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<title>linux/kernel, branch v2.6.34.10</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<id>https://git.amat.us/linux/atom/kernel?h=v2.6.34.10</id>
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<updated>2011-06-26T16:47:09Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>smp_call_function_many: handle concurrent clearing of mask</title>
<updated>2011-06-26T16:47:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Milton Miller</name>
<email>miltonm@bga.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-03-15T19:27:17Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:989d5e239a809c7f8ff67f19fd89d043da70eaa7</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 723aae25d5cdb09962901d36d526b44d4be1051c upstream.

Mike Galbraith reported finding a lockup ("perma-spin bug") where the
cpumask passed to smp_call_function_many was cleared by other cpu(s)
while a cpu was preparing its call_data block, resulting in no cpu to
clear the last ref and unlock the block.

Having cpus clear their bit asynchronously could be useful on a mask of
cpus that might have a translation context, or cpus that need a push to
complete an rcu window.

Instead of adding a BUG_ON and requiring yet another cpumask copy, just
detect the race and handle it.

Note: arch_send_call_function_ipi_mask must still handle an empty
cpumask because the data block is globally visible before the that arch
callback is made.  And (obviously) there are no guarantees to which cpus
are notified if the mask is changed during the call; only cpus that were
online and had their mask bit set during the whole call are guaranteed
to be called.

Reported-by: Mike Galbraith &lt;efault@gmx.de&gt;
Reported-by: Jan Beulich &lt;JBeulich@novell.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jan Beulich &lt;jbeulich@novell.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Milton Miller &lt;miltonm@bga.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>call_function_many: add missing ordering</title>
<updated>2011-06-26T16:47:08Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Milton Miller</name>
<email>miltonm@bga.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-03-15T19:27:16Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:6935f5d794d9a8f7de8e764391ad241e8d22911f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 45a5791920ae643eafc02e2eedef1a58e341b736 upstream.

Paul McKenney's review pointed out two problems with the barriers in the
2.6.38 update to the smp call function many code.

First, a barrier that would force the func and info members of data to
be visible before their consumption in the interrupt handler was
missing.  This can be solved by adding a smp_wmb between setting the
func and info members and setting setting the cpumask; this will pair
with the existing and required smp_rmb ordering the cpumask read before
the read of refs.  This placement avoids the need a second smp_rmb in
the interrupt handler which would be executed on each of the N cpus
executing the call request.  (I was thinking this barrier was present
but was not).

Second, the previous write to refs (establishing the zero that we the
interrupt handler was testing from all cpus) was performed by a third
party cpu.  This would invoke transitivity which, as a recient or
concurrent addition to memory-barriers.txt now explicitly states, would
require a full smp_mb().

However, we know the cpumask will only be set by one cpu (the data
owner) and any preivous iteration of the mask would have cleared by the
reading cpu.  By redundantly writing refs to 0 on the owning cpu before
the smp_wmb, the write to refs will follow the same path as the writes
that set the cpumask, which in turn allows us to keep the barrier in the
interrupt handler a smp_rmb instead of promoting it to a smp_mb (which
will be be executed by N cpus for each of the possible M elements on the
list).

I moved and expanded the comment about our (ab)use of the rcu list
primitives for the concurrent walk earlier into this function.  I
considered moving the first two paragraphs to the queue list head and
lock, but felt it would have been too disconected from the code.

Cc: Paul McKinney &lt;paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Milton Miller &lt;miltonm@bga.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>call_function_many: fix list delete vs add race</title>
<updated>2011-06-26T16:47:08Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Milton Miller</name>
<email>miltonm@bga.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-03-15T19:27:16Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:87dbfb3e2ef719eab4b41703d88a5e20daec9cac</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e6cd1e07a185d5f9b0aa75e020df02d3c1c44940 upstream.

Peter pointed out there was nothing preventing the list_del_rcu in
smp_call_function_interrupt from running before the list_add_rcu in
smp_call_function_many.

Fix this by not setting refs until we have gotten the lock for the list.
Take advantage of the wmb in list_add_rcu to save an explicit additional
one.

