linux/kernel, branch v3.0.3

futex: Fix regression with read only mappings

2011-08-16T01:31:32Z

commit 9ea71503a8ed9184d2d0b8ccc4d269d05f7940ae upstream. commit 7485d0d3758e8e6491a5c9468114e74dc050785d (futexes: Remove rw parameter from get_futex_key()) in 2.6.33 fixed two problems: First, It prevented a loop when encountering a ZERO_PAGE. Second, it fixed RW MAP_PRIVATE futex operations by forcing the COW to occur by unconditionally performing a write access get_user_pages_fast() to get the page. The commit also introduced a user-mode regression in that it broke futex operations on read-only memory maps. For example, this breaks workloads that have one or more reader processes doing a FUTEX_WAIT on a futex within a read only shared file mapping, and a writer processes that has a writable mapping issuing the FUTEX_WAKE. This fixes the regression for valid futex operations on RO mappings by trying a RO get_user_pages_fast() when the RW get_user_pages_fast() fails. This change makes it necessary to also check for invalid use cases, such as anonymous RO mappings (which can never change) and the ZERO_PAGE which the commit referenced above was written to address. This patch does restore the original behavior with RO MAP_PRIVATE mappings, which have inherent user-mode usage problems and don't really make sense. With this patch performing a FUTEX_WAIT within a RO MAP_PRIVATE mapping will be successfully woken provided another process updates the region of the underlying mapped file. However, the mmap() man page states that for a MAP_PRIVATE mapping: It is unspecified whether changes made to the file after the mmap() call are visible in the mapped region. So user-mode users attempting to use futex operations on RO MAP_PRIVATE mappings are depending on unspecified behavior. Additionally a RO MAP_PRIVATE mapping could fail to wake up in the following case. Thread-A: call futex(FUTEX_WAIT, memory-region-A). get_futex_key() return inode based key. sleep on the key Thread-B: call mprotect(PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, memory-region-A) Thread-B: write memory-region-A. COW happen. This process's memory-region-A become related to new COWed private (ie PageAnon=1) page. Thread-B: call futex(FUETX_WAKE, memory-region-A). get_futex_key() return mm based key. IOW, we fail to wake up Thread-A. Once again doing something like this is just silly and users who do something like this get what they deserve. While RO MAP_PRIVATE mappings are nonsensical, checking for a private mapping requires walking the vmas and was deemed too costly to avoid a userspace hang. This Patch is based on Peter Zijlstra's initial patch with modifications to only allow RO mappings for futex operations that need VERIFY_READ access. Reported-by: David Oliver Signed-off-by: Shawn Bohrer Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra Signed-off-by: Darren Hart Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro Cc: peterz@infradead.org Cc: eric.dumazet@gmail.com Cc: zvonler@rgmadvisors.com Cc: hughd@google.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1309450892-30676-1-git-send-email-sbohrer@rgmadvisors.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mm/futex: fix futex writes on archs with SW tracking of dirty & young

2011-08-05T04:58:38Z

commit 2efaca927f5cd7ecd0f1554b8f9b6a9a2c329c03 upstream. I haven't reproduced it myself but the fail scenario is that on such machines (notably ARM and some embedded powerpc), if you manage to hit that futex path on a writable page whose dirty bit has gone from the PTE, you'll livelock inside the kernel from what I can tell. It will go in a loop of trying the atomic access, failing, trying gup to "fix it up", getting succcess from gup, go back to the atomic access, failing again because dirty wasn't fixed etc... So I think you essentially hang in the kernel. The scenario is probably rare'ish because affected architecture are embedded and tend to not swap much (if at all) so we probably rarely hit the case where dirty is missing or young is missing, but I think Shan has a piece of SW that can reliably reproduce it using a shared writable mapping & fork or something like that. On archs who use SW tracking of dirty & young, a page without dirty is effectively mapped read-only and a page without young unaccessible in the PTE. Additionally, some architectures might lazily flush the TLB when relaxing write protection (by doing only a local flush), and expect a fault to invalidate the stale entry if it's still present on another processor. The futex code assumes that if the "in_atomic()" access -EFAULT's, it can "fix it up" by causing get_user_pages() which would then be equivalent to taking the fault. However that isn't the case. get_user_pages() will not call handle_mm_fault() in the case where the PTE seems to have the right permissions, regardless of the dirty and young state. It will eventually update those bits ... in the struct page, but not in the PTE. Additionally, it will not handle the lazy TLB flushing that can be required by some architectures in the fault case. Basically, gup is the wrong interface for the job. The patch provides a more appropriate one which boils down to just calling handle_mm_fault() since what we are trying to do is simulate a real page fault. The futex code currently attempts to write to user memory within a pagefault disabled section, and if that fails, tries to fix it up using get_user_pages(). This doesn't work on archs where the dirty and young bits are maintained by software, since they will gate access permission in the TLB, and will not be updated by gup(). In addition, there's an expectation on some archs that a spurious write fault triggers a local TLB flush, and that is missing from the picture as well. I decided that adding those "features" to gup() would be too much for this already too complex function, and instead added a new simpler fixup_user_fault() which is essentially a wrapper around handle_mm_fault() which the futex code can call. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix some nits Darren saw, fiddle comment layout] Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt Reported-by: Shan Hai Tested-by: Shan Hai Cc: David Laight Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Darren Hart Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tracing: Have "enable" file use refcounts like the "filter" file

2011-08-05T04:58:38Z

commit 40ee4dffff061399eb9358e0c8fcfbaf8de4c8fe upstream. The "enable" file for the event system can be removed when a module is unloaded and the event system only has events from that module. As the event system nr_events count goes to zero, it may be freed if its ref_count is also set to zero. Like the "filter" file, the "enable" file may be opened by a task and referenced later, after a module has been unloaded and the events for that event system have been removed. Although the "filter" file referenced the event system structure, the "enable" file only references a pointer to the event system name. Since the name is freed when the event system is removed, it is possible that an access to the "enable" file may reference a freed pointer. Update the "enable" file to use the subsystem_open() routine that the "filter" file uses, to keep a reference to the event system structure while the "enable" file is opened. Reported-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tracing: Fix bug when reading system filters on module removal

2011-08-05T04:58:38Z

commit e9dbfae53eeb9fc3d4bb7da3df87fa9875f5da02 upstream. The event system is freed when its nr_events is set to zero. This happens when a module created an event system and then later the module is removed. Modules may share systems, so the system is allocated when it is created and freed when the modules are unloaded and all the events under the system are removed (nr_events set to zero). The problem arises when a task opened the "filter" file for the system. If the module is unloaded and it removed the last event for that system, the system structure is freed. If the task that opened the filter file accesses the "filter" file after the system has been freed, the system will access an invalid pointer. By adding a ref_count, and using it to keep track of what is using the event system, we can free it after all users are finished with the event system. Reported-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

perf: Fix software event overflow

2011-08-05T04:58:35Z

The below patch is for -stable only, upstream has a much larger patch that contains the below hunk in commit a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 Vince found that under certain circumstances software event overflows go wrong and deadlock. Avoid trying to delete a timer from the timer callback. Reported-by: Vince Weaver Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Merge branch 'core-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip

2011-07-20T22:56:25Z

* 'core-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: signal: align __lock_task_sighand() irq disabling and RCU softirq,rcu: Inform RCU of irq_exit() activity sched: Add irq_{enter,exit}() to scheduler_ipi() rcu: protect __rcu_read_unlock() against scheduler-using irq handlers rcu: Streamline code produced by __rcu_read_unlock() rcu: Fix RCU_BOOST race handling current->rcu_read_unlock_special rcu: decrease rcu_report_exp_rnp coupling with scheduler

Merge branch 'rcu/urgent' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/paulmck/linux-2.6-rcu into core/urgent

2011-07-20T18:59:26Z

signal: align __lock_task_sighand() irq disabling and RCU

2011-07-20T18:04:54Z

The __lock_task_sighand() function calls rcu_read_lock() with interrupts and preemption enabled, but later calls rcu_read_unlock() with interrupts disabled. It is therefore possible that this RCU read-side critical section will be preempted and later RCU priority boosted, which means that rcu_read_unlock() will call rt_mutex_unlock() in order to deboost itself, but with interrupts disabled. This results in lockdep splats, so this commit nests the RCU read-side critical section within the interrupt-disabled region of code. This prevents the RCU read-side critical section from being preempted, and thus prevents the attempt to deboost with interrupts disabled. It is quite possible that a better long-term fix is to make rt_mutex_unlock() disable irqs when acquiring the rt_mutex structure's ->wait_lock. Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney

softirq,rcu: Inform RCU of irq_exit() activity

2011-07-20T17:50:12Z

The rcu_read_unlock_special() function relies on in_irq() to exclude scheduler activity from interrupt level. This fails because exit_irq() can invoke the scheduler after clearing the preempt_count() bits that in_irq() uses to determine that it is at interrupt level. This situation can result in failures as follows: $task IRQ SoftIRQ rcu_read_lock() /* do stuff */ |= UNLOCK_BLOCKED rcu_read_unlock() --t->rcu_read_lock_nesting irq_enter(); /* do stuff, don't use RCU */ irq_exit(); sub_preempt_count(IRQ_EXIT_OFFSET); invoke_softirq() ttwu(); spin_lock_irq(&pi->lock) rcu_read_lock(); /* do stuff */ rcu_read_unlock(); rcu_read_unlock_special() rcu_report_exp_rnp() ttwu() spin_lock_irq(&pi->lock) /* deadlock */ rcu_read_unlock_special(t); Ed can simply trigger this 'easy' because invoke_softirq() immediately does a ttwu() of ksoftirqd/# instead of doing the in-place softirq stuff first, but even without that the above happens. Cure this by also excluding softirqs from the rcu_read_unlock_special() handler and ensuring the force_irqthreads ksoftirqd/# wakeup is done from full softirq context. [ Alternatively, delaying the ->rcu_read_lock_nesting decrement until after the special handling would make the thing more robust in the face of interrupts as well. And there is a separate patch for that. ] Cc: Thomas Gleixner Reported-and-tested-by: Ed Tomlinson Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney

sched: Add irq_{enter,exit}() to scheduler_ipi()

2011-07-20T17:50:11Z

Ensure scheduler_ipi() calls irq_{enter,exit} when it does some actual work. Traditionally we never did any actual work from the resched IPI and all magic happened in the return from interrupt path. Now that we do do some work, we need to ensure irq_{enter,exit} are called so that we don't confuse things. This affects things like timekeeping, NO_HZ and RCU, basically everything with a hook in irq_enter/exit. Explicit examples of things going wrong are: sched_clock_cpu() -- has a callback when leaving NO_HZ state to take a new reading from GTOD and TSC. Without this callback, time is stuck in the past. RCU -- needs in_irq() to work in order to avoid some nasty deadlocks Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney