Merge branch 'next' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security

* 'next' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security: (95 commits)
  TOMOYO: Fix incomplete read after seek.
  Smack: allow to access /smack/access as normal user
  TOMOYO: Fix unused kernel config option.
  Smack: fix: invalid length set for the result of /smack/access
  Smack: compilation fix
  Smack: fix for /smack/access output, use string instead of byte
  Smack: domain transition protections (v3)
  Smack: Provide information for UDS getsockopt(SO_PEERCRED)
  Smack: Clean up comments
  Smack: Repair processing of fcntl
  Smack: Rule list lookup performance
  Smack: check permissions from user space (v2)
  TOMOYO: Fix quota and garbage collector.
  TOMOYO: Remove redundant tasklist_lock.
  TOMOYO: Fix domain transition failure warning.
  TOMOYO: Remove tomoyo_policy_memory_lock spinlock.
  TOMOYO: Simplify garbage collector.
  TOMOYO: Fix make namespacecheck warnings.
  target: check hex2bin result
  encrypted-keys: check hex2bin result
  ...

99 files changed, 4701 insertions, 1432 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm b/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..8374d4557e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+What:		security/evm
+Date:		March 2011
+Contact:	Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+Description:
+		EVM protects a file's security extended attributes(xattrs)
+		against integrity attacks. The initial method maintains an
+		HMAC-sha1 value across the extended attributes, storing the
+		value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'.
+
+		EVM depends on the Kernel Key Retention System to provide it
+		with a trusted/encrypted key for the HMAC-sha1 operation.
+		The key is loaded onto the root's keyring using keyctl.  Until
+		EVM receives notification that the key has been successfully
+		loaded onto the keyring (echo 1 > <securityfs>/evm), EVM
+		can not create or validate the 'security.evm' xattr, but
+		returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN.  Loading the key and signaling EVM
+		should be done as early as possible.  Normally this is done
+		in the initramfs, which has already been measured as part
+		of the trusted boot.  For more information on creating and
+		loading existing trusted/encrypted keys, refer to:
+		Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt.  (A sample dracut
+		patch, which loads the trusted/encrypted key and enables
+		EVM, is available from http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/#EVM.)
diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
index d6e6724446c..d317f6cf0d3 100644
--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ parameter is applicable:
 	EDD	BIOS Enhanced Disk Drive Services (EDD) is enabled
 	EFI	EFI Partitioning (GPT) is enabled
 	EIDE	EIDE/ATAPI support is enabled.
+	EVM	Extended Verification Module
 	FB	The frame buffer device is enabled.
 	FTRACE	Function tracing enabled.
 	GCOV	GCOV profiling is enabled.
@@ -760,6 +761,11 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
 			This option is obsoleted by the "netdev=" option, which
 			has equivalent usage. See its documentation for details.
 
+	evm=		[EVM]
+			Format: { "fix" }
+			Permit 'security.evm' to be updated regardless of
+			current integrity status.
+
 	failslab=
 	fail_page_alloc=
 	fail_make_request=[KNL]
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index 6185d051358..51a8160dc54 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -2552,6 +2552,11 @@ S:	Maintained
 F:	Documentation/filesystems/ext4.txt
 F:	fs/ext4/
 
+Extended Verification Module (EVM)
+M:	Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+S:	Supported
+F:	security/integrity/evm/
+
 F71805F HARDWARE MONITORING DRIVER
 M:	Jean Delvare <khali@linux-fr.org>
 L:	lm-sensors@lm-sensors.org
@@ -6447,7 +6452,7 @@ L:	tomoyo-users-en@lists.sourceforge.jp (subscribers-only, for users in English)
 L:	tomoyo-dev@lists.sourceforge.jp (subscribers-only, for developers in Japanese)
 L:	tomoyo-users@lists.sourceforge.jp (subscribers-only, for users in Japanese)
 W:	http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/
-T:	quilt http://svn.sourceforge.jp/svnroot/tomoyo/trunk/2.4.x/tomoyo-lsm/patches/
+T:	quilt http://svn.sourceforge.jp/svnroot/tomoyo/trunk/2.5.x/tomoyo-lsm/patches/
 S:	Maintained
 F:	security/tomoyo/
 
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
index 9ca5c021d0b..361a1dff8f7 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
@@ -966,6 +966,9 @@ ssize_t tpm_show_durations(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 {
 	struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
 
+	if (chip->vendor.duration[TPM_LONG] == 0)
+		return 0;
+
 	return sprintf(buf, "%d %d %d [%s]\n",
 		       jiffies_to_usecs(chip->vendor.duration[TPM_SHORT]),
 		       jiffies_to_usecs(chip->vendor.duration[TPM_MEDIUM]),
diff --git a/drivers/target/target_core_fabric_lib.c b/drivers/target/target_core_fabric_lib.c
index c4ea3a9a555..39f021b855e 100644
--- a/drivers/target/target_core_fabric_lib.c
+++ b/drivers/target/target_core_fabric_lib.c
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ u32 sas_get_pr_transport_id(
 	unsigned char *buf)
 {
 	unsigned char *ptr;
+	int ret;
 
 	/*
 	 * Set PROTOCOL IDENTIFIER to 6h for SAS
@@ -74,7 +75,9 @@ u32 sas_get_pr_transport_id(
 	 */
 	ptr = &se_nacl->initiatorname[4]; /* Skip over 'naa. prefix */
 
-	hex2bin(&buf[4], ptr, 8);
+	ret = hex2bin(&buf[4], ptr, 8);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		pr_debug("sas transport_id: invalid hex string\n");
 
 	/*
 	 * The SAS Transport ID is a hardcoded 24-byte length
@@ -156,8 +159,9 @@ u32 fc_get_pr_transport_id(
 	unsigned char *buf)
 {
 	unsigned char *ptr;
-	int i;
+	int i, ret;
 	u32 off = 8;
+
 	/*
 	 * PROTOCOL IDENTIFIER is 0h for FCP-2
 	 *
@@ -174,7 +178,9 @@ u32 fc_get_pr_transport_id(
 			i++;
 			continue;
 		}
-		hex2bin(&buf[off++], &ptr[i], 1);
+		ret = hex2bin(&buf[off++], &ptr[i], 1);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			pr_debug("fc transport_id: invalid hex string\n");
 		i += 2;
 	}
 	/*
diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c
index 538e27959d3..7ee7ba48831 100644
--- a/fs/attr.c
+++ b/fs/attr.c
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
 #include <linux/fcntl.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/evm.h>
 
 /**
  * inode_change_ok - check if attribute changes to an inode are allowed
@@ -237,8 +238,10 @@ int notify_change(struct dentry * dentry, struct iattr * attr)
 	else
 		error = simple_setattr(dentry, attr);
 
-	if (!error)
+	if (!error) {
 		fsnotify_change(dentry, ia_valid);
+		evm_inode_post_setattr(dentry, ia_valid);
+	}
 
 	return error;
 }
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/xattr.c b/fs/btrfs/xattr.c
index 69565e5fc6a..426aa464f1a 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/xattr.c
@@ -383,36 +383,36 @@ int btrfs_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 				XATTR_REPLACE);
 }
 
-int btrfs_xattr_security_init(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
-			      struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
-			      const struct qstr *qstr)
+int btrfs_initxattrs(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr_array,
+		     void *fs_info)
 {
-	int err;
-	size_t len;
-	void *value;
-	char *suffix;
+	const struct xattr *xattr;
+	struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans = fs_info;
 	char *name;
+	int err = 0;
 
-	err = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, &suffix, &value,
-					   &len);
-	if (err) {
-		if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP)
-			return 0;
-		return err;
-	}
-
-	name = kmalloc(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN + strlen(suffix) + 1,
-		       GFP_NOFS);
-	if (!name) {
-		err = -ENOMEM;
-	} else {
+	for (xattr = xattr_array; xattr->name != NULL; xattr++) {
+		name = kmalloc(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN +
+			       strlen(xattr->name) + 1, GFP_NOFS);
+		if (!name) {
+			err = -ENOMEM;
+			break;
+		}
 		strcpy(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX);
-		strcpy(name + XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN, suffix);
-		err = __btrfs_setxattr(trans, inode, name, value, len, 0);
+		strcpy(name + XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN, xattr->name);
+		err = __btrfs_setxattr(trans, inode, name,
+				       xattr->value, xattr->value_len, 0);
 		kfree(name);
+		if (err < 0)
+			break;
 	}
-
-	kfree(suffix);
-	kfree(value);
 	return err;
 }
+
+int btrfs_xattr_security_init(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
+			      struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
+			      const struct qstr *qstr)
+{
+	return security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr,
+					    &btrfs_initxattrs, trans);
+}
diff --git a/fs/cifs/xattr.c b/fs/cifs/xattr.c
index 2a22fb2989e..c3230888214 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/xattr.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
 #include "cifsfs.h"
 #include "cifspdu.h"
 #include "cifsglob.h"
@@ -31,16 +32,8 @@
 #define MAX_EA_VALUE_SIZE 65535
 #define CIFS_XATTR_DOS_ATTRIB "user.DosAttrib"
 #define CIFS_XATTR_CIFS_ACL "system.cifs_acl"
-#define CIFS_XATTR_USER_PREFIX "user."
-#define CIFS_XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX "system."
-#define CIFS_XATTR_OS2_PREFIX "os2."
-#define CIFS_XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX "security."
-#define CIFS_XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX "trusted."
-#define XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN  8
-#define XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN 9
-/* BB need to add server (Samba e.g) support for security and trusted prefix */
-
 
+/* BB need to add server (Samba e.g) support for security and trusted prefix */
 
 int cifs_removexattr(struct dentry *direntry, const char *ea_name)
 {
@@ -76,8 +69,8 @@ int cifs_removexattr(struct dentry *direntry, const char *ea_name)
 	}
 	if (ea_name == NULL) {
 		cFYI(1, "Null xattr names not supported");
-	} else if (strncmp(ea_name, CIFS_XATTR_USER_PREFIX, 5)
-		&& (strncmp(ea_name, CIFS_XATTR_OS2_PREFIX, 4))) {
+	} else if (strncmp(ea_name, XATTR_USER_PREFIX, XATTR_USER_PREFIX_LEN)
+		&& (strncmp(ea_name, XATTR_OS2_PREFIX, XATTR_OS2_PREFIX_LEN))) {
 		cFYI(1,
 		     "illegal xattr request %s (only user namespace supported)",
 		     ea_name);
@@ -88,7 +81,7 @@ int cifs_removexattr(struct dentry *direntry, const char *ea_name)
 		if (cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags & CIFS_MOUNT_NO_XATTR)
 			goto remove_ea_exit;
 
-		ea_name += 5; /* skip past user. prefix */
+		ea_name += XATTR_USER_PREFIX_LEN; /* skip past user. prefix */
 		rc = CIFSSMBSetEA(xid, pTcon, full_path, ea_name, NULL,</