<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux/net, branch v2.6.36.2</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<id>https://git.amat.us/linux/atom/net?h=v2.6.36.2</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/atom/net?h=v2.6.36.2'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/'/>
<updated>2010-12-09T21:33:33Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>cfg80211: fix extension channel checks to initiate communication</title>
<updated>2010-12-09T21:33:33Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Luis R. Rodriguez</name>
<email>lrodriguez@atheros.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-11-13T00:31:23Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=ed4da9a03330588712be421d370fd53eeec3eecc'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ed4da9a03330588712be421d370fd53eeec3eecc</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9236d838c920e90708570d9bbd7bb82d30a38130 upstream.

When operating in a mode that initiates communication and using
HT40 we should fail if we cannot use both primary and secondary
channels to initiate communication. Our current ht40 allowmap
only covers STA mode of operation, for beaconing modes we need
a check on the fly as the mode of operation is dynamic and
there other flags other than disable which we should read
to check if we can initiate communication.

Do not allow for initiating communication if our secondary HT40
channel has is either disabled, has a passive scan flag, a
no-ibss flag or is a radar channel. Userspace now has similar
checks but this is also needed in-kernel.

Reported-by: Jouni Malinen &lt;jouni.malinen@atheros.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Luis R. Rodriguez &lt;lrodriguez@atheros.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville &lt;linville@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rds: Integer overflow in RDS cmsg handling</title>
<updated>2010-12-09T21:33:32Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Rosenberg</name>
<email>drosenberg@vsecurity.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-11-17T06:37:16Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:df76d4ac11f3b4e718e0737e2b5f7972948ca805</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 218854af84038d828a32f061858b1902ed2beec6 upstream.

In rds_cmsg_rdma_args(), the user-provided args-&gt;nr_local value is
restricted to less than UINT_MAX.  This seems to need a tighter upper
bound, since the calculation of total iov_size can overflow, resulting
in a small sock_kmalloc() allocation.  This would probably just result
in walking off the heap and crashing when calling rds_rdma_pages() with
a high count value.  If it somehow doesn't crash here, then memory
corruption could occur soon after.

Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg &lt;drosenberg@vsecurity.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>econet: fix CVE-2010-3848</title>
<updated>2010-12-09T21:33:32Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Phil Blundell</name>
<email>philb@gnu.org</email>
</author>
<published>2010-11-24T19:51:47Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=a072d3e9840e924180044f9b68041b5c338a812b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a072d3e9840e924180044f9b68041b5c338a812b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a27e13d370415add3487949c60810e36069a23a6 upstream.

Don't declare variable sized array of iovecs on the stack since this
could cause stack overflow if msg-&gt;msgiovlen is large.  Instead, coalesce
the user-supplied data into a new buffer and use a single iovec for it.

Signed-off-by: Phil Blundell &lt;philb@gnu.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>econet: fix CVE-2010-3850</title>
<updated>2010-12-09T21:33:31Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Phil Blundell</name>
<email>philb@gnu.org</email>
</author>
<published>2010-11-24T19:49:53Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=29d0e9fdced7e35db2ac8ecea49e5bc3c7115b98'/>
<id>urn:sha1:29d0e9fdced7e35db2ac8ecea49e5bc3c7115b98</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 16c41745c7b92a243d0874f534c1655196c64b74 upstream.

Add missing check for capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN) in SIOCSIFADDR operation.

Signed-off-by: Phil Blundell &lt;philb@gnu.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>econet: disallow NULL remote addr for sendmsg(), fixes CVE-2010-3849</title>
<updated>2010-12-09T21:33:31Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Phil Blundell</name>
<email>philb@gnu.org</email>
</author>
<published>2010-11-24T19:49:19Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:3ca62aac185300f80dad0e412c1033d2ef8a1b44</id>
<content type='text'>
commit fa0e846494792e722d817b9d3d625a4ef4896c96 upstream.

Later parts of econet_sendmsg() rely on saddr != NULL, so return early
with EINVAL if NULL was passed otherwise an oops may occur.

Signed-off-by: Phil Blundell &lt;philb@gnu.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x25: Prevent crashing when parsing bad X.25 facilities</title>
<updated>2010-12-09T21:33:30Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Rosenberg</name>
<email>drosenberg@vsecurity.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-11-12T20:44:42Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:9398085155dfc475ba9a5e1c4da10ad3dd009380</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5ef41308f94dcbb3b7afc56cdef1c2ba53fa5d2f upstream.

Now with improved comma support.

On parsing malformed X.25 facilities, decrementing the remaining length
may cause it to underflow.  Since the length is an unsigned integer,
this will result in the loop continuing until the kernel crashes.

This patch adds checks to ensure decrementing the remaining length does
not cause it to wrap around.

Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg &lt;drosenberg@vsecurity.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>can-bcm: fix minor heap overflow</title>
<updated>2010-12-09T21:33:30Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Oliver Hartkopp</name>
<email>socketcan@hartkopp.net</email>
</author>
<published>2010-11-10T12:10:30Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=ba4395a3649c3cd730b43351061892f96fadd16d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ba4395a3649c3cd730b43351061892f96fadd16d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0597d1b99fcfc2c0eada09a698f85ed413d4ba84 upstream.

On 64-bit platforms the ASCII representation of a pointer may be up to 17
bytes long. This patch increases the length of the buffer accordingly.

http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&amp;m=128872251418192&amp;w=2

Reported-by: Dan Rosenberg &lt;drosenberg@vsecurity.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp &lt;socketcan@hartkopp.net&gt;
CC: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>filter: make sure filters dont read uninitialized memory</title>
<updated>2010-12-09T21:33:30Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David S. Miller</name>
<email>davem@davemloft.net</email>
</author>
<published>2010-11-10T18:38:24Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=2bd84dce08a6a782925f5e34c2e87ad957c57007'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2bd84dce08a6a782925f5e34c2e87ad957c57007</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 57fe93b374a6b8711995c2d466c502af9f3a08bb upstream.

There is a possibility malicious users can get limited information about
uninitialized stack mem array. Even if sk_run_filter() result is bound
to packet length (0 .. 65535), we could imagine this can be used by
hostile user.

Initializing mem[] array, like Dan Rosenberg suggested in his patch is
expensive since most filters dont even use this array.

Its hard to make the filter validation in sk_chk_filter(), because of
the jumps. This might be done later.

In this patch, I use a bitmap (a single long var) so that only filters
using mem[] loads/stores pay the price of added security checks.

For other filters, additional cost is a single instruction.

[ Since we access fentry-&gt;k a lot now, cache it in a local variable
  and mark filter entry pointer as const. -DaveM ]

Reported-by: Dan Rosenberg &lt;drosenberg@vsecurity.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;eric.dumazet@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vlan: Avoid hwaccel vlan packets when vid not used.</title>
<updated>2010-12-09T21:33:29Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jesse Gross</name>
<email>jesse@nicira.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-11-08T21:23:01Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=1b7cd15c8c89f5c26dc525d985e45c9bd9265fe2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1b7cd15c8c89f5c26dc525d985e45c9bd9265fe2</id>
<content type='text'>
[This patch applies only to 2.6.36 stable.  The problem was introduced
in that release and is already fixed by larger changes to the vlan
code in 2.6.37.]

Normally hardware accelerated vlan packets are quickly dropped if
there is no corresponding vlan device configured.  The one exception
is promiscuous mode, where we allow all of these packets through so
they can be picked up by tcpdump.  However, this behavior causes a
crash if we actually try to receive these packets.  This fixes that
crash by ignoring packets with vids not corresponding to a configured
device in the vlan hwaccel routines and then dropping them before they
get to consumers in the network stack.


Reported-by: Ben Greear &lt;greearb@candelatech.com&gt;
Tested-by: Nikola Ciprich &lt;extmaillist@linuxbox.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross &lt;jesse@nicira.com&gt;
Acked-by: David Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>memory corruption in X.25 facilities parsing</title>
<updated>2010-12-09T21:33:29Z</updated>
<author>
<name>andrew hendry</name>
<email>andrew.hendry@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-11-03T12:54:53Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=70d5f4e7ddb91da21169629548b763cc1244c374'/>
<id>urn:sha1:70d5f4e7ddb91da21169629548b763cc1244c374</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a6331d6f9a4298173b413cf99a40cc86a9d92c37 upstream.

Signed-of-by: Andrew Hendry &lt;andrew.hendry@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
</entry>
</feed>
