linux/kernel, branch v3.4.22

timekeeping: Cast raw_interval to u64 to avoid shift overflow

2012-12-03T19:47:23Z

commit 5b3900cd409466c0070b234d941650685ad0c791 upstream. We fixed a bunch of integer overflows in timekeeping code during the 3.6 cycle. I did an audit based on that and found this potential overflow. Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Acked-by: John Stultz Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20121009071823.GA19159@elgon.mountain Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Ben Hutchings [ herton: adapt for 3.5, timekeeper instead of tk pointer ] Signed-off-by: Herton Ronaldo Krzesinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

watchdog: using u64 in get_sample_period()

2012-12-03T19:47:17Z

commit 8ffeb9b0e6369135bf03a073514f571ef10606b9 upstream. In get_sample_period(), unsigned long is not enough: watchdog_thresh * 2 * (NSEC_PER_SEC / 5) case1: watchdog_thresh is 10 by default, the sample value will be: 0xEE6B2800 case2: set watchdog_thresh is 20, the sample value will be: 0x1 DCD6 5000 In case2, we need use u64 to express the sample period. Otherwise, changing the threshold thru proc often can not be successful. Signed-off-by: liu chuansheng Acked-by: Don Zickus Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

futex: avoid wake_futex() for a PI futex_q

2012-12-03T19:47:07Z

commit aa10990e028cac3d5e255711fb9fb47e00700e35 upstream. Dave Jones reported a bug with futex_lock_pi() that his trinity test exposed. Sometime between queue_me() and taking the q.lock_ptr, the lock_ptr became NULL, resulting in a crash. While futex_wake() is careful to not call wake_futex() on futex_q's with a pi_state or an rt_waiter (which are either waiting for a futex_unlock_pi() or a PI futex_requeue()), futex_wake_op() and futex_requeue() do not perform the same test. Update futex_wake_op() and futex_requeue() to test for q.pi_state and q.rt_waiter and abort with -EINVAL if detected. To ensure any future breakage is caught, add a WARN() to wake_futex() if the same condition is true. This fix has seen 3 hours of testing with "trinity -c futex" on an x86_64 VM with 4 CPUS. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: tidy up the WARN()] Signed-off-by: Darren Hart Reported-by: Dave Jones Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: John Kacur Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

module: fix out-by-one error in kallsyms

2012-11-26T19:37:41Z

commit 59ef28b1f14899b10d6b2682c7057ca00a9a3f47 upstream. Masaki found and patched a kallsyms issue: the last symbol in a module's symtab wasn't transferred. This is because we manually copy the zero'th entry (which is always empty) then copy the rest in a loop starting at 1, though from src[0]. His fix was minimal, I prefer to rewrite the loops in more standard form. There are two loops: one to get the size, and one to copy. Make these identical: always count entry 0 and any defined symbol in an allocated non-init section. This bug exists since the following commit was introduced. module: reduce symbol table for loaded modules (v2) commit: 4a4962263f07d14660849ec134ee42b63e95ea9a LKML: http://lkml.org/lkml/2012/10/24/27 Reported-by: Masaki Kimura Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

futex: Handle futex_pi OWNER_DIED take over correctly

2012-11-17T21:16:22Z

commit 59fa6245192159ab5e1e17b8e31f15afa9cff4bf upstream. Siddhesh analyzed a failure in the take over of pi futexes in case the owner died and provided a workaround. See: http://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=14076 The detailed problem analysis shows: Futex F is initialized with PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT and PTHREAD_MUTEX_ROBUST_NP attributes. T1 lock_futex_pi(F); T2 lock_futex_pi(F); --> T2 blocks on the futex and creates pi_state which is associated to T1. T1 exits --> exit_robust_list() runs --> Futex F userspace value TID field is set to 0 and FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit is set. T3 lock_futex_pi(F); --> Succeeds due to the check for F's userspace TID field == 0 --> Claims ownership of the futex and sets its own TID into the userspace TID field of futex F --> returns to user space T1 --> exit_pi_state_list() --> Transfers pi_state to waiter T2 and wakes T2 via rt_mutex_unlock(&pi_state->mutex) T2 --> acquires pi_state->mutex and gains real ownership of the pi_state --> Claims ownership of the futex and sets its own TID into the userspace TID field of futex F --> returns to user space T3 --> observes inconsistent state This problem is independent of UP/SMP, preemptible/non preemptible kernels, or process shared vs. private. The only difference is that certain configurations are more likely to expose it. So as Siddhesh correctly analyzed the following check in futex_lock_pi_atomic() is the culprit: if (unlikely(ownerdied || !(curval & FUTEX_TID_MASK))) { We check the userspace value for a TID value of 0 and take over the futex unconditionally if that's true. AFAICT this check is there as it is correct for a different corner case of futexes: the WAITERS bit became stale. Now the proposed change - if (unlikely(ownerdied || !(curval & FUTEX_TID_MASK))) { + if (unlikely(ownerdied || + !(curval & (FUTEX_TID_MASK | FUTEX_WAITERS)))) { solves the problem, but it's not obvious why and it wreckages the "stale WAITERS bit" case. What happens is, that due to the WAITERS bit being set (T2 is blocked on that futex) it enforces T3 to go through lookup_pi_state(), which in the above case returns an existing pi_state and therefor forces T3 to legitimately fight with T2 over the ownership of the pi_state (via pi_state->mutex). Probelm solved! Though that does not work for the "WAITERS bit is stale" problem because if lookup_pi_state() does not find existing pi_state it returns -ERSCH (due to TID == 0) which causes futex_lock_pi() to return -ESRCH to user space because the OWNER_DIED bit is not set. Now there is a different solution to that problem. Do not look at the user space value at all and enforce a lookup of possibly available pi_state. If pi_state can be found, then the new incoming locker T3 blocks on that pi_state and legitimately races with T2 to acquire the rt_mutex and the pi_state and therefor the proper ownership of the user space futex. lookup_pi_state() has the correct order of checks. It first tries to find a pi_state associated with the user space futex and only if that fails it checks for futex TID value = 0. If no pi_state is available nothing can create new state at that point because this happens with the hash bucket lock held. So the above scenario changes to: T1 lock_futex_pi(F); T2 lock_futex_pi(F); --> T2 blocks on the futex and creates pi_state which is associated to T1. T1 exits --> exit_robust_list() runs --> Futex F userspace value TID field is set to 0 and FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit is set. T3 lock_futex_pi(F); --> Finds pi_state and blocks on pi_state->rt_mutex T1 --> exit_pi_state_list() --> Transfers pi_state to waiter T2 and wakes it via rt_mutex_unlock(&pi_state->mutex) T2 --> acquires pi_state->mutex and gains ownership of the pi_state --> Claims ownership of the futex and sets its own TID into the userspace TID field of futex F --> returns to user space This covers all gazillion points on which T3 might come in between T1's exit_robust_list() clearing the TID field and T2 fixing it up. It also solves the "WAITERS bit stale" problem by forcing the take over. Another benefit of changing the code this way is that it makes it less dependent on untrusted user space values and therefor minimizes the possible wreckage which might be inflicted. As usual after staring for too long at the futex code my brain hurts so much that I really want to ditch that whole optimization of avoiding the syscall for the non contended case for PI futexes and rip out the maze of corner case handling code. Unfortunately we can't as user space relies on that existing behaviour, but at least thinking about it helps me to preserve my mental sanity. Maybe we should nevertheless :) Reported-and-tested-by: Siddhesh Poyarekar Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LFD.2.02.1210232138540.2756@ionos Acked-by: Darren Hart Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Revert "cgroup: Drop task_lock(parent) on cgroup_fork()"