I tried to force this race with a udelay before the lock &amp; list_add and
by mixing all 64 online cpus with just 3 random cpus in the mask, but
was unsuccessful.  Still, inspection shows a valid race, and the fix is
a extension of the existing protection window in the current code.

Reported-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Milton Miller &lt;miltonm@bga.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ftrace: Fix memory leak with function graph and cpu hotplug</title>
<updated>2011-06-26T16:47:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Steven Rostedt</name>
<email>srostedt@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-02-11T02:26:13Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:1237d7b76c365f5026e9c55534dcd7126fa014ed</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 868baf07b1a259f5f3803c1dc2777b6c358f83cf upstream.

When the fuction graph tracer starts, it needs to make a special
stack for each task to save the real return values of the tasks.
All running tasks have this stack created, as well as any new
tasks.

On CPU hot plug, the new idle task will allocate a stack as well
when init_idle() is called. The problem is that cpu hotplug does
not create a new idle_task. Instead it uses the idle task that
existed when the cpu went down.

ftrace_graph_init_task() will add a new ret_stack to the task
that is given to it. Because a clone will make the task
have a stack of its parent it does not check if the task's
ret_stack is already NULL or not. When the CPU hotplug code
starts a CPU up again, it will allocate a new stack even
though one already existed for it.

The solution is to treat the idle_task specially. In fact, the
function_graph code already does, just not at init_idle().
Instead of using the ftrace_graph_init_task() for the idle task,
which that function expects the task to be a clone, have a
separate ftrace_graph_init_idle_task(). Also, we will create a
per_cpu ret_stack that is used by the idle task. When we call
ftrace_graph_init_idle_task() it will check if the idle task's
ret_stack is NULL, if it is, then it will assign it the per_cpu
ret_stack.

Reported-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt &lt;benh@kernel.crashing.org&gt;
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt &lt;rostedt@goodmis.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cpuset: add a missing unlock in cpuset_write_resmask()</title>
<updated>2011-06-26T16:46:56Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Li Zefan</name>
<email>lizf@cn.fujitsu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-03-05T01:36:21Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:e9dab809ef06d2be702cfe04a1d22436b5ef6f1f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b75f38d659e6fc747eda64cb72f3920e29dd44a4 upstream.

Don't forget to release cgroup_mutex if alloc_trial_cpuset() fails.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: avoid multiple return points]
Signed-off-by: Li Zefan &lt;lizf@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Cc: Paul Menage &lt;menage@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Cc: Miao Xie &lt;miaox@cn.fujitsu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>clockevents: Prevent oneshot mode when broadcast device is periodic</title>
<updated>2011-06-26T16:46:53Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2011-02-25T21:34:23Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:64323cd54f3a6450bd64aac242df7bd1ade457f3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3a142a0672b48a853f00af61f184c7341ac9c99d upstream.

When the per cpu timer is marked CLOCK_EVT_FEAT_C3STOP, then we only
can switch into oneshot mode, when the backup broadcast device
supports oneshot mode as well. Otherwise we would try to switch the
broadcast device into an unsupported mode unconditionally. This went
unnoticed so far as the current available broadcast devices support
oneshot mode. Seth unearthed this problem while debugging and working
around an hpet related BIOS wreckage.

Add the necessary check to tick_is_oneshot_available().

Reported-and-tested-by: Seth Forshee &lt;seth.forshee@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
LKML-Reference: &lt;alpine.LFD.2.00.1102252231200.2701@localhost6.localdomain6&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>genirq: Disable the SHIRQ_DEBUG call in request_threaded_irq for now</title>
<updated>2011-06-26T16:46:47Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2011-02-18T22:27:23Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:b41a082a4785add51bee06b3908d2eba98c0ae50</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6d83f94db95cfe65d2a6359cccdf61cf087c2598 upstream.

With CONFIG_SHIRQ_DEBUG=y we call a newly installed interrupt handler
in request_threaded_irq().

The original implementation (commit a304e1b8) called the handler
_BEFORE_ it was installed, but that caused problems with handlers
calling disable_irq_nosync(). See commit 377bf1e4.

It's braindead in the first place to call disable_irq_nosync in shared
handlers, but ....

Moving this call after we installed the handler looks innocent, but it
is very subtle broken on SMP.

Interrupt handlers rely on the fact, that the irq core prevents
reentrancy.

Now this debug call violates that promise because we run the handler
w/o the IRQ_INPROGRESS protection - which we cannot apply here because
that would result in a possibly forever masked interrupt line.

A concurrent real hardware interrupt on a different CPU results in
handler reentrancy and can lead to complete wreckage, which was
unfortunately observed in reality and took a fricking long time to
debug.

Leave the code here for now. We want this debug feature, but that's
not easy to fix. We really should get rid of those
disable_irq_nosync() abusers and remove that function completely.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Anton Vorontsov &lt;avorontsov@ru.mvista.com&gt;
Cc: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw2@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Arjan van de Ven &lt;arjan@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>PM / Hibernate: Return error code when alloc_image_page() fails</title>
<updated>2011-06-26T16:46:45Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Stanislaw Gruszka</name>
<email>stf_xl@pop3.wp.pl</email>
</author>
<published>2011-02-12T20:06:51Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=6f7850bb86a521f6da68794548a34dfa7ea7e1b9'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6f7850bb86a521f6da68794548a34dfa7ea7e1b9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2e725a065b0153f0c449318da1923a120477633d upstream.

Currently we return 0 in swsusp_alloc() when alloc_image_page() fails.
Fix that.  Also remove unneeded "error" variable since the only
useful value of error is -ENOMEM.

[rjw: Fixed up the changelog and changed subject.]

Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka &lt;stf_xl@wp.pl&gt;
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki &lt;rjw@sisk.pl&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>CRED: Fix memory and refcount leaks upon security_prepare_creds() failure</title>
<updated>2011-06-26T16:46:42Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tetsuo Handa</name>
<email>penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp</email>
</author>
<published>2011-02-07T13:36:16Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=c14b55cd3067feb77ce8b745d49a043a45f50f44'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c14b55cd3067feb77ce8b745d49a043a45f50f44</id>
<content type='text'>
commit fb2b2a1d37f80cc818fd4487b510f4e11816e5e1 upstream.

In prepare_kernel_cred() since 2.6.29, put_cred(new) is called without
assigning new-&gt;usage when security_prepare_creds() returned an error.  As a
result, memory for new and refcount for new-&gt;{user,group_info,tgcred} are
leaked because put_cred(new) won't call __put_cred() unless old-&gt;usage == 1.

Fix these leaks by assigning new-&gt;usage (and new-&gt;subscribers which was added
in 2.6.32) before calling security_prepare_creds().

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>CRED: Fix BUG() upon security_cred_alloc_blank() failure</title>
<updated>2011-06-26T16:46:42Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tetsuo Handa</name>
<email>penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp</email>
</author>
<published>2011-02-07T13:36:10Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=66b29b835482062342f6b6ac6785646d0997235f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:66b29b835482062342f6b6ac6785646d0997235f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2edeaa34a6e3f2c43b667f6c4f7b27944b811695 upstream.

In cred_alloc_blank() since 2.6.32, abort_creds(new) is called with
new-&gt;security == NULL and new-&gt;magic == 0 when security_cred_alloc_blank()
returns an error.  As a result, BUG() will be triggered if SELinux is enabled
or CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS=y.

If CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS=y, BUG() is called from __invalid_creds() because
cred-&gt;magic == 0.  Failing that, BUG() is called from selinux_cred_free()
because selinux_cred_free() is not expecting cred-&gt;security == NULL.  This does
not affect smack_cred_free(), tomoyo_cred_free() or apparmor_cred_free().

Fix these bugs by

(1) Set new-&gt;magic before calling security_cred_alloc_blank().

(2) Handle null cred-&gt;security in creds_are_invalid() and selinux_cred_free().

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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