linux/security, branch v3.4

security: fix compile error in commoncap.c

2012-04-19T02:56:39Z

Add missing "personality.h" security/commoncap.c: In function 'cap_bprm_set_creds': security/commoncap.c:510: error: 'PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID' undeclared (first use in this function) security/commoncap.c:510: error: (Each undeclared identifier is reported only once security/commoncap.c:510: error: for each function it appears in.) Signed-off-by: Jonghwan Choi Acked-by: Serge Hallyn Signed-off-by: James Morris

fcaps: clear the same personality flags as suid when fcaps are used

2012-04-18T02:37:56Z

If a process increases permissions using fcaps all of the dangerous personality flags which are cleared for suid apps should also be cleared. Thus programs given priviledge with fcaps will continue to have address space randomization enabled even if the parent tried to disable it to make it easier to attack. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn Signed-off-by: James Morris

Smack: move label list initialization

2012-04-18T02:02:28Z

A kernel with Smack enabled will fail if tmpfs has xattr support. Move the initialization of predefined Smack label list entries to the LSM initialization from the smackfs setup. This became an issue when tmpfs acquired xattr support, but was never correct. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler Signed-off-by: James Morris

Smack: build when CONFIG_AUDIT not defined

2012-04-10T23:14:40Z

This fixes builds where CONFIG_AUDIT is not defined and CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK=y. This got introduced by the stack-usage reducation commit 48c62af68a40 ("LSM: shrink the common_audit_data data union"). Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Acked-by: Eric Paris Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

lsm_audit: don't specify the audit pre/post callbacks in 'struct common_audit_data'

2012-04-03T16:49:59Z

It just bloats the audit data structure for no good reason, since the only time those fields are filled are just before calling the common_lsm_audit() function, which is also the only user of those fields. So just make them be the arguments to common_lsm_audit(), rather than bloating that structure that is passed around everywhere, and is initialized in hot paths. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

SELinux: do not allocate stack space for AVC data unless needed

2012-04-03T16:49:41Z

Instead of declaring the entire selinux_audit_data on the stack when we start an operation on declare it on the stack if we are going to use it. We know it's usefulness at the end of the security decision and can declare it there. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

SELinux: remove avd from slow_avc_audit()

2012-04-03T16:49:10Z

We don't use the argument, so remove it. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

SELinux: remove avd from selinux_audit_data

2012-04-03T16:49:10Z

We do not use it. Remove it. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

LSM: shrink the common_audit_data data union

2012-04-03T16:49:10Z

After shrinking the common_audit_data stack usage for private LSM data I'm not going to shrink the data union. To do this I'm going to move anything larger than 2 void * ptrs to it's own structure and require it to be declared separately on the calling stack. Thus hot paths which don't need more than a couple pointer don't have to declare space to hold large unneeded structures. I could get this down to one void * by dealing with the key struct and the struct path. We'll see if that is helpful after taking care of networking. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

LSM: shrink sizeof LSM specific portion of common_audit_data

2012-04-03T16:48:40Z

Linus found that the gigantic size of the common audit data caused a big perf hit on something as simple as running stat() in a loop. This patch requires LSMs to declare the LSM specific portion separately rather than doing it in a union. Thus each LSM can be responsible for shrinking their portion and don't have to pay a penalty just because other LSMs have a bigger space requirement. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds