linux/crypto, branch v3.7-rc2

Merge branch 'modules-next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux

2012-10-14T20:39:34Z

Pull module signing support from Rusty Russell: "module signing is the highlight, but it's an all-over David Howells frenzy..." Hmm "Magrathea: Glacier signing key". Somebody has been reading too much HHGTTG. * 'modules-next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux: (37 commits) X.509: Fix indefinite length element skip error handling X.509: Convert some printk calls to pr_devel asymmetric keys: fix printk format warning MODSIGN: Fix 32-bit overflow in X.509 certificate validity date checking MODSIGN: Make mrproper should remove generated files. MODSIGN: Use utf8 strings in signer's name in autogenerated X.509 certs MODSIGN: Use the same digest for the autogen key sig as for the module sig MODSIGN: Sign modules during the build process MODSIGN: Provide a script for generating a key ID from an X.509 cert MODSIGN: Implement module signature checking MODSIGN: Provide module signing public keys to the kernel MODSIGN: Automatically generate module signing keys if missing MODSIGN: Provide Kconfig options MODSIGN: Provide gitignore and make clean rules for extra files MODSIGN: Add FIPS policy module: signature checking hook X.509: Add a crypto key parser for binary (DER) X.509 certificates MPILIB: Provide a function to read raw data into an MPI X.509: Add an ASN.1 decoder X.509: Add simple ASN.1 grammar compiler ...

Merge tag 'md-3.7' of git://neil.brown.name/md

2012-10-13T20:22:01Z

Pull md updates from NeilBrown: - "discard" support, some dm-raid improvements and other assorted bits and pieces. * tag 'md-3.7' of git://neil.brown.name/md: (29 commits) md: refine reporting of resync/reshape delays. md/raid5: be careful not to resize_stripes too big. md: make sure manual changes to recovery checkpoint are saved. md/raid10: use correct limit variable md: writing to sync_action should clear the read-auto state. Subject: [PATCH] md:change resync_mismatches to atomic64_t to avoid races md/raid5: make sure to_read and to_write never go negative. md: When RAID5 is dirty, force reconstruct-write instead of read-modify-write. md/raid5: protect debug message against NULL derefernce. md/raid5: add some missing locking in handle_failed_stripe. MD: raid5 avoid unnecessary zero page for trim MD: raid5 trim support md/bitmap:Don't use IS_ERR to judge alloc_page(). md/raid1: Don't release reference to device while handling read error. raid: replace list_for_each_continue_rcu with new interface add further __init annotations to crypto/xor.c DM RAID: Fix for "sync" directive ineffectiveness DM RAID: Fix comparison of index and quantity for "rebuild" parameter DM RAID: Add rebuild capability for RAID10 DM RAID: Move 'rebuild' checking code to its own function ...

add further __init annotations to crypto/xor.c

2012-10-11T02:42:32Z

Allow particularly do_xor_speed() to be discarded post-init. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Signed-off-by: NeilBrown

X.509: Convert some printk calls to pr_devel

2012-10-10T09:36:38Z

Some debugging printk() calls should've been converted to pr_devel() calls. Do that now. Signed-off-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell

asymmetric keys: fix printk format warning

2012-10-10T09:36:38Z

Fix printk format warning in x509_cert_parser.c: crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c: In function 'x509_note_OID': crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:113:3: warning: format '%zu' expects type 'size_t', but argument 2 has type 'long unsigned int' Builds cleanly on i386 and x86_64. Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap Cc: David Howells Cc: Herbert Xu Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell

MODSIGN: Fix 32-bit overflow in X.509 certificate validity date checking

2012-10-10T09:36:37Z

The current choice of lifetime for the autogenerated X.509 of 100 years, putting the validTo date in 2112, causes problems on 32-bit systems where a 32-bit time_t wraps in 2106. 64-bit x86_64 systems seem to be unaffected. This can result in something like: Loading module verification certificates X.509: Cert 6e03943da0f3b015ba6ed7f5e0cac4fe48680994 has expired MODSIGN: Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (-127) Or: X.509: Cert 6e03943da0f3b015ba6ed7f5e0cac4fe48680994 is not yet valid MODSIGN: Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (-129) Instead of turning the dates into time_t values and comparing, turn the system clock and the ASN.1 dates into tm structs and compare those piecemeal instead. Reported-by: Rusty Russell Signed-off-by: David Howells Acked-by: Josh Boyer Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell

X.509: Add a crypto key parser for binary (DER) X.509 certificates

2012-10-08T03:20:22Z

Add a crypto key parser for binary (DER) encoded X.509 certificates. The certificate is parsed and, if possible, the signature is verified. An X.509 key can be added like this: # keyctl padd crypto bar @s Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell

RSA: Fix signature verification for shorter signatures

2012-10-08T03:20:17Z

gpg can produce a signature file where length of signature is less than the modulus size because the amount of space an MPI takes up is kept as low as possible by discarding leading zeros. This regularly happens for several modules during the build. Fix it by relaxing check in RSA verification code. Thanks to Tomas Mraz and Miloslav Trmac for help. Signed-off-by: Milan Broz Signed-off-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell

RSA: Implement signature verification algorithm [PKCS#1 / RFC3447]

2012-10-08T03:20:16Z

Implement RSA public key cryptography [PKCS#1 / RFC3447]. At this time, only the signature verification algorithm is supported. This uses the asymmetric public key subtype to hold its key data. Signed-off-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell

KEYS: Provide signature verification with an asymmetric key

2012-10-08T03:20:15Z

Provide signature verification using an asymmetric-type key to indicate the public key to be used. The API is a single function that can be found in crypto/public_key.h: int verify_signature(const struct key *key, const struct public_key_signature *sig) The first argument is the appropriate key to be used and the second argument is the parsed signature data: struct public_key_signature { u8 *digest; u16 digest_size; enum pkey_hash_algo pkey_hash_algo : 8; union { MPI mpi[2]; struct { MPI s; /* m^d mod n */ } rsa; struct { MPI r; MPI s; } dsa; }; }; This should be filled in prior to calling the function. The hash algorithm should already have been called and the hash finalised and the output should be in a buffer pointed to by the 'digest' member. Any extra data to be added to the hash by the hash format (eg. PGP) should have been added by the caller prior to finalising the hash. It is assumed that the signature is made up of a number of MPI values. If an algorithm becomes available for which this is not the case, the above structure will have to change. It is also assumed that it will have been checked that the signature algorithm matches the key algorithm. Signed-off-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell