<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux/security, branch v2.6.24.4</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<id>https://git.amat.us/linux/atom/security?h=v2.6.24.4</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/atom/security?h=v2.6.24.4'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/'/>
<updated>2008-03-24T18:47:19Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>file capabilities: simplify signal check</title>
<updated>2008-03-24T18:47:19Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Serge E. Hallyn</name>
<email>serue@us.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-02-24T02:10:07Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=2628814b59f33d6a1aae535adc7ef44359aafe98'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2628814b59f33d6a1aae535adc7ef44359aafe98</id>
<content type='text'>
commit: 094972840f2e7c1c6fc9e1a97d817cc17085378e

Simplify the uid equivalence check in cap_task_kill().  Anyone can kill a
process owned by the same uid.

Without this patch wireshark is reported to fail.

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serue@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan &lt;morgan@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>SELinux: Fix double free in selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid()</title>
<updated>2008-02-26T00:18:34Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Moore</name>
<email>paul.moore@hp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-02-15T09:46:10Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=07e6e223bed8c3d387f92f92a4706ff6d601b285'/>
<id>urn:sha1:07e6e223bed8c3d387f92f92a4706ff6d601b285</id>
<content type='text'>
Upstream commit: e1770d97a730ff4c3aa1775d98f4d0558390607f

As pointed out by Adrian Bunk, commit
45c950e0f839fded922ebc0bfd59b1081cc71b70 ("fix memory leak in netlabel
code") caused a double-free when security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr()
fails.  This patch fixes this by removing the netlbl_secattr_destroy()
call from that function since we are already releasing the secattr
memory in selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid().

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul.moore@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: fix labeling of /proc/net inodes</title>
<updated>2008-02-08T19:46:28Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Smalley</name>
<email>sds@tycho.nsa.gov</email>
</author>
<published>2008-01-25T18:03:42Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=9a87ea3ee51fb81e7a33b820a8bb59d23c7be9ef'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9a87ea3ee51fb81e7a33b820a8bb59d23c7be9ef</id>
<content type='text'>
patch b1aa5301b9f88a4891061650c591fb8fe1c1d1da in mainline.

The proc net rewrite had a side effect on selinux, leading it to mislabel
the /proc/net inodes, thereby leading to incorrect denials.  Fix
security_genfs_sid to ignore extra leading / characters in the path supplied
by selinux_proc_get_sid since we now get "//net/..." rather than "/net/...".

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6</title>
<updated>2008-01-22T03:45:49Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@woody.linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2008-01-22T03:45:49Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=8b85eaadd5b8d3786996bd74c73aff54a92ec456'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8b85eaadd5b8d3786996bd74c73aff54a92ec456</id>
<content type='text'>
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6:
  selinux: fix memory leak in netlabel code
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Fix filesystem capability support</title>
<updated>2008-01-22T03:39:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrew G. Morgan</name>
<email>morgan@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2008-01-22T01:18:30Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=a6dbb1ef2fc8d73578eacd02ac701f4233175c9f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a6dbb1ef2fc8d73578eacd02ac701f4233175c9f</id>
<content type='text'>
In linux-2.6.24-rc1, security/commoncap.c:cap_inh_is_capped() was
introduced. It has the exact reverse of its intended behavior. This
led to an unintended privilege esculation involving a process'
inheritable capability set.

To be exposed to this bug, you need to have Filesystem Capabilities
enabled and in use. That is:

- CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES must be defined for the buggy code
  to be compiled in.

- You also need to have files on your system marked with fI bits raised.

Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan &lt;morgan@kernel.org&gt;

Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: fix memory leak in netlabel code</title>
<updated>2008-01-21T22:31:00Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Moore</name>
<email>paul.moore@hp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2008-01-21T22:31:00Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=45c950e0f839fded922ebc0bfd59b1081cc71b70'/>
<id>urn:sha1:45c950e0f839fded922ebc0bfd59b1081cc71b70</id>
<content type='text'>
Fix a memory leak in security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr() as reported here:
 * https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=352281

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul.moore@hp.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Security: allow capable check to permit mmap or low vm space</title>
<updated>2007-12-05T13:24:30Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Paris</name>
<email>eparis@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2007-11-26T23:47:46Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=ab5a91a8364c3d6fc617abc47cc81d162c01d90a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ab5a91a8364c3d6fc617abc47cc81d162c01d90a</id>
<content type='text'>
On a kernel with CONFIG_SECURITY but without an LSM which implements
security_file_mmap it is impossible for an application to mmap addresses
lower than mmap_min_addr.  Based on a suggestion from a developer in the
openwall community this patch adds a check for CAP_SYS_RAWIO.  It is
assumed that any process with this capability can harm the system a lot
more easily than writing some stuff on the zero page and then trying to
get the kernel to trip over itself.  It also means that programs like X
on i686 which use vm86 emulation can work even with mmap_min_addr set.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>SELinux: detect dead booleans</title>
<updated>2007-12-05T13:24:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Smalley</name>
<email>sds@tycho.nsa.gov</email>
</author>
<published>2007-11-26T16:12:53Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=d313f948309ab22797316e789a7ff8fa358176b6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d313f948309ab22797316e789a7ff8fa358176b6</id>
<content type='text'>
Instead of using f_op to detect dead booleans, check the inode index
against the number of booleans and check the dentry name against the
boolean name for that index on reads and writes.  This prevents
incorrect use of a boolean file opened prior to a policy reload while
allowing valid use of it as long as it still corresponds to the same
boolean in the policy.

Signed-off-by:  Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>SELinux: do not clear f_op when removing entries</title>
<updated>2007-12-05T13:23:46Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Smalley</name>
<email>sds@tycho.nsa.gov</email>
</author>
<published>2007-11-21T14:01:36Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=0955dc03aedfb6a5565445b3f2176255b784cc6a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0955dc03aedfb6a5565445b3f2176255b784cc6a</id>
<content type='text'>
Do not clear f_op when removing entries since it isn't safe to do.

Signed-off-by:  Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>file capabilities: don't prevent signaling setuid root programs</title>
<updated>2007-11-29T17:24:53Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Serge E. Hallyn</name>
<email>serue@us.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2007-11-29T00:21:47Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=8ec2328f1138a58eaea55ec6150985a1623b01c5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8ec2328f1138a58eaea55ec6150985a1623b01c5</id>
<content type='text'>
An unprivileged process must be able to kill a setuid root program started
by the same user.  This is legacy behavior needed for instance for xinit to
kill X when the window manager exits.

When an unprivileged user runs a setuid root program in !SECURE_NOROOT
mode, fP, fI, and fE are set full on, so pP' and pE' are full on.  Then
cap_task_kill() prevents the user from signaling the setuid root task.
This is a change in behavior compared to when
!CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES.

This patch introduces a special check into cap_task_kill() just to check
whether a non-root user is signaling a setuid root program started by the
same user.  If so, then signal is allowed.

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serue@us.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Andrew Morgan &lt;morgan@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@epoch.ncsc.mil&gt;
Cc: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
