<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux/security/apparmor, branch v3.6</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<id>https://git.amat.us/linux/atom/security/apparmor?h=v3.6</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/atom/security/apparmor?h=v3.6'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/'/>
<updated>2012-05-31T17:11:54Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>split -&gt;file_mmap() into -&gt;mmap_addr()/-&gt;mmap_file()</title>
<updated>2012-05-31T17:11:54Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2012-05-30T17:30:51Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=e5467859f7f79b69fc49004403009dfdba3bec53'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e5467859f7f79b69fc49004403009dfdba3bec53</id>
<content type='text'>
... i.e. file-dependent and address-dependent checks.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>split cap_mmap_addr() out of cap_file_mmap()</title>
<updated>2012-05-31T17:10:54Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2012-05-30T17:11:37Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=d007794a182bc072a7b7479909dbd0d67ba341be'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d007794a182bc072a7b7479909dbd0d67ba341be</id>
<content type='text'>
... switch callers.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'master' of git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/selinux into next</title>
<updated>2012-05-22T01:21:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>James Morris</name>
<email>james.l.morris@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-05-22T01:21:06Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=ff2bb047c4bce9742e94911eeb44b4d6ff4734ab'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ff2bb047c4bce9742e94911eeb44b4d6ff4734ab</id>
<content type='text'>
Per pull request, for 3.5.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: fix long path failure due to disconnected path</title>
<updated>2012-05-18T18:09:52Z</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-05-16T18:01:05Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=cffee16e8b997ab947de661e8820e486b0830c94'/>
<id>urn:sha1:cffee16e8b997ab947de661e8820e486b0830c94</id>
<content type='text'>
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/955892

All failures from __d_path where being treated as disconnected paths,
however __d_path can also fail when the generated pathname is too long.

The initial ENAMETOOLONG error was being lost, and ENAMETOOLONG was only
returned if the subsequent dentry_path call resulted in that error.  Other
wise if the path was split across a mount point such that the dentry_path
fit within the buffer when the __d_path did not the failure was treated
as a disconnected path.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: fix profile lookup for unconfined</title>
<updated>2012-05-18T18:09:28Z</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-05-16T18:00:05Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=bf83208e0b7f5938f5a7f6d9dfa9960bf04692fa'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bf83208e0b7f5938f5a7f6d9dfa9960bf04692fa</id>
<content type='text'>
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/978038

also affects apparmor portion of
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/987371

The unconfined profile is not stored in the regular profile list, but
change_profile and exec transitions may want access to it when setting
up specialized transitions like switch to the unconfined profile of a
new policy namespace.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Fix execve behavior apparmor for PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS</title>
<updated>2012-04-14T01:13:18Z</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-04-12T21:47:51Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=c29bceb3967398cf2ac8bf8edf9634fdb722df7d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c29bceb3967398cf2ac8bf8edf9634fdb722df7d</id>
<content type='text'>
Add support for AppArmor to explicitly fail requested domain transitions
if NO_NEW_PRIVS is set and the task is not unconfined.

Transitions from unconfined are still allowed because this always results
in a reduction of privileges.

Acked-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry &lt;wad@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;

v18: new acked-by, new description
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs</title>
<updated>2012-04-14T01:13:18Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Andy Lutomirski</name>
<email>luto@amacapital.net</email>
</author>
<published>2012-04-12T21:47:50Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=259e5e6c75a910f3b5e656151dc602f53f9d7548'/>
<id>urn:sha1:259e5e6c75a910f3b5e656151dc602f53f9d7548</id>
<content type='text'>
With this change, calling
  prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)
disables privilege granting operations at execve-time.  For example, a
process will not be able to execute a setuid binary to change their uid
or gid if this bit is set.  The same is true for file capabilities.

Additionally, LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS is defined to ensure that
LSMs respect the requested behavior.

To determine if the NO_NEW_PRIVS bit is set, a task may call
  prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 0, 0, 0, 0);
It returns 1 if set and 0 if it is not set. If any of the arguments are
non-zero, it will return -1 and set errno to -EINVAL.
(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS behaves similarly.)

This functionality is desired for the proposed seccomp filter patch
series.  By using PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, it allows a task to modify the
system call behavior for itself and its child tasks without being
able to impact the behavior of a more privileged task.

Another potential use is making certain privileged operations
unprivileged.  For example, chroot may be considered "safe" if it cannot
affect privileged tasks.

Note, this patch causes execve to fail when PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS is
set and AppArmor is in use.  It is fixed in a subsequent patch.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@amacapital.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry &lt;wad@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;

v18: updated change desc
v17: using new define values as per 3.4
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>LSM: do not initialize common_audit_data to 0</title>
<updated>2012-04-09T16:23:04Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Paris</name>
<email>eparis@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-04-04T19:01:43Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=50c205f5e5c2e2af002fd4ef537ded79b90b1b56'/>
<id>urn:sha1:50c205f5e5c2e2af002fd4ef537ded79b90b1b56</id>
<content type='text'>
It isn't needed.  If you don't set the type of the data associated with
that type it is a pretty obvious programming bug.  So why waste the cycles?

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: move task from common_audit_data to apparmor_audit_data</title>
<updated>2012-04-09T16:23:02Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Paris</name>
<email>eparis@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-04-04T19:01:42Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=0972c74ecba4878baa5f97bb78b242c0eefacfb6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0972c74ecba4878baa5f97bb78b242c0eefacfb6</id>
<content type='text'>
apparmor is the only LSM that uses the common_audit_data tsk field.
Instead of making all LSMs pay for the stack space move the aa usage into
the apparmor_audit_data.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>LSM: remove the COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT type expansion</title>
<updated>2012-04-09T16:23:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Paris</name>
<email>eparis@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-04-04T19:01:42Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=bd5e50f9c1c71daac273fa586424f07205f6b13b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bd5e50f9c1c71daac273fa586424f07205f6b13b</id>
<content type='text'>
Just open code it so grep on the source code works better.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