2012-10-28T17:14:14Z

commit 9bb71308b8133d643648776243e4d5599b1c193d upstream. This reverts commit 7e381b0eb1e1a9805c37335562e8dc02e7d7848c. The commit incorrectly assumed that fork path always performed threadgroup_change_begin/end() and depended on that for synchronization against task exit and cgroup migration paths instead of explicitly grabbing task_lock(). threadgroup_change is not locked when forking a new process (as opposed to a new thread in the same process) and even if it were it wouldn't be effective as different processes use different threadgroup locks. Revert the incorrect optimization. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo LKML-Reference: <20121008020000.GB2575@localhost> Acked-by: Li Zefan Bitterly-Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Revert "cgroup: Remove task_lock() from cgroup_post_fork()"

2012-10-28T17:14:14Z

commit d87838321124061f6c935069d97f37010fa417e6 upstream. This reverts commit 7e3aa30ac8c904a706518b725c451bb486daaae9. The commit incorrectly assumed that fork path always performed threadgroup_change_begin/end() and depended on that for synchronization against task exit and cgroup migration paths instead of explicitly grabbing task_lock(). threadgroup_change is not locked when forking a new process (as opposed to a new thread in the same process) and even if it were it wouldn't be effective as different processes use different threadgroup locks. Revert the incorrect optimization. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo LKML-Reference: <20121008020000.GB2575@localhost> Acked-by: Li Zefan Cc: Frederic Weisbecker Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

cgroup: notify_on_release may not be triggered in some cases

2012-10-28T17:14:14Z

commit 1f5320d5972aa50d3e8d2b227b636b370e608359 upstream. notify_on_release must be triggered when the last process in a cgroup is move to another. But if the first(and only) process in a cgroup is moved to another, notify_on_release is not triggered. # mkdir /cgroup/cpu/SRC # mkdir /cgroup/cpu/DST # # echo 1 >/cgroup/cpu/SRC/notify_on_release # echo 1 >/cgroup/cpu/DST/notify_on_release # # sleep 300 & [1] 8629 # # echo 8629 >/cgroup/cpu/SRC/tasks # echo 8629 >/cgroup/cpu/DST/tasks -> notify_on_release for /SRC must be triggered at this point, but it isn't. This is because put_css_set() is called before setting CGRP_RELEASABLE in cgroup_task_migrate(), and is a regression introduce by the commit:74a1166d(cgroups: make procs file writable), which was merged into v3.0. Acked-by: Li Zefan Cc: Ben Blum Signed-off-by: Daisuke Nishimura Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

use clamp_t in UNAME26 fix

2012-10-28T17:14:13Z

commit 31fd84b95eb211d5db460a1dda85e004800a7b52 upstream. The min/max call needed to have explicit types on some architectures (e.g. mn10300). Use clamp_t instead to avoid the warning: kernel/sys.c: In function 'override_release': kernel/sys.c:1287:10: warning: comparison of distinct pointer types lacks a cast [enabled by default] Reported-by: Fengguang Wu Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

kernel/sys.c: fix stack memory content leak via UNAME26

2012-10-28T17:14:13Z

commit 2702b1526c7278c4d65d78de209a465d4de2885e upstream. Calling uname() with the UNAME26 personality set allows a leak of kernel stack contents. This fixes it by defensively calculating the length of copy_to_user() call, making the len argument unsigned, and initializing the stack buffer to zero (now technically unneeded, but hey, overkill). CVE-2012-0957 Reported-by: PaX Team Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: PaX Team Cc: Brad Spengler Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman