<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux, branch v3.14.6</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<id>https://git.amat.us/linux/atom/?h=v3.14.6</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/atom/?h=v3.14.6'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/'/>
<updated>2014-06-07T20:24:43Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Linux 3.14.6</title>
<updated>2014-06-07T20:24:43Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-06-07T20:24:43Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=a1bc295d7a4be9425bbeecc005d0cd013eb46cea'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a1bc295d7a4be9425bbeecc005d0cd013eb46cea</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>futex: Make lookup_pi_state more robust</title>
<updated>2014-06-07T17:28:29Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2014-06-03T12:27:08Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=b1f9d594668d008cacd5679cfde675dcdb9f5f8f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b1f9d594668d008cacd5679cfde675dcdb9f5f8f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 54a217887a7b658e2650c3feff22756ab80c7339 upstream.

The current implementation of lookup_pi_state has ambigous handling of
the TID value 0 in the user space futex.  We can get into the kernel
even if the TID value is 0, because either there is a stale waiters bit
or the owner died bit is set or we are called from the requeue_pi path
or from user space just for fun.

The current code avoids an explicit sanity check for pid = 0 in case
that kernel internal state (waiters) are found for the user space
address.  This can lead to state leakage and worse under some
circumstances.

Handle the cases explicit:

       Waiter | pi_state | pi-&gt;owner | uTID      | uODIED | ?

  [1]  NULL   | ---      | ---       | 0         | 0/1    | Valid
  [2]  NULL   | ---      | ---       | &gt;0        | 0/1    | Valid

  [3]  Found  | NULL     | --        | Any       | 0/1    | Invalid

  [4]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | 0         | 1      | Valid
  [5]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | &gt;0        | 1      | Invalid

  [6]  Found  | Found    | task      | 0         | 1      | Valid

  [7]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | Any       | 0      | Invalid

  [8]  Found  | Found    | task      | ==taskTID | 0/1    | Valid
  [9]  Found  | Found    | task      | 0         | 0      | Invalid
  [10] Found  | Found    | task      | !=taskTID | 0/1    | Invalid

 [1] Indicates that the kernel can acquire the futex atomically. We
     came came here due to a stale FUTEX_WAITERS/FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit.

 [2] Valid, if TID does not belong to a kernel thread. If no matching
     thread is found then it indicates that the owner TID has died.

 [3] Invalid. The waiter is queued on a non PI futex

 [4] Valid state after exit_robust_list(), which sets the user space
     value to FUTEX_WAITERS | FUTEX_OWNER_DIED.

 [5] The user space value got manipulated between exit_robust_list()
     and exit_pi_state_list()

 [6] Valid state after exit_pi_state_list() which sets the new owner in
     the pi_state but cannot access the user space value.

 [7] pi_state-&gt;owner can only be NULL when the OWNER_DIED bit is set.

 [8] Owner and user space value match

 [9] There is no transient state which sets the user space TID to 0
     except exit_robust_list(), but this is indicated by the
     FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit. See [4]

[10] There is no transient state which leaves owner and user space
     TID out of sync.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Will Drewry &lt;wad@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Darren Hart &lt;dvhart@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>futex: Always cleanup owner tid in unlock_pi</title>
<updated>2014-06-07T17:28:29Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2014-06-03T12:27:07Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=19040c57ac6f39a6940c7c266bb80cee113d3a18'/>
<id>urn:sha1:19040c57ac6f39a6940c7c266bb80cee113d3a18</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 13fbca4c6ecd96ec1a1cfa2e4f2ce191fe928a5e upstream.

If the owner died bit is set at futex_unlock_pi, we currently do not
cleanup the user space futex.  So the owner TID of the current owner
(the unlocker) persists.  That's observable inconsistant state,
especially when the ownership of the pi state got transferred.

Clean it up unconditionally.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Will Drewry &lt;wad@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Darren Hart &lt;dvhart@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>futex: Validate atomic acquisition in futex_lock_pi_atomic()</title>
<updated>2014-06-07T17:28:29Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2014-06-03T12:27:06Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=cae300d1bd7c591602725520aec185cc81d49547'/>
<id>urn:sha1:cae300d1bd7c591602725520aec185cc81d49547</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b3eaa9fc5cd0a4d74b18f6b8dc617aeaf1873270 upstream.

We need to protect the atomic acquisition in the kernel against rogue
user space which sets the user space futex to 0, so the kernel side
acquisition succeeds while there is existing state in the kernel
associated to the real owner.

Verify whether the futex has waiters associated with kernel state.  If
it has, return -EINVAL.  The state is corrupted already, so no point in
cleaning it up.  Subsequent calls will fail as well.  Not our problem.

[ tglx: Use futex_top_waiter() and explain why we do not need to try
  	restoring the already corrupted user space state. ]

Signed-off-by: Darren Hart &lt;dvhart@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Will Drewry &lt;wad@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>futex-prevent-requeue-pi-on-same-futex.patch futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_requeue(..., requeue_pi=1)</title>
<updated>2014-06-07T17:28:29Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2014-06-03T12:27:06Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=1ab0607b48fdcbac787b073f845f2ef529d4e936'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1ab0607b48fdcbac787b073f845f2ef529d4e936</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e9c243a5a6de0be8e584c604d353412584b592f8 upstream.

If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing from
a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call.  If we attempt this, then
dangling pointers may be left for rt_waiter resulting in an exploitable
condition.

This change brings futex_requeue() in line with futex_wait_requeue_pi()
which performs the same check as per commit 6f7b0a2a5c0f ("futex: Forbid
uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi()")

[ tglx: Compare the resulting keys as well, as uaddrs might be
  	different depending on the mapping ]

Fixes CVE-2014-3153.

Reported-by: Pinkie Pie
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry &lt;wad@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart &lt;dvhart@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: use cpu_online_mask when using forced irq_set_affinity</title>
<updated>2014-06-07T17:28:29Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Sudeep Holla</name>
<email>sudeep.holla@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-05-09T16:37:44Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=3e32c277e17b859738f0d38a2e609ad926554ee9'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3e32c277e17b859738f0d38a2e609ad926554ee9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 601c942176d8ad8334118bddb747e3720bed24f8 upstream.

Commit 01f8fa4f01d8("genirq: Allow forcing cpu affinity of interrupts")
enabled the forced irq_set_affinity which previously refused to route an
interrupt to an offline cpu.

Commit ffde1de64012("irqchip: Gic: Support forced affinity setting")
implements this force logic and disables the cpu online check for GIC
interrupt controller.

When __cpu_disable calls migrate_irqs, it disables the current cpu in
cpu_online_mask and uses forced irq_set_affinity to migrate the IRQs
away from the cpu but passes affinity mask with the cpu being offlined
also included in it.

When calling irq_set_affinity with force == true in a cpu hotplug path,
the caller must ensure that the cpu being offlined is not present in the
affinity mask or it may be selected as the target CPU, leading to the
interrupt not being migrated.

This patch uses cpu_online_mask when using forced irq_set_affinity so
that the IRQs are properly migrated away.

Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla &lt;sudeep.holla@arm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>media: V4L2: fix VIDIOC_CREATE_BUFS in 64- / 32-bit compatibility mode</title>
<updated>2014-06-07T17:28:29Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Guennadi Liakhovetski</name>
<email>g.liakhovetski@gmx.de</email>
</author>
<published>2014-04-26T15:51:31Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=3372ac6f0c1617a381f8a69ff1e7cc2e6751bdd3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3372ac6f0c1617a381f8a69ff1e7cc2e6751bdd3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 97d9d23dda6f37d90aefeec4ed619d52df525382 upstream.

If a struct contains 64-bit fields, it is aligned on 64-bit boundaries
within containing structs in 64-bit compilations. This is the case with
struct v4l2_window, which contains pointers and is embedded into struct
v4l2_format, and that one is embedded into struct v4l2_create_buffers.
Unlike some other structs, used as a part of the kernel ABI as ioctl()
arguments, that are packed, these structs aren't packed. This isn't a
problem per se, but the ioctl-compat code for VIDIOC_CREATE_BUFS contains
a bug, that triggers in such 64-bit builds. That code wrongly assumes,
that in struct v4l2_create_buffers, struct v4l2_format immediately follows
the __u32 memory field, which in fact isn't the case. This bug wasn't
visible until now, because until recently hardly any applications used
this ioctl() and mostly embedded 32-bit only drivers implemented it. This
is changing now with addition of this ioctl() to some USB drivers, e.g.
UVC. This patch fixes the bug by copying parts of struct
v4l2_create_buffers separately.

Signed-off-by: Guennadi Liakhovetski &lt;g.liakhovetski@gmx.de&gt;
Acked-by: Laurent Pinchart &lt;laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab &lt;m.chehab@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>media: V4L2: ov7670: fix a wrong index, potentially Oopsing the kernel from user-space</title>
<updated>2014-06-07T17:28:28Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Guennadi Liakhovetski</name>
<email>g.liakhovetski@gmx.de</email>
</author>
<published>2014-04-14T13:49:34Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=d0c47e5d003514bef6b7be36a49a4c87058a732a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d0c47e5d003514bef6b7be36a49a4c87058a732a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit cfece5857ca51d1dcdb157017aba226f594e9dcf upstream.

Commit 75e2bdad8901a0b599e01a96229be922eef1e488 "ov7670: allow
configuration of image size, clock speed, and I/O method" uses a wrong
index to iterate an array. Apart from being wrong, it also uses an
unchecked value from user-space, which can cause access to unmapped
memory in the kernel, triggered by a normal desktop user with rights to
use V4L2 devices.

Signed-off-by: Guennadi Liakhovetski &lt;g.liakhovetski@gmx.de&gt;
Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab &lt;m.chehab@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>iwlwifi: mvm: rs: clear per rate stats when aggregation changes</title>
<updated>2014-06-07T17:28:28Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eyal Shapira</name>
<email>eyal@wizery.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-06-04T18:58:01Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=ca4a4d64a7b1c0d08067622c02ec6a276a4ebf7c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ca4a4d64a7b1c0d08067622c02ec6a276a4ebf7c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b804eeb6649d75caeccbeae9f5623fc7b8bdfdfa upstream.

The per rate stats should be cleared when aggregation state changes
to avoid making rate scale decisions based on throughput figures which
were collected prior to the aggregation state change and are now stale.
While at it make sure any clearing of the per rate stats will get logged.

Signed-off-by: Eyal Shapira &lt;eyalx.shapira@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach &lt;emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>iwlwifi: add rs_rate_scale_clear_tbl_windows helper function</title>
<updated>2014-06-07T17:28:28Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eliad Peller</name>
<email>eliad@wizery.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-06-04T18:58:00Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=424048eb3ff12c2b8da830cb8827d5bec136f515'/>
<id>urn:sha1:424048eb3ff12c2b8da830cb8827d5bec136f515</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3ca71f603bb1a0f55e1ba24618ba45617bc36f70 upstream.

instead of duplicating the same loop multiple times,
use a new function for it.

this will be later used also for clearing other
windows in the table.

Signed-off-by: Eliad Peller &lt;eliadx.peller@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach &lt;emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
