+		/* check that we aren't going to create a cycle by linking one
+		 * keyring to another */
+		return keyring_detect_cycle(keyring, key);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * link a key into to a keyring
+ * - must be called with __key_link_begin() having being called
+ * - discard already extant link to matching key if there is one
+ */
+void __key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
+		struct keyring_list **_prealloc)
+{
+	struct keyring_list *klist, *nklist;
+
+	nklist = *_prealloc;
+	*_prealloc = NULL;
+
+	kenter("%d,%d,%p", keyring->serial, key->serial, nklist);
+
+	klist = rcu_dereference_protected(keyring->payload.subscriptions,
+					  rwsem_is_locked(&keyring->sem));
+
+	atomic_inc(&key->usage);
+
+	/* there's a matching key we can displace or an empty slot in a newly
+	 * allocated list we can fill */
+	if (nklist) {
+		kdebug("replace %hu/%hu/%hu",
+		       nklist->delkey, nklist->nkeys, nklist->maxkeys);
+
+		nklist->keys[nklist->delkey] = key;
+
+		rcu_assign_pointer(keyring->payload.subscriptions, nklist);
+
+		/* dispose of the old keyring list and, if there was one, the
+		 * displaced key */
+		if (klist) {
+			kdebug("dispose %hu/%hu/%hu",
+			       klist->delkey, klist->nkeys, klist->maxkeys);
+			call_rcu(&klist->rcu, keyring_unlink_rcu_disposal);
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* there's sufficient slack space to append directly */
+		klist->keys[klist->nkeys] = key;
+		smp_wmb();
+		klist->nkeys++;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * finish linking a key into to a keyring
+ * - must be called with __key_link_begin() having being called
+ */
+void __key_link_end(struct key *keyring, struct key_type *type,
+		    struct keyring_list *prealloc)
+	__releases(&keyring->sem)
+{
+	BUG_ON(type == NULL);
+	BUG_ON(type->name == NULL);
+	kenter("%d,%s,%p", keyring->serial, type->name, prealloc);
+
+	if (type == &key_type_keyring)
+		up_write(&keyring_serialise_link_sem);
+
+	if (prealloc) {
+		kfree(prealloc);
+		key_payload_reserve(keyring,
+				    keyring->datalen - KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES);
+	}
+	up_write(&keyring->sem);
+}
 
-/*****************************************************************************/
 /*
  * link a key to a keyring
  */
 int key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key)
 {
+	struct keyring_list *prealloc;
 	int ret;
 
 	key_check(keyring);
 	key_check(key);
 
-	down_write(&keyring->sem);
-	ret = __key_link(keyring, key);
-	up_write(&keyring->sem);
+	ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, key->type, key->description, &prealloc);
+	if (ret == 0) {
+		ret = __key_link_check_live_key(keyring, key);
+		if (ret == 0)
+			__key_link(keyring, key, &prealloc);
+		__key_link_end(keyring, key->type, prealloc);
+	}
 
 	return ret;
-
-} /* end key_link() */
+}
 
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_link);
 
diff --git a/security/keys/permission.c b/security/keys/permission.c
index 0ed802c9e69..28645502cd0 100644
--- a/security/keys/permission.c
+++ b/security/keys/permission.c
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ int key_validate(struct key *key)
 		}
 	}
 
- error:
+error:
 	return ret;
 
 } /* end key_validate() */
diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c
index 706d63f4f18..068b66ea2f1 100644
--- a/security/keys/proc.c
+++ b/security/keys/proc.c
@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ static void *proc_key_users_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos)
 static void *proc_key_users_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos)
 {
 	(*_pos)++;
-	return key_user_next((struct rb_node *) v);
+	return key_user_next((struct rb_node *)v);
 }
 
 static void proc_key_users_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v)
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index 06c2ccf26ed..20a38fed61b 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -508,7 +508,7 @@ try_again:
 
 			ret = install_thread_keyring();
 			if (ret < 0) {
-				key = ERR_PTR(ret);
+				key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
 				goto error;
 			}
 			goto reget_creds;
@@ -526,7 +526,7 @@ try_again:
 
 			ret = install_process_keyring();
 			if (ret < 0) {
-				key = ERR_PTR(ret);
+				key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
 				goto error;
 			}
 			goto reget_creds;
@@ -585,7 +585,7 @@ try_again:
 
 	case KEY_SPEC_GROUP_KEYRING:
 		/* group keyrings are not yet supported */
-		key = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+		key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 		goto error;
 
 	case KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY:
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index d8c1a6a0fb0..f656e9c069e 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -299,12 +299,15 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type,
 			       struct key_user *user,
 			       struct key **_key)
 {
+	struct keyring_list *prealloc;
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	struct key *key;
 	key_ref_t key_ref;
+	int ret;
 
 	kenter("%s,%s,,,", type->name, description);
 
+	*_key = NULL;
 	mutex_lock(&user->cons_lock);
 
 	key = key_alloc(type, description, cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred,
@@ -314,8 +317,12 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type,
 
 	set_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags);
 
-	if (dest_keyring)
-		down_write(&dest_keyring->sem);
+	if (dest_keyring) {
+		ret = __key_link_begin(dest_keyring, type, description,
+				       &prealloc);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto link_prealloc_failed;
+	}
 
 	/* attach the key to the destination keyring under lock, but we do need
 	 * to do another check just in case someone beat us to it whilst we
@@ -327,31 +334,49 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct key_type *type,
 		goto key_already_present;
 
 	if (dest_keyring)
-		__key_link(dest_keyring, key);
+		__key_link(dest_keyring, key, &prealloc);
 
 	mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
 	if (dest_keyring)
-		up_write(&dest_keyring->sem);
+		__key_link_end(dest_keyring, type, prealloc);
 	mutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);
 	*_key = key;
 	kleave(" = 0 [%d]", key_serial(key));
 	return 0;
 
+	/* the key is now present - we tell the caller that we found it by
+	 * returning -EINPROGRESS  */
 key_already_present:
+	key_put(key);
 	mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
+	key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
 	if (dest_keyring) {
-		__key_link(dest_keyring, key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref));
-		up_write(&dest_keyring->sem);
+		ret = __key_link_check_live_key(dest_keyring, key);
+		if (ret == 0)
+			__key_link(dest_keyring, key, &prealloc);
+		__key_link_end(dest_keyring, type, prealloc);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto link_check_failed;
 	}
 	mutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);
-	key_put(key);
-	*_key = key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+	*_key = key;
 	kleave(" = -EINPROGRESS [%d]", key_serial(key));
 	return -EINPROGRESS;
 
+link_check_failed:
+	mutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);
+	key_put(key);
+	kleave(" = %d [linkcheck]", ret);
+	return ret;
+
+link_prealloc_failed:
+	up_write(&dest_keyring->sem);
+	mutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);
+	kleave(" = %d [prelink]", ret);
+	return ret;
+
 alloc_failed:
 	mutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);
-	*_key = NULL;
 	kleave(" = %ld", PTR_ERR(key));
 	return PTR_ERR(key);
 }
@@ -390,6 +415,10 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
 			kdebug("cons failed");
 			goto construction_failed;
 		}
+	} else if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) {
+		ret = 0;
+	} else {
+		key = ERR_PTR(ret);
 	}
 
 	key_put(dest_keyring);
@@ -422,6 +451,7 @@ struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	struct key *key;
 	key_ref_t key_ref;
+	int ret;
 
 	kenter("%s,%s,%p,%zu,%p,%p,%lx",
 	       type->name, description, callout_info, callout_len, aux,
@@ -435,8 +465,13 @@ struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
 		key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
 		if (dest_keyring) {
 			construct_get_dest_keyring(&dest_keyring);
-			key_link(dest_keyring, key);
+			ret = key_link(dest_keyring, key);
 			key_put(dest_keyring);
+			if (ret < 0) {
+				key_put(key);
+				key = ERR_PTR(ret);
+				goto error;
+			}
 		}
 	} else if (PTR_ERR(key_ref) != -EAGAIN) {
 		key = ERR_CAST(key_ref);
diff --git a/security/lsm_audit.c b/security/lsm_audit.c
index 893365b79a2..908aa712816 100644
--- a/security/lsm_audit.c
+++ b/security/lsm_audit.c
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab,
 	}
 
 	switch (a->type) {
-	case LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT:
+	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE:
 		return;
 	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC:
 		audit_log_format(ab, " key=%d ", a->u.ipc_id);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 687c6fd14bb..351942a4ca0 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -23,14 +23,14 @@ static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1] =
 	CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY;
 
 /* things that live in capability.c */
-extern void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops);
+extern void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops);
 
 static struct security_operations *security_ops;
 static struct security_operations default_security_ops = {
 	.name	= "default",
 };
 
-static inline int verify(struct security_operations *ops)
+static inline int __init verify(struct security_operations *ops)
 {
 	/* verify the security_operations structure exists */
 	if (!ops)
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ int __init security_module_enable(struct security_operations *ops)
  * If there is already a security module registered with the kernel,
  * an error will be returned.  Otherwise %0 is returned on success.
  */
-int register_security(struct security_operations *ops)
+int __init register_security(struct security_operations *ops)
 {
 	if (verify(ops)) {
 		printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s could not verify "
@@ -190,11 +190,6 @@ int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
 	return ret;
 }
 
-int security_acct(struct file *file)
-{
-	return security_ops->acct(file);
-}
-
 int security_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int op)
 {
 	return security_ops->sysctl(table, op);
@@ -306,46 +301,16 @@ int security_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path,
 	return security_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
 }
 
-int security_sb_check_sb(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct path *path)
-{
-	return security_ops->sb_check_sb(mnt, path);
-}
-
 int security_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
 {
 	return security_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
 }
 
-void security_sb_umount_close(struct vfsmount *mnt)
-{
-	security_ops->sb_umount_close(mnt);
-}
-
-void security_sb_umount_busy(struct vfsmount *mnt)
-{
-	security_ops->sb_umount_busy(mnt);
-}
-
-void security_sb_post_remount(struct vfsmount *mnt, unsigned long flags, void *data)
-{
-	security_ops->sb_post_remount(mnt, flags, data);
-}
-
-void security_sb_post_addmount(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct path *mountpoint)
-{
-	security_ops->sb_post_addmount(mnt, mountpoint);
-}
-
 int security_sb_pivotroot(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path)
 {
 	return security_ops->sb_pivotroot(old_path, new_path);
 }
 
-void security_sb_post_pivotroot(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path)
-{
-	security_ops->sb_post_pivotroot(old_path, new_path);
-}
-
 int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 				struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
 {
@@ -580,13 +545,6 @@ int security_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
 	return security_ops->inode_getattr(mnt, dentry);
 }
 
-void security_inode_delete(struct inode *inode)
-{
-	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
-		return;
-	security_ops->inode_delete(inode);
-}
-
 int security_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 			    const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
 {
@@ -749,11 +707,6 @@ int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp)
 	return security_ops->cred_prepare(new, old, gfp);
 }
 
-void security_commit_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
-{
-	security_ops->cred_commit(new, old);
-}
-
 void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 {
 	security_ops->cred_transfer(new, old);
@@ -774,22 +727,12 @@ int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
 	return security_ops->kernel_module_request(kmod_name);
 }
 
-int security_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
-{
-	return security_ops->task_setuid(id0, id1, id2, flags);
-}
-
 int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 			     int flags)
 {
 	return security_ops->task_fix_setuid(new, old, flags);
 }
 
-int security_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
-{
-	return security_ops->task_setgid(id0, id1, id2, flags);
-}
-
 int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
 {
 	return security_ops->task_setpgid(p, pgid);
@@ -811,11 +754,6 @@ void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid);
 
-int security_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
-{
-	return security_ops->task_setgroups(group_info);
-}
-
 int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 {
 	return security_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
@@ -1319,13 +1257,6 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
 	return security_ops->key_getsecurity(key, _buffer);
 }
 
-int security_key_session_to_parent(const struct cred *cred,
-				   const struct cred *parent_cred,
-				   struct key *key)
-{
-	return security_ops->key_session_to_parent(cred, parent_cred, key);
-}
-
 #endif	/* CONFIG_KEYS */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 989fef82563..7f1a304712a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -499,8 +499,7 @@ void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 		return;
 	if (!a) {
 		a = &stack_data;
-		memset(a, 0, sizeof(*a));
-		a->type = LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT;
+		COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(a, NONE);
 	}
 	a->selinux_audit_data.tclass = tclass;
 	a->selinux_audit_data.requested = requested;
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 5feecb41009..a03fd74602b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -293,28 +293,28 @@ static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
 
 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
 {
-	struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
 
-	ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
-	if (!ssec)
+	sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
+	if (!sksec)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
-	ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
-	sk->sk_security = ssec;
+	sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	sk->sk_security = sksec;
 
-	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec);
+	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
 
 	return 0;
 }
 
 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
 {
-	struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
 
 	sk->sk_security = NULL;
-	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssec);
-	kfree(ssec);
+	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
+	kfree(sksec);
 }
 
 /* The security server must be initialized before
@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ extern int ss_initialized;
 
 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
 
-static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
+static const char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
 	"uses xattr",
 	"uses transition SIDs",
 	"uses task SIDs",
@@ -2999,13 +2999,15 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 	return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
 }
 
+static int default_noexec;
+
 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	int rc = 0;
 
-#ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
-	if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
+	if (default_noexec &&
+	    (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
 		/*
 		 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
 		 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
@@ -3015,7 +3017,6 @@ static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared
 		if (rc)
 			goto error;
 	}
-#endif
 
 	if (file) {
 		/* read access is always possible with a mapping */
@@ -3076,8 +3077,8 @@ static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 	if (selinux_checkreqprot)
 		prot = reqprot;
 
-#ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
-	if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
+	if (default_noexec &&
+	    (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
 		int rc = 0;
 		if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
 		    vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
@@ -3099,7 +3100,6 @@ static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
 	}
-#endif
 
 	return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
 }
@@ -4002,7 +4002,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
 					      struct socket *other,
 					      struct sock *newsk)
 {
-	struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 	struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
@@ -4021,13 +4021,13 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
 		return err;
 
 	/* connecting socket */
-	ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
-	ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
+	sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+	sksec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
 
 	/* server child socket */
-	ssec = newsk->sk_security;
-	ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
-	err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
+	sksec = newsk->sk_security;
+	sksec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
+	err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, sksec->peer_sid, &sksec->sid);
 
 	return err;
 }
@@ -4190,7 +4190,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *op
 	int err = 0;
 	char *scontext;
 	u32 scontext_len;
-	struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 	u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
 
@@ -4198,8 +4198,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *op
 
 	if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
 	    isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
-		ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
-		peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
+		sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+		peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
 	}
 	if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
 		err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
@@ -4266,14 +4266,14 @@ static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
 
 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
 {
-	struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
-	struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
 
-	newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
-	newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
-	newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
+	newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
+	newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
+	newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
 
-	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec);
+	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
 }
 
 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
@@ -5662,6 +5662,8 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
 	/* Set the security state for the initial task. */
 	cred_init_security();
 
+	default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
+
 	sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
 					    sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
 					    0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h
index d4fac82793a..a59b64e3fd0 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /* This file is automatically generated.  Do not edit. */
-static char *initial_sid_to_string[] =
+static const char *initial_sid_to_string[] =
 {
     "null",
     "kernel",
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
index 8d7384280a7..cf2f628e6e2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
@@ -42,8 +42,8 @@ void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void);
 
 void selinux_netlbl_err(struct sk_buff *skb, int error, int gateway);
 
-void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(struct sk_security_struct *ssec);
-void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(struct sk_security_struct *ssec);
+void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(struct sk_security_struct *sksec);
+void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(struct sk_security_struct *sksec);
 
 int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
 				 u16 family,
@@ -79,13 +79,13 @@ static inline void selinux_netlbl_err(struct sk_buff *skb,
 }
 
 static inline void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(
-					       struct sk_security_struct *ssec)
+					       struct sk_security_struct *sksec)
 {
 	return;
 }
 
 static inline void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(
-					       struct sk_security_struct *ssec)
+					       struct sk_security_struct *sksec)
 {
 	return;
 }
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index 628da72ee76..1c2fc46544b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -132,21 +132,21 @@ void selinux_netlbl_err(struct sk_buff *skb, int error, int gateway)
 
 /**
  * selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free - Free the NetLabel fields
- * @sssec: the sk_security_struct
+ * @sksec: the sk_security_struct
  *
  * Description:
  * Free all of the memory in the NetLabel fields of a sk_security_struct.
  *
  */
-void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(struct sk_security_struct *ssec)
+void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(struct sk_security_struct *sksec)
 {
-	if (ssec->nlbl_secattr != NULL)
-		netlbl_secattr_free(ssec->nlbl_secattr);
+	if (sksec->nlbl_secattr != NULL)
+		netlbl_secattr_free(sksec->nlbl_secattr);
 }
 
 /**
  * selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset - Reset the NetLabel fields
- * @ssec: the sk_security_struct
+ * @sksec: the sk_security_struct
  * @family: the socket family
  *
  * Description:
@@ -154,9 +154,9 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(struct sk_security_struct *ssec)
  * The caller is responsibile for all the NetLabel sk_security_struct locking.
  *
  */
-void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(struct sk_security_struct *ssec)
+void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(struct sk_security_struct *sksec)
 {
-	ssec->nlbl_state = NLBL_UNSET;
+	sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_UNSET;
 }
 
 /**
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlink.c b/security/selinux/netlink.c
index 0e147b6914a..36ac257cec9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlink.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlink.c
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/stddef.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
-#include <linux/list.h>
 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
 #include <linux/netlink.h>
 #include <linux/selinux_netlink.h>
diff --git a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
index dd7cc6de77f..75ec0c6ebac 100644
--- a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@
  */
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
-#include <linux/skbuff.h>
 #include <linux/netlink.h>
 #include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
 #include <linux/if.h>
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index cd191bbec03..0293843f7ed 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -503,11 +503,11 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 		return length;
 
 	length = -ENOMEM;
-	scon = kzalloc(size+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	scon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!scon)
 		return length;
 
-	tcon = kzalloc(size+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	tcon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!tcon)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -515,10 +515,10 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
 		goto out2;
 
-	length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon)+1, &ssid);
+	length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid);
 	if (length < 0)
 		goto out2;
-	length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon)+1, &tsid);
+	length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid);
 	if (length < 0)
 		goto out2;
 
@@ -550,11 +550,11 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 		return length;
 
 	length = -ENOMEM;
-	scon = kzalloc(size+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	scon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!scon)
 		return length;
 
-	tcon = kzalloc(size+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	tcon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!tcon)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -562,10 +562,10 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
 		goto out2;
 
-	length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon)+1, &ssid);
+	length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid);
 	if (length < 0)
 		goto out2;
-	length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon)+1, &tsid);
+	length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid);
 	if (length < 0)
 		goto out2;
 
@@ -609,11 +609,11 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_relabel(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 		return length;
 
 	length = -ENOMEM;
-	scon = kzalloc(size+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	scon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!scon)
 		return length;
 
-	tcon = kzalloc(size+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	tcon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!tcon)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -621,10 +621,10 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_relabel(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
 		goto out2;
 
-	length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon)+1, &ssid);
+	length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid);
 	if (length < 0)
 		goto out2;
-	length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon)+1, &tsid);
+	length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid);
 	if (length < 0)
 		goto out2;
 
@@ -666,11 +666,11 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 		return length;
 
 	length = -ENOMEM;
-	con = kzalloc(size+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	con = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!con)
 		return length;
 
-	user = kzalloc(size+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	user = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!user)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -678,7 +678,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s", con, user) != 2)
 		goto out2;
 
-	length = security_context_to_sid(con, strlen(con)+1, &sid);
+	length = security_context_to_sid(con, strlen(con) + 1, &sid);
 	if (length < 0)
 		goto out2;
 
@@ -727,11 +727,11 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 		return length;
 
 	length = -ENOMEM;
-	scon = kzalloc(size+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	scon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!scon)
 		return length;
 
-	tcon = kzalloc(size+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	tcon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!tcon)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -739,10 +739,10 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
 		goto out2;
 
-	length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon)+1, &ssid);
+	length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid);
 	if (length < 0)
 		goto out2;
-	length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon)+1, &tsid);
+	length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid);
 	if (length < 0)
 		goto out2;
 
@@ -1401,7 +1401,7 @@ static int sel_make_perm_files(char *objclass, int classvalue,
 		}
 		inode->i_fop = &sel_perm_ops;
 		/* i+1 since perm values are 1-indexed */
-		inode->i_ino = sel_perm_to_ino(classvalue, i+1);
+		inode->i_ino = sel_perm_to_ino(classvalue, i + 1);
 		d_add(dentry, inode);
 	}
 
@@ -1489,7 +1489,7 @@ static int sel_make_classes(void)
 		goto out;
 
 	/* +2 since classes are 1-indexed */
-	last_class_ino = sel_class_to_ino(nclasses+2);
+	last_class_ino = sel_class_to_ino(nclasses + 2);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < nclasses; i++) {
 		struct dentry *class_name_dir;
@@ -1506,7 +1506,7 @@ static int sel_make_classes(void)
 			goto out1;
 
 		/* i+1 since class values are 1-indexed */
-		rc = sel_make_class_dir_entries(classes[i], i+1,
+		rc = sel_make_class_dir_entries(classes[i], i + 1,
 				class_name_dir);
 		if (rc)
 			goto out1;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
index 372b773f821..b4eff7a60c5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ int mls_context_to_sid(struct policydb *pol,
 
 	if (!pol->mls_enabled) {
 		if (def_sid != SECSID_NULL && oldc)
-			*scontext += strlen(*scontext)+1;
+			*scontext += strlen(*scontext) + 1;
 		return 0;
 	}
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index 23c6e53c102..c57802a164d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
 #define _DEBUG_HASHES
 
 #ifdef DEBUG_HASHES
-static char *symtab_name[SYM_NUM] = {
+static const char *symtab_name[SYM_NUM] = {
 	"common prefixes",
 	"classes",
 	"roles",
@@ -156,12 +156,11 @@ static int roles_init(struct policydb *p)
 		rc = -EINVAL;
 		goto out_free_role;
 	}
-	key = kmalloc(strlen(OBJECT_R)+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	key = kstrdup(OBJECT_R, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!key) {
 		rc = -ENOMEM;
 		goto out_free_role;
 	}
-	strcpy(key, OBJECT_R);
 	rc = hashtab_insert(p->p_roles.table, key, role);
 	if (rc)
 		goto out_free_key;
@@ -2195,7 +2194,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 		rangetr_hash_eval(p->range_tr);
 	}
 
-	p->type_attr_map = kmalloc(p->p_types.nprim*sizeof(struct ebitmap), GFP_KERNEL);
+	p->type_attr_map = kmalloc(p->p_types.nprim * sizeof(struct ebitmap), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!p->type_attr_map)
 		goto bad;
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index cf27b3ee1a9..1de60ce90d9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -274,15 +274,15 @@ static int constraint_expr_eval(struct context *scontext,
 		case CEXPR_AND:
 			BUG_ON(sp < 1);
 			sp--;
-			s[sp] &= s[sp+1];
+			s[sp] &= s[sp + 1];
 			break;
 		case CEXPR_OR:
 			BUG_ON(sp < 1);
 			sp--;
-			s[sp] |= s[sp+1];
+			s[sp] |= s[sp + 1];
 			break;
 		case CEXPR_ATTR:
-			if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH-1))
+			if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
 				return 0;
 			switch (e->attr) {
 			case CEXPR_USER:
@@ -1216,7 +1216,7 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
 	*sid = SECSID_NULL;
 
 	/* Copy the string so that we can modify the copy as we parse it. */
-	scontext2 = kmalloc(scontext_len+1, gfp_flags);
+	scontext2 = kmalloc(scontext_len + 1, gfp_flags);
 	if (!scontext2)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	memcpy(scontext2, scontext, scontext_len);
@@ -1760,22 +1760,28 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
 
 	if (!ss_initialized) {
 		avtab_cache_init();
-		if (policydb_read(&policydb, fp)) {
+		rc = policydb_read(&policydb, fp);
+		if (rc) {
 			avtab_cache_destroy();
-			return -EINVAL;
+			return rc;
 		}
-		if (selinux_set_mapping(&policydb, secclass_map,
-					&current_mapping,
-					&current_mapping_size)) {
+
+		rc = selinux_set_mapping(&policydb, secclass_map,
+					 &current_mapping,
+					 &current_mapping_size);
+		if (rc) {
 			policydb_destroy(&policydb);
 			avtab_cache_destroy();
-			return -EINVAL;
+			return rc;
 		}
-		if (policydb_load_isids(&policydb, &sidtab)) {
+
+		rc = policydb_load_isids(&policydb, &sidtab);
+		if (rc) {
 			policydb_destroy(&policydb);
 			avtab_cache_destroy();
-			return -EINVAL;
+			return rc;
 		}
+
 		security_load_policycaps();
 		ss_initialized = 1;
 		seqno = ++latest_granting;
@@ -1791,8 +1797,9 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
 	sidtab_hash_eval(&sidtab, "sids");
 #endif
 
-	if (policydb_read(&newpolicydb, fp))
-		return -EINVAL;
+	rc = policydb_read(&newpolicydb, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
 
 	/* If switching between different policy types, log MLS status */
 	if (policydb.mls_enabled && !newpolicydb.mls_enabled)
@@ -1807,8 +1814,8 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
 		return rc;
 	}
 
-	if (selinux_set_mapping(&newpolicydb, secclass_map,
-				&map, &map_size))
+	rc = selinux_set_mapping(&newpolicydb, secclass_map, &map, &map_size);
+	if (rc)
 		goto err;
 
 	rc = security_preserve_bools(&newpolicydb);
@@ -1819,10 +1826,10 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
 
 	/* Clone the SID table. */
 	sidtab_shutdown(&sidtab);
-	if (sidtab_map(&sidtab, clone_sid, &newsidtab)) {
-		rc = -ENOMEM;
+
+	rc = sidtab_map(&sidtab, clone_sid, &newsidtab);
+	if (rc)
 		goto err;
-	}
 
 	/*
 	 * Convert the internal representations of contexts
@@ -2101,9 +2108,9 @@ int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid,
 
 	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&user->roles, rnode, i) {
 		role = policydb.role_val_to_struct[i];
-		usercon.role = i+1;
+		usercon.role = i + 1;
 		ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&role->types, tnode, j) {
-			usercon.type = j+1;
+			usercon.type = j + 1;
 
 			if (mls_setup_user_range(fromcon, user, &usercon))
 				continue;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index fdfeaa2f28e..0f2fc480fc6 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@
 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
 #include <linux/mount.h>
 #include <linux/stat.h>
-#include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
 #include <linux/kd.h>
 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
 #include <linux/ip.h>
@@ -1119,15 +1118,6 @@ static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 }
 
 /**
- * smack_cred_commit - commit new credentials
- * @new: the new credentials
- * @old: the original credentials
- */
-static void smack_cred_commit(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
-{
-}
-
-/**
  * smack_cred_transfer - Transfer the old credentials to the new credentials
  * @new: the new credentials
  * @old: the original credentials
@@ -3121,7 +3111,6 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
 	.cred_alloc_blank =		smack_cred_alloc_blank,
 	.cred_free =			smack_cred_free,
 	.cred_prepare =			smack_cred_prepare,
-	.cred_commit =			smack_cred_commit,
 	.cred_transfer =		smack_cred_transfer,
 	.kernel_act_as =		smack_kernel_act_as,
 	.kernel_create_files_as =	smack_kernel_create_files_as,
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/Makefile b/security/tomoyo/Makefile
index 60a9e2002da..4fb39030f6b 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/Makefile
+++ b/security/tomoyo/Makefile
@@ -1 +1 @@
-obj-y = common.o realpath.o tomoyo.o domain.o file.o gc.o
+obj-y = common.o realpath.o tomoyo.o domain.o file.o gc.o path_group.o
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.c b/security/tomoyo/common.c
index 975c45d88ba..b5dbdc9ff73 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.c
@@ -76,6 +76,49 @@ static int tomoyo_write_control(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
 				const int buffer_len);
 
 /**
+ * tomoyo_parse_name_union - Parse a tomoyo_name_union.
+ *
+ * @filename: Name or name group.
+ * @ptr:      Pointer to "struct tomoyo_name_union".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_parse_name_union(const char *filename,
+			     struct tomoyo_name_union *ptr)
+{
+	if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(filename, 0, 0, 0))
+		return false;
+	if (filename[0] == '@') {
+		ptr->group = tomoyo_get_path_group(filename + 1);
+		ptr->is_group = true;
+		return ptr->group != NULL;
+	}
+	ptr->filename = tomoyo_get_name(filename);
+	ptr->is_group = false;
+	return ptr->filename != NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_print_name_union - Print a tomoyo_name_union.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ * @ptr:  Pointer to "struct tomoyo_name_union".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_print_name_union(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head,
+				 const struct tomoyo_name_union *ptr)
+{
+	int pos = head->read_avail;
+	if (pos && head->read_buf[pos - 1] == ' ')
+		head->read_avail--;
+	if (ptr->is_group)
+		return tomoyo_io_printf(head, " @%s",
+					ptr->group->group_name->name);
+	return tomoyo_io_printf(head, " %s", ptr->filename->name);
+}
+
+/**
  * tomoyo_is_byte_range - Check whether the string isa \ooo style octal value.
  *
  * @str: Pointer to the string.
@@ -172,6 +215,33 @@ static void tomoyo_normalize_line(unsigned char *buffer)
 }
 
 /**
+ * tomoyo_tokenize - Tokenize string.
+ *
+ * @buffer: The line to tokenize.
+ * @w:      Pointer to "char *".
+ * @size:   Sizeof @w .
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_tokenize(char *buffer, char *w[], size_t size)
+{
+	int count = size / sizeof(char *);
+	int i;
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
+		w[i] = "";
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+		char *cp = strchr(buffer, ' ');
+		if (cp)
+			*cp = '\0';
+		w[i] = buffer;
+		if (!cp)
+			break;
+		buffer = cp + 1;
+	}
+	return i < count || !*buffer;
+}
+
+/**
  * tomoyo_is_correct_path - Validate a pathname.
  * @filename:     The pathname to check.
  * @start_type:   Should the pathname start with '/'?
@@ -874,17 +944,17 @@ bool tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok(struct tomoyo_domain_info * const domain)
 static struct tomoyo_profile *tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_profile(const unsigned
 								int profile)
 {
-	static DEFINE_MUTEX(lock);
 	struct tomoyo_profile *ptr = NULL;
 	int i;
 
 	if (profile >= TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES)
 		return NULL;
-	mutex_lock(&lock);
+	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
+		return NULL;
 	ptr = tomoyo_profile_ptr[profile];
 	if (ptr)
 		goto ok;
-	ptr = kmalloc(sizeof(*ptr), GFP_KERNEL);
+	ptr = kmalloc(sizeof(*ptr), GFP_NOFS);
 	if (!tomoyo_memory_ok(ptr)) {
 		kfree(ptr);
 		ptr = NULL;
@@ -895,7 +965,7 @@ static struct tomoyo_profile *tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_profile(const unsigned
 	mb(); /* Avoid out-of-order execution. */
 	tomoyo_profile_ptr[profile] = ptr;
  ok:
-	mutex_unlock(&lock);
+	mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
 	return ptr;
 }
 
@@ -1071,44 +1141,42 @@ LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_policy_manager_list);
 static int tomoyo_update_manager_entry(const char *manager,
 				       const bool is_delete)
 {
-	struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry *entry = NULL;
 	struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry *ptr;
-	const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_manager;
+	struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry e = { };
 	int error = is_delete ? -ENOENT : -ENOMEM;
-	bool is_domain = false;
 
 	if (tomoyo_is_domain_def(manager)) {
 		if (!tomoyo_is_correct_domain(manager))
 			return -EINVAL;
-		is_domain = true;
+		e.is_domain = true;
 	} else {
 		if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(manager, 1, -1, -1))
 			return -EINVAL;
 	}
-	saved_manager = tomoyo_get_name(manager);
-	if (!saved_manager)
+	e.manager = tomoyo_get_name(manager);
+	if (!e.manager)
 		return -ENOMEM;
-	if (!is_delete)
-		entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
-	mutex_lock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
+	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
+		goto out;
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_policy_manager_list, list) {
-		if (ptr->manager != saved_manager)
+		if (ptr->manager != e.manager)
 			continue;
 		ptr->is_deleted = is_delete;
 		error = 0;
 		break;
 	}
-	if (!is_delete && error && tomoyo_memory_ok(entry)) {
-		entry->manager = saved_manager;
-		saved_manager = NULL;
-		entry->is_domain = is_domain;
-		list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, &tomoyo_policy_manager_list);
-		entry = NULL;
-		error = 0;
+	if (!is_delete && error) {
+		struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry *entry =
+			tomoyo_commit_ok(&e, sizeof(e));
+		if (entry) {
+			list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list,
+					  &tomoyo_policy_manager_list);
+			error = 0;
+		}
 	}
 	mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
-	tomoyo_put_name(saved_manager);
-	kfree(entry);
+ out:
+	tomoyo_put_name(e.manager);
 	return error;
 }
 
@@ -1287,7 +1355,8 @@ static int tomoyo_delete_domain(char *domainname)
 
 	name.name = domainname;
 	tomoyo_fill_path_info(&name);
-	mutex_lock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
+	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
+		return 0;
 	/* Is there an active domain? */
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) {
 		/* Never delete tomoyo_kernel_domain */
@@ -1369,23 +1438,20 @@ static bool tomoyo_print_path_acl(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head,
 {
 	int pos;
 	u8 bit;
-	const char *atmark = "";
-	const char *filename;
 	const u32 perm = ptr->perm | (((u32) ptr->perm_high) << 16);
 
-	filename = ptr->filename->name;
 	for (bit = head->read_bit; bit < TOMOYO_MAX_PATH_OPERATION; bit++) {
-		const char *msg;
 		if (!(perm & (1 << bit)))
 			continue;
 		/* Print "read/write" instead of "read" and "write". */
 		if ((bit == TOMOYO_TYPE_READ || bit == TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE)
 		    && (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE)))
 			continue;
-		msg = tomoyo_path2keyword(bit);
 		pos = head->read_avail;
-		if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, "allow_%s %s%s\n", msg,
-				      atmark, filename))
+		if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, "allow_%s ",
+				      tomoyo_path2keyword(bit)) ||
+		    !tomoyo_print_name_union(head, &ptr->name) ||
+		    !tomoyo_io_printf(head, "\n"))
 			goto out;
 	}
 	head->read_bit = 0;
@@ -1408,23 +1474,18 @@ static bool tomoyo_print_path2_acl(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head,
 				   struct tomoyo_path2_acl *ptr)
 {
 	int pos;
-	const char *atmark1 = "";
-	const char *atmark2 = "";
-	const char *filename1;
-	const char *filename2;
 	const u8 perm = ptr->perm;
 	u8 bit;
 
-	filename1 = ptr->filename1->name;
-	filename2 = ptr->filename2->name;
 	for (bit = head->read_bit; bit < TOMOYO_MAX_PATH2_OPERATION; bit++) {
-		const char *msg;
 		if (!(perm & (1 << bit)))
 			continue;
-		msg = tomoyo_path22keyword(bit);
 		pos = head->read_avail;
-		if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, "allow_%s %s%s %s%s\n", msg,
-				      atmark1, filename1, atmark2, filename2))
+		if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, "allow_%s ",
+				      tomoyo_path22keyword(bit)) ||
+		    !tomoyo_print_name_union(head, &ptr->name1) ||
+		    !tomoyo_print_name_union(head, &ptr->name2) ||
+		    !tomoyo_io_printf(head, "\n"))
 			goto out;
 	}
 	head->read_bit = 0;
@@ -1687,6 +1748,8 @@ static int tomoyo_write_exception_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
 		return tomoyo_write_pattern_policy(data, is_delete);
 	if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_DENY_REWRITE))
 		return tomoyo_write_no_rewrite_policy(data, is_delete);
+	if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_PATH_GROUP))
+		return tomoyo_write_path_group_policy(data, is_delete);
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
@@ -1743,6 +1806,12 @@ static int tomoyo_read_exception_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
 			head->read_var2 = NULL;
 			head->read_step = 9;
 		case 9:
+			if (!tomoyo_read_path_group_policy(head))
+				break;
+			head->read_var1 = NULL;
+			head->read_var2 = NULL;
+			head->read_step = 10;
+		case 10:
 			head->read_eof = true;
 			break;
 		default:
@@ -1886,7 +1955,7 @@ static int tomoyo_read_self_domain(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
  */
 static int tomoyo_open_control(const u8 type, struct file *file)
 {
-	struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head = kzalloc(sizeof(*head), GFP_KERNEL);
+	struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head = kzalloc(sizeof(*head), GFP_NOFS);
 
 	if (!head)
 		return -ENOMEM;
@@ -1947,7 +2016,7 @@ static int tomoyo_open_control(const u8 type, struct file *file)
 	} else {
 		if (!head->readbuf_size)
 			head->readbuf_size = 4096 * 2;
-		head->read_buf = kzalloc(head->readbuf_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+		head->read_buf = kzalloc(head->readbuf_size, GFP_NOFS);
 		if (!head->read_buf) {
 			kfree(head);
 			return -ENOMEM;
@@ -1961,7 +2030,7 @@ static int tomoyo_open_control(const u8 type, struct file *file)
 		head->write = NULL;
 	} else if (head->write) {
 		head->writebuf_size = 4096 * 2;
-		head->write_buf = kzalloc(head->writebuf_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+		head->write_buf = kzalloc(head->writebuf_size, GFP_NOFS);
 		if (!head->write_buf) {
 			kfree(head->read_buf);
 			kfree(head);
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.h b/security/tomoyo/common.h
index 67bd22dd3e6..9f1ae5e3ba5 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.h
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.h
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ struct linux_binprm;
 #define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_KEEP_DOMAIN               "keep_domain "
 #define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_NO_INITIALIZE_DOMAIN      "no_initialize_domain "
 #define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_NO_KEEP_DOMAIN            "no_keep_domain "
+#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_PATH_GROUP                "path_group "
 #define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_SELECT                    "select "
 #define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_USE_PROFILE               "use_profile "
 #define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ  "ignore_global_allow_read"
@@ -204,6 +205,27 @@ struct tomoyo_path_info_with_data {
 	char barrier2[16]; /* Safeguard for overrun. */
 };
 
+struct tomoyo_name_union {
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename;
+	struct tomoyo_path_group *group;
+	u8 is_group;
+};
+
+/* Structure for "path_group" directive. */
+struct tomoyo_path_group {
+	struct list_head list;
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *group_name;
+	struct list_head member_list;
+	atomic_t users;
+};
+
+/* Structure for "path_group" directive. */
+struct tomoyo_path_group_member {
+	struct list_head list;
+	bool is_deleted;
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *member_name;
+};
+
 /*
  * tomoyo_acl_info is a structure which is used for holding
  *
@@ -274,7 +296,7 @@ struct tomoyo_domain_info {
  *
  *  (1) "head" which is a "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
  *  (2) "perm" which is a bitmask of permitted operations.
- *  (3) "filename" is the pathname.
+ *  (3) "name" is the pathname.
  *
  * Directives held by this structure are "allow_read/write", "allow_execute",
  * "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir",
@@ -287,8 +309,7 @@ struct tomoyo_path_acl {
 	struct tomoyo_acl_info head; /* type = TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_ACL */
 	u8 perm_high;
 	u16 perm;
-	/* Pointer to single pathname. */
-	const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename;
+	struct tomoyo_name_union name;
 };
 
 /*
@@ -298,8 +319,8 @@ struct tomoyo_path_acl {
  *
  *  (1) "head" which is a "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
  *  (2) "perm" which is a bitmask of permitted operations.
- *  (3) "filename1" is the source/old pathname.
- *  (4) "filename2" is the destination/new pathname.
+ *  (3) "name1" is the source/old pathname.
+ *  (4) "name2" is the destination/new pathname.
  *
  * Directives held by this structure are "allow_rename", "allow_link" and
  * "allow_pivot_root".
@@ -307,10 +328,8 @@ struct tomoyo_path_acl {
 struct tomoyo_path2_acl {
 	struct tomoyo_acl_info head; /* type = TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH2_ACL */
 	u8 perm;
-	/* Pointer to single pathname. */
-	const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename1;
-	/* Pointer to single pathname. */
-	const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename2;
+	struct tomoyo_name_union name1;
+	struct tomoyo_name_union name2;
 };
 
 /*
@@ -514,6 +533,9 @@ struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry {
 
 /********** Function prototypes. **********/
 
+/* Check whether the given name matches the given name_union. */
+bool tomoyo_compare_name_union(const struct tomoyo_path_info *name,
+			       const struct tomoyo_name_union *ptr);
 /* Check whether the domain has too many ACL entries to hold. */
 bool tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok(struct tomoyo_domain_info * const domain);
 /* Transactional sprintf() for policy dump. */
@@ -526,6 +548,12 @@ bool tomoyo_is_correct_path(const char *filename, const s8 start_type,
 			    const s8 pattern_type, const s8 end_type);
 /* Check whether the token can be a domainname. */
 bool tomoyo_is_domain_def(const unsigned char *buffer);
+bool tomoyo_parse_name_union(const char *filename,
+			     struct tomoyo_name_union *ptr);
+/* Check whether the given filename matches the given path_group. */
+bool tomoyo_path_matches_group(const struct tomoyo_path_info *pathname,
+			       const struct tomoyo_path_group *group,
+			       const bool may_use_pattern);
 /* Check whether the given filename matches the given pattern. */
 bool tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename,
 				 const struct tomoyo_path_info *pattern);
@@ -540,10 +568,14 @@ bool tomoyo_read_domain_initializer_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head);
 bool tomoyo_read_domain_keeper_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head);
 /* Read "file_pattern" entry in exception policy. */
 bool tomoyo_read_file_pattern(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head);
+/* Read "path_group" entry in exception policy. */
+bool tomoyo_read_path_group_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head);
 /* Read "allow_read" entry in exception policy. */
 bool tomoyo_read_globally_readable_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head);
 /* Read "deny_rewrite" entry in exception policy. */
 bool tomoyo_read_no_rewrite_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head);
+/* Tokenize a line. */
+bool tomoyo_tokenize(char *buffer, char *w[], size_t size);
 /* Write domain policy violation warning message to console? */
 bool tomoyo_verbose_mode(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain);
 /* Convert double path operation to operation name. */
@@ -580,12 +612,18 @@ int tomoyo_write_globally_readable_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete);
 int tomoyo_write_no_rewrite_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete);
 /* Create "file_pattern" entry in exception policy. */
 int tomoyo_write_pattern_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete);
+/* Create "path_group" entry in exception policy. */
+int tomoyo_write_path_group_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete);
 /* Find a domain by the given name. */
 struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_domain(const char *domainname);
 /* Find or create a domain by the given name. */
 struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_domain(const char *
 							    domainname,
 							    const u8 profile);
+
+/* Allocate memory for "struct tomoyo_path_group". */
+struct tomoyo_path_group *tomoyo_get_path_group(const char *group_name);
+
 /* Check mode for specified functionality. */
 unsigned int tomoyo_check_flags(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
 				const u8 index);
@@ -616,6 +654,7 @@ char *tomoyo_realpath_from_path(struct path *path);
 
 /* Check memory quota. */
 bool tomoyo_memory_ok(void *ptr);
+void *tomoyo_commit_ok(void *data, const unsigned int size);
 
 /*
  * Keep the given name on the RAM.
@@ -641,6 +680,9 @@ int tomoyo_path2_perm(const u8 operation, struct path *path1,
 int tomoyo_check_rewrite_permission(struct file *filp);
 int tomoyo_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
 
+/* Drop refcount on tomoyo_name_union. */
+void tomoyo_put_name_union(struct tomoyo_name_union *ptr);
+
 /* Run garbage collector. */
 void tomoyo_run_gc(void);
 
@@ -654,6 +696,7 @@ extern struct srcu_struct tomoyo_ss;
 /* The list for "struct tomoyo_domain_info". */
 extern struct list_head tomoyo_domain_list;
 
+extern struct list_head tomoyo_path_group_list;
 extern struct list_head tomoyo_domain_initializer_list;
 extern struct list_head tomoyo_domain_keeper_list;
 extern struct list_head tomoyo_alias_list;
@@ -662,7 +705,6 @@ extern struct list_head tomoyo_pattern_list;
 extern struct list_head tomoyo_no_rewrite_list;
 extern struct list_head tomoyo_policy_manager_list;
 extern struct list_head tomoyo_name_list[TOMOYO_MAX_HASH];
-extern struct mutex tomoyo_name_list_lock;
 
 /* Lock for protecting policy. */
 extern struct mutex tomoyo_policy_lock;
@@ -725,6 +767,12 @@ static inline void tomoyo_put_name(const struct tomoyo_path_info *name)
 	}
 }
 
+static inline void tomoyo_put_path_group(struct tomoyo_path_group *group)
+{
+	if (group)
+		atomic_dec(&group->users);
+}
+
 static inline struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_domain(void)
 {
 	return current_cred()->security;
@@ -736,6 +784,59 @@ static inline struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_real_domain(struct task_struct
 	return task_cred_xxx(task, security);
 }
 
+static inline bool tomoyo_is_same_acl_head(const struct tomoyo_acl_info *p1,
+					   const struct tomoyo_acl_info *p2)
+{
+	return p1->type == p2->type;
+}
+
+static inline bool tomoyo_is_same_name_union
+(const struct tomoyo_name_union *p1, const struct tomoyo_name_union *p2)
+{
+	return p1->filename == p2->filename && p1->group == p2->group &&
+		p1->is_group == p2->is_group;
+}
+
+static inline bool tomoyo_is_same_path_acl(const struct tomoyo_path_acl *p1,
+					   const struct tomoyo_path_acl *p2)
+{
+	return tomoyo_is_same_acl_head(&p1->head, &p2->head) &&
+		tomoyo_is_same_name_union(&p1->name, &p2->name);
+}
+
+static inline bool tomoyo_is_same_path2_acl(const struct tomoyo_path2_acl *p1,
+					    const struct tomoyo_path2_acl *p2)
+{
+	return tomoyo_is_same_acl_head(&p1->head, &p2->head) &&
+		tomoyo_is_same_name_union(&p1->name1, &p2->name1) &&
+		tomoyo_is_same_name_union(&p1->name2, &p2->name2);
+}
+
+static inline bool tomoyo_is_same_domain_initializer_entry
+(const struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry *p1,
+ const struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry *p2)
+{
+	return p1->is_not == p2->is_not && p1->is_last_name == p2->is_last_name
+		&& p1->domainname == p2->domainname
+		&& p1->program == p2->program;
+}
+
+static inline bool tomoyo_is_same_domain_keeper_entry
+(const struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry *p1,
+ const struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry *p2)
+{
+	return p1->is_not == p2->is_not && p1->is_last_name == p2->is_last_name
+		&& p1->domainname == p2->domainname
+		&& p1->program == p2->program;
+}
+
+static inline bool tomoyo_is_same_alias_entry
+(const struct tomoyo_alias_entry *p1, const struct tomoyo_alias_entry *p2)
+{
+	return p1->original_name == p2->original_name &&
+		p1->aliased_name == p2->aliased_name;
+}
+
 /**
  * list_for_each_cookie - iterate over a list with cookie.
  * @pos:        the &struct list_head to use as a loop cursor.
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/domain.c b/security/tomoyo/domain.c
index acb8c397d5c..cd8ba444676 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/domain.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/domain.c
@@ -130,57 +130,47 @@ static int tomoyo_update_domain_initializer_entry(const char *domainname,
 						  const bool is_not,
 						  const bool is_delete)
 {
-	struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry *entry = NULL;
 	struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry *ptr;
-	const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_program = NULL;
-	const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_domainname = NULL;
+	struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry e = { .is_not = is_not };
 	int error = is_delete ? -ENOENT : -ENOMEM;
-	bool is_last_name = false;
 
 	if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(program, 1, -1, -1))
 		return -EINVAL; /* No patterns allowed. */
 	if (domainname) {
 		if (!tomoyo_is_domain_def(domainname) &&
 		    tomoyo_is_correct_path(domainname, 1, -1, -1))
-			is_last_name = true;
+			e.is_last_name = true;
 		else if (!tomoyo_is_correct_domain(domainname))
 			return -EINVAL;
-		saved_domainname = tomoyo_get_name(domainname);
-		if (!saved_domainname)
+		e.domainname = tomoyo_get_name(domainname);
+		if (!e.domainname)
 			goto out;
 	}
-	saved_program = tomoyo_get_name(program);
-	if (!saved_program)
+	e.program = tomoyo_get_name(program);
+	if (!e.program)
+		goto out;
+	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
 		goto out;
-	if (!is_delete)
-		entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
-	mutex_lock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_domain_initializer_list, list) {
-		if (ptr->is_not != is_not ||
-		    ptr->domainname != saved_domainname ||
-		    ptr->program != saved_program)
+		if (!tomoyo_is_same_domain_initializer_entry(ptr, &e))
 			continue;
 		ptr->is_deleted = is_delete;
 		error = 0;
 		break;
 	}
-	if (!is_delete && error && tomoyo_memory_ok(entry)) {
-		entry->domainname = saved_domainname;
-		saved_domainname = NULL;
-		entry->program = saved_program;
-		saved_program = NULL;
-		entry->is_not = is_not;
-		entry->is_last_name = is_last_name;
-		list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list,
-				  &tomoyo_domain_initializer_list);
-		entry = NULL;
-		error = 0;
+	if (!is_delete && error) {
+		struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry *entry =
+			tomoyo_commit_ok(&e, sizeof(e));
+		if (entry) {
+			list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list,
+					  &tomoyo_domain_initializer_list);
+			error = 0;
+		}
 	}
 	mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
  out:
-	tomoyo_put_name(saved_domainname);
-	tomoyo_put_name(saved_program);
-	kfree(entry);
+	tomoyo_put_name(e.domainname);
+	tomoyo_put_name(e.program);
 	return error;
 }
 
@@ -350,56 +340,47 @@ static int tomoyo_update_domain_keeper_entry(const char *domainname,
 					     const bool is_not,
 					     const bool is_delete)
 {
-	struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry *entry = NULL;
 	struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry *ptr;
-	const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_domainname = NULL;
-	const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_program = NULL;
+	struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry e = { .is_not = is_not };
 	int error = is_delete ? -ENOENT : -ENOMEM;
-	bool is_last_name = false;
 
 	if (!tomoyo_is_domain_def(domainname) &&
 	    tomoyo_is_correct_path(domainname, 1, -1, -1))
-		is_last_name = true;
+		e.is_last_name = true;
 	else if (!tomoyo_is_correct_domain(domainname))
 		return -EINVAL;
 	if (program) {
 		if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(program, 1, -1, -1))
 			return -EINVAL;
-		saved_program = tomoyo_get_name(program);
-		if (!saved_program)
+		e.program = tomoyo_get_name(program);
+		if (!e.program)
 			goto out;
 	}
-	saved_domainname = tomoyo_get_name(domainname);
-	if (!saved_domainname)
+	e.domainname = tomoyo_get_name(domainname);
+	if (!e.domainname)
+		goto out;
+	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
 		goto out;
-	if (!is_delete)
-		entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
-	mutex_lock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_domain_keeper_list, list) {
-		if (ptr->is_not != is_not ||
-		    ptr->domainname != saved_domainname ||
-		    ptr->program != saved_program)
+		if (!tomoyo_is_same_domain_keeper_entry(ptr, &e))
 			continue;
 		ptr->is_deleted = is_delete;
 		error = 0;
 		break;
 	}
-	if (!is_delete && error && tomoyo_memory_ok(entry)) {
-		entry->domainname = saved_domainname;
-		saved_domainname = NULL;
-		entry->program = saved_program;
-		saved_program = NULL;
-		entry->is_not = is_not;
-		entry->is_last_name = is_last_name;
-		list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, &tomoyo_domain_keeper_list);
-		entry = NULL;
-		error = 0;
+	if (!is_delete && error) {
+		struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry *entry =
+			tomoyo_commit_ok(&e, sizeof(e));
+		if (entry) {
+			list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list,
+					  &tomoyo_domain_keeper_list);
+			error = 0;
+		}
 	}
 	mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
  out:
-	tomoyo_put_name(saved_domainname);
-	tomoyo_put_name(saved_program);
-	kfree(entry);
+	tomoyo_put_name(e.domainname);
+	tomoyo_put_name(e.program);
 	return error;
 }
 
@@ -551,44 +532,38 @@ static int tomoyo_update_alias_entry(const char *original_name,
 				     const char *aliased_name,
 				     const bool is_delete)
 {
-	struct tomoyo_alias_entry *entry = NULL;
 	struct tomoyo_alias_entry *ptr;
-	const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_original_name;
-	const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_aliased_name;
+	struct tomoyo_alias_entry e = { };
 	int error = is_delete ? -ENOENT : -ENOMEM;
 
 	if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(original_name, 1, -1, -1) ||
 	    !tomoyo_is_correct_path(aliased_name, 1, -1, -1))
 		return -EINVAL; /* No patterns allowed. */
-	saved_original_name = tomoyo_get_name(original_name);
-	saved_aliased_name = tomoyo_get_name(aliased_name);
-	if (!saved_original_name || !saved_aliased_name)
+	e.original_name = tomoyo_get_name(original_name);
+	e.aliased_name = tomoyo_get_name(aliased_name);
+	if (!e.original_name || !e.aliased_name)
+		goto out;
+	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
 		goto out;
-	if (!is_delete)
-		entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
-	mutex_lock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_alias_list, list) {
-		if (ptr->original_name != saved_original_name ||
-		    ptr->aliased_name != saved_aliased_name)
+		if (!tomoyo_is_same_alias_entry(ptr, &e))
 			continue;
 		ptr->is_deleted = is_delete;
 		error = 0;
 		break;
 	}
-	if (!is_delete && error && tomoyo_memory_ok(entry)) {
-		entry->original_name = saved_original_name;
-		saved_original_name = NULL;
-		entry->aliased_name = saved_aliased_name;
-		saved_aliased_name = NULL;
-		list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, &tomoyo_alias_list);
-		entry = NULL;
-		error = 0;
+	if (!is_delete && error) {
+		struct tomoyo_alias_entry *entry =
+			tomoyo_commit_ok(&e, sizeof(e));
+		if (entry) {
+			list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, &tomoyo_alias_list);
+			error = 0;
+		}
 	}
 	mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
  out:
-	tomoyo_put_name(saved_original_name);
-	tomoyo_put_name(saved_aliased_name);
-	kfree(entry);
+	tomoyo_put_name(e.original_name);
+	tomoyo_put_name(e.aliased_name);
 	return error;
 }
 
@@ -656,7 +631,7 @@ struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_domain(const char *
 							    const u8 profile)
 {
 	struct tomoyo_domain_info *entry;
-	struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
+	struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = NULL;
 	const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_domainname;
 	bool found = false;
 
@@ -665,8 +640,9 @@ struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_domain(const char *
 	saved_domainname = tomoyo_get_name(domainname);
 	if (!saved_domainname)
 		return NULL;
-	entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
-	mutex_lock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
+	entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_NOFS);
+	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
+		goto out;
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) {
 		if (domain->is_deleted ||
 		    tomoyo_pathcmp(saved_domainname, domain->domainname))
@@ -685,6 +661,7 @@ struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_domain(const char *
 		found = true;
 	}
 	mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
+ out:
 	tomoyo_put_name(saved_domainname);
 	kfree(entry);
 	return found ? domain : NULL;
@@ -705,7 +682,7 @@ int tomoyo_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	 * This function assumes that the size of buffer returned by
 	 * tomoyo_realpath() = TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN.
 	 */
-	struct tomoyo_page_buffer *tmp = kzalloc(sizeof(*tmp), GFP_KERNEL);
+	struct tomoyo_page_buffer *tmp = kzalloc(sizeof(*tmp), GFP_NOFS);
 	struct tomoyo_domain_info *old_domain = tomoyo_domain();
 	struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = NULL;
 	const char *old_domain_name = old_domain->domainname->name;
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/file.c b/security/tomoyo/file.c
index 6f3fe76a1fd..1c6f8238ec4 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/file.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/file.c
@@ -45,6 +45,37 @@ static const char *tomoyo_path2_keyword[TOMOYO_MAX_PATH2_OPERATION] = {
 	[TOMOYO_TYPE_PIVOT_ROOT] = "pivot_root",
 };
 
+void tomoyo_put_name_union(struct tomoyo_name_union *ptr)
+{
+	if (!ptr)
+		return;
+	if (ptr->is_group)
+		tomoyo_put_path_group(ptr->group);
+	else
+		tomoyo_put_name(ptr->filename);
+}
+
+bool tomoyo_compare_name_union(const struct tomoyo_path_info *name,
+			       const struct tomoyo_name_union *ptr)
+{
+	if (ptr->is_group)
+		return tomoyo_path_matches_group(name, ptr->group, 1);
+	return tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(name, ptr->filename);
+}
+
+static bool tomoyo_compare_name_union_pattern(const struct tomoyo_path_info
+					      *name,
+					      const struct tomoyo_name_union
+					      *ptr, const bool may_use_pattern)
+{
+	if (ptr->is_group)
+		return tomoyo_path_matches_group(name, ptr->group,
+						 may_use_pattern);
+	if (may_use_pattern || !ptr->filename->is_patterned)
+		return tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(name, ptr->filename);
+	return false;
+}
+
 /**
  * tomoyo_path2keyword - Get the name of single path operation.
  *
@@ -100,7 +131,7 @@ static struct tomoyo_path_info *tomoyo_get_path(struct path *path)
 {
 	int error;
 	struct tomoyo_path_info_with_data *buf = kzalloc(sizeof(*buf),
-							 GFP_KERNEL);
+							 GFP_NOFS);
 
 	if (!buf)
 		return NULL;
@@ -164,36 +195,36 @@ LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_globally_readable_list);
 static int tomoyo_update_globally_readable_entry(const char *filename,
 						 const bool is_delete)
 {
-	struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry *entry = NULL;
 	struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry *ptr;
-	const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_filename;
+	struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry e = { };
 	int error = is_delete ? -ENOENT : -ENOMEM;
 
 	if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(filename, 1, 0, -1))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	saved_filename = tomoyo_get_name(filename);
-	if (!saved_filename)
+	e.filename = tomoyo_get_name(filename);
+	if (!e.filename)
 		return -ENOMEM;
-	if (!is_delete)
-		entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
-	mutex_lock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
+	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
+		goto out;
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_globally_readable_list, list) {
-		if (ptr->filename != saved_filename)
+		if (ptr->filename != e.filename)
 			continue;
 		ptr->is_deleted = is_delete;
 		error = 0;
 		break;
 	}
-	if (!is_delete && error && tomoyo_memory_ok(entry)) {
-		entry->filename = saved_filename;
-		saved_filename = NULL;
-		list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, &tomoyo_globally_readable_list);
-		entry = NULL;
-		error = 0;
+	if (!is_delete && error) {
+		struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry *entry =
+			tomoyo_commit_ok(&e, sizeof(e));
+		if (entry) {
+			list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list,
+					  &tomoyo_globally_readable_list);
+			error = 0;
+		}
 	}
 	mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
-	tomoyo_put_name(saved_filename);
-	kfree(entry);
+ out:
+	tomoyo_put_name(e.filename);
 	return error;
 }
 
@@ -311,37 +342,34 @@ LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_pattern_list);
 static int tomoyo_update_file_pattern_entry(const char *pattern,
 					    const bool is_delete)
 {
-	struct tomoyo_pattern_entry *entry = NULL;
 	struct tomoyo_pattern_entry *ptr;
-	const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_pattern;
+	struct tomoyo_pattern_entry e = { .pattern = tomoyo_get_name(pattern) };
 	int error = is_delete ? -ENOENT : -ENOMEM;
 
-	saved_pattern = tomoyo_get_name(pattern);
-	if (!saved_pattern)
+	if (!e.pattern)
 		return error;
-	if (!saved_pattern->is_patterned)
+	if (!e.pattern->is_patterned)
+		goto out;
+	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
 		goto out;
-	if (!is_delete)
-		entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
-	mutex_lock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_pattern_list, list) {
-		if (saved_pattern != ptr->pattern)
+		if (e.pattern != ptr->pattern)
 			continue;
 		ptr->is_deleted = is_delete;
 		error = 0;
 		break;
 	}
-	if (!is_delete && error && tomoyo_memory_ok(entry)) {
-		entry->pattern = saved_pattern;
-		saved_pattern = NULL;
-		list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, &tomoyo_pattern_list);
-		entry = NULL;
-		error = 0;
+	if (!is_delete && error) {
+		struct tomoyo_pattern_entry *entry =
+			tomoyo_commit_ok(&e, sizeof(e));
+		if (entry) {
+			list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, &tomoyo_pattern_list);
+			error = 0;
+		}
 	}
 	mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
  out:
-	kfree(entry);
-	tomoyo_put_name(saved_pattern);
+	tomoyo_put_name(e.pattern);
 	return error;
 }
 
@@ -464,36 +492,36 @@ LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_no_rewrite_list);
 static int tomoyo_update_no_rewrite_entry(const char *pattern,
 					  const bool is_delete)
 {
-	struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry *entry = NULL;
 	struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry *ptr;
-	const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_pattern;
+	struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry e = { };
 	int error = is_delete ? -ENOENT : -ENOMEM;
 
 	if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(pattern, 0, 0, 0))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	saved_pattern = tomoyo_get_name(pattern);
-	if (!saved_pattern)
+	e.pattern = tomoyo_get_name(pattern);
+	if (!e.pattern)
 		return error;
-	if (!is_delete)
-		entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
-	mutex_lock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
+	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
+		goto out;
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_no_rewrite_list, list) {
-		if (ptr->pattern != saved_pattern)
+		if (ptr->pattern != e.pattern)
 			continue;
 		ptr->is_deleted = is_delete;
 		error = 0;
 		break;
 	}
-	if (!is_delete && error && tomoyo_memory_ok(entry)) {
-		entry->pattern = saved_pattern;
-		saved_pattern = NULL;
-		list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, &tomoyo_no_rewrite_list);
-		entry = NULL;
-		error = 0;
+	if (!is_delete && error) {
+		struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry *entry =
+			tomoyo_commit_ok(&e, sizeof(e));
+		if (entry) {
+			list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list,
+					  &tomoyo_no_rewrite_list);
+			error = 0;
+		}
 	}
 	mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
-	tomoyo_put_name(saved_pattern);
-	kfree(entry);
+ out:
+	tomoyo_put_name(e.pattern);
 	return error;
 }
 
@@ -640,13 +668,9 @@ static int tomoyo_path_acl2(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
 			if (!(acl->perm_high & (perm >> 16)))
 				continue;
 		}
-		if (may_use_pattern || !acl->filename->is_patterned) {
-			if (!tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(filename,
-							 acl->filename))
-				continue;
-		} else {
+		if (!tomoyo_compare_name_union_pattern(filename, &acl->name,
+                                                       may_use_pattern))
 			continue;
-		}
 		error = 0;
 		break;
 	}
@@ -805,70 +829,64 @@ static int tomoyo_update_path_acl(const u8 type, const char *filename,
 				  struct tomoyo_domain_info *const domain,
 				  const bool is_delete)
 {
-	static const u32 rw_mask =
+	static const u32 tomoyo_rw_mask =
 		(1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ) | (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE);
-	const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_filename;
+	const u32 perm = 1 << type;
 	struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr;
-	struct tomoyo_path_acl *entry = NULL;
+	struct tomoyo_path_acl e = {
+		.head.type = TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_ACL,
+		.perm_high = perm >> 16,
+		.perm = perm
+	};
 	int error = is_delete ? -ENOENT : -ENOMEM;
-	const u32 perm = 1 << type;
 
+	if (type == TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE)
+		e.perm |= tomoyo_rw_mask;
 	if (!domain)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(filename, 0, 0, 0))
+	if (!tomoyo_parse_name_union(filename, &e.name))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	saved_filename = tomoyo_get_name(filename);
-	if (!saved_filename)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-	if (!is_delete)
-		entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
-	mutex_lock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
+	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
+		goto out;
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) {
 		struct tomoyo_path_acl *acl =
 			container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_path_acl, head);
-		if (ptr->type != TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_ACL)
-			continue;
-		if (acl->filename != saved_filename)
+		if (!tomoyo_is_same_path_acl(acl, &e))
 			continue;
 		if (is_delete) {
 			if (perm <= 0xFFFF)
 				acl->perm &= ~perm;
 			else
 				acl->perm_high &= ~(perm >> 16);
-			if ((acl->perm & rw_mask) != rw_mask)
+			if ((acl->perm & tomoyo_rw_mask) != tomoyo_rw_mask)
 				acl->perm &= ~(1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE);
 			else if (!(acl->perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE)))
-				acl->perm &= ~rw_mask;
+				acl->perm &= ~tomoyo_rw_mask;
 		} else {
 			if (perm <= 0xFFFF)
 				acl->perm |= perm;
 			else
 				acl->perm_high |= (perm >> 16);
-			if ((acl->perm & rw_mask) == rw_mask)
+			if ((acl->perm & tomoyo_rw_mask) == tomoyo_rw_mask)
 				acl->perm |= 1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE;
 			else if (acl->perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE))
-				acl->perm |= rw_mask;
+				acl->perm |= tomoyo_rw_mask;
 		}
 		error = 0;
 		break;
 	}
-	if (!is_delete && error && tomoyo_memory_ok(entry)) {
-		entry->head.type = TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_ACL;
-		if (perm <= 0xFFFF)
-			entry->perm = perm;
-		else
-			entry->perm_high = (perm >> 16);
-		if (perm == (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE))
-			entry->perm |= rw_mask;
-		entry->filename = saved_filename;
-		saved_filename = NULL;
-		list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->head.list, &domain->acl_info_list);
-		entry = NULL;
-		error = 0;
+	if (!is_delete && error) {
+		struct tomoyo_path_acl *entry =
+			tomoyo_commit_ok(&e, sizeof(e));
+		if (entry) {
+			list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->head.list,
+					  &domain->acl_info_list);
+			error = 0;
+		}
 	}
 	mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
-	kfree(entry);
-	tomoyo_put_name(saved_filename);
+ out:
+	tomoyo_put_name_union(&e.name);
 	return error;
 }
 
@@ -890,32 +908,25 @@ static int tomoyo_update_path2_acl(const u8 type, const char *filename1,
 				   struct tomoyo_domain_info *const domain,
 				   const bool is_delete)
 {
-	const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_filename1;
-	const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_filename2;
+	const u8 perm = 1 << type;
+	struct tomoyo_path2_acl e = {
+		.head.type = TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH2_ACL,
+		.perm = perm
+	};
 	struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr;
-	struct tomoyo_path2_acl *entry = NULL;
 	int error = is_delete ? -ENOENT : -ENOMEM;
-	const u8 perm = 1 << type;
 
 	if (!domain)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(filename1, 0, 0, 0) ||
-	    !tomoyo_is_correct_path(filename2, 0, 0, 0))
-		return -EINVAL;
-	saved_filename1 = tomoyo_get_name(filename1);
-	saved_filename2 = tomoyo_get_name(filename2);
-	if (!saved_filename1 || !saved_filename2)
+	if (!tomoyo_parse_name_union(filename1, &e.name1) ||
+	    !tomoyo_parse_name_union(filename2, &e.name2))
+		goto out;
+	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
 		goto out;
-	if (!is_delete)
-		entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
-	mutex_lock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) {
 		struct tomoyo_path2_acl *acl =
 			container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_path2_acl, head);
-		if (ptr->type != TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH2_ACL)
-			continue;
-		if (acl->filename1 != saved_filename1 ||
-		    acl->filename2 != saved_filename2)
+		if (!tomoyo_is_same_path2_acl(acl, &e))
 			continue;
 		if (is_delete)
 			acl->perm &= ~perm;
@@ -924,22 +935,19 @@ static int tomoyo_update_path2_acl(const u8 type, const char *filename1,
 		error = 0;
 		break;
 	}
-	if (!is_delete && error && tomoyo_memory_ok(entry)) {
-		entry->head.type = TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH2_ACL;
-		entry->perm = perm;
-		entry->filename1 = saved_filename1;
-		saved_filename1 = NULL;
-		entry->filename2 = saved_filename2;
-		saved_filename2 = NULL;
-		list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->head.list, &domain->acl_info_list);
-		entry = NULL;
-		error = 0;
+	if (!is_delete && error) {
+		struct tomoyo_path2_acl *entry =
+			tomoyo_commit_ok(&e, sizeof(e));
+		if (entry) {
+			list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->head.list,
+					  &domain->acl_info_list);
+			error = 0;
+		}
 	}
 	mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
  out:
-	tomoyo_put_name(saved_filename1);
-	tomoyo_put_name(saved_filename2);
-	kfree(entry);
+	tomoyo_put_name_union(&e.name1);
+	tomoyo_put_name_union(&e.name2);
 	return error;
 }
 
@@ -992,9 +1000,9 @@ static int tomoyo_path2_acl(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
 		acl = container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_path2_acl, head);
 		if (!(acl->perm & perm))
 			continue;
-		if (!tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(filename1, acl->filename1))
+		if (!tomoyo_compare_name_union(filename1, &acl->name1))
 			continue;
-		if (!tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(filename2, acl->filename2))
+		if (!tomoyo_compare_name_union(filename2, &acl->name2))
 			continue;
 		error = 0;
 		break;
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/gc.c b/security/tomoyo/gc.c
index d9ad35bc7fa..b9cc71b0431 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/gc.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/gc.c
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 
 enum tomoyo_gc_id {
+	TOMOYO_ID_PATH_GROUP,
+	TOMOYO_ID_PATH_GROUP_MEMBER,
 	TOMOYO_ID_DOMAIN_INITIALIZER,
 	TOMOYO_ID_DOMAIN_KEEPER,
 	TOMOYO_ID_ALIAS,
@@ -91,15 +93,15 @@ static void tomoyo_del_acl(struct tomoyo_acl_info *acl)
 		{
 			struct tomoyo_path_acl *entry
 				= container_of(acl, typeof(*entry), head);
-			tomoyo_put_name(entry->filename);
+			tomoyo_put_name_union(&entry->name);
 		}
 		break;
 	case TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH2_ACL:
 		{
 			struct tomoyo_path2_acl *entry
 				= container_of(acl, typeof(*entry), head);
-			tomoyo_put_name(entry->filename1);
-			tomoyo_put_name(entry->filename2);
+			tomoyo_put_name_union(&entry->name1);
+			tomoyo_put_name_union(&entry->name2);
 		}
 		break;
 	default:
@@ -149,9 +151,21 @@ static void tomoyo_del_name(const struct tomoyo_name_entry *ptr)
 {
 }
 
+static void tomoyo_del_path_group_member(struct tomoyo_path_group_member
+					 *member)
+{
+	tomoyo_put_name(member->member_name);
+}
+
+static void tomoyo_del_path_group(struct tomoyo_path_group *group)
+{
+	tomoyo_put_name(group->group_name);
+}
+
 static void tomoyo_collect_entry(void)
 {
-	mutex_lock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
+	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
+		return;
 	{
 		struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry *ptr;
 		list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_globally_readable_list,
@@ -275,8 +289,6 @@ static void tomoyo_collect_entry(void)
 				break;
 		}
 	}
-	mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
-	mutex_lock(&tomoyo_name_list_lock);
 	{
 		int i;
 		for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_HASH; i++) {
@@ -294,7 +306,30 @@ static void tomoyo_collect_entry(void)
 			}
 		}
 	}
-	mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_name_list_lock);
+	{
+		struct tomoyo_path_group *group;
+		list_for_each_entry_rcu(group, &tomoyo_path_group_list, list) {
+			struct tomoyo_path_group_member *member;
+			list_for_each_entry_rcu(member, &group->member_list,
+						list) {
+				if (!member->is_deleted)
+					continue;
+				if (tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_PATH_GROUP_MEMBER,
+						     member))
+					list_del_rcu(&member->list);
+				else
+					break;
+			}
+			if (!list_empty(&group->member_list) ||
+			    atomic_read(&group->users))
+				continue;
+			if (tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_PATH_GROUP, group))
+				list_del_rcu(&group->list);
+			else
+				break;
+		}
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
 }
 
 static void tomoyo_kfree_entry(void)
@@ -335,6 +370,12 @@ static void tomoyo_kfree_entry(void)
 			if (!tomoyo_del_domain(p->element))
 				continue;
 			break;
+		case TOMOYO_ID_PATH_GROUP_MEMBER:
+			tomoyo_del_path_group_member(p->element);
+			break;
+		case TOMOYO_ID_PATH_GROUP:
+			tomoyo_del_path_group(p->element);
+			break;
 		default:
 			printk(KERN_WARNING "Unknown type\n");
 			break;
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/path_group.c b/security/tomoyo/path_group.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..c988041c8e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/tomoyo/path_group.c
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/path_group.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2009  NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ */
+
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include "common.h"
+/* The list for "struct ccs_path_group". */
+LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_path_group_list);
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_get_path_group - Allocate memory for "struct tomoyo_path_group".
+ *
+ * @group_name: The name of pathname group.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_path_group" on success, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+struct tomoyo_path_group *tomoyo_get_path_group(const char *group_name)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_path_group *entry = NULL;
+	struct tomoyo_path_group *group = NULL;
+	const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_group_name;
+	int error = -ENOMEM;
+	if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(group_name, 0, 0, 0) ||
+	    !group_name[0])
+		return NULL;
+	saved_group_name = tomoyo_get_name(group_name);
+	if (!saved_group_name)
+		return NULL;
+	entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_NOFS);
+	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
+		goto out;
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(group, &tomoyo_path_group_list, list) {
+		if (saved_group_name != group->group_name)
+			continue;
+		atomic_inc(&group->users);
+		error = 0;
+		break;
+	}
+	if (error && tomoyo_memory_ok(entry)) {
+		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->member_list);
+		entry->group_name = saved_group_name;
+		saved_group_name = NULL;
+		atomic_set(&entry->users, 1);
+		list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, &tomoyo_path_group_list);
+		group = entry;
+		entry = NULL;
+		error = 0;
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
+ out:
+	tomoyo_put_name(saved_group_name);
+	kfree(entry);
+	return !error ? group : NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_path_group_policy - Write "struct tomoyo_path_group" list.
+ *
+ * @data:      String to parse.
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, nagative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_write_path_group_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_path_group *group;
+	struct tomoyo_path_group_member *member;
+	struct tomoyo_path_group_member e = { };
+	int error = is_delete ? -ENOENT : -ENOMEM;
+	char *w[2];
+	if (!tomoyo_tokenize(data, w, sizeof(w)) || !w[1][0])
+		return -EINVAL;
+	group = tomoyo_get_path_group(w[0]);
+	if (!group)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	e.member_name = tomoyo_get_name(w[1]);
+	if (!e.member_name)
+		goto out;
+	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
+		goto out;
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(member, &group->member_list, list) {
+		if (member->member_name != e.member_name)
+			continue;
+		member->is_deleted = is_delete;
+		error = 0;
+		break;
+	}
+	if (!is_delete && error) {
+		struct tomoyo_path_group_member *entry =
+			tomoyo_commit_ok(&e, sizeof(e));
+		if (entry) {
+			list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, &group->member_list);
+			error = 0;
+		}
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
+ out:
+	tomoyo_put_name(e.member_name);
+	tomoyo_put_path_group(group);
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_path_group_policy - Read "struct tomoyo_path_group" list.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+bool tomoyo_read_path_group_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	struct list_head *gpos;
+	struct list_head *mpos;
+	list_for_each_cookie(gpos, head->read_var1, &tomoyo_path_group_list) {
+		struct tomoyo_path_group *group;
+		group = list_entry(gpos, struct tomoyo_path_group, list);
+		list_for_each_cookie(mpos, head->read_var2,
+				     &group->member_list) {
+			struct tomoyo_path_group_member *member;
+			member = list_entry(mpos,
+					    struct tomoyo_path_group_member,
+					    list);
+			if (member->is_deleted)
+				continue;
+			if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_PATH_GROUP
+					      "%s %s\n",
+					      group->group_name->name,
+					      member->member_name->name))
+				return false;
+		}
+	}
+	return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_path_matches_group - Check whether the given pathname matches members of the given pathname group.
+ *
+ * @pathname:        The name of pathname.
+ * @group:           Pointer to "struct tomoyo_path_group".
+ * @may_use_pattern: True if wild card is permitted.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @pathname matches pathnames in @group, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+bool tomoyo_path_matches_group(const struct tomoyo_path_info *pathname,
+			       const struct tomoyo_path_group *group,
+			       const bool may_use_pattern)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_path_group_member *member;
+	bool matched = false;
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(member, &group->member_list, list) {
+		if (member->is_deleted)
+			continue;
+		if (!member->member_name->is_patterned) {
+			if (tomoyo_pathcmp(pathname, member->member_name))
+				continue;
+		} else if (may_use_pattern) {
+			if (!tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(pathname,
+							 member->member_name))
+				continue;
+		} else
+			continue;
+		matched = true;
+		break;
+	}
+	return matched;
+}
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/realpath.c b/security/tomoyo/realpath.c
index c225c65ce42..d1b96f01962 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/realpath.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/realpath.c
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ int tomoyo_realpath_from_path2(struct path *path, char *newname,
  */
 char *tomoyo_realpath_from_path(struct path *path)
 {
-	char *buf = kzalloc(sizeof(struct tomoyo_page_buffer), GFP_KERNEL);
+	char *buf = kzalloc(sizeof(struct tomoyo_page_buffer), GFP_NOFS);
 
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct tomoyo_page_buffer)
 		     <= TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN - 1);
@@ -223,6 +223,25 @@ bool tomoyo_memory_ok(void *ptr)
 }
 
 /**
+ * tomoyo_commit_ok - Check memory quota.
+ *
+ * @data:   Data to copy from.
+ * @size:   Size in byte.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to allocated memory on success, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+void *tomoyo_commit_ok(void *data, const unsigned int size)
+{
+	void *ptr = kzalloc(size, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (tomoyo_memory_ok(ptr)) {
+		memmove(ptr, data, size);
+		memset(data, 0, size);
+		return ptr;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
  * tomoyo_memory_free - Free memory for elements.
  *
  * @ptr:  Pointer to allocated memory.
@@ -240,8 +259,6 @@ void tomoyo_memory_free(void *ptr)
  * "const struct tomoyo_path_info *".
  */
 struct list_head tomoyo_name_list[TOMOYO_MAX_HASH];
-/* Lock for protecting tomoyo_name_list . */
-DEFINE_MUTEX(tomoyo_name_list_lock);
 
 /**
  * tomoyo_get_name - Allocate permanent memory for string data.
@@ -263,14 +280,15 @@ const struct tomoyo_path_info *tomoyo_get_name(const char *name)
 	len = strlen(name) + 1;
 	hash = full_name_hash((const unsigned char *) name, len - 1);
 	head = &tomoyo_name_list[hash_long(hash, TOMOYO_HASH_BITS)];
-	mutex_lock(&tomoyo_name_list_lock);
+	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
+		return NULL;
 	list_for_each_entry(ptr, head, list) {
 		if (hash != ptr->entry.hash || strcmp(name, ptr->entry.name))
 			continue;
 		atomic_inc(&ptr->users);
 		goto out;
 	}
-	ptr = kzalloc(sizeof(*ptr) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	ptr = kzalloc(sizeof(*ptr) + len, GFP_NOFS);
 	allocated_len = ptr ? ksize(ptr) : 0;
 	if (!ptr || (tomoyo_quota_for_policy &&
 		     atomic_read(&tomoyo_policy_memory_size) + allocated_len
@@ -290,7 +308,7 @@ const struct tomoyo_path_info *tomoyo_get_name(const char *name)
 	tomoyo_fill_path_info(&ptr->entry);
 	list_add_tail(&ptr->list, head);
  out:
-	mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_name_list_lock);
+	mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
 	return ptr ? &ptr->entry : NULL;
 }