linux, branch v2.6.33.10

Linux 2.6.33.10

2011-04-14T23:53:30Z

xfs: zero proper structure size for geometry calls

2011-04-14T23:53:16Z

commit af24ee9ea8d532e16883251a6684dfa1be8eec29 upstream. Commit 493f3358cb289ccf716c5a14fa5bb52ab75943e5 added this call to xfs_fs_geometry() in order to avoid passing kernel stack data back to user space: + memset(geo, 0, sizeof(*geo)); Unfortunately, one of the callers of that function passes the address of a smaller data type, cast to fit the type that xfs_fs_geometry() requires. As a result, this can happen: Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: f87aca93 Pid: 262, comm: xfs_fsr Not tainted 2.6.38-rc6-493f3358cb2+ #1 Call Trace: [] ? panic+0x50/0x150 [] ? __stack_chk_fail+0x10/0x18 [] ? xfs_ioc_fsgeometry_v1+0x56/0x5d [xfs] Fix this by fixing that one caller to pass the right type and then copy out the subset it is interested in. Note: This patch is an alternative to one originally proposed by Eric Sandeen. Reported-by: Jeffrey Hundstad Signed-off-by: Alex Elder Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen Tested-by: Jeffrey Hundstad Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: fix rds_iovec page count overflow

2011-04-14T23:53:15Z

commit 1b1f693d7ad6d193862dcb1118540a030c5e761f upstream. As reported by Thomas Pollet, the rdma page counting can overflow. We get the rdma sizes in 64-bit unsigned entities, but then limit it to UINT_MAX bytes and shift them down to pages (so with a possible "+1" for an unaligned address). So each individual page count fits comfortably in an 'unsigned int' (not even close to overflowing into signed), but as they are added up, they might end up resulting in a signed return value. Which would be wrong. Catch the case of tot_pages turning negative, and return the appropriate error code. Reported-by: Thomas Pollet Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Andy Grover Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

exec: copy-and-paste the fixes into compat_do_execve() paths

2011-04-14T23:53:15Z

commit 114279be2120a916e8a04feeb2ac976a10016f2f upstream. Note: this patch targets 2.6.37 and tries to be as simple as possible. That is why it adds more copy-and-paste horror into fs/compat.c and uglifies fs/exec.c, this will be cleanuped later. compat_copy_strings() plays with bprm->vma/mm directly and thus has two problems: it lacks the RLIMIT_STACK check and argv/envp memory is not visible to oom killer. Export acct_arg_size() and get_arg_page(), change compat_copy_strings() to use get_arg_page(), change compat_do_execve() to do acct_arg_size(0) as do_execve() does. Add the fatal_signal_pending/cond_resched checks into compat_count() and compat_copy_strings(), this matches the code in fs/exec.c and certainly makes sense. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

exec: make argv/envp memory visible to oom-killer

2011-04-14T23:53:15Z

commit 3c77f845722158206a7209c45ccddc264d19319c upstream. Brad Spengler published a local memory-allocation DoS that evades the OOM-killer (though not the virtual memory RLIMIT): http://www.grsecurity.net/~spender/64bit_dos.c execve()->copy_strings() can allocate a lot of memory, but this is not visible to oom-killer, nobody can see the nascent bprm->mm and take it into account. With this patch get_arg_page() increments current's MM_ANONPAGES counter every time we allocate the new page for argv/envp. When do_execve() succeds or fails, we change this counter back. Technically this is not 100% correct, we can't know if the new page is swapped out and turn MM_ANONPAGES into MM_SWAPENTS, but I don't think this really matters and everything becomes correct once exec changes ->mm or fails. Reported-by: Brad Spengler Reviewed-and-discussed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

CAN: Use inode instead of kernel address for /proc file

2011-04-14T23:53:14Z

commit 9f260e0efa4766e56d0ac14f1aeea6ee5eb8fe83 upstream. Since the socket address is just being used as a unique identifier, its inode number is an alternative that does not leak potentially sensitive information. CC-ing stable because MITRE has assigned CVE-2010-4565 to the issue. Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

irda: prevent integer underflow in IRLMP_ENUMDEVICES

2011-04-14T23:53:14Z

commit fdac1e0697356ac212259f2147aa60c72e334861 upstream. If the user-provided len is less than the expected offset, the IRLMP_ENUMDEVICES getsockopt will do a copy_to_user() with a very large size value. While this isn't be a security issue on x86 because it will get caught by the access_ok() check, it may leak large amounts of kernel heap on other architectures. In any event, this patch fixes it. Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

econet: Fix crash in aun_incoming().

2011-04-14T23:53:13Z

commit 4e085e76cbe558b79b54cbab772f61185879bc64 upstream. Unconditional use of skb->dev won't work here, try to fetch the econet device via skb_dst()->dev instead. Suggested by Eric Dumazet. Reported-by: Nelson Elhage Tested-by: Nelson Elhage Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff [jmm: Slightly adapted for 2.6.32] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

inet_diag: Make sure we actually run the same bytecode we audited.

2011-04-14T23:53:13Z

commit 22e76c849d505d87c5ecf3d3e6742a65f0ff4860 upstream. We were using nlmsg_find_attr() to look up the bytecode by attribute when auditing, but then just using the first attribute when actually running bytecode. So, if we received a message with two attribute elements, where only the second had type INET_DIAG_REQ_BYTECODE, we would validate and run different bytecode strings. Fix this by consistently using nlmsg_find_attr everywhere. Signed-off-by: Nelson Elhage Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: tipc: fix information leak to userland

2011-04-14T23:53:13Z

commit 88f8a5e3e7defccd3925cabb1ee4d3994e5cdb52 upstream. Structure sockaddr_tipc is copied to userland with padding bytes after "id" field in union field "name" unitialized. It leads to leaking of contents of kernel stack memory. We have to initialize them to zero. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman