<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux, branch v2.6.17.5</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<id>https://git.amat.us/linux/atom/?h=v2.6.17.5</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/atom/?h=v2.6.17.5'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/'/>
<updated>2006-07-15T02:38:43Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Linux 2.6.17.5</title>
<updated>2006-07-15T02:38:43Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2006-07-15T02:38:43Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=79146daf9736143f28e21c76964918e9a1151fe7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:79146daf9736143f28e21c76964918e9a1151fe7</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] Fix nasty /proc vulnerability (CVE-2006-3626)</title>
<updated>2006-07-15T02:35:20Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@osdl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2006-07-14T23:59:02Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=4a7ac3ab06932949d3069c1811f6f2a310f656c4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4a7ac3ab06932949d3069c1811f6f2a310f656c4</id>
<content type='text'>
Fix nasty /proc vulnerability

We have a bad interaction with both the kernel and user space being able
to change some of the /proc file status.  This fixes the most obvious
part of it, but I expect we'll also make it harder for users to modify
even their "own" files in /proc.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Linux 2.6.17.4</title>
<updated>2006-07-06T20:02:28Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2006-07-06T20:02:28Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=4f9619cdd90ac846fa0ca6e9e8a9d87a0d6b4f57'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4f9619cdd90ac846fa0ca6e9e8a9d87a0d6b4f57</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fix prctl privilege escalation and suid_dumpable (CVE-2006-2451)</title>
<updated>2006-07-06T20:02:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2006-07-06T20:02:05Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=0af184bb9f80edfbb94de46cb52e9592e5a547b0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0af184bb9f80edfbb94de46cb52e9592e5a547b0</id>
<content type='text'>
Based on a patch from Ernie Petrides

During security research, Red Hat discovered a behavioral flaw in core
dump handling. A local user could create a program that would cause a
core file to be dumped into a directory they would not normally have
permissions to write to. This could lead to a denial of service (disk
consumption), or allow the local user to gain root privileges.

Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Linux 2.6.17.3</title>
<updated>2006-06-30T17:37:38Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Chris Wright</name>
<email>chrisw@sous-sol.org</email>
</author>
<published>2006-06-30T17:37:38Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=52cbb7b78994ea3799f1bbb8c03bce1e2f72a271'/>
<id>urn:sha1:52cbb7b78994ea3799f1bbb8c03bce1e2f72a271</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] NETFILTER: SCTP conntrack: fix crash triggered by packet without chunks [CVE-2006-2934]</title>
<updated>2006-06-30T17:37:31Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Patrick McHardy</name>
<email>kaber@trash.net</email>
</author>
<published>2006-06-30T03:33:12Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=9c48e1ea8cf8800cc5e2d39ccbb8b5ff9704f8e9'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9c48e1ea8cf8800cc5e2d39ccbb8b5ff9704f8e9</id>
<content type='text'>
When a packet without any chunks is received, the newconntrack variable
in sctp_packet contains an out of bounds value that is used to look up an
pointer from the array of timeouts, which is then dereferenced, resulting
in a crash. Make sure at least a single chunk is present.

Problem noticed by George A. Theall &lt;theall@tenablesecurity.com&gt;

Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy &lt;kaber@trash.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Linux 2.6.17.2</title>
<updated>2006-06-30T00:17:23Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Chris Wright</name>
<email>chrisw@sous-sol.org</email>
</author>
<published>2006-06-30T00:17:23Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=27162bf76c8e1d20f81ba53c356ca8681aa90461'/>
<id>urn:sha1:27162bf76c8e1d20f81ba53c356ca8681aa90461</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] Input: return correct size when reading modalias attribute</title>
<updated>2006-06-30T00:17:17Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Purdie</name>
<email>rpurdie@rpsys.net</email>
</author>
<published>2006-06-27T05:25:35Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=988bc3337ebc15c7c6078d3263b0599bc744d693'/>
<id>urn:sha1:988bc3337ebc15c7c6078d3263b0599bc744d693</id>
<content type='text'>
Input: return correct size when reading modalias attribute

Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie &lt;rpurdie@rpsys.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov &lt;dtor@mail.ru&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] idr: fix race in idr code</title>
<updated>2006-06-30T00:17:17Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Sonny Rao</name>
<email>sonny@burdell.org</email>
</author>
<published>2006-06-25T12:49:34Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=26992852dde78e6acc9a9b2bdc9e734428e34d65'/>
<id>urn:sha1:26992852dde78e6acc9a9b2bdc9e734428e34d65</id>
<content type='text'>
From: Sonny Rao &lt;sonny@burdell.org&gt;

I ran into a bug where the kernel died in the idr code:

cpu 0x1d: Vector: 300 (Data Access) at [c000000b7096f710]
    pc: c0000000001f8984: .idr_get_new_above_int+0x140/0x330
    lr: c0000000001f89b4: .idr_get_new_above_int+0x170/0x330
    sp: c000000b7096f990
   msr: 800000000000b032
   dar: 0
 dsisr: 40010000
  current = 0xc000000b70d43830
  paca    = 0xc000000000556900
    pid   = 2022, comm = hwup
1d:mon&gt; t
[c000000b7096f990] c0000000000d2ad8 .expand_files+0x2e8/0x364 (unreliable)
[c000000b7096faa0] c0000000001f8bf8 .idr_get_new_above+0x18/0x68
[c000000b7096fb20] c00000000002a054 .init_new_context+0x5c/0xf0
[c000000b7096fbc0] c000000000049dc8 .copy_process+0x91c/0x1404
[c000000b7096fcd0] c00000000004a988 .do_fork+0xd8/0x224
[c000000b7096fdc0] c00000000000ebdc .sys_clone+0x5c/0x74
[c000000b7096fe30] c000000000008950 .ppc_clone+0x8/0xc
-- Exception: c00 (System Call) at 000000000fde887c
SP (f8b4e7a0) is in userspace

Turned out to be a race-condition and NULL ptr deref, here's my fix:

Users of the idr code are supposed to call idr_pre_get without locking, so the
idr code must serialize itself with respect to layer allocations.  However, it
fails to do so in an error path in idr_get_new_above_int().  I added the
missing locking to fix this.

Signed-off-by: Sonny Rao &lt;sonny@burdell.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] Link error when futexes are disabled on 64bit architectures</title>
<updated>2006-06-30T00:17:17Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Anton Blanchard</name>
<email>anton@samba.org</email>
</author>
<published>2006-06-25T12:48:44Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=c4389daed17fb3d6ec54f2759e2705c268828899'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c4389daed17fb3d6ec54f2759e2705c268828899</id>
<content type='text'>
From: Anton Blanchard &lt;anton@samba.org&gt;

If futexes are disabled we fail to link on ppc64.

Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard &lt;anton@samba.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright &lt;chrisw@sous-sol.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
