linux/fs/sysfs, branch v3.12.2

Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs

2013-09-07T21:36:57Z

Pull vfs pile 2 (of many) from Al Viro: "Mostly Miklos' series this time" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: constify dcache.c inlined helpers where possible fuse: drop dentry on failed revalidate fuse: clean up return in fuse_dentry_revalidate() fuse: use d_materialise_unique() sysfs: use check_submounts_and_drop() nfs: use check_submounts_and_drop() gfs2: use check_submounts_and_drop() afs: use check_submounts_and_drop() vfs: check unlinked ancestors before mount vfs: check submounts and drop atomically vfs: add d_walk() vfs: restructure d_genocide()

Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace

2013-09-07T21:35:32Z

Pull namespace changes from Eric Biederman: "This is an assorted mishmash of small cleanups, enhancements and bug fixes. The major theme is user namespace mount restrictions. nsown_capable is killed as it encourages not thinking about details that need to be considered. A very hard to hit pid namespace exiting bug was finally tracked and fixed. A couple of cleanups to the basic namespace infrastructure. Finally there is an enhancement that makes per user namespace capabilities usable as capabilities, and an enhancement that allows the per userns root to nice other processes in the user namespace" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: userns: Kill nsown_capable it makes the wrong thing easy capabilities: allow nice if we are privileged pidns: Don't have unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) imply CLONE_THREAD userns: Allow PR_CAPBSET_DROP in a user namespace. namespaces: Simplify copy_namespaces so it is clear what is going on. pidns: Fix hang in zap_pid_ns_processes by sending a potentially extra wakeup sysfs: Restrict mounting sysfs userns: Better restrictions on when proc and sysfs can be mounted vfs: Don't copy mount bind mounts of /proc//ns/mnt between namespaces kernel/nsproxy.c: Improving a snippet of code. proc: Restrict mounting the proc filesystem vfs: Lock in place mounts from more privileged users

sysfs: use check_submounts_and_drop()

2013-09-05T20:23:53Z

Do have_submounts(), shrink_dcache_parent() and d_drop() atomically. check_submounts_and_drop() can deal with negative dentries and non-directories as well. Non-directories can also be mounted on. And just like directories we don't want these to disappear with invalidation. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Al Viro

sysfs: Restrict mounting sysfs

2013-08-29T04:35:14Z

Don't allow mounting sysfs unless the caller has CAP_SYS_ADMIN rights over the net namespace. The principle here is if you create or have capabilities over it you can mount it, otherwise you get to live with what other people have mounted. Instead of testing this with a straight forward ns_capable call, perform this check the long and torturous way with kobject helpers, this keeps direct knowledge of namespaces out of sysfs, and preserves the existing sysfs abstractions. Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman"

userns: Better restrictions on when proc and sysfs can be mounted

2013-08-27T02:17:03Z

Rely on the fact that another flavor of the filesystem is already mounted and do not rely on state in the user namespace. Verify that the mounted filesystem is not covered in any significant way. I would love to verify that the previously mounted filesystem has no mounts on top but there are at least the directories /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc and /sys/fs/cgroup/ that exist explicitly for other filesystems to mount on top of. Refactor the test into a function named fs_fully_visible and call that function from the mount routines of proc and sysfs. This makes this test local to the filesystems involved and the results current of when the mounts take place, removing a weird threading of the user namespace, the mount namespace and the filesystems themselves. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman"

sysfs: group.c: fix up kerneldoc

2013-08-22T16:23:28Z

Fix up the wording of sysfs_create/remove_groups() a bit. Reported-by: Anthony Foiani Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

sysfs: sysfs.h: fix coding style issues

2013-08-21T23:40:05Z

This fixes up the remaining coding style issues in sysfs.h Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

sysfs: file.c: fix up broken string warnings

2013-08-21T23:37:42Z

This fixes the coding style warnings in fs/sysfs/file.c for broken strings across lines. Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

sysfs: dir.c: fix up odd do/while indentation

2013-08-21T23:36:02Z

This fixes up the odd do/while after an if statement warning in dir.c Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

sysfs: fix up uaccess.h coding style warnings

2013-08-21T23:34:59Z

This fixes the uaccess.h warnings in the sysfs.c files. Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman