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<title>linux/security/integrity/evm, branch v3.4.3</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<id>https://git.amat.us/linux/atom/security/integrity/evm?h=v3.4.3</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/atom/security/integrity/evm?h=v3.4.3'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/'/>
<updated>2012-01-09T01:16:48Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'next' into for-linus</title>
<updated>2012-01-09T01:16:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>James Morris</name>
<email>jmorris@namei.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-01-09T01:16:48Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=8fcc99549522fc7a0bbaeb5755855ab0d9a59ce8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8fcc99549522fc7a0bbaeb5755855ab0d9a59ce8</id>
<content type='text'>
Conflicts:
	security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c

Resolved upstream fix vs. next conflict manually.

Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: prevent racing during tfm allocation</title>
<updated>2011-12-20T15:50:08Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
<email>dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-12-05T11:17:42Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=97426f985729573cea06e82e271cc3929f1f5f8e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:97426f985729573cea06e82e271cc3929f1f5f8e</id>
<content type='text'>
There is a small chance of racing during tfm allocation.
This patch fixes it.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: key must be set once during initialization</title>
<updated>2011-12-20T15:45:45Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
<email>dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-12-05T11:17:41Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=d21b59451886cb82448302f8d6f9ac87c3bd56cf'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d21b59451886cb82448302f8d6f9ac87c3bd56cf</id>
<content type='text'>
On multi-core systems, setting of the key before every caclculation,
causes invalid HMAC calculation for other tfm users, because internal
state (ipad, opad) can be invalid before set key call returns.
It needs to be set only once during initialization.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: prevent racing during tfm allocation</title>
<updated>2011-12-07T23:06:12Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
<email>dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-12-05T11:17:42Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=143b01d33221e4937d3930e6bb2b63d70b7c7a65'/>
<id>urn:sha1:143b01d33221e4937d3930e6bb2b63d70b7c7a65</id>
<content type='text'>
There is a small chance of racing during tfm allocation.
This patch fixes it.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: key must be set once during initialization</title>
<updated>2011-12-07T23:06:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
<email>dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-12-05T11:17:41Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=88d7ed35085184f15a2af3d9e88d775059b2f307'/>
<id>urn:sha1:88d7ed35085184f15a2af3d9e88d775059b2f307</id>
<content type='text'>
On multi-core systems, setting of the key before every caclculation,
causes invalid HMAC calculation for other tfm users, because internal
state (ipad, opad) can be invalid before set key call returns.
It needs to be set only once during initialization.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: digital signature verification support</title>
<updated>2011-11-09T14:51:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
<email>dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-09-01T11:41:40Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=15647eb3985ef30dfd657038924dc85c03026733'/>
<id>urn:sha1:15647eb3985ef30dfd657038924dc85c03026733</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch adds support for digital signature verification to EVM.
With this feature file metadata can be protected using digital
signature instead of an HMAC. When building an image,
which has to be flashed to different devices, an HMAC cannot
be used to sign file metadata, because the HMAC key should be
different on every device.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: permit mode bits to be updated</title>
<updated>2011-09-14T19:24:52Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-08-22T13:14:18Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=566be59ab86c0e030b980645a580d683a015a483'/>
<id>urn:sha1:566be59ab86c0e030b980645a580d683a015a483</id>
<content type='text'>
Before permitting 'security.evm' to be updated, 'security.evm' must
exist and be valid.  In the case that there are no existing EVM protected
xattrs, it is safe for posix acls to update the mode bits.

To differentiate between no 'security.evm' xattr and no xattrs used to
calculate 'security.evm', this patch defines INTEGRITY_NOXATTR.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: posix acls modify i_mode</title>
<updated>2011-09-14T19:24:51Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-08-18T22:07:44Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=bf6d0f5dcda17df3cc5577e203d0f8ea1c2ad6aa'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bf6d0f5dcda17df3cc5577e203d0f8ea1c2ad6aa</id>
<content type='text'>
The posix xattr acls are 'system' prefixed, which normally would not
affect security.evm.  An interesting side affect of writing posix xattr
acls is their modifying of the i_mode, which is included in security.evm.

This patch updates security.evm when posix xattr acls are written.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: limit verifying current security.evm integrity</title>
<updated>2011-09-14T19:24:51Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-08-11T05:22:30Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=a924ce0b35875ef9512135b46a32f4150fd700b2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a924ce0b35875ef9512135b46a32f4150fd700b2</id>
<content type='text'>
evm_protect_xattr unnecessarily validates the current security.evm
integrity, before updating non-evm protected extended attributes
and other file metadata. This patch limits validating the current
security.evm integrity to evm protected metadata.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: remove TCG_TPM dependency</title>
<updated>2011-09-14T19:24:49Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-08-28T12:57:11Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=1d714057ef8f6348eba7b28ace6d307513e57cef'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1d714057ef8f6348eba7b28ace6d307513e57cef</id>
<content type='text'>
All tristates selected by EVM(boolean) are forced to be builtin, except
in the TCG_TPM(tristate) dependency case. Arnaud Lacombe summarizes the
Kconfig bug as, "So it would seem direct dependency state influence the
state of reverse dependencies.."  For a detailed explanation, refer to
Arnaud Lacombe's posting http://lkml.org/lkml/2011/8/23/498.

With the "encrypted-keys: remove trusted-keys dependency" patch, EVM
can now be built without a dependency on TCG_TPM.  The trusted-keys
dependency requires trusted-keys to either be builtin or not selected.
This dependency will prevent the boolean/tristate mismatch from
occuring.

Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell &lt;sfr@canb.auug.org.au&gt;,
             Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@xenotimenet&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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