<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux/security, branch v3.2.36</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<id>https://git.amat.us/linux/atom/security?h=v3.2.36</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/atom/security?h=v3.2.36'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/'/>
<updated>2013-01-03T03:26:03Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Revert "device_cgroup: fix RCU usage"</title>
<updated>2013-01-03T03:26:03Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ben Hutchings</name>
<email>ben@decadent.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2012-12-07T01:41:33Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=b17d8aeb433dcf5f2ff6d3ea5e1cc04375cea00f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b17d8aeb433dcf5f2ff6d3ea5e1cc04375cea00f</id>
<content type='text'>
This reverts commit c5ee58688baa98bc3a4f6095a1acf6fd7fd9e967,
which was commit 201e72acb2d3821e2de9ce6091e98859c316b29a upstream.

Herton Ronaldo Krzesinski pointed out that the race condition this
dealt with does not exist in 3.2.y.

Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: fix sel_netnode_insert() suspicious rcu dereference</title>
<updated>2012-12-06T11:20:32Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dave Jones</name>
<email>davej@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-11-09T00:09:27Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=5940e5b8f719f95f9c84a836ecde3f438d70419a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5940e5b8f719f95f9c84a836ecde3f438d70419a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 88a693b5c1287be4da937699cb82068ce9db0135 upstream.

===============================
[ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ]
3.5.0-rc1+ #63 Not tainted
-------------------------------
security/selinux/netnode.c:178 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!

other info that might help us debug this:

rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0
1 lock held by trinity-child1/8750:
 #0:  (sel_netnode_lock){+.....}, at: [&lt;ffffffff812d8f8a&gt;] sel_netnode_sid+0x16a/0x3e0

stack backtrace:
Pid: 8750, comm: trinity-child1 Not tainted 3.5.0-rc1+ #63
Call Trace:
 [&lt;ffffffff810cec2d&gt;] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xfd/0x130
 [&lt;ffffffff812d91d1&gt;] sel_netnode_sid+0x3b1/0x3e0
 [&lt;ffffffff812d8e20&gt;] ? sel_netnode_find+0x1a0/0x1a0
 [&lt;ffffffff812d24a6&gt;] selinux_socket_bind+0xf6/0x2c0
 [&lt;ffffffff810cd1dd&gt;] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xd/0x10
 [&lt;ffffffff810cdb55&gt;] ? lock_release_holdtime.part.9+0x15/0x1a0
 [&lt;ffffffff81093841&gt;] ? lock_hrtimer_base+0x31/0x60
 [&lt;ffffffff812c9536&gt;] security_socket_bind+0x16/0x20
 [&lt;ffffffff815550ca&gt;] sys_bind+0x7a/0x100
 [&lt;ffffffff816c03d5&gt;] ? sysret_check+0x22/0x5d
 [&lt;ffffffff810d392d&gt;] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x10d/0x1a0
 [&lt;ffffffff8133b09e&gt;] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f
 [&lt;ffffffff816c03a9&gt;] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

This patch below does what Paul McKenney suggested in the previous thread.

Signed-off-by: Dave Jones &lt;davej@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@parisplace.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>device_cgroup: fix RCU usage</title>
<updated>2012-12-06T11:20:03Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tejun Heo</name>
<email>tj@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-11-06T17:17:37Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=c5ee58688baa98bc3a4f6095a1acf6fd7fd9e967'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c5ee58688baa98bc3a4f6095a1acf6fd7fd9e967</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 201e72acb2d3821e2de9ce6091e98859c316b29a upstream.

dev_cgroup-&gt;exceptions is protected with devcgroup_mutex for writes
and RCU for reads; however, RCU usage isn't correct.

* dev_exception_clean() doesn't use RCU variant of list_del() and
  kfree().  The function can race with may_access() and may_access()
  may end up dereferencing already freed memory.  Use list_del_rcu()
  and kfree_rcu() instead.

* may_access() may be called only with RCU read locked but doesn't use
  RCU safe traversal over -&gt;exceptions.  Use list_for_each_entry_rcu().

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com&gt;
Cc: Aristeu Rozanski &lt;aris@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Li Zefan &lt;lizefan@huawei.com&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
 - Adjust context
 - Exception list is called whitelist]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>SELinux: if sel_make_bools errors don't leave inconsistent state</title>
<updated>2012-05-30T23:43:21Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Paris</name>
<email>eparis@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-04-04T17:47:11Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=f41798196161e37579b3f7c3d3df54a01393500c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f41798196161e37579b3f7c3d3df54a01393500c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 154c50ca4eb9ae472f50b6a481213e21ead4457d upstream.

We reset the bool names and values array to NULL, but do not reset the
number of entries in these arrays to 0.  If we error out and then get back
into this function we will walk these NULL pointers based on the belief
that they are non-zero length.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: fix compile error in commoncap.c</title>
<updated>2012-04-22T22:31:13Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jonghwan Choi</name>
<email>jhbird.choi@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-04-18T21:23:04Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=fd18a0805b2b68228c0493337000f63c2573cc0c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:fd18a0805b2b68228c0493337000f63c2573cc0c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 51b79bee627d526199b2f6a6bef8ee0c0739b6d1 upstream.

Add missing "personality.h"
security/commoncap.c: In function 'cap_bprm_set_creds':
security/commoncap.c:510: error: 'PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID' undeclared (first use in this function)
security/commoncap.c:510: error: (Each undeclared identifier is reported only once
security/commoncap.c:510: error: for each function it appears in.)

Signed-off-by: Jonghwan Choi &lt;jhbird.choi@samsung.com&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fcaps: clear the same personality flags as suid when fcaps are used</title>
<updated>2012-04-22T22:31:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Paris</name>
<email>eparis@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-04-17T20:26:54Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=f2c309c36d0a433c88534082cb2c3a817d6bd409'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f2c309c36d0a433c88534082cb2c3a817d6bd409</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d52fc5dde171f030170a6cb78034d166b13c9445 upstream.

If a process increases permissions using fcaps all of the dangerous
personality flags which are cleared for suid apps should also be cleared.
Thus programs given priviledge with fcaps will continue to have address space
randomization enabled even if the parent tried to disable it to make it
easier to attack.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>TOMOYO: Fix mount flags checking order.</title>
<updated>2012-04-13T15:33:49Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tetsuo Handa</name>
<email>penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp</email>
</author>
<published>2012-02-29T12:53:22Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=ddfdc39959c916766a3264facffc75fbba3d7f4c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ddfdc39959c916766a3264facffc75fbba3d7f4c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit df91e49477a9be15921cb2854e1d12a3bdb5e425 upstream.

Userspace can pass in arbitrary combinations of MS_* flags to mount().

If both MS_BIND and one of MS_SHARED/MS_PRIVATE/MS_SLAVE/MS_UNBINDABLE are
passed, device name which should be checked for MS_BIND was not checked because
MS_SHARED/MS_PRIVATE/MS_SLAVE/MS_UNBINDABLE had higher priority than MS_BIND.

If both one of MS_BIND/MS_MOVE and MS_REMOUNT are passed, device name which
should not be checked for MS_REMOUNT was checked because MS_BIND/MS_MOVE had
higher priority than MS_REMOUNT.

Fix these bugs by changing priority to MS_REMOUNT -&gt; MS_BIND -&gt;
MS_SHARED/MS_PRIVATE/MS_SLAVE/MS_UNBINDABLE -&gt; MS_MOVE as with do_mount() does.

Also, unconditionally return -EINVAL if more than one of
MS_SHARED/MS_PRIVATE/MS_SLAVE/MS_UNBINDABLE is passed so that TOMOYO will not
generate inaccurate audit logs, for commit 7a2e8a8f "VFS: Sanity check mount
flags passed to change_mnt_propagation()" clarified that these flags must be
exclusively passed.

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: fix Kconfig dependencies</title>
<updated>2012-04-02T16:52:36Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Fabio Estevam</name>
<email>festevam@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-01-05T14:49:54Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=4a02744bb48ce0d1ea3470c5f791382786a02ee9'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4a02744bb48ce0d1ea3470c5f791382786a02ee9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f4a0391dfa91155bd961673b31eb42d9d45c799d upstream.

Fix the following build warning:
warning: (IMA) selects TCG_TPM which has unmet direct dependencies
(HAS_IOMEM &amp;&amp; EXPERIMENTAL)

Suggested-by: Rajiv Andrade &lt;srajiv@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam &lt;fabio.estevam@freescale.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Rajiv Andrade &lt;srajiv@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Security: tomoyo: add .gitignore file</title>
<updated>2012-03-01T00:30:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2011-12-09T19:23:46Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=ae9aea55d123e1091f239833f832de071ff00f22'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ae9aea55d123e1091f239833f832de071ff00f22</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 735e93c70434614bffac4a914ca1da72e37d43c0 upstream.

This adds the .gitignore file for the autogenerated TOMOYO files to keep
git from complaining after building things.

Cc: Kentaro Takeda &lt;takedakn@nttdata.co.jp&gt;
Cc: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>TOMOYO: Accept \000 as a valid character.</title>
<updated>2012-01-26T00:13:45Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tetsuo Handa</name>
<email>from-tomoyo-users-en@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp</email>
</author>
<published>2012-01-15T02:05:59Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=f42395415b6b335ddd8c32776d3fa44dae3cdf21'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f42395415b6b335ddd8c32776d3fa44dae3cdf21</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 25add8cf99c9ec8b8dc0acd8b9241e963fc0d29c upstream.

TOMOYO 2.5 in Linux 3.2 and later handles Unix domain socket's address.
Thus, tomoyo_correct_word2() needs to accept \000 as a valid character, or
TOMOYO 2.5 cannot handle Unix domain's abstract socket address.

Reported-by: Steven Allen &lt;steven@stebalien.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
</entry>
</feed>
