<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux/fs/ecryptfs, branch v3.2.2</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<id>https://git.amat.us/linux/atom/fs/ecryptfs?h=v3.2.2</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/atom/fs/ecryptfs?h=v3.2.2'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/'/>
<updated>2011-11-23T21:43:53Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: Extend array bounds for all filename chars</title>
<updated>2011-11-23T21:43:53Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tyler Hicks</name>
<email>tyhicks@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-11-23T17:31:24Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=0f751e641a71157aa584c2a2e22fda52b52b8a56'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0f751e641a71157aa584c2a2e22fda52b52b8a56</id>
<content type='text'>
From mhalcrow's original commit message:

    Characters with ASCII values greater than the size of
    filename_rev_map[] are valid filename characters.
    ecryptfs_decode_from_filename() will access kernel memory beyond
    that array, and ecryptfs_parse_tag_70_packet() will then decrypt
    those characters. The attacker, using the FNEK of the crafted file,
    can then re-encrypt the characters to reveal the kernel memory past
    the end of the filename_rev_map[] array. I expect low security
    impact since this array is statically allocated in the text area,
    and the amount of memory past the array that is accessible is
    limited by the largest possible ASCII filename character.

This patch solves the issue reported by mhalcrow but with an
implementation suggested by Linus to simply extend the length of
filename_rev_map[] to 256. Characters greater than 0x7A are mapped to
0x00, which is how invalid characters less than 0x7A were previously
being handled.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Reported-by: Michael Halcrow &lt;mhalcrow@google.com&gt;
Cc: stable@kernel.org
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: Flush file in vma close</title>
<updated>2011-11-23T21:40:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tyler Hicks</name>
<email>tyhicks@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-11-21T23:31:29Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=32001d6fe9ac6b0423e674a3093aa56740849f3b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:32001d6fe9ac6b0423e674a3093aa56740849f3b</id>
<content type='text'>
Dirty pages weren't being written back when an mmap'ed eCryptfs file was
closed before the mapping was unmapped. Since f_ops-&gt;flush() is not
called by the munmap() path, the lower file was simply being released.
This patch flushes the eCryptfs file in the vm_ops-&gt;close() path.

https://launchpad.net/bugs/870326

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: stable@kernel.org [2.6.39+]
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: Prevent file create race condition</title>
<updated>2011-11-23T21:39:38Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tyler Hicks</name>
<email>tyhicks@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-11-21T23:31:02Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=b59db43ad4434519feb338eacb01d77eb50825c5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b59db43ad4434519feb338eacb01d77eb50825c5</id>
<content type='text'>
The file creation path prematurely called d_instantiate() and
unlock_new_inode() before the eCryptfs inode info was fully
allocated and initialized and before the eCryptfs metadata was written
to the lower file.

This could result in race conditions in subsequent file and inode
operations leading to unexpected error conditions or a null pointer
dereference while attempting to use the unallocated memory.

https://launchpad.net/bugs/813146

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: stable@kernel.org
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>filesystems: add set_nlink()</title>
<updated>2011-11-02T11:53:43Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Miklos Szeredi</name>
<email>mszeredi@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2011-10-28T12:13:29Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=bfe8684869601dacfcb2cd69ef8cfd9045f62170'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bfe8684869601dacfcb2cd69ef8cfd9045f62170</id>
<content type='text'>
Replace remaining direct i_nlink updates with a new set_nlink()
updater function.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@suse.cz&gt;
Tested-by: Toshiyuki Okajima &lt;toshi.okajima@jp.fujitsu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>treewide: use __printf not __attribute__((format(printf,...)))</title>
<updated>2011-11-01T00:30:54Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Joe Perches</name>
<email>joe@perches.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-11-01T00:11:33Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=b9075fa968a0a4347aef35e235e2995c0e57dddd'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b9075fa968a0a4347aef35e235e2995c0e57dddd</id>
<content type='text'>
Standardize the style for compiler based printf format verification.
Standardized the location of __printf too.

Done via script and a little typing.

$ grep -rPl --include=*.[ch] -w "__attribute__" * | \
  grep -vP "^(tools|scripts|include/linux/compiler-gcc.h)" | \
  xargs perl -n -i -e 'local $/; while (&lt;&gt;) { s/\b__attribute__\s*\(\s*\(\s*format\s*\(\s*printf\s*,\s*(.+)\s*,\s*(.+)\s*\)\s*\)\s*\)/__printf($1, $2)/g ; print; }'

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: revert arch bits]
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches &lt;joe@perches.com&gt;
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" &lt;kirill@shutemov.name&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Ecryptfs: Add mount option to check uid of device being mounted = expect uid</title>
<updated>2011-08-10T04:29:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-07-22T15:14:15Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=764355487ea220fdc2faf128d577d7f679b91f97'/>
<id>urn:sha1:764355487ea220fdc2faf128d577d7f679b91f97</id>
<content type='text'>
Close a TOCTOU race for mounts done via ecryptfs-mount-private.  The mount
source (device) can be raced when the ownership test is done in userspace.
Provide Ecryptfs a means to force the uid check at mount time.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: Fix payload_len unitialized variable warning</title>
<updated>2011-08-09T18:42:46Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tyler Hicks</name>
<email>tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-08-05T09:15:19Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=99b373ff2d1246f64b97a3d449a2fd6018d504e6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:99b373ff2d1246f64b97a3d449a2fd6018d504e6</id>
<content type='text'>
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c: In function ‘ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set’:
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:1991:28: warning: ‘payload_len’ may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wuninitialized]
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c:1976:9: note: ‘payload_len’ was declared here

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: fix compile error</title>
<updated>2011-08-09T18:42:46Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@polito.it</email>
</author>
<published>2011-08-01T11:33:38Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=4b6fee17b1758391281ddf5b00328035573f8be1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4b6fee17b1758391281ddf5b00328035573f8be1</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch fixes the compile error reported at the address:

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=40292

The problem arises when compiling eCryptfs as built-in and the 'encrypted'
key type as a module. The patch prevents this combination from being set in
the kernel configuration, by fixing the eCryptfs dependencies.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@polito.it&gt;
Reported-by: David Hill &lt;hilld@binarystorm.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>eCryptfs: Return error when lower file pointer is NULL</title>
<updated>2011-08-09T18:42:45Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tyler Hicks</name>
<email>tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-08-05T03:58:51Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=f61500e000eedc0c7a0201200a7f00ba5529c002'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f61500e000eedc0c7a0201200a7f00ba5529c002</id>
<content type='text'>
When an eCryptfs inode's lower file has been closed, and the pointer has
been set to NULL, return an error when trying to do a lower read or
write rather than calling BUG().

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=37292

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ecryptfs: Make inode bdi consistent with superblock bdi</title>
<updated>2011-07-29T04:48:26Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thieu Le</name>
<email>thieule@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2011-07-26T23:15:10Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=985ca0e626e195ea08a1a82b8dbeb6719747429a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:985ca0e626e195ea08a1a82b8dbeb6719747429a</id>
<content type='text'>
Make the inode mapping bdi consistent with the superblock bdi so that
dirty pages are flushed properly.

Signed-off-by: Thieu Le &lt;thieule@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt; [2.6.39+]
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
