<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux/security/integrity/evm, branch v3.2</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<id>https://git.amat.us/linux/atom/security/integrity/evm?h=v3.2</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/atom/security/integrity/evm?h=v3.2'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/'/>
<updated>2011-12-20T15:50:08Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>evm: prevent racing during tfm allocation</title>
<updated>2011-12-20T15:50:08Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
<email>dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-12-05T11:17:42Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=97426f985729573cea06e82e271cc3929f1f5f8e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:97426f985729573cea06e82e271cc3929f1f5f8e</id>
<content type='text'>
There is a small chance of racing during tfm allocation.
This patch fixes it.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: key must be set once during initialization</title>
<updated>2011-12-20T15:45:45Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
<email>dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-12-05T11:17:41Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=d21b59451886cb82448302f8d6f9ac87c3bd56cf'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d21b59451886cb82448302f8d6f9ac87c3bd56cf</id>
<content type='text'>
On multi-core systems, setting of the key before every caclculation,
causes invalid HMAC calculation for other tfm users, because internal
state (ipad, opad) can be invalid before set key call returns.
It needs to be set only once during initialization.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: permit mode bits to be updated</title>
<updated>2011-09-14T19:24:52Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-08-22T13:14:18Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=566be59ab86c0e030b980645a580d683a015a483'/>
<id>urn:sha1:566be59ab86c0e030b980645a580d683a015a483</id>
<content type='text'>
Before permitting 'security.evm' to be updated, 'security.evm' must
exist and be valid.  In the case that there are no existing EVM protected
xattrs, it is safe for posix acls to update the mode bits.

To differentiate between no 'security.evm' xattr and no xattrs used to
calculate 'security.evm', this patch defines INTEGRITY_NOXATTR.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: posix acls modify i_mode</title>
<updated>2011-09-14T19:24:51Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-08-18T22:07:44Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=bf6d0f5dcda17df3cc5577e203d0f8ea1c2ad6aa'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bf6d0f5dcda17df3cc5577e203d0f8ea1c2ad6aa</id>
<content type='text'>
The posix xattr acls are 'system' prefixed, which normally would not
affect security.evm.  An interesting side affect of writing posix xattr
acls is their modifying of the i_mode, which is included in security.evm.

This patch updates security.evm when posix xattr acls are written.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: limit verifying current security.evm integrity</title>
<updated>2011-09-14T19:24:51Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-08-11T05:22:30Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=a924ce0b35875ef9512135b46a32f4150fd700b2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a924ce0b35875ef9512135b46a32f4150fd700b2</id>
<content type='text'>
evm_protect_xattr unnecessarily validates the current security.evm
integrity, before updating non-evm protected extended attributes
and other file metadata. This patch limits validating the current
security.evm integrity to evm protected metadata.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: remove TCG_TPM dependency</title>
<updated>2011-09-14T19:24:49Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-08-28T12:57:11Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=1d714057ef8f6348eba7b28ace6d307513e57cef'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1d714057ef8f6348eba7b28ace6d307513e57cef</id>
<content type='text'>
All tristates selected by EVM(boolean) are forced to be builtin, except
in the TCG_TPM(tristate) dependency case. Arnaud Lacombe summarizes the
Kconfig bug as, "So it would seem direct dependency state influence the
state of reverse dependencies.."  For a detailed explanation, refer to
Arnaud Lacombe's posting http://lkml.org/lkml/2011/8/23/498.

With the "encrypted-keys: remove trusted-keys dependency" patch, EVM
can now be built without a dependency on TCG_TPM.  The trusted-keys
dependency requires trusted-keys to either be builtin or not selected.
This dependency will prevent the boolean/tristate mismatch from
occuring.

Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell &lt;sfr@canb.auug.org.au&gt;,
             Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@xenotimenet&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: add Kconfig TCG_TPM dependency</title>
<updated>2011-08-18T02:58:12Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-08-17T22:51:36Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=dbe5ad17ec62fbd3be7789f9a5ab71d23da8acf0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:dbe5ad17ec62fbd3be7789f9a5ab71d23da8acf0</id>
<content type='text'>
Although the EVM encrypted-key should be encrypted/decrypted using a
trusted-key, a user-defined key could be used instead. When using a user-
defined key, a TCG_TPM dependency should not be required.  Unfortunately,
the encrypted-key code needs to be refactored a bit in order to remove
this dependency.

This patch adds the TCG_TPM dependency.

Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell &lt;sfr@canb.auug.org.au&gt;,
	     Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@xenotimenet&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: fix evm_inode_init_security return code</title>
<updated>2011-08-11T07:42:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-08-11T04:22:52Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=5a4730ba9517cf2793175991243436a24b1db18f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5a4730ba9517cf2793175991243436a24b1db18f</id>
<content type='text'>
evm_inode_init_security() should return 0, when EVM is not enabled.
(Returning an error is a remnant of evm_inode_post_init_security.)

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>EVM: ensure trusted and encypted key symbols are available to EVM</title>
<updated>2011-08-09T01:33:36Z</updated>
<author>
<name>James Morris</name>
<email>jmorris@namei.org</email>
</author>
<published>2011-08-09T01:33:36Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=0b024d2446474c6a7c47573af5a35db83f557ce3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0b024d2446474c6a7c47573af5a35db83f557ce3</id>
<content type='text'>
Select trusted and encrypted keys if EVM is selected, to ensure
the requisite symbols are available.  Otherwise, these can be
selected as modules while EVM is static, leading to a kernel
build failure.

Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: add evm_inode_setattr to prevent updating an invalid security.evm</title>
<updated>2011-07-18T16:29:50Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-05-13T16:53:38Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=817b54aa45db03437c6d09a7693fc6926eb8e822'/>
<id>urn:sha1:817b54aa45db03437c6d09a7693fc6926eb8e822</id>
<content type='text'>
Permit changing of security.evm only when valid, unless in fixmode.

Reported-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@polito.it&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
