diff options
author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2010-08-04 10:28:39 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2010-08-04 10:28:39 -0700 |
commit | 7e6880951da86928c7f6cecf26dcb8e8d9f826da (patch) | |
tree | 1ad8af6c52e06710f93847933c2720751100d668 | |
parent | 3a09b1be53d23df780a0cd0e4087a05e2ca4a00c (diff) | |
parent | 77c80e6b2fd049848bfd1bdab67899ad3ac407a7 (diff) |
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (90 commits)
AppArmor: fix build warnings for non-const use of get_task_cred
selinux: convert the policy type_attr_map to flex_array
AppArmor: Enable configuring and building of the AppArmor security module
TOMOYO: Use pathname specified by policy rather than execve()
AppArmor: update path_truncate method to latest version
AppArmor: core policy routines
AppArmor: policy routines for loading and unpacking policy
AppArmor: mediation of non file objects
AppArmor: LSM interface, and security module initialization
AppArmor: Enable configuring and building of the AppArmor security module
AppArmor: update Maintainer and Documentation
AppArmor: functions for domain transitions
AppArmor: file enforcement routines
AppArmor: userspace interfaces
AppArmor: dfa match engine
AppArmor: contexts used in attaching policy to system objects
AppArmor: basic auditing infrastructure.
AppArmor: misc. base functions and defines
TOMOYO: Update version to 2.3.0
TOMOYO: Fix quota check.
...
86 files changed, 13288 insertions, 4596 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/apparmor.txt b/Documentation/apparmor.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..93c1fd7d063 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/apparmor.txt @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +--- What is AppArmor? --- + +AppArmor is MAC style security extension for the Linux kernel. It implements +a task centered policy, with task "profiles" being created and loaded +from user space. Tasks on the system that do not have a profile defined for +them run in an unconfined state which is equivalent to standard Linux DAC +permissions. + +--- How to enable/disable --- + +set CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR=y + +If AppArmor should be selected as the default security module then + set CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY="apparmor" + and CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE=1 + +Build the kernel + +If AppArmor is not the default security module it can be enabled by passing +security=apparmor on the kernel's command line. + +If AppArmor is the default security module it can be disabled by passing +apparmor=0, security=XXXX (where XXX is valid security module), on the +kernel's command line + +For AppArmor to enforce any restrictions beyond standard Linux DAC permissions +policy must be loaded into the kernel from user space (see the Documentation +and tools links). + +--- Documentation --- + +Documentation can be found on the wiki. + +--- Links --- + +Mailing List - apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com +Wiki - http://apparmor.wiki.kernel.org/ +User space tools - https://launchpad.net/apparmor +Kernel module - git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/apparmor-dev.git diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt index 2b2407d9a6d..b61f89fa01c 100644 --- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ parameter is applicable: Documentation/scsi/. SECURITY Different security models are enabled. SELINUX SELinux support is enabled. + APPARMOR AppArmor support is enabled. SERIAL Serial support is enabled. SH SuperH architecture is enabled. SMP The kernel is an SMP kernel. @@ -2312,6 +2313,13 @@ and is between 256 and 4096 characters. It is defined in the file If enabled at boot time, /selinux/disable can be used later to disable prior to initial policy load. + apparmor= [APPARMOR] Disable or enable AppArmor at boot time + Format: { "0" | "1" } + See security/apparmor/Kconfig help text + 0 -- disable. + 1 -- enable. + Default value is set via kernel config option. + serialnumber [BUGS=X86-32] shapers= [NET] diff --git a/Documentation/tomoyo.txt b/Documentation/tomoyo.txt index b3a232cae7f..200a2d37cbc 100644 --- a/Documentation/tomoyo.txt +++ b/Documentation/tomoyo.txt @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ TOMOYO is a name-based MAC extension (LSM module) for the Linux kernel. LiveCD-based tutorials are available at -http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/en/1.6.x/1st-step/ubuntu8.04-live/ -http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/en/1.6.x/1st-step/centos5-live/ . +http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/1.7/1st-step/ubuntu10.04-live/ +http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/1.7/1st-step/centos5-live/ . Though these tutorials use non-LSM version of TOMOYO, they are useful for you to know what TOMOYO is. @@ -13,12 +13,12 @@ to know what TOMOYO is. Build the kernel with CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO=y and pass "security=tomoyo" on kernel's command line. -Please see http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/en/2.2.x/ for details. +Please see http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/2.3/ for details. --- Where is documentation? --- User <-> Kernel interface documentation is available at -http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/en/2.2.x/policy-reference.html . +http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/2.3/policy-reference.html . Materials we prepared for seminars and symposiums are available at http://sourceforge.jp/projects/tomoyo/docs/?category_id=532&language_id=1 . @@ -50,6 +50,6 @@ multiple LSM modules at the same time. We feel sorry that you have to give up SELinux/SMACK/AppArmor etc. when you want to use TOMOYO. We hope that LSM becomes stackable in future. Meanwhile, you can use non-LSM -version of TOMOYO, available at http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/en/1.6.x/ . +version of TOMOYO, available at http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/1.7/ . LSM version of TOMOYO is a subset of non-LSM version of TOMOYO. We are planning to port non-LSM version's functionalities to LSM versions. diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 02f75fccac2..33606bb91f1 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -5061,6 +5061,14 @@ S: Supported F: include/linux/selinux* F: security/selinux/ +APPARMOR SECURITY MODULE +M: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> +L: apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com (subscribers-only, general discussion) +W: apparmor.wiki.kernel.org +T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/apparmor-dev.git +S: Supported +F: security/apparmor/ + SENSABLE PHANTOM M: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com> S: Maintained @@ -5605,7 +5613,7 @@ L: tomoyo-users-en@lists.sourceforge.jp (subscribers-only, for developers and us L: tomoyo-dev@lists.sourceforge.jp (subscribers-only, for developers in Japanese) L: tomoyo-users@lists.sourceforge.jp (subscribers-only, for users in Japanese) W: http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/ -T: quilt http://svn.sourceforge.jp/svnroot/tomoyo/trunk/2.2.x/tomoyo-lsm/patches/ +T: quilt http://svn.sourceforge.jp/svnroot/tomoyo/trunk/2.3.x/tomoyo-lsm/patches/ S: Maintained F: security/tomoyo/ diff --git a/fs/fuse/dir.c b/fs/fuse/dir.c index 3cdc5f78a40..431be0795b6 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/dir.c +++ b/fs/fuse/dir.c @@ -1016,7 +1016,7 @@ static int fuse_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) exist. So if permissions are revoked this won't be noticed immediately, only after the attribute timeout has expired */ - } else if (mask & MAY_ACCESS) { + } else if (mask & (MAY_ACCESS | MAY_CHDIR)) { err = fuse_access(inode, mask); } else if ((mask & MAY_EXEC) && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) { if (!(inode->i_mode & S_IXUGO)) { diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c index 868d0cb9d47..42d2d28fb82 100644 --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c @@ -282,8 +282,7 @@ int inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) if (retval) return retval; - return security_inode_permission(inode, - mask & (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND)); + return security_inode_permission(inode, mask); } /** @@ -1484,8 +1483,7 @@ static int handle_truncate(struct path *path) */ error = locks_verify_locked(inode); if (!error) - error = security_path_truncate(path, 0, - ATTR_MTIME|ATTR_CTIME|ATTR_OPEN); + error = security_path_truncate(path); if (!error) { error = do_truncate(path->dentry, 0, ATTR_MTIME|ATTR_CTIME|ATTR_OPEN, diff --git a/fs/nfs/dir.c b/fs/nfs/dir.c index e60416d3f81..832e9e23932 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/dir.c +++ b/fs/nfs/dir.c @@ -1953,7 +1953,7 @@ int nfs_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) if ((mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC)) == 0) goto out; /* Is this sys_access() ? */ - if (mask & MAY_ACCESS) + if (mask & (MAY_ACCESS | MAY_CHDIR)) goto force_lookup; switch (inode->i_mode & S_IFMT) { diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c index 5463266db9e..0d1fa3dc0ef 100644 --- a/fs/open.c +++ b/fs/open.c @@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ static long do_sys_truncate(const char __user *pathname, loff_t length) error = locks_verify_truncate(inode, NULL, length); if (!error) - error = security_path_truncate(&path, length, 0); + error = security_path_truncate(&path); if (!error) error = do_truncate(path.dentry, length, 0, NULL); @@ -165,8 +165,7 @@ static long do_sys_ftruncate(unsigned int fd, loff_t length, int small) error = locks_verify_truncate(inode, file, length); if (!error) - error = security_path_truncate(&file->f_path, length, - ATTR_MTIME|ATTR_CTIME); + error = security_path_truncate(&file->f_path); if (!error) error = do_truncate(dentry, length, ATTR_MTIME|ATTR_CTIME, file); out_putf: @@ -367,7 +366,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(chdir, const char __user *, filename) if (error) goto out; - error = inode_permission(path.dentry->d_inode, MAY_EXEC | MAY_ACCESS); + error = inode_permission(path.dentry->d_inode, MAY_EXEC | MAY_CHDIR); if (error) goto dput_and_out; @@ -396,7 +395,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(fchdir, unsigned int, fd) if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) goto out_putf; - error = inode_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC | MAY_ACCESS); + error = inode_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC | MAY_CHDIR); if (!error) set_fs_pwd(current->fs, &file->f_path); out_putf: @@ -414,7 +413,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(chroot, const char __user *, filename) if (error) goto out; - error = inode_permission(path.dentry->d_inode, MAY_EXEC | MAY_ACCESS); + error = inode_permission(path.dentry->d_inode, MAY_EXEC | MAY_CHDIR); if (error) goto dput_and_out; diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h index 39e5ff512fb..90012b9ddbf 100644 --- a/include/linux/capability.h +++ b/include/linux/capability.h @@ -49,9 +49,6 @@ typedef struct __user_cap_data_struct { } __user *cap_user_data_t; -#define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability" -#define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX - #define VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK 0xFF000000 #define VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT 24 #define VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK ~VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h index f91affb7d53..e5106e49bd2 100644 --- a/include/linux/fs.h +++ b/include/linux/fs.h @@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ struct inodes_stat_t { #define MAY_APPEND 8 #define MAY_ACCESS 16 #define MAY_OPEN 32 +#define MAY_CHDIR 64 /* * flags in file.f_mode. Note that FMODE_READ and FMODE_WRITE must correspond diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h index 6907251d520..112a5503335 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h @@ -90,10 +90,42 @@ struct common_audit_data { u32 requested; u32 audited; u32 denied; + /* + * auditdeny is a bit tricky and unintuitive. See the + * comments in avc.c for it's meaning and usage. + */ + u32 auditdeny; struct av_decision *avd; int result; } selinux_audit_data; #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR + struct { + int error; + int op; + int type; + void *profile; + const char *name; + const char *info; + union { + void *target; + struct { + long pos; + void *target; + } iface; + struct { + int rlim; + unsigned long max; + } rlim; + struct { + const char *target; + u32 request; + u32 denied; + uid_t ouid; + } fs; + }; + } apparmor_audit_data; +#endif }; /* these callback will be implemented by a specific LSM */ void (*lsm_pre_audit)(struct audit_buffer *, void *); diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 0c881917046..723a93df756 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -470,8 +470,6 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts) * @path_truncate: * Check permission before truncating a file. * @path contains the path structure for the file. - * @length is the new length of the file. - * @time_attrs is the flags passed to do_truncate(). * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_getattr: * Check permission before obtaining file attributes. @@ -1412,8 +1410,7 @@ struct security_operations { int (*path_rmdir) (struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry); int (*path_mknod) (struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, unsigned int dev); - int (*path_truncate) (struct path *path, loff_t length, - unsigned int time_attrs); + int (*path_truncate) (struct path *path); int (*path_symlink) (struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *old_name); int (*path_link) (struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir, @@ -2806,8 +2803,7 @@ int security_path_mkdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode); int security_path_rmdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry); int security_path_mknod(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, unsigned int dev); -int security_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length, - unsigned int time_attrs); +int security_path_truncate(struct path *path); int security_path_symlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *old_name); int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir, @@ -2841,8 +2837,7 @@ static inline int security_path_mknod(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, return 0; } -static inline int security_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length, - unsigned int time_attrs) +static inline in |