linux/security, branch v3.4.55

key: Fix resource leak

2013-03-28T19:12:27Z

commit a84a921978b7d56e0e4b87ffaca6367429b4d8ff upstream. On an error iov may still have been reallocated and need freeing Signed-off-by: Alan Cox Signed-off-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

selinux: use GFP_ATOMIC under spin_lock

2013-03-20T20:05:00Z

commit 4502403dcf8f5c76abd4dbab8726c8e4ecb5cd34 upstream. The call tree here is: sk_clone_lock() <- takes bh_lock_sock(newsk); xfrm_sk_clone_policy() __xfrm_sk_clone_policy() clone_policy() <- uses GFP_ATOMIC for allocations security_xfrm_policy_clone() security_ops->xfrm_policy_clone_security() selinux_xfrm_policy_clone() Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: James Morris Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Fix: compat_rw_copy_check_uvector() misuse in aio, readv, writev, and security keys

2013-03-14T18:29:51Z

commit 8aec0f5d4137532de14e6554fd5dd201ff3a3c49 upstream. Looking at mm/process_vm_access.c:process_vm_rw() and comparing it to compat_process_vm_rw() shows that the compatibility code requires an explicit "access_ok()" check before calling compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(). The same difference seems to appear when we compare fs/read_write.c:do_readv_writev() to fs/compat.c:compat_do_readv_writev(). This subtle difference between the compat and non-compat requirements should probably be debated, as it seems to be error-prone. In fact, there are two others sites that use this function in the Linux kernel, and they both seem to get it wrong: Now shifting our attention to fs/aio.c, we see that aio_setup_iocb() also ends up calling compat_rw_copy_check_uvector() through aio_setup_vectored_rw(). Unfortunately, the access_ok() check appears to be missing. Same situation for security/keys/compat.c:compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(). I propose that we add the access_ok() check directly into compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(), so callers don't have to worry about it, and it therefore makes the compat call code similar to its non-compat counterpart. Place the access_ok() check in the same location where copy_from_user() can trigger a -EFAULT error in the non-compat code, so the ABI behaviors are alike on both compat and non-compat. While we are here, fix compat_do_readv_writev() so it checks for compat_rw_copy_check_uvector() negative return values. And also, fix a memory leak in compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov() error handling. Acked-by: Linus Torvalds Acked-by: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

keys: fix race with concurrent install_user_keyrings()

2013-03-14T18:29:51Z

commit 0da9dfdd2cd9889201bc6f6f43580c99165cd087 upstream. This fixes CVE-2013-1792. There is a race in install_user_keyrings() that can cause a NULL pointer dereference when called concurrently for the same user if the uid and uid-session keyrings are not yet created. It might be possible for an unprivileged user to trigger this by calling keyctl() from userspace in parallel immediately after logging in. Assume that we have two threads both executing lookup_user_key(), both looking for KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING. THREAD A THREAD B =============================== =============================== ==>call install_user_keyrings(); if (!cred->user->session_keyring) ==>call install_user_keyrings() ... user->uid_keyring = uid_keyring; if (user->uid_keyring) return 0; <== key = cred->user->session_keyring [== NULL] user->session_keyring = session_keyring; atomic_inc(&key->usage); [oops] At the point thread A dereferences cred->user->session_keyring, thread B hasn't updated user->session_keyring yet, but thread A assumes it is populated because install_user_keyrings() returned ok. The race window is really small but can be exploited if, for example, thread B is interrupted or preempted after initializing uid_keyring, but before doing setting session_keyring. This couldn't be reproduced on a stock kernel. However, after placing systemtap probe on 'user->session_keyring = session_keyring;' that introduced some delay, the kernel could be crashed reliably. Fix this by checking both pointers before deciding whether to return. Alternatively, the test could be done away with entirely as it is checked inside the mutex - but since the mutex is global, that may not be the best way. Signed-off-by: David Howells Reported-by: Mateusz Guzik Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: James Morris Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

evm: checking if removexattr is not a NULL

2013-01-28T04:47:43Z

commit a67adb997419fb53540d4a4f79c6471c60bc69b6 upstream. The following lines of code produce a kernel oops. fd = socket(PF_FILE, SOCK_STREAM|SOCK_CLOEXEC|SOCK_NONBLOCK, 0); fchmod(fd, 0666); [ 139.922364] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) [ 139.924982] IP: [< (null)>] (null) [ 139.924982] *pde = 00000000 [ 139.924982] Oops: 0000 [#5] SMP [ 139.924982] Modules linked in: fuse dm_crypt dm_mod i2c_piix4 serio_raw evdev binfmt_misc button [ 139.924982] Pid: 3070, comm: acpid Tainted: G D 3.8.0-rc2-kds+ #465 Bochs Bochs [ 139.924982] EIP: 0060:[<00000000>] EFLAGS: 00010246 CPU: 0 [ 139.924982] EIP is at 0x0 [ 139.924982] EAX: cf5ef000 EBX: cf5ef000 ECX: c143d600 EDX: c15225f2 [ 139.924982] ESI: cf4d2a1c EDI: cf4d2a1c EBP: cc02df10 ESP: cc02dee4 [ 139.924982] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 [ 139.924982] CR0: 80050033 CR2: 00000000 CR3: 0c059000 CR4: 000006d0 [ 139.924982] DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000 [ 139.924982] DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400 [ 139.924982] Process acpid (pid: 3070, ti=cc02c000 task=d7705340 task.ti=cc02c000) [ 139.924982] Stack: [ 139.924982] c1203c88 00000000 cc02def4 cf4d2a1c ae21eefa 471b60d5 1083c1ba c26a5940 [ 139.924982] e891fb5e 00000041 00000004 cc02df1c c1203964 00000000 cc02df4c c10e20c3 [ 139.924982] 00000002 00000000 00000000 22222222 c1ff2222 cf5ef000 00000000 d76efb08 [ 139.924982] Call Trace: [ 139.924982] [] ? evm_update_evmxattr+0x5b/0x62 [ 139.924982] [] evm_inode_post_setattr+0x22/0x26 [ 139.924982] [] notify_change+0x25f/0x281 [ 139.924982] [] chmod_common+0x59/0x76 [ 139.924982] [] ? put_unused_fd+0x33/0x33 [ 139.924982] [] sys_fchmod+0x39/0x5c [ 139.924982] [] syscall_call+0x7/0xb [ 139.924982] Code: Bad EIP value. This happens because sockets do not define the removexattr operation. Before removing the xattr, verify the removexattr function pointer is not NULL. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: James Morris Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

selinux: fix sel_netnode_insert() suspicious rcu dereference

2012-11-26T19:38:02Z

commit 88a693b5c1287be4da937699cb82068ce9db0135 upstream. =============================== [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ] 3.5.0-rc1+ #63 Not tainted ------------------------------- security/selinux/netnode.c:178 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0 1 lock held by trinity-child1/8750: #0: (sel_netnode_lock){+.....}, at: [] sel_netnode_sid+0x16a/0x3e0 stack backtrace: Pid: 8750, comm: trinity-child1 Not tainted 3.5.0-rc1+ #63 Call Trace: [] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xfd/0x130 [] sel_netnode_sid+0x3b1/0x3e0 [] ? sel_netnode_find+0x1a0/0x1a0 [] selinux_socket_bind+0xf6/0x2c0 [] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xd/0x10 [] ? lock_release_holdtime.part.9+0x15/0x1a0 [] ? lock_hrtimer_base+0x31/0x60 [] security_socket_bind+0x16/0x20 [] sys_bind+0x7a/0x100 [] ? sysret_check+0x22/0x5d [] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x10d/0x1a0 [] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f [] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b This patch below does what Paul McKenney suggested in the previous thread. Signed-off-by: Dave Jones Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney Acked-by: Paul Moore Cc: Eric Paris Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: James Morris Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Yama: handle 32-bit userspace prctl

2012-10-07T15:32:28Z

commit 2e4930eb7c8fb20a39dfb5f8a8f80402710dcea8 upstream. When running a 64-bit kernel and receiving prctls from a 32-bit userspace, the "-1" used as an unsigned long will end up being misdetected. The kernel is looking for 0xffffffffffffffff instead of 0xffffffff. Since prctl lacks a distinct compat interface, Yama needs to handle this translation itself. As such, support either value as meaning PR_SET_PTRACER_ANY, to avoid breaking the ABI for 64-bit. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Acked-by: John Johansen Signed-off-by: James Morris Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

posix_types.h: Cleanup stale __NFDBITS and related definitions

2012-08-09T15:31:39Z

commit 8ded2bbc1845e19c771eb55209aab166ef011243 upstream. Recently, glibc made a change to suppress sign-conversion warnings in FD_SET (glibc commit ceb9e56b3d1). This uncovered an issue with the kernel's definition of __NFDBITS if applications #include after including . A build failure would be seen when passing the -Werror=sign-compare and -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 flags to gcc. It was suggested that the kernel should either match the glibc definition of __NFDBITS or remove that entirely. The current in-kernel uses of __NFDBITS can be replaced with BITS_PER_LONG, and there are no uses of the related __FDELT and __FDMASK defines. Given that, we'll continue the cleanup that was started with commit 8b3d1cda4f5f ("posix_types: Remove fd_set macros") and drop the remaining unused macros. Additionally, linux/time.h has similar macros defined that expand to nothing so we'll remove those at the same time. Reported-by: Jeff Law Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer [ .. and fix up whitespace as per akpm ] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

SELinux: if sel_make_bools errors don't leave inconsistent state

2012-06-01T07:18:16Z

commit 154c50ca4eb9ae472f50b6a481213e21ead4457d upstream. We reset the bool names and values array to NULL, but do not reset the number of entries in these arrays to 0. If we error out and then get back into this function we will walk these NULL pointers based on the belief that they are non-zero length. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

security: fix compile error in commoncap.c

2012-04-19T02:56:39Z

Add missing "personality.h" security/commoncap.c: In function 'cap_bprm_set_creds': security/commoncap.c:510: error: 'PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID' undeclared (first use in this function) security/commoncap.c:510: error: (Each undeclared identifier is reported only once security/commoncap.c:510: error: for each function it appears in.) Signed-off-by: Jonghwan Choi Acked-by: Serge Hallyn Signed-off-by: James Morris