<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux, branch v2.6.14.1</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<id>https://git.amat.us/linux/atom/?h=v2.6.14.1</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/atom/?h=v2.6.14.1'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/'/>
<updated>2005-11-08T19:22:55Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Linux 2.6.14.1</title>
<updated>2005-11-08T19:22:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2005-11-08T19:22:55Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=93b188a95f1da119769a1165086b7d2912603470'/>
<id>urn:sha1:93b188a95f1da119769a1165086b7d2912603470</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] CVE-2005-2709 sysctl unregistration oops</title>
<updated>2005-11-08T19:14:00Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2005-11-08T15:03:46Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=e4e0411221c7d4f2bd82fa5e21745f927a1bff28'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e4e0411221c7d4f2bd82fa5e21745f927a1bff28</id>
<content type='text'>
You could open the /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/&lt;if&gt;/&lt;whatever&gt; file, then
wait for interface to go away, try to grab as much memory as possible in
hope to hit the (kfreed) ctl_table.  Then fill it with pointers to your
function. Then do read from file you've opened and if you are lucky,
you'll get it called as -&gt;proc_handler() in kernel mode.

So this is at least an Oops and possibly more.  It does depend on an
interface going away though, so less of a security risk than it would
otherwise be.

Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Linux v2.6.14</title>
<updated>2005-10-28T00:02:08Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@g5.osdl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2005-10-28T00:02:08Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=741b2252a5e14d6c60a913c77a6099abe73a854a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:741b2252a5e14d6c60a913c77a6099abe73a854a</id>
<content type='text'>
"Better late than never"
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge master.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/acme/net-2.6</title>
<updated>2005-10-27T23:58:20Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@g5.osdl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2005-10-27T23:58:20Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=cdada08eb26e7cc57bb423e51e6e70fd5450a0b5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:cdada08eb26e7cc57bb423e51e6e70fd5450a0b5</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] cpufreq: SMP fix for conservative governor</title>
<updated>2005-10-27T23:29:24Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dave Jones</name>
<email>davej@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2005-10-27T23:16:25Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=927321440976d0781a252eefe686ae6b0f236ae2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:927321440976d0781a252eefe686ae6b0f236ae2</id>
<content type='text'>
Don't try to access not-present CPUs.  Conservative governor will always
oops on SMP without this fix.

Fixes http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4781

Signed-off-by: Venkatesh Pallipadi &lt;venkatesh.pallipadi@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Jones &lt;davej@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@osdl.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "x86-64: Avoid unnecessary double bouncing for swiotlb"</title>
<updated>2005-10-27T23:28:39Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@g5.osdl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2005-10-27T23:28:39Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=79b95a454bb5c1d9b7287d1016a70885ba3f346c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:79b95a454bb5c1d9b7287d1016a70885ba3f346c</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit id 6142891a0c0209c91aa4a98f725de0d6e2ed4918

Andi Kleen reports that it seems to break things for some people,
and since it's purely a small optimization, revert it for now.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[TCP]: Clear stale pred_flags when snd_wnd changes</title>
<updated>2005-10-27T17:11:04Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2005-10-27T08:47:46Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=2ad41065d9fe518759b695fc2640cf9c07261dd2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2ad41065d9fe518759b695fc2640cf9c07261dd2</id>
<content type='text'>
This bug is responsible for causing the infamous "Treason uncloaked"
messages that's been popping up everywhere since the printk was added.
It has usually been blamed on foreign operating systems.  However,
some of those reports implicate Linux as both systems are running
Linux or the TCP connection is going across the loopback interface.

In fact, there really is a bug in the Linux TCP header prediction code
that's been there since at least 2.1.8.  This bug was tracked down with
help from Dale Blount.

The effect of this bug ranges from harmless "Treason uncloaked"
messages to hung/aborted TCP connections.  The details of the bug
and fix is as follows.

When snd_wnd is updated, we only update pred_flags if
tcp_fast_path_check succeeds.  When it fails (for example,
when our rcvbuf is used up), we will leave pred_flags with
an out-of-date snd_wnd value.

When the out-of-date pred_flags happens to match the next incoming
packet we will again hit the fast path and use the current snd_wnd
which will be wrong.

In the case of the treason messages, it just happens that the snd_wnd
cached in pred_flags is zero while tp-&gt;snd_wnd is non-zero.  Therefore
when a zero-window packet comes in we incorrectly conclude that the
window is non-zero.

In fact if the peer continues to send us zero-window pure ACKs we
will continue making the same mistake.  It's only when the peer
transmits a zero-window packet with data attached that we get a
chance to snap out of it.  This is what triggers the treason
message at the next retransmit timeout.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@mandriva.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] Yet more posix-cpu-timer fixes</title>
<updated>2005-10-27T16:08:43Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Roland McGrath</name>
<email>roland@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2005-10-27T10:16:42Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=72ab373a5688a78cbdaf3bf96012e597d5399bb7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:72ab373a5688a78cbdaf3bf96012e597d5399bb7</id>
<content type='text'>
This just makes sure that a thread's expiry times can't get reset after
it clears them in do_exit.

This is what allowed us to re-introduce the stricter BUG_ON() check in
a362f463a6d316d14daed0f817e151835ce97ff7.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "remove false BUG_ON() from run_posix_cpu_timers()"</title>
<updated>2005-10-27T16:07:33Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@g5.osdl.org</email>
</author>
<published>2005-10-27T16:07:33Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=a362f463a6d316d14daed0f817e151835ce97ff7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a362f463a6d316d14daed0f817e151835ce97ff7</id>
<content type='text'>
This reverts commit 3de463c7d9d58f8cf3395268230cb20a4c15bffa.

Roland has another patch that allows us to leave the BUG_ON() in place
by just making sure that the condition it tests for really is always
true.

That goes in next.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>[PATCH] Fix cpu timers expiration time</title>
<updated>2005-10-26T22:21:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleg Nesterov</name>
<email>oleg@tv-sign.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2005-10-26T16:26:53Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.amat.us/linux/commit/?id=7a4ed937aa44acdeb8c6ba671509dc7b54b09d3a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7a4ed937aa44acdeb8c6ba671509dc7b54b09d3a</id>
<content type='text'>
There's a silly off-by-one error in the code that updates the expiration
of posix CPU timers, causing them to not be properly updated when they
hit exactly on their expiration time (which should be the normal case).

This causes them to then fire immediately again, and only _then_ get
properly updated.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@osdl.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
